Stator Vane: 100%. The FMA tells you what the AFDS doing via FD or autopilot. The basic performance instruments tell you what the a/c is doing. Which is more important? Today's trained monkeys have not been taught the basics of a/c performance and aerodynamic performance and interpreting a scan. It is not their fault.

If you have the automatics on, the FMA is only way you know what they are doing. This includes the thrust. If you don't want to read the FMA that's fine, but make sure the automatic stuff is turned off first.

Is there any indication that the number of GAs have increased since the introduction of RAAS as suggested might happen in #1525 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9507678.

Would any increase in GAs influence management's balance of safety benefit vs operating cost.

Has RAAS been overly promoted by Boeing to offset Airbus' ROPS, which is a true predictive system when airborne, and provides positive advice on the ground.

don, do read the ASAGA report #1560

I don't know if things have improved or not, but the RAAS was somewhat inaccurate when I was using it. It would often warn of approaching a runway only after you were past the holding point & actually on the runway. Not much help then. If it is still that inaccurate, perhaps the warning this flight crew received was not entirely appropriate.

As part of your daily departure briefing ensure that you include the instruction to utterly ignore any callout from the RAAS except for "on taxiway" and "altimeter setting".

If this causes a summons for tea and biscuits enjoy them to the utmost as a professional aviator, positioned high above the drones who have summoned you.

That is why the ground based systems will directly provide the wind data to the FMS, that way, the system can compare and validate what the winds are for the system to use.
There are already several systems that do this though the IFE bandwidth.

One would think that as RAAS becomes more common, even in B737NG a/c, the training of manoeuvres in response to the cautions will need to be reviewed carefully. I have no knowledge of the system, but if it can generate a "long landing' caution, even after touchdown, and if the SOP is to reject the landing, then this manoeuvre needs to be trained, surely. In today's environment trained often = an SOP. Currently the rejected landing is an FCTM manoeuvre. Many airlines have a single GA SOP. However, there are multitude of reasons to make a GA where a single SOP is not appropriate.

1. ATC Go Round when above MAA. This s not really a GA but an abandoned approach. If in APP mode this would cause many crews much confusion how to achieve it wth automatics; and it may well be that the best method is to disconnect then reconnect in basic mode and reselect what is necessary. I'm sure it is untrained in TR's. Perhaps some recurrency might include it, but I never saw it. System knowledge was the key.
2. GA anywhere between MAA & DA. You might be in APP mode or only LOC. Again a moment of pause then act. No rush.
3. GA at DA. Straight forward, often rushed, and the SOP kicks in. Trained.
4. Wave Off below DA. SOP GA. You may touchdown, but continue. Trained.
5. Heavy bounced landing. GA, but be careful and gentle as you are VERY close to the ground. Not trained. SOP might work, but wth some finesse. What guidance is given, if any?
6. Rejected landing after touchdown. GA SOP not appropriate. Not trained (uncommon)

Now if RAAS is fitted it could give a warning in Nos. 5 & 6. To certify crews to fly with RAAS is there a training program to give crews experience of the difference in GA technique to the standard, or is it just a self-study technical toy that has been added with written instructions of what to do but not how?
What are your experiences of training to use this system for airborne caution/warnings?

RAT, RAAS should only give a Long Landing alert in the air; see http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/58438...ml#post9507540
The concern, the effect of an apparent alert on the ground, which may apply in this accident (and probably is what you implied) is that a 'valid' RAAS alert could be given in the air, and where SOPs demand a GA it requires a late non-standard version of the GA procedure, however, by the time (short time) TOGA is selected the automatic TOGA function is no longer available as the aircraft is effectively on the ground (<2ft) which requires a completely different rejected landing procedure. (#1525) Confusing, yes ?

The position accuracy comments are interesting; presumable such errors are function of the GPS performance and/or system input (see previous comments on GPS Nav input vs internal GPS from EGPWS).

RAAS is a very good safety concept, but one wonders if it has been pushed a bit too far for landing performance due to system accuracy, aircraft installation/FGS interface, and how it is used (choice of SOP).

From the Honeywell EGPWS manual, page 111
my red.
The second point implies both weight on wheel signal need to be false to inhibit the RAAS Long Landing alert.

Preliminary report, factual information.

0837:17 Right main touchdown
0837:19 RAAS "Long Landing Long Landing"
0837:20 Left main Gear touchdown
0837:23 Aircraft airborne again.

The next question is when is TOGA disabled? Are both WoW inputs required to inhibit it, or just one? Was TOGA pressed & when in the timeline? Is there a small window of opportunity for RAAS still being enabled, whilst TOGA is simultaneously inhibited?

"The preliminary report on the Aug. 3 crash landing of an Emirates Airline Boeing 777-300 at Dubai International Airport stated that the aircraft attempted a go-around after initially touching down briefly.

All 300 passengers and crew escaped as the aircraft burst into flames, but an airport firefighter was killed when the aircraft’s center fuel tank exploded as he fought the blaze after the aircraft came to a rest. The aircraft was destroyed, marking the first hull loss for Emirates.

The preliminary report, published by the United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority, is purely factual and does not attempt any analysis of the reasons for the crash. That will follow when the final report is published.

The preliminary report stated the aircraft was reaching the end of its flight from Trivandrum International Airport in southern India and was on approach to Dubai’s runway 12L. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the co-pilot was the pilot monitoring (PM).

As the flight neared Dubai, it received a warning from the automatic terminal information service of wind shear conditions affecting all runways.

As the aircraft descended through 1,100 ft. at 152 kts. indicated airspeed (IAS), the headwind of 8 kts. changed to a tailwind. The autopilot was disengaged at approximately 920 ft. and the approach continued with autothrottle connected. As the aircraft descended through 700 ft., the tailwind gradually increased to 16 kts.

The PF began to flare the aircraft—the landing step that follows final approach—at 35 ft. and 159 kts. IAS. The autothrottle transitioned to idle and both thrust levers moved towards the idle position. At 160 kts. IAS— 5 ft. above the runway and five seconds before touchdown—the wind direction again started to change to a headwind.

The right main landing gear touched down approximately 1,100 meters from the runway 12L threshold at 162 kts. IAS, followed three seconds later by the left main landing gear. The nose landing gear remained in the air.

Two seconds later, the aircraft’s runway awareness advisory system (RAAS) triggered a “long landing, long landing” warning and, four seconds later, the aircraft became airborne again in an attempt to go around.

A few seconds later the undercarriage began to retract. The aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 85 ft. at 134 kts. IAS, with the landing gear still retracting, when it began to drop back onto the runway.

According to the report, both pilots recalled seeing the IAS decreasing and the co-pilot called out “check speed.” Three seconds before impact with the runway, both thrust levers were moved from the idle position to full forward.

One second before impact, both engines started to respond, but the aircraft’s aft fuselage hit the runway, with a nose-up pitch angle of 9.5 degrees, and at a rate of descent of 900 ft. per minute. The engine nacelles then hit the runway.

As the aircraft slid along the runway, the No. 2 engine-pylon assembly separated from the right hand wing and an intense fuel fire began at the engine-pylon wing attachment area. Subsequently, another fire began on the underside of the No. 1 engine.

The PF transmitted a Mayday call and advised that the aircraft was being evacuated. The first airport fire service vehicle arrived within one minute of the aircraft coming to a stop and began spraying foam, with other vehicles arriving shortly afterward.

Apart from the firefighter who died, 21 passengers, one pilot and one cabin crew member sustained minor injuries. Another cabin crew member was more seriously injured and hospitalized for five days with smoke inhalation."

UAE: Emirates 777 touched down long, then attempted go-around | Safety content from ATWOnline

At least in airbus SOP all these situations are clearly spelt out. But if pilots are not taught to slam the thrust levers to the limit and to immediately check FMA then incidents can happen. There are at least three incidents on record where pilot nursed the thrust levers short of TOGA and followed short sighted company procedure of not checking FMA immediately reaching in one case 14 feet AAL in poor visibility. What to and how to both are important.

CT, an intriguing analysis (#1573).
The logic given is according to Honeywell, but the precise integration and configuration for the 777 is not known.
It would be unusual to use a single switch, the RAAS description of 'WoW' is more likely to be a generic input term. The aircraft output would have be chosen by Boeing, which probably involves at least both main wheels. Some aircraft use a 'two out of three' logic to provide additional integrity for WoW or specific systems' selection.
It is even feasible that the 777 RAAS installation chose a logic which provided RAAS alerts until all wheels are on the ground, and perhaps with pilot reaction time, represents the last chance of a rejected landing. I think that is is too much to suppose and it would further complicate the contradictions and confusion with SOPs and TOGA.

The primary inhibition on the RAAS alert appears to be 'less than 5ft', but this is not necessarily supported by the FDR. However, without knowledge of the FDR update rate for an assumed 'low priority' advisory RAAS parameter (~4 sec?) there is no certainty.
Also, it would be unusual to consider WoW as a backup for loss RA when the RA is required previously to enable the long landing alert (<100ft); I suspect that this is associated with other parts of RAAS.

The details of 777 TOGA inhibit are unclear; the FCOM suggests WoW (but which aircraft logic?), yet there is technical opinion that it occurs at <2 ft RA (and what's the back up system for a failed RA?).

This whole issue highlights the importance of management requiring a thorough understanding of 'add-on' systems and the host aircraft. And particularly the interface and interactions before choosing an operating procedure (N.B Honeywell does not require a GA).
The alerting system and aircraft manufacturer also have roles in this area, as should the approving regulator. Whilst independently each system / aircraft function meets the certification requirements, together, the previously assumed risks (certification basis) in new 'improbable', yet relevant situations can be very significant.

I may have missed this in the report but when did the FO evacuate? The Captain and senior steward gained a mention but not the FO?

I agree that the logic and inputs related to RAAS alerts need to be looked at hard to avoid unnecessary Go Arounds. But no matter how well the RAAS functions, the fact remains that a Go Around attempt should never result in gear up ground contact. Had the flight crew verified power lever position and/or manually moved the power levers rather than relying completely on the automatics, the go around would have been successful and this disaster averted. Particularly unsettling to me is that the TOGA switches on a B777 are right in front of the tops of the power levers (see photo below). How the pilot can press the TOGA switches and not feel the levers stay stationary and not advancing is beyond me. Clearly he was trained very differently than I. To me, the main lesson learned here is that flight crews need to be trained how to aviate without resort to automatics, and taught to always verify what the automatics are doing, ESPECIALLY when they are in proximity to the ground and/or at low airspeeds. And on Boeing products I believe they should be taught to verify what the automatics are doing tactilely (feel is a very instinctive feedback) because on Boeing products (unlike Airbus products) the flight/thrust controls always move to reflect what the automatics are doing. (NOTE: I'm NOT saying the "Boeing way" is "better". I'm just saying that since tactile feedback is available on Boeing aircraft, flight crew should be trained to make use of that tactile feedback.)

http://www.team-bhp.com/forum/attach...e-switches.jpg

KenV, " should never result; a common misconception, where IMHO the reasons for this disbelief of human behaviour are explained in the interesting ASAGA report.

"The time pressure associated with limited human cognitive abilities - and therefore of crews - is the major problem in ASAGA. The crew must perform a number of actions and cross-check them in a short time. The induced cognitive overload may prevent the detection of deviations both by the PF, who is mainly concentrated on the PFD, and by the PM, who undertakes a set of tasks that divert his attention. Thus, a deviation, even in an important parameter or in the flight path, may not be detected by the crew."

And a quote from some wit, but without comment or rflection on your views in any way:-
All accidents are preventable... with the benefit of hindsight...or
All accidents are preventable... in theory...or
All accidents are preventable... given unlimited knowledge, resources, perfect prediction (and quite some luck).
All of which, regrettably makes it a rather useless statement in the everyday job.
And besides, do we really want to prevent absolutely everything? ... Really??

“systems work as designed, just not how the designer intended.”

I'm not talking about a "deviation". I'm talking about the single most important parameter in a go around situation: increase thrust. If a pilot cannot be counted on to ensure an increase in thrust during a Go Around, something is seriously wrong, be it the pilot, his training, and/or the company's SOP.

Can we prevent "absolutely everything"? Absolutely not. And I never remotely suggested we can or should.

Can we prevent pilots from failing to add thrust during a go around? Absolutely yes. Please allow me to alter your question just slightly: "Do we really want to prevent"... pilots from failing to add thrust during a Go Around? Yes!!! We absolutely want to do that!!!! While there are countless things we cannot foresee and thus cannot prevent, pilots failing to add thrust during a go around is NOT one of them!

To put what KenV is saying a bit differently:
'On Boeings, the flight/thrust controls move to reflect what the automatics are doing'. Wither or not that's better than the AB way is not the point - the point is that Boeing does that on purpose to provide the pilots tactile feedback of what the automatics are doing (and it the case of the flight controls, what the other pilot is doing). Pilots training and SOPs should be designed to take advantage of that feedback - to pound it into the pilots to verify - via that designed in tactile feedback - that the automatics (or the other pilot) are doing what they want them to.

Interesting point and it caused me to reflect on something most of us do by intuition; car driving. This is not expressing an opinion, but opening a human performance discussion.

Steering: if we want to turn gently we deflect, and HOLD the deflection to complete the turn. If we wish to alter the radius we alter the deflection and receive a change in force feedback. In hydraulic controlled a/c we deflect ailerons and when the BA is reached we centralise; AB perhaps more so than Boeing. At least we move the relevant control. Changes in forces are less than cars.
With changing thrust in a car we deflect the accelerator pedal, more or less and keep it deflected. Auto-Thrust in Boeing yes, in AB no. With braking we deflect the pedal and the stronger the braking the harder the deflection and force feedback. In all these actions, car or a/c we have feedback to our tactile sense and follow it up with visual senses and g forces. The car doesn't do pitch, but in the a/c we deflect the control and centralise, AB, or manually trim out the force, old Boeing.
The point being, in a car, if we want to do something we deflect a control and feel it move and receive various forms of feedback. Even in CRZ Control we can feel the accelerator move automatically with our foot and see the RPM change.
I'm not an FBW pilot, but I wonder if we've removed too much of the instinctive tactile feedback we receive in an a/c and make it so different to something we do every day instinctively without conscious effort. Is removing the power pitch couple and improvement in letting us know what the a/c is doing?
The other argument is that the a/c is designed to be flown more via automatics than manually. Once airborne, and until flare, it can be purely a monitoring role: i.e. the feedback is only visual with some g thrown in. Is this instinctive? In other words would we be better off in some phases of flight being more manual and less automatic? Being trained about the automatic systems & understanding the automatic systems in a stressless class room is one thing, but under stress, or startle, would instinctive reactions be safer? This question about AT over dependancy, even in manual flight is a case in point. If it is manual thrust, with pitch couple (feedback effect) there is no doubt what is necessary. Does this not remove confusion; because it seems to be confusion about an automatic system that has caused various crashes. Remove the doubt.
I've only flown an AB sim for 1hr. The role control was not instinctive; i.e. the nudge/centre/nudge/centre. It needed strong concentration on PFD. From some I've spoken to it's not so easy, in the early days, in strong gusty X-wnds as a conventional column e.g. B757/767/737. I can not comment on B777. The AB pilots will be able to inform us much better, and B777 as well. I hear it can be trained and you can 'get used to it', even the non-moving TL's, but from a human factors perspective is the reduced tactile feedback and reduced 'instinctive behaviour' an improvement & safer for manual flight?
I know the techies are trying to persuade us about automatic cars. I am sceptical . They might work on motorways specially designed for nose to tail max flow at constant speed with no lane changes = 4 wheel trains in convoy; but in towns & cities? Hm? Our instincts will still be needed.
I'm sure there will be strong opinions from the old & new, standard hydraulic & FBW, AB & Boeing. I've read that people love one or the other, or have no problem with either. My query is about it being instinctive or not. Do we as pilots not rely on instincts subconsciously? If, during critical phases on manual flight, everything has to be scanned, monitored, interpreted e.g. FMA to know what is going on, is there not a tiny delay in digesting the information and deciding on an action, or even a possibility of confusion and even further delay on action? I once jump seated during live base training of a DC8 captain trying to fly circuits in B757. The SOP was to use FD's and call for MCP changes. He was all over the sky and the TRE was ready to bin him as a non-pilot. I suggest switching off the FD's so he didn't have to think, speak, follow. He went back to basics & instincts in silence and flew it on rails.
I know there are many who believe we are here & now in 21st century not in steam driven jets of 80's. True; but does that mean that we are operating the new technology in the best manner, or that the new technology, just because it is hi-tech, is automatically better in every respect? We haven't changed the human very much but we sure have changed what they have to interact with by huge amounts. Do we have the best combination? Have we moved too far & too fast?

KenV, let's take a step back; remove the barbs from my previous post.
By focusing on just one item it is very difficult to avoid ending up blaming the pilot. The greater safety benefit is to explore why activities were not completed, or what factors might have contributed to an oversight, with the objective to aid crews alleviate the risks in these situations.

What has been published and discussed so far indicates that this was an 'unforeseen' accident; not an extreme unforeseeable event, but something which fell outside of the classic approach to safety. It appears to have emerged from a combination of factors involving many aspects of operation; these situations require a different approach to investigation and safety improvement.
For example, compare this incident with many successful GAs, where crew actions were correct, or if with deviation, were detected and corrected in time. Perhaps this accident involved an excessive variation in actions or corrective action took longer; the latter is more likely.

By considering the human as an asset in maintaining safety, as indicated by the successes of normal operation, then an output of accident investigation should identify aspects which increased the difficulty for the crew to act normally, and with this consider alleviation.
A major theme from the ASAGA report considered task saturation, workload, and time, against the backdrop of surprise.
Those aspect already discussed about systems integration, SOPs, and operational assumptions about new systems, should be reconsidered to reduce surprise, workload, etc, to effect change.

I refrain from choosing one item; emergent accidents require safety changes which involve many apparently insignificant areas of operations. Any one of which could prevented an accident, but without assurance for the next one - the next unforeseeable one; thus broad based changes are preferred.

We cannot continue to consider safety as good or bad, because modern complex operations require continuous adjustment to new (emergent) challenges e.g. the surprise of RAAS TOGA interaction. Safety involves continuous activity to manage the operational probabilities in risk, we attempt to keep the odds as low as possible.

"Can we prevent pilots from failing to add thrust during a go around? Absolutely yes."
I disagree; but we might reduce the probability, by reducing surprise, workload, systems complexity, and the proliferation of SOPs.
Help pilots detect and correct any oversight, to do what they already do well, but better.

td, the principle of tactile feedback is well established, but as with any good design the benefits can be circumvented by the method of use and the variability of human performance, particularly if influenced by conflicting advise;
E.g. always, always, use AT - as designed, as trained, as SOP, a fully automatic operation ... except when it isn't fully automatic.
Its the exceptions which usually get you

On the RAAS, does Boeing or E require mandatory GA on alert? (I am aware that with AB, if the predictive windshear alert system alarms, it is a mandatory GA)

I see a reliance on the automatics, but it has been shown that the winds measured by the aircraft on final, at/near the ground, in windshear and crosswind/crabbing conditions, are not accurate. What then, are the automatics using for windspeed and wind direction?

Correct

Much talk on here about something described as 'muscle memory'? I would have to have that explained to me a little more. However it appears to suggest limb movement absent of conscious thought? I would strongly suggest that is no way to fly a modern jet! It is DEFINITELY and UNEQUIVICALLY not the way to cope with the 'startle effect'! Engage the wrong motor program, without conscious thought, and you could quickly end up dead!

Pilots today, are the same people as yesteryear. Not 'better' nor 'worse', they are just interacting with a completely different style of machine! Lessons learned on the Wright Flyer are unlikely to transfer easily to flying an A350!! One to the other in little more than a single lifespan!

These machines require excellent training to operate safely. But airlines (generally) try to reduce training to the absolute minimum. The a/c work well, when you operate them as designed. Pilots just need to be aware of the fragility of the human condition, and it's tendency to react instantly (the chimp) rather than more intelligently. There are traps!! Training needs to be better, and sadly for some, more expensive!

Coping strategies are also required, such as pre-briefing of threats. Sharing responsibilities are healthy, rather than the old 'man and dog' of previous generations, where "you don't touch that, because I'm the Captain"! Still sadly alive in some cockpits/airlines!

Emirates really dodged a bullet here. They are not an outlier! This could have been far worse.

Apparently in a rush to rotate, was it both hands on the yoke as he usually does past V1 ... ?
What I don't get is how he can rotate without first feeling the thrust output ?
To me the situation had to be treated more like a touch and go than a GA, but was he trained for that ... ?
Or when did he rent a Cessna for the last time for a couple of touch and go maneuvers, just for the fun of it ?

Safetypee, I totally agree.
We need to adapt the training and SOPs to prevent that circumvention.

4468
Further to the muscle memory myth I want to include the misuse of the word instinctual. Humans as specie have no instincts once they leave the ground. Flying is an acquired habit/skill. What we do in the air is habitual and not instinctual. Habits can be drilled into subconscious but they are not instincts. That is why in the air when a required aspect of that skill is found wanting no instinctual act comes to rescue and crashes happen. AF447, QZ8501 may well have been the results of being instinctual. We are taught as a first principle of instrument flying to ignore all bodily sensations and orientation clues human body creates. Why Boeing designed their FBW the way did has nothing to do with being instinctual but choosing a design philosophy that was more conventional i.e. speed stable and transitioning pilots were habitually used to it. Moving thrust levers was not designed for tactile feed back but was merely an improvement on the existing system of manual thrust control in B747 classics. First it was only capable of maintaining speed during approach then came the much celebrated FFRATS(Full Flight Regime Auto Throttle System). It continued on to 747 400 with FADEC/FMS and then on to 777. Both Boeing and Airbus chose their different design philosophies more to suite their commercial interest than anything else. Airbus was not a major player with conventional aircrafts. They offered the market something different, economical and safer for low experience level pilots. They have successfully created/added a segment that finds it difficult to move away from airbus . Boeing on the other hand wanted to keep its flock together so avoided the culture shock by keeping things conventional.
However the accidents in both the philosophies we keep discussing have generally come from lack of knowledge of automation and/or lack of manual flying skill. Acquiring skill in one may not replace the deficiency in the other. Statistics abundantly prove that automation has made flying easier and safer for pilots. Flying has become so safe that involving in an accident requires real bad luck. In the present case had the pilot not gone around could have added another accident free 10/15000 hrs. without having ever known how to execute a rejected landing.

http://i68.tinypic.com/ftg4cj.jpg

12L has a 9kts tailwind component to a 28 kt tailwind gust, moving to a 18/21kt headwind along the runway. Why wasnt 12R with headwinds better?

ATC reported winds from 340 degrees, 11 kts. Where is the AWOS located?

Look at the crazy METAR from 110 degrees 15 kts, variable from 60 to 150 degrees with temp wind from 350 degrees 15 kts.

I don't agree. However bad your automation skills may be, if you have good manual flying skills, you will survive.

Bloggs
If you keep using manual skills in RVSM and CAT3 you will lose your job.Airlines don't hire you to keep surviving from ignorance.

Don't go silly on us now, Vilas. If you can't get a bit of hand flying in on the line do it in the Sim!

I would hire a pilot who could fly over someone who couldn't. Wouldn't you?

The Airbus pilots in AF447 and Air Asia crashed, not after a few seconds like EK521, but after some minutes flopping around the sky in the seemingly "something different, economical and safer for low experience level pilots" Airbus (your words). To continue to beat the Automation drum is ignorance (your word) IMO.

Bloggs
I am all for manual skills. But manual skill and knowledge of automation are not exchangeable in modern aircraft. yes in a DC3 if you didn't know about the AP it didn't matter. Any pilot who knows his automatics poorly is a hazard in RVSM and CAT3. Manual skill requirement may not arise at all in cruise but ignorance of automation can kill you. The manual skill you are talking about is more required during approach landing phase doing a raw data approach, handling EFATO or handling strong gusty crosswinds but CAT3 regime is all automation. In Airbus FBW flying raw data approach or OEI on take off or GA is not that big a deal, many 200hrs. CPLs do it extremely well. In a field that is getting automated by the hour there is no justification for not knowing automation of your machine. SFO, Bangalore, Paphos all came out of ignorance of automation. Bangalore guys were experienced B737 200 pilots they knew very well how to do a visual approach with manual thrust but didn't know how to get the A320 ATHR in speed mode. Some aircrafts manual skills are difficult and need more practice in some others they are not that difficult but you need to know well their automation because that is their design philosophy. And no! I would not higher a pilot in Airbus who is unable to understand automation. I would definitely higher him for flying a twin otter for island hopping in Indonesia.

The irony, Vilas, is that in both Air France 447 and Air Asia 8501, there was no automation involved. And they crashed. Superior knowledge of the automation isn't much help when it isn't working and it "gives" the aeroplane back to you, for whatever reason. This industry bias towards automation is now unnecessarily causing fatal accidents. This is not a case of this or that. Pilots must now be good at this and that.

The further irony is your comment about CPLs doing EFATOs etc well; that would be expected, given their lack of reliance on the automation at that point of their careers!

That is how you drive your car and how you walk, ( you don't have to think about each step do you? ) and it is how the PF pushed the TOGA button, what a shame he didn't have the same cognitive process for advancing thrust. He probably used to but after a year or two of 777 that neural pathway was full of cob webs. ( IMO)

That goes both ways. On the other side of the coin I have seen accusing looks by copilots who glare at you because I as captain dared to touch a switch which was in their area of responsibility Sadly alive in some cockpits/airlines!

Along with typing, tying your shoelaces etc. All 'simple' actions.

What you are describing is commonly referred to in neurological circles as 'automaticity'. Which is precisely how I described 'muscle memory'. It is limb/digit movement without conscious thought/monitoring. Luckily typists have spell checkers, and if I make a hash of tying my shoes, I just swear and start again with a little more concentration!

But it's generally a BAD idea when operating complex machinery, in which informed choice of precise action is invariably necessary.

Indeed, here in Dubai, we have the perfect example of the 'chimp' eliminating conscious thought and selecting the WRONG motor program, which then ran automatically! (They shouldn't even have pressed the TOGA buttons! We don't yet know if they did?) The problem wasn't lack of automaticity per se. Nobody needs to 'remember' how to push the thrust levers forward if that becomes necessary!! Nor are we required to do that in 99% of go-arounds! It's also difficult for the human brain to 'monitor' what our actions have achieved, when we are simultaneously, actively engaged in exercising a manual skill involving a cognitive process. Particularly so, when the picture we are seeing, is not what we were expecting.

The issue here had nothing whatsoever to do with automaticity. It's just that the wrong actions (motor programs) were hurriedly selected by the chimp. That may be due to lack of pre-briefing, lack of training, or (highly unlikely) lack of ability/knowledge!

It could possibly be a combination of such things, but I have little doubt, in the current climate, many of us (both old and bold, AND magenta line!) could easily have fallen into the same trap.

Area of Responsibility. Biggest furphy out.

4468, nose goes up on a GA, throttles go up. Nothing "operating complex machinery" about that. If you did that 50 times in the last year, what do you reckon your chances of doing it on this occasion would be? Why? Muscle Memory (or Familiarity or Auto-whatever you called it or "been there done that"). If you don't have muscle memory, you have to think while you act. That's when you sometimes forget.

Some excellent comments and that is what a professional debate encourages. Solutions?????

More stick and rudder (in the Sim for Vilas :ok:) , which must be regulated by the XAAs! That is the only way to drag the kicking and screaming beancounters to the reality that our manual flying skills are going down (unfortunately, literally) way before the pilotless airliner is ready.

I don't see the irony. You surely can see I quoted these examples to emphasize that humans have no instincts in air or if they do anything instinctively will be wrong. These are not the examples of lack of automative skills but DXB, SFO and Bangalore were due to lack of knowledge auto thrust/throttle system. A pilot who flies well without automation but keeps disconnecting automatics at a drop of a hat because of lack of knowledge is not a great pilot. A professional pilot is complete product. An airline pilot's manual skills are not that of a combat pilot. Similarly learning about automation is not a rocket science either. It is just the attitude to give too much emphasis on one at expense of the other. Limitations of system can be learnt in a class room. Had the EK pilot read about the GA after touch down or been told during his training he wouldn't have done what he did. If he didn't know about it then he would have been in trouble whenever he got into this situation. Unless he made a one off mistake that can happen it is the price off being human

Capn Bloggs
You've flown 50 go-arounds in the last year?

Wow

As a long haul pilot, I doubt I've flown more than about 30 take offs and landings in that period! Very probably less?

All part of the issues in play here!

Well Vilas, we are going to have to agree to disagree. You can be the autowhizz, or the autocripple. But if you can fly, none of those 5 prangs would have occurred. Airbus Golden Rules all require one skill when all else fails: the ability to fly the aeroplane. The automatons are driving that skill out of the industry.

Nonsense. Unless you practise, over and over, you may get it wrong. You can have all you like in your nice (electronic) manuals but if you expect Joe Bloggs to pull out a procedure that he may have seen/used once in a blue moon and do it successfully, you do not have a grip on reality.

The price of being human? Even if he did, his offsider, if suitably exposed/trained and re-current, would much more readily pick up what he did wrong (the FO here did actually work out something was wrong when he called "speed". If you're familiar with something, then you've got spare brainspace to use on other stuff, like checking the power is actually up when the nose comes up on a rejected landing. The workload is immediately noticeable to me whenever we start doing weird stuff in the Sim (or the pressure comes on airborne); surely you have felt the same, if not you, in your students?

Did I say that? No. I was merely using it as an example of the development of muscle memory.