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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

Old 14th Sep 2016, 20:09
  #1521 (permalink)  
 
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Auto-thrust. I've seen it on B757/767/737NG be very lethargic. Equally I've seen many an F/O be over enthusiastic. Thrust management on finals is a fine art. It's not wait for limits then handfuls on or off. I've watched manual thrust actions where there was no appreciation of what the airology was doing. Changes from tail to headwind with huge thrust changes. Flying through thermals with high thrust changes. Usually it was large reductions of thrust only to find that a few seconds later it was needed to be increased. It would have been better to leave the datum and let the speed oscillate a little with delicate adjustments.
This was educated via non-autothrust a/c and an understanding of the environment. The auto-thrust has no such knowledge. It is a limit system. The pilot who flys with A/T also has no education of the environment.
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Old 14th Sep 2016, 21:42
  #1522 (permalink)  
 
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Auto Thrust
Auto Pilots
Auto Mation

None of it is designed nor programmed by Pilots. That's why you HAVE to be suspicious of it.

I believe Humankind's greatest achievement was going to the moon AND coming back. And it's very telling... The Astronauts, Drivers, Chiefs, Bwanas, whatever you demand they should be called, insisted that the voice they heard on the radio, was one of them, not a scientist, not a manager, not a systems designer. Another person that did exactly the same as they did.

There was inherent trust in the operation because there were checks and balances in the system that removed ego and intransigence.

Our profession hasn't been so fortunate. This profession has degenerated to the point where the wrong people have authority, not because they deserve it, but because they can quote chapter and verse.

There have been posts on this thread that really want to find the Captain at fault because... he is a local! Well thinking outside of the box just might allow this investigation to develop more, into looking into the extenuating circumstances of this accident.

Yep, bigots might say it's to protect the local, but if the investigation delves into the training culture and finds an issue with it, pilots all over the world will be glad there was an indigenous commander at the controls, because his country will stand behind him. And it's a very good thing because the investigation won't be so bigoted and will look beyond him, unlike the Uk and Captain Stewart who landed his 747 without much fuel...And I hope they castigate the training regimes they have inherited. The training culture, clearly leaves a lot to be desired.

2, 7,000+ hour pilots, that flew a G/A without increasing thrust... Neither of them... That has nothing to do with nationality, that points to the fact they have been in the wrong training environment, professionally, for a very long time.

The cause of this accident is to do with a lot more than Auto anything.

Last edited by 604driver; 15th Sep 2016 at 11:24.
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Old 14th Sep 2016, 21:45
  #1523 (permalink)  
 
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Originally posted by vilas
When one flies automated FBW aircrafts isn't it necessary to know the limitations of automation?
Yes, of course it is, and therein lies one of the problems. In the past, these hidden 'traps' of the 777 autoflight system (eg FLCH HOLD mode, TOGA inhibit, etc) have been poorly documented and poorly trained. We've seen at least three serious incidents/accidents over the last few years (SQ at Munich, Asiana at SFO and now EK at DXB) where the pilots' poor understanding of these traps seems to have been a factor. It's high time the manufacturer and the airlines recognised the problem, provided better documentation and procedures, and trained people accordingly.
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Old 14th Sep 2016, 22:14
  #1524 (permalink)  
 
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Sadly, it is clear that the most qualified Pilots are those who have flown Jets that still require a scan and manipulation of the thrust levers, those Pilots are often the ones who are disregarded. Modern accidents appear to be associated with reliance on automation and SOP's (which are very important but the use of common sense is more important).
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Old 14th Sep 2016, 22:15
  #1525 (permalink)  
 
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notapilot, #1573, I don't disagree with action before reporting, but I would question the assumption that most airlines learn from their own and others mistakes.
Have all of the mistakes been identified, is 'error' reporting as widespread as the Just Culture promoters imagine. Which operators share safety data, real data; there are some good examples, UKFSC, but what about the outsiders.
Is the reasoning behind 'the error' fully understood, e.g. It appears that many pilots in this thread have or have known someone who has learnt about the 777 TOGA AT GA functioning through experience (error), but how many of these events were reported, who else knew, and what action was taken.
Mandatory reporting is fine providing the report is a true reflection of the incident and contributing factors. Unfortunately pilots, humans, more often 'blame' themselves and do not question the technical system or wider influences affecting behaviour.
Also, who publicly reports incidents which do not fall into the mandatory categorisation.
A sceptical view maybe, but an optimistic sceptic.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 04:06
  #1526 (permalink)  
 
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1- If not from the LONG LANDING audio message it is most probable the guys would have simply completed their landing, but didn't like the idea to have to meet the boss for disregarding the computer ...
2- What made the PF think he could rotate without feeling the thrust output first ?
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 07:52
  #1527 (permalink)  
 
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What made the PF think he could rotate without feeling the thrust output first ?
7000+ hrs of longhaul, widebody flying, staring out the window trying to keep his eyes open while the automatics kept him safe?

We've seen at least three serious incidents/accidents over the last few years (SQ at Munich, Asiana at SFO and now EK at DXB) where the pilots' poor understanding of these traps seems to have been a factor
They all forgot to fly the aircraft.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 08:14
  #1528 (permalink)  
 
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They all forgot to fly the aircraft.
I said a poor understanding of the traps was A factor, not the ONLY factor.

Last edited by BuzzBox; 15th Sep 2016 at 08:36.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 08:18
  #1529 (permalink)  
 
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Sure, but there is a simple way out of the situation.

Am I a pilot or a passenger? What every pilot should ask him/herself before going to work.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 08:37
  #1530 (permalink)  
 
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Problem solved then. No need to look any further.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 09:04
  #1531 (permalink)  
 
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It's all very well saying we should know the FCOM inside out ( true) but it's one thing being able to recite the books, it's another one understanding every subtle nuiance and logic trap that the designers may have buried in the system- and there are more than a few. Over the years on a couple of the big Boeings I've certainly seen manuals and company training " morph" as yet another aspect of the autothrottle system has been discovered by some poor so and so on the line....(and I'll fess up and say been there and explored the system logic, or apparent lack of it on a GA from a lowish platform altitude one dark and not so stormy night....)

However ultimately yes, you have to be prepared to get rid of the automatics.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 09:30
  #1532 (permalink)  
 
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No one can remember everything in all the manuals. There will always be circumstances where you will forget something or not be able to bring it to mind quickly enough in the time available. The less you use something, the more this will be true.


I once had an F/O bounce a badly executed x-wind landing some 50' into the air, with the thrust levers at idle, & then let go of the controls. I didn't even think of TOGA. I didn't have the luxury of the time required to think & then act. I simply pushed the thrust levers way forward & then tried to pick a pitch attitude that would not lead to a stall on one hand, but also not lead to an excessive sink rate on the other. Eventually the power came in & the incident had a happy ending, but it was not much fun.


Sometimes you just need to be able to fly, not operate the equipment.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 09:44
  #1533 (permalink)  
 
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OMG Oakape, you didn't verify the FMA????
Very unsafe pilot, you are.

Well done!
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 09:49
  #1534 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem
They all forgot to fly the aircraft.
In this case I see that there were a few factors restricting their flying decisions...

1: Windshear: headwind turned to a tail wind so they landed long.
2: Long Landing not pilot fault but an OK Landing performed
3: automatics: LongLanding annunciated
4: Not your decision. See #5
5: Company SOP: You shall go-around buddy
6: Boeing: sorry but with WOW, Toga inhibited
7: EK SOP: Flaps 2, raise UC on +ve climb
8: OK, we did what we were ALLOWED and told
9: Whoops: +ve Climb was temporary
10: Alert: IAS falling, now lets start flying this brick
11: too late, no time to spool up.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 09:53
  #1535 (permalink)  
 
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7. Forgot to push thrust levers forward.
8. Game over.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 10:14
  #1536 (permalink)  
 
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7. Forgot to push thrust levers forward.
8. Game over.
7B. Nope, didn't forget, but I'm just sayin' that at that stage they believed they were "protected" by the automation (and training) as the TOGA had been pressed.

But I imagine, with hands on throttles at that stage things would have gone differently. That would have saved the day.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 10:27
  #1537 (permalink)  
 
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Oakape, wiggy
Nobody knows FCOM inside out nor is it required. But it is not unreasonable to expect a thorough knowledge of the aircraft systems, automation and performance of take off and landing phase where there is severe time constraint. Simple thing like not adjusting seat properly has led to runway excursion after engine failure because pilot was not able to apply differential braking. When three different situations for GA are mentioned in the manual there is no reason for a pilot not to know them. I remember one of my instructor telling me, you get paid for what you do below 500ft. above that any one can do it. Modern aircrafts require very little old fashioned throttle and stick skills. It is these limitations of computers what they will do and what they won't is all that is required. Someone in airline has to go through the accident database and seek manufacturers advise before making/changing procedures/trg. syllabus. But is not done and sometimes changes are made idiosyncratically and changed again after an incidence or they continue waiting for one to happen. Non verbalising and thereby non monitoring of FMA has caused so many incidents and yet it sparks a heated argument about its requirement. The aircraft and engines in general are so safe may be this much effort is considered superfluous. Ultimately it is another business and unless profitability is seriously affected nothing will change and that too will change towards better/safer automation.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 10:34
  #1538 (permalink)  
 
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7B. Nope, didn't forget, but I'm just sayin' that at that stage they believed they were "protected" by the automation
They forgot to fly the aircraft. They were at that stage system operators with limited knowledge of the system.
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 10:38
  #1539 (permalink)  
 
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It's worth remembering that neither of these guys set out with the intention to crash an aeroplane that day. They'd probably had nothing particularly untoward happen in their respective careers and if they'd allowed some bad habits to develop those habits had been let through because 99% of the time nothing much happens and when something does happen the automatics work as expected.

The point is that we should take this as an opportunity to examine our own habits and make sure we haven't allowed them to deteriorate. Do we always read the FMA? I bet most of us do, some of us do most of the time but might have lapses under pressure, and a few of us are slack and don't really do it at all. Do we always monitor the automatics adequately? I bet everyone here has been a bit slack on occasion, humans make bad monitors after all.

If you were to ask those two guys prior to the accident if they push the thrust levers up on a go-around, I'm sure they'd've said "of course!" but we aren't perfect and don't always react under pressure the way we'd like to think we would. Maybe we think we push the levers up but really we've got into the habit of just following them up with the autothrottle. It seems the Airbus system wins this little battle.

I ask myself, would you have pushed the thrust levers up? And I'm absolutely certain I would have, but I've flown with a bloke who selected flap zero after take-off instead of gear up and he was utterly dumbfounded that he'd done it. So I like to think I would but maybe given the right combination of fatigue, mindset, procedures, previous experience etc, I'd screw it up as well.

Stay ever vigilant out there .
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Old 15th Sep 2016, 10:42
  #1540 (permalink)  
 
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Isnt #1 undershoot shear?
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