A380 low at Melbourne
 

From FlightGlobalWhat would the bottom of the controlled airspace here?

Melbourne CTA C3 lower limit is 2500ft.

The RNAV Z for 34 has a platform altitude of 3000ft.

The RNAV P (AR) for 34 has a platform of 2000ft but that is only applicable within about 8nm from the THR.

Sector Safe is 3700ft.

From context it looks like 'A030' is 3000 feet MSL. Is that an FMS format or something?

In recent years we've had a rash of incidents where the arrival was 'cleaned up in the box' and altitude constraints were inadvertently deleted from the vertical navigation path. And, as Captain VanderBurgh observed two decades ago, we have become 'children of the magenta line' even on visual approaches.

Good thing it's nothing important, so no hurry, right?

That's fast for the ATSB. In some cases we're still awaiting reports on serious incidents that occurred over three years ago!

"Altitude 3000". As opposed to F350, being "Flight Level 350".

Standard ICAO format...same as you put in the Flight Notification.

Thanks, is a Flight Notification some sort of flight plan in Oz perhaps? Or an ATC message?

ICAO Flight Notification... every IFR aeroplane flies on one. You might call it the Operational Flight Plan (at least the bit that actually tells ATC what you're doing)?

That's it, thanks again. :ok: Just as you will never see 3000 MSL written as A030 in an NTSB report, I've never heard the ICAO flight plan called a Flight Notification.

Fortunately, as an American, I don't worry about that ICAO stuff too much when flying internationally. ;)

I was in KIX a while back and saw a purple trimotor freighter drop down quite low over the bay turning final on that curved ILS to 24L. They then started a climb and I thought they would go missed but they continued to an uneventful landing. I assume it was a case of 'extend me off the runway' (or whatever the equivalent phrase is on the Mad Dog) and a low phony vertical profile was generated and perhaps chased in vertical speed away from the altitude window.

KIX is Kansai airport in Japan, purple trimotor freighter is probably a FedEx MD11, anything else?

Kansai International... FedEx MD-11, a.k.a. Mad Dog.... flying published curved step-down approach to stay over water and avoid overflying populated land, involving both a VOR and an NDB, to intercept the ILS at the marker.

http://opennav.com/pdf/RJBB/JP-AD-2....RJBB-en-JP.pdf

Presumably, swapping NAV sources lost the altitude settings, although I have no idea about MD autopilot logic, either.

(The approach is sort of an all-radio version of the old "billboard ILS" at Kai Tak/Hong Kong.)

Anyway - back to previously scheduled programming....

So, if pilots can work that out, why don't our flight ops departments insist that positive action has to be taken to delete an altitude restriction otherwise it remains in place even when cleaning up?
Otherwise the tool (FMS) is damaging the workpiece (V-Nav).

During simulator training generally would it be correct to say manually flown visual approaches are rarely practiced. Thus the accent is on following the magenta line via the FD?

Before I retired a couple of years ago, most sim sessions had a segment where you had to demonstrate a manual visual approach without any glide slope guidance, meaning no ILS, vasi/papi or vnav indication.

Ref Airbubbba comment on KIX ILS 24L and FedEx. I most likely caused by hitting app arm to early. The arrival transition calls for LNAV/VNAV in most a/c and if you select APP to early the aircraft will start looking for LOC/GS . Iv seen this happen in more than one type over the years.

On my final simulator session before retirement 18 years ago, the examiner suggested I might like to fly visually under the Dartford Bridge. That was more difficult than might be imagined but I did succeed. I wanted to follow up with a go through the Dartford Tunnel but it was pointed out that the sim might take a while to reset:)

Jack

That would be my suspicion as well. And maybe they went back out of approach mode when it started to chase, hurriedly tried to reselect things in the box and dropped some constraints.

On the vertical profile you have that mandatory 2600 ft. crossing just as you start the turn to intercept final. I've shot that approach with and without GPS over the years and sometimes the plane does the intercept gracefully but other times it starts to hunt as you turn toward KN. If it doesn't settle down you need to reduce the automation and, in the worst case, fly the plane. :eek:

Perhaps the incident I saw had the ILS extended off the FAF and inadvertently deleted the (at or above) 2000 ft. and 1600 ft. altitude constraints. Maybe they went to 1200 ft. way too soon, caught the mistake and climbed back up on profile.

That's one of the reasons I was hoping we would soon find out more about the A380 incident at MEL.

They were 15 miles from the runway. Looks like a 3000 ft. crossing restriction at SUDOS and 2000 ft. at ML627. If they were still on vectors maybe a misread of the altitude clearance, serious at any altitude but potentially deadly down low.

Or, were they given direct to SUDOS and cleared for the approach and somehow started down early on some faulty vertical guidance? Did they sequence the waypoints to go to ML627 and thought they could descend to 2000 ft.?

Maybe we will know in a year or so.

In this golden era of the FMS there seem to be subtle traps on waypoints and constraints that differ on each aircraft I've flown. On some planes if you get a vector to final you need to do an intercept to a waypoint ahead or it will not become 'active'. On others it doesn't matter and you can concentrate on flying the approach.

I've certainly armed approach mode too soon. And too late. And this RNP stuff is all automatic until it messes up. :D

My apologies, I let myself lapse into pilot jargon and perhaps used some terms unfamiliar to you. I wasn't familiar with a Flight Notification and certainly have learned from this discussion myself. :ok:

I've read all the 'maybe's & perhaps' and what the automatics might have been doing, or not. No-one has mentioned the weather. IF they were in VMC why were they not looking out the window? If they saw the a/c starting its descent too early; if they wondered why they were 3000'/2000' at 15nm; if they were slightly curious about "what's it doing now?" why did they allow it to continue? Even if they were IMC the parameters seem to suggest something was not kosher. To hell with selecting this & that at the wrong time was the cause of an early descent. Sorry, but 'mind the office.' Or am I being too simple & harsh? A good dinner and even better bottle of red makes me cranky; so my wife tells me.

Before I retired a couple of years ago, most sim sessions had a segment where you had to demonstrate a manual visual approach without any glide slope guidance, meaning no ILS, vasi/papi or vnav indication.

Wish it were common all over; but then that topic has been beaten to death numerous times. Let's not reopen it. Lucky you had an enlightened training dept. Sadly, I'm associated with an outfit who prides itself on in-depth training but has reduced the amount of manual flying in the sim. There are the enlightened ones and there are the others. Nowt so curious as folk and none so blind as they who do not see.

As the facts in this case are yet to be revealed I cannot comment specifically on what happened to the A380 however, what I can say regarding any type of GNSS approach (RNAV-Z or RNP-AR) is that you must not arm the approach pushbutton unless the ATC assigned altitude and the IAF (or suitable Direct to waypoint) altitude are the same, otherwise the FMGC switches from NAV to FINAL APP mode and therefore will drop down to the NEXT altitude constraint as per the FMGC constraints, thereby bypassing the relevant safe altitude even if it is still selected in the FCU.

This was why, some time back Airservices changed the terminology to "when established cleared Runway xx x approach" that is to say:established on the approach itself and not simply tracking to intercept a waypoint on the approach.

In simple terms, selecting APP mode early on the FCU has the same effect as (spuriously) being in LOC capture but you're only tracking to the IAF and not yet runway aligned, therefore you might get G/S capture on base for example.

In FINAL APP mode the aircraft likes the track so it descends, it's not smart enough to see that a direct to is not necessarily on the approach itself.

If the A380 did what I'm referring to (yet to be determined) then it's not the first time it's occurred on YMML 34.

No RAT 5, you are spot on. It is a disgrace that after DME has been invented and now GPS is on every cheap smartphone, professional pilots still go below a 3deg path within 10nm of the runway with heavies. There is no reason to do so, distance to go is omnipresent in all airliners, so there is only inherent danger.

Those who continue do it, do it so without being aware and should be removed from such cockpits asap.

Willie: That is an informed explanation for a non-AB pilot. You may be correct, BUT.......
what would any pilot do, in any a/c, if it captured a false ILS Glide Slope and started descending. I hope there would be an instant disconnect and level off until the a/c was re-positioned to capture the correct GS. Whether a full GA would be necessary would depend on circumstances. A false GS was not uncommon at some airfields. The solution at every airfield was to have a gross error check ticking away in your mind. When it happened you were aware and knew what to do about it. On later versions of some a/c it became impossible to capture GP before LLZ. This helped the dummies who were asleep.
It has been known for decades that the approach phase is perhaps the most critical phase and during which most errors occur and incidents result; thus one would hope crews are at their most alert. After hours of safe sky underneath you most of it s now above you. Senses should be heightened.
If there is a known gotcha in the automatic system then surely the manufacturer should be taking steps to design it out AND publishing alerts to the crews. SOP's could be another level of avoidance. If Willie is correct this is a case in point; as too was the Korean B777 gotcha in San F.
Every a/c is trying to bite you in the backside. Don't let it.

I'm in furious agreement with you Rat5 about all your comments on flying the plane and knowing what your profile is/ should be ( a basic 3x profile isn't that hard even if the airfield is above sea level) but I think it is worth pointing out that the above sentence is only half right.
The approach and landing phase is the most critical as you said, but more errors are made in the pre-departure phase of flight. I think that is something worth knowing and thinking about when I see people rushing like mad to claw back 5 minutes.
Cheers

Agree about the errors: I defer to your statistics.

So you "reduce" the automation and see if that works. How long do you wait for reduced automation to give the desired result before gasp horror you actually are forced to fly the plane. I suggest that instead of "reducing" automation if it doesn't settle down, it would be prudent to disengage the automation immediately and seamlessly fly the plane where you want it to go. Of course if the pilot lacks the manual flying skills to do so, then simply reduce the automation as you say and send out a PAN before resorting to manual flying.:E

This reducing the level of automation is the modern training speak for what you are saying, i.e. turn the magic off and make the plane do what you want it to. :ok:

The FAA and Boeing talk about 'levels' of automation from one to four. I think Airbus talks about similar levels with less automation being more 'direct'.

As Airbus says in their SOP treatise on 'Optimum Use of Automation':

http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._SOP_SEQ02.pdf

As usual, a lot of this philosophical stuff about levels of automation finds its way into the company pubs as CYA boilerplate paragraphs and filters down to the line through the training department.

On the particular KIX approach I was discussing earlier, you could go into a heading and vertical speed or altitude hold mode and let the plane settle down as it made the turn to intercept the ILS and then reselect LNAV/VNAV (on a Boeing) and then go to approach mode when the signal was stable.

You certainly could turn the autopilot off and hand fly the approach but recently that is somewhat frowned upon where I work since you had briefed a coupled approach.

Even following the glide path down with vertical speed if it doesn't capture for some reason is now considered a deviation from your planned procedure. I'm told that you should go missed, request holding, reassess your nav status, call the company and speak to a subject matter expert if required and rebrief the approach with reduced nav automation capability. You've got plenty of gas, right? ;)

If, in fact, the flight was cleared for an RNP AR approach, not only is that an instrument approach, it requires specific training and flight crew operating procedures. The database isn't supposed to be messed with. Performance-based navigation actually means what it says with RNP AR IAPs. Deviation from the VNAV path, exceeding maximum segment speed, or deviating from the lateral path all invalidate the approach.

And these RNP approaches are NOT flown in APP mode, but rather in NAV/DES so should follow the vertical constraint...

I have personally however had a colleague try and stuff up the approach to 34 in MEL with finger trouble and only intervention from my side stopped us going below a waypoint altitude constraint...

Easy to have finger trouble on such a tiring pattern that we fly here!

Attached is the Austrian AIP chart for the RNAV-P (RNP) RWY 34 approach. If entering at either LAVER or GOOLA the specified speed (or less) and RF legs must be followed. The vertical profile (VNAV or VPATH) must entered not less than 2,000. 3,000 or higher must be maintain untl ML632 or ML642. ATC cannot intervene on either of these transitions other than to assign a speed less than the maximum specified. ATC can vector to an extension of the final approach course, in which case the approach must begin not later than MEXUN. In the case of a vector to the final outside of MEXUN the last assigned altitude should be maintained until intercepting the VPATH, but descending to 2,000 after SUDOS to intercept the VPATH at 2,000 would be acceptable with ATC concurrence.

Oz also provides an OEI procedure with their RNP AR approaches. Page 2 would apply only in that case and only with a declaration of the engine failure.

As a general comment regarding RNP approaches in MEL, I've found over the years that it all goes well, until ATC decide to vector you off, or worse keep you high and then expect you to be back on profile and speed etc.
I even asked the ATCO why clear us for the approach and then vector us off..etc his reply "because that's what we do"
As I said, just a general comment, but it does add complexity to an approach that is further complicated by various operator restrictions and physical limitations.

Automation and competency in general.
 

At what point does the reliance on, and extended use of, automation create a critical dysfunction in the thought processes and mechanics of flying?
And at what stage of training (prior non-automation flight experience) does that impact occur?
As an example, at some point (already in testing), there will be automobiles with with autopilot modes which can be engaged and/or disengaged. Theoretically, the disengagement mode would be activated for problem situations to allow the human with driving experience to control the situation. That would be appropriate for a skilled driver. At some point however, there will be "drivers" of automobiles who have essentially been passengers for a decade and will be highly unskilled for actually driving even in basic control situations (breaking distance calculations, turning at speed, etc.) let alone high traffic situations and poor road conditions such as ice, rain, snow.

huatney1:

The second time they did that, I would refuse the RNP AR approach.

Does the approach need to be redesigned?

Chris2303:
The approach is fine. It should have been designed with air traffic management in mind. If not, then the Oz aviation authority issued incorrect specs to the procedures designers. I doubt that was the case. Sounds like an ATC facility problem to me.

From your chart it looks to me like the approach could begin inside MEXUN as long at it was not later than ML627 which is the FAF. Not a huge difference but I've received these direct to FAF RNAV-P clearances in Europe before. And sometimes I've gotten vectors that seem to closely mimic the published side approach transitions.

From ATSB website these guys were 15 nm south though and perhaps vectored for the long final.

airbubba:

Check the note referenced with "#." Jepp makes it clearer; the note appear alongside MEXUM.

Thanks! :ok: I'm not used to that chart format, hopefully I wouldn't have missed it but I certainly might have. :eek:

One possible way down the primrose path would be if they had one of the approach transitions from the side loaded, got vectors to a long final instead and saw that they could go to MEXUN without reselecting the approach since it was already in the box and the rest of the approach is the same for all the transitions. Unfortunately, the 3000 feet restriction at SUDOS would not be seen by the FMGC.

It will be interesting to see whether they were cleared for the approach out over the water and selected approach mode too soon with a missing waypoint constraint.

Re post27 by aterpster.

"Austrian AIP" Mate, there are no Kangaroos in Austria.;)

Rule3:
I caught one of those, obviously missed that one. In any case the chart I posted should make the location obvious. :)

Aibubba:

Attached are the Jepp charts for the procedure in question. However, Emirates was likely using Lido charts.

LIDO chart:

Thanks again for the charts. :ok: