Cognitive dissonance
 

Try looking it up. It goes like this.

Pilots are human and make mistakes. I am a pilot. If I make a mistake people will die. Including me. That cant be right. >> Denial >> pilots are always right and never make mistakes....

Simple psychology. But if this is you, then don't fly. Its pretty unhealrhy.

Air travel is pretty safe these days, thanks to a combination of pilots (better and worse) and computers (more reliable than many pilots).

Air Asia captain... pulls the circuit breakers on the flight computer... FlyDubai, 12 seconds nose down trim (just ease off on the thrust, dude), KLM no clearance to take off. Pilots make errors, one could list hundreds if not thousands.

This guy made a mistake and thankfully got away with it. I care little what the report will say...

Trying to keep an open mind

might the pilot judge from initial cabin reports that it was only a tailpipe fire and as such continued to operate the rh engine in idle with reversers stowed to blow the fire straight back?

Under this scenario (absent any decent facts) the cabin crew would not have put passengers out the slides.

decisions decisions vs timing and then there is hindsight

Blindly following a SOP without thinking is dangerous. The best reason for having a human instead of a machine execute a NNCL is that the human can intelligently decide based on available information when a step is (and is not) a good idea.

Case in point: QF32. One very busy FO was actioning ECAM messages - one of which instructed the transfer of fuel between wings to balance the aircraft. Had his hand reaching up to the cross-feed valves when de Crespigny stopped him. Not a great idea to transfer good fuel to a wing that's leaking it as fast as it could be pumped (in the short-term anyway) - even though normally it's the logical thing to do.

Lets wait until we have the same information the SIA crew had before reaching our own conclusions. Lets call it a professional courtesy.

Sorry to be the one doing this but is there a point of keeping this thread open (while locking down many others)?

If (big if) the Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore (AAIB) commes up with an informed report it will be time to review this topic... Until then I guess it has become the proverbial hamsterwhell

lomapaseo Looking at the videos, from the start of flames to the wing being engulfed seems too short a time for a report of 'small fire' to reach the FD and then be followed by further information. It turned into 'big fire' very rapidly.

PAX boy. Rapid fire is most likely and (my theory) extinguished just as rapidly.
Singapore is RFF 10
Any " fire fighters" input on the time required to extinguish a fire like this?

When the fire department practice fire drills at the airport on the fire trainer fuselage it seems a minute passes only before extinguishing the practice fire assuming zero additional fuel sources. Ie tank ruptured.

What if the fire was reported (from fire tender one) "under control" within a minute? My guess and speculation .
A Shorter time than completing the evacuation checklist.
What then?

nose,cabin I was referring to this by lomapaseo:
That is: A warning call from the cabin would have been overtaken by the rapidity of the fire. If they needed to call to say 'there is a tailpipe fire' by the time they were speaking to them, the fire would have been fully established and their report uprated.

It is possible that the flow of warnings to the FC from tower, fire truck and cabin arrived close on top of each other. How they were handled - and acted upon - would depend upon the sequence of answering by the three flight crew. (We know it was at least three due to the length of the sector.) Only the voice and data recorders can answer that clearly, for the flight crew's own memories of the event may not be in sequence - as we know from other events.

Is the one month-report a legal obligation as far as accident investigation is concerned or it can be omitted like in the case of MS804? If it must be published then we are only a few days away from some probably unseen info.

Considering that it appears to be nearly black outside during the landing, the glare from the fire bouncing off the terrain and through the cockpit windows must have given the scope of the fire away to the crew in the front office.

Not quite that simple...
 

I believe the SOP says don't pump fuel if a leak is suspected. Something that Air Transat 236 failed to spot. Luckily they had some gliding skill at the pointy end.

Try watching the video!
 

The rff do not arrive and pump until over a minute after wheels stop (I acknowledge that is a fast time). A minute later, the fire is in no way under control (everyone would be out by that time if an evac was called). It took another 2 mins to control the fire. So 3 mins after pumping started, 4 mins after wheels stopped, and about 5 mins after touchdown (they reported 6 in the Singapore press, we can't tell the time of the rollout from the video).

The point I am making is why guess that the fire might have been in control within a minute when we have hard, video evidence that is certainly was not?

The tower could certainly see what the video captured (I am talking about the one shot from afar by a malaysian speaking ground staff) but the rff were driving in the opposite direction for the first 30-40 seconds, and so could not see it. The cc and pax clearly could see it.

By the way, the darkness on some videos is an exposure effect inside the AC vs the huge flare outside. At the time the ac landed, it was not pitch black. This can be judged by the distant video. It was 20 mins before sunrise (07.06), and it pops up in an instant here on the equator. Best described as half-light at the time of landing. Like a grey day in the UK.

Why this thread should stay open
 

The reason I believe this thread has, and should, stay open is this.

In the absence of a report that says the fc made an error of judgement, it is encumbent upon the "evac evac evac" (majority i believe) to persuade the fence sitters that it was an error.

Doing so might save some lives. Tomorrow. Or the next day.

Yes, with all the caveats. Evac LHS and check for hazards first (trust the cc training). In this case, there is clear evidence a LHS evac would have been safe. Staying onboard endangered the lives of pax and crew.

Fire
(they reported 6 minutes in the Singapore press)

If the press are correct it is a "no brainer" to evacuate as you write.
That seems a very long time.
If 6 minutes after touchdown (is correct) to get the fire "under control " with a fire like that, they are very lucky indeed.
Why did they not evacuate.?

My initial reaction was obvious , " no brainer" to evacuate.

The aircraft landed (guessing) flap15 VRef 170 knot MLW 240 tons approx landing distance say over 2000 meters no heavy braking. (A guess).
This landing roll would take 40 seconds say while burning wing is being photographed.

I expect the tech., Crew were informed by tower immediately, and engine fire warning, the cabin crew call (perhaps )was answered after PARK BRAKE set.

My guess , Captain calls for EVACUATION checklist after setting park brake.
Initial PA "cabin crew at stations" ( SOP)

This evacuation checklist is practiced by all crew repeatedly in simulator License renewals worldwide.

A cabin video shows entertainment screens illuminated in the cabin, IFE was still powered by AC bus, hence the engine or APU, still running, hence evacuation checklist was not completed. At that time.

Why not? it was a "no brainer" as we agree.

All I can think of is the efficiency of the fire trucks do get the fire "extinguished " or "under control" in a very short time. Less than time required to complete the evacuation checklist , hard to believe for sure. 6 minutes is too long.

This needs to be discussed as it could easily happen to anyone on any evacuation in future.

See USA threads re sacking a captain.
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...vacuation.html

How important is this area if "fire crew " do call off the evacuation ?
Have the fire services confirmed and accepted full responsibility for the aircraft?

The wing fuel tank ( I guess.) 20 tons of fuel and is possibly weakened by heat. I would not trust the FIre services, "under control " report, because too many passengers lives in danger and no legislation to protect and recognize this call from fire services. Have they been licensed to make this important decision?.

It is overdue time for the worlds' regulators and airlines flight operations management , to show some leadership.
They need to make a directive immediately.

I hope this is not viewed by some, as "wild speculation" after all this is a forum to read and think. And learn !

Julio747 - What unbelievable arrogance, the assumption that you are right and everyone who disagrees with you is wrong. So far the photo/video evidence is completely unreliable and you most certainly do NOT have any clear evidence that a LHS evacuation would have been safe. I don't want you in command of any aircraft my family or I are on.

Don't feed the troll.

I've never know thought power to be regulated.

So in other words - like many SOPs - it's not a "no-brainer". And that humans do in fact need to use their brains for somewhat of a "sanity check" before executing items?

Need for regulations
Allegiant argues that Nevada does not have a public policy prohibiting termination of at-will employment based on compliance or non-compliance with FARs.

Allegiant also made some arguments based on the Airline Deregulation Act, which was not very convincing.

Unfortunately for us spectators, there have been no further info from on what actually happened that fateful day.

At this point, the arguments from both sides have lots of holes in them.

The Captain's lawyers want the case to be remanded back to Nevada state court and/or decided under Nevada labor laws. Allegiant's lawyers want the case dismissed, or failing that, for the case stay in the U.S. district court and be decided under preempting Federal laws.

The PIC really needs to think which of those two scenarios they'd rather be justifying at an inquest .

It's the combustion byproducts (CO, HCL...) that can incapacitate in seconds. Demise from inhaling toxic fumes generally precedes combustion.

The real question in considering evacuation is less the state of the fire 90 seconds from now than the survivability of the cabin atmosphere 90 seconds from now.

"Under Control"
: Fire or spill etc. is no longer spreading. The situation is contained. This term should not be confused with a report that the fire is extinguished.

I thank God that julio wasnt the capt on that plane.

I want Julio on that plane if I was on it.

I fail to see why a fire that big was not enough to evacuate

Staying on the aircraft with doors closed is playing a very bad hand.

Playing with the lives of all on board.

If there were fatalities I wonder how many would say it was the right call to stay put and not evac soon as the wheels stopped rolling and brakes set and engines off.

I would not want to stay on a burning plane.

Would you honestly if you were onboard?

Lots of comments, please let me reply
 

@ nose cabin
Good question! Why were the lights out but the IFE still working? Engines still on is my best guess. But why?

@ parabellum
Arrogance or decisiveness? A fine line. But i question your assertion that photo & video evidence is unreliable! Really?? Is your head in the sand?

@ gatbusdriver
I hope you are not put in the same situation.

@ speedbird
Totally agree. I expect that. There is a brain between SOP and action. I like to think so.

@ sqrew
Oh, so a few bruises from the slide is better than the alternative? You must be a gambling man.... Bravo!

@ armchairpilot
Thanks for the vote of confidence!

The lights out is an easy one. Many airlines put out cabin lights prior to landing with the apparent intention of ensuring that night vision is available to evacuating pax. They then ruin it by allowing pax to use overhead lights and personal electronics. Most of the flights I have been on recently the window seat pax shut the blinds on arrival at the seat and it is kept firmly shut till the flight attendants suggest that those that may be open are shut 'to keep the aircraft cool'. I doubt if anyone would have noticed a wing fire in most of my recent flights.

I think it's important to point out that the FD crew don't have the benefit of hindsight; they can only make the best call that they can with the info they have available.

For all we know they might have had reason to THINK fuel was pooling under the aircraft (regardless of whether it was or wasn't) and thus may have felt that in that situation they were better off to sit tight until rescue services were in a better position to protect them if they evacuated into it.

Who knows? THEY DO - We don't. And it's not fair to judge them until we do.

FACT.....you do not know what information these guys were privy to before making their decision (or not as the case may be). You can use words like surely or they must have, but the fact is you do not know. What did the crew tell them? What did ATC tell them? ARFF? Did they use the GMCS? Was it even working? What cautions/ warnings were they getting? Just a few of the things I would be interested in knowing.

Until information is leaked or a report is out detailing everything from the start of the failure to the point the passengers disembarked i will refrain from stating my opinion as fact. When that information is released I will hopefully be able to learn from it.

I agree that I hope I never find myself in that position, but I also hope that if I were to find myself in that position my training and experience would stand the test and leave me alive to read the 36 pages of guaranteed drivel/opinions that will appear on PPRuNe written by armchair experts who really have no idea what went on in the flight deck that day (I know that's a little unfair as there are some very informative posts by some).

I am not defending their course of action/inaction, I just don't see how you can judge with absolutely certainty until you are aware of......here comes those words again........all the facts.

Regards,

GBD

Julio747 - No, my head is not in the sand but I do think you are blustering ahead with insufficient knowledge of the facts and are making some very rash, some would say dangerous, claims and statements of your probable actions.


For instance, are you aware of the construction of the top layer of asphalt on modern runways? Are you aware that the top layer is deliberately porous to allow the draining away of surface water, through a myriad of tiny tunnels? (A technique invented and developed in The Netherlands, also Singapore University has done some work on this subject, which involves the mixing of tyre rubber with tarmac to achieve the porous effect).


The fact that you can't see a shimmering pool of fuel under the aircraft doesn't mean it isn't there, if present it would be just below the surface and just as flammable.

So if kids call parents to say forest fire reached one side of the house, but other sides are good, should one say, "Don't leave the house, our city FD is top class, and fire chief is very competent".

Get over it. Irrespective of what story SAAIB writes 4 years from now, this incident showed different side of SQ and CAG.

They can release information what they have to change my opinion. Until then they stand incompetent.

"For all we know they might have had reason to THINK fuel was pooling under the aircraft....."

Wouldnt given the knowledge of pooling fuel under the aircraft combined with a known fire give impetus to the "Lets get the f%$^# off this aeroplane" argument.

The assumption in the stay onboard argument is that the RFF WILL SUCCEED. As anyone who has been involved in fire fighting knows, it is not until you are standing around eating sandwiches after the fact that you can say with any certainty that the fire is under control.

Now that we tap into the delicacies of runway construction - how do you physically explain your pool of fuel on the crown of a monsoon zone runway which is sloped towards its edges? Fuel gushing from wing tanks so forcefully it creeps up-crown from where to drain to port?

777's port slides clearly reach into the left half of the runway, don't they.

Let's wait for some facts, right? How long?

Actually you picked an unfortunate example that disproves your point. Forest fires can move faster than you can run or drive. The radiant heat from the fire front will kill you if you are outside.

From https://www.dfes.wa.gov.au/safetyinf...ushfire.aspx#2This information will increase your chances of survival:

• Stay in the house when the fire front is passing, this usually takes five to fifteen minutes. You need to actively defend while sheltering

"The fact that you can't see a shimmering pool of fuel under the aircraft doesn't mean it isn't there"

There was a blazing fire on the wing.

How could they have established if the runway had fuel on it? Would that have made the evacuation more or less urgent? How could they decide? How long would all this have taken?

Your comment is seriously over-complicating this, and over-estimating the number of variables any crew could reliably deal with.

The only had time to deal with the actual known problem "wing on fire".

They didn't deal with it.

http://www.mot.gov.sg/About-MOT/Air-...gation-Report/

Do they have something like a Preliminary to satisfy us somewhat?

It's always nice to know at least where the source of the leak was and wait later for the Why's

Again the same for the crew actions and only later for the in-actions why's

I will admit that if some of the key questions might be unique to this accident only, then there might be a longer wait in many states-of-occurance and registry

Sounds odd but at least house owner has an options, but SQ pax don't have self evac option with 90 lbs guarding the exits and federal laws dictate pax follow crew instructions.

Heat Transfer
 

While we are waiting for some factual news from the Singapore investigation, would anyone else like to comment on the significance of the three, now Whitish color, hand hole access plates on the underside of the aircraft wing outboard of the starboard engine pylon?

To me, it looks like they got much hotter than the adjacent wing skin, but I have not had opportunity to get up close and personal with them. Suppose they had melted through. Would that have made things more interesting?

I am fully conversant with runway design, my friend. And I have viewed every comment, every video, and every photograph on this thread.

The "after the event" shots (and I can't be bothered to find them in the thread for you) are crystal clear. After the event: LHS not a drop of foam...ergo????

So you can hypothesise all you want. But it didn't happen.

If they opened the LH doors, and said, ooh, not sure about that. I may have a different view. But they did not.

They hung on and crossed their fingers. The cc were traumatised to see the fire, and perplexed as to why they were not given an evac command. Let alone the pax....

But hey, let's try to blur the issue with runway design.... Dohhh...

30 tonnes of fuel under a raging fire..... Get the hell out is my view.

I find it hard to believe that when you land and your engine and wing burst into flames that you should wait for the Fire Chief to tell you what you should do.

Machinbird:
The 3 white access panels you see are impact resistant and of a different spec to the outer normal panels.I'd imagine if you could see inboard of the pylon, the panels there would look similar as they too are all impact resistant.
They are not hand holes as such, people can and do get into them to gain entry into the fuel tanks.

Thanks for that Tinny. I'm reading the whitish surface as burnt paint, so that would indicate a multi surface component that does not have fuel in direct contact with the external surface at that location, thus minimal heat sink effect from the fuel load.
I had wondered about that. Thanks.

Machinbird, as Whinging pointed out, those are fuel tank access panels - rather large since a human has to be able to fit through. On the British Airtours 737 fire 30 years ago, an uncontained piece of the engine (part of a burner can) impacted one of those fuel tank access panel. The panel shattered (cast aluminum), resulting an a massive fuel leak onto an engine that had a hole in the burner (whoops).
One of the changes due to that accident is that now all fuel access panels that are within the engine 'burst zone' need to be impact resistant. On the 737 this was done by going to forged aluminum (instead of cast). I'm not sure what they use on the 777 but if I had to guess I'd say they are also forged aluminum.

To change topic slightly, I'm curious about the firefighting aspect of this.

From the videos, the fire is on the underside of the wing, doesn't appear to have spread to the ground. So the flammable fluid must be coating the wing.

The foam is being sprayed horizontally. It seems like the thin wing would give a narrow "target", meaning the foam would have to hit the leading or trailing edges else it just shoots past parallel to the flaming surface and wouldn't have much effect.

It seems like it would be easier to attack the a at an angle to the surface on fire, eg if the hose nozzle were closer to the ground aimed upwards. Then the foam/fluid spray can spread out across the surface as it were, getting more effect per unit of time/fluid.

Obviously they got the fire out so it worked. I'm just curious if anyone knowledgeable can speak to how they attack this kind of fire.

Ref post #716,

here is the preliminary report:

Cheers