So, is it really a case of full 'power' and pull back as hard as you can with the aircraft figuring out the rest?

I would imagine a lot of the seat covers on the LHS of the A330 as well as seats 0A and 0B on the A320 needed their covers changing after that event.

I'm going to make a big assumption here. The A320 got airborne. Both cockpit members probably soiled their underwear shortly before, during and after the event. There would have been an exchange of radio calls and certainly a discussion between them. All the time the CVR would have been running. I'll bet they landed at wherever and the thought of popping the C/B for the CVR never went through their minds. After 30 minutes or two hours (the most likely CVR durations) the most pertinent data would have been over-written.

I don't recall any protections active in ground mode. At that stage, it's pure aerodynamics. Full back stick at low speed, is likely to scrape the tail, and may or may not result in the a/c becoming airborne. Just like a Boeing.

But when airborne, with protections available, yes, that will absolutely do the trick!

As another poster pointed out, there are no TOGA buttons on an Airbus. There is only one way to 'self select' TOGA power. That is to firewall the thrust levers. (The a/c does of course have it's own method of selecting TOGA power, should certain airborne protections be triggered!)

It’s an interesting scenario that I suspect quite a few of us have thought about away from the aeroplane. Many busy airfields regularly cross traffic over active runways so it’s something that is familiar but that rarely goes wrong in such a spectacular fashion.

If you’re on the runway, at what point do you recognise that someone is going to infringe rather than hold short, being used to aircraft doing the latter? There is a short window available for a very big decision and it has to be done mostly on feel because there is no time for any sort of calculation, especially as there isn’t much data to put into it at that instant.

An initial analysis shows that they *might* have been able to stop but there are a lot of inherent assumptions about the timing of the reject decision and how well the RTO would have been handled in the circumstances. Well over 100kts and coming up on V1 you are eating runway up at quite a rate. Steer onto the grass if you think you’re going to collide? Depends on what else is on the surrounding taxiways, as you’re effectively going to lose control at that point.

It’s a horrible decision to have to make but it needs to be made. Nothing was broken in this case so it was de-facto at least adequate. Optimal? Who can say, given the amount of variables at play...

Lots of fields in that part of the world have those deep storm drains in the verges, go through one of those with enough momentum and anything could happen I would think...lose the gear, rupture a fuel tank.

Never worked TWR but it sounds like either the 330 crew didn't comply with a hold short instruction they read back, in which case they're in doo doo, or they didn't read it back, in which case they and the controller are both in doo doo.

Probably a stupid question but do you guys have SOPS to check left and right before crossing a runway? If the 320 saw the 330 then the 330 should have seen the 320 right? I mean you're going to notice a 320 near V1 right?

Triple yes. :sad:

On this occasion it looks like the A320 crew had two good options and chose one of them. CAAC calculated that they could have stopped in time, which was one option - and it is self evident that the option they took was also a good option.

Assuming 110 knots, that is 56 metres per second - that doesn't buy you much thinking time before your stopping margin just went negative - less than 4 seconds could have taken you from 2 good options to no good options.

Hats off to the quick actions of the crew

Almost a repeat of the outcome of Tenerife, but not of course a repeat of the circumstances. Lest we forget, at Tenerife there was no 'incursion'; the Pan Am 747 was backtracking on the runway with ATC clearance; the fog was so thick that the KL captain, when he initiated takeoff without clearance, couldn't see a 747 backtracking towards him. In the present incident the weather was CAVOK and everyone could see everyone else if they were looking; the A330 captain would only have had to glance out of the window.

No, it was the A330's CVR that was overwritten. It had already landed and was taxying to the gate when the incident occurred.

It is awesome easy for the armchair quarterbacks to tell us what we, "Should have done".

And no-one has brought up the question of "why didn't they extend the flaps a little more?" ;) I guess Chuck Y was home that day.

For CAAC to publish their stopping calculation is of dubious value. Are they suggesting that stopping was OK, or that it was so close to disaster that GO as the correct decision? In what context were they saying they could have stopped 200m short? That is assuming no burst tyres or worn brakes; and assuming the WFT moment didn't case hesitation/disbelief which allowed 200m to disappear in a blink.

Good job; everyone lives to fight another day. Has anyone put the crews in touch with the lawyers at Dublin handling the ambulance case? :)

One of my first Chiefs told me, "As a surgeon you will have to learn to make quick decisions. And if they are correct then so much the better."

I suppose the point being "Don't dither!". For ANY decision is likely to be better than no decision.

Can't stand ditherers m'self.

Seems like this crew made the Go/No go decision in time - good for them.

Tell me again about the remotely-piloted airliners of the future.....

Tell me again about the remotely-piloted airliners of the future.....

That would be the one that would not have infringed the runway in the first place, either by remote control, or because it would not cross the stop bar, automatically; because nothing can go wrong.....go wrong......go wrong........

Does anyone look out the window these days or is it common practise just to blindly do what we are told?

Many years ago - 1971 to be exact I was a student controller in Sydney tower when the following incident/accident took place: https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19710129-1. between a TAA (Trans Australian Airlines) B727-100 and a Canadian Pacific Airlines (CPA) DC-8 62 occurred. Many years later (around 2010 I think) I was the Aerodrome Controller for RWY 07R at Hong Kong (CLK) International airport. I had just cleared an A330 for take-off from twy J1 and as the departing aircraft started it's takeoff roll, an inbound freighter B747 on TWY J5 was approaching the RWY J5 holding point at speed. Simultaneously the crosser called me and I said "Confirm holding short of RWY 07R" (as he Crossed the stop bar). My next transmission was to the now rolling A330, "Stop immediately, I say again Hold position". The A330 then had to vacate via J4 and taxi back to terminal due brake temps. As an extra result, the 8 odd aircraft awaiting departure on TWY's J and H were each delayed whilst a RWY inspection took place. So what can I say, but as a tower instructor for many years in HK, I endeavored to stress to my students to "look out the window"....I wonder how many do?
PS if my link to TAA/CPA doesn't work, you may like to Google the event. It's well worthwhile.Bedder believe me

Bedder believeit - the report is well worth the read.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24753/197101202.pdf

bradandwhitney
It wasnt PVG...it was SHA.

That's kind of what I was wondering reading this, about the A330 crew. I was taught (in single engine stuff) to always look, never assume that crossing runway/taxiway is clear.

I don't mean that critically, wonder about the stuff I miss too, and had an interesting humbling example of that just this weekend.

Fortunately in this case at least two people were watching... good on 'em.

No, the A330 was cleared to cross. So it would have crossed the stop bar, automatically.