Shaggy,

380 lands at 390t, 744 takes off at 400t. Not sure those 2 reverses matter too much.

@Flap62

How easy it is for pprune to make a non-event an event! As the wisdom of D.P.Davies might have put it, 'The only system that can survive, therefore, is one which spells out in detail all operating procedures and insists on their application through a very high level of personal and crew discipline'. So Bravo to the A380 pilots who maintained the SOP's and Bravo to @Craggenmore for leaving zero doubt with concise elucidation!

Although I can follow the reasoning about adhering religiously to sops and not getting in the way of any management stooge, let’s summarise what is described and agreed:

A perfectly airworthy aircraft made an approach to an airport with adequate runway length, the weather within limits for the operation and the crew qualified. During the approach an automated warning sounded that implied a go-around, apparently before the system design would normally trigger it. They went into a holding and assessed the situation, then tried a second approach with the same outcome. No attempt with disabling the particular warning system and using alternate methods was made. Finally they diverted.

Did I get anything wrong?

Yes!

It did not imply a go-around, it REQUIRED a go-around.

Wow glofish, only took you 5 pages to catch up. I am guessing you also know what information MCC gave this crew as well right?

It seems difficult to detect sarcasm!

I repeat myself when saying that reading comprehension must have been taken out of pilots assessment, or the ME Puniverse seems to get to some of us ....

Maybe if you are as tired as is being stated in other parts then it is the safest and least career limiting decision to follow SOPs and not make it up as you go along.
Good call all round.

Divert to Stansted?

Not arguing about the crew obeying letter of law-they have no choice.
But SOPs do not just exist in the airline industry but all over the place. they are of course laid down to protect customers/passengers are n't they.

Well yes sort of but they are mostly their to protect management who because theyare management mean they can never be wrong but also they cannot be everywhere at once . Thus the SOPs protect them while leaving plenty of leeway to blame the operatives/crew.

In this case captain realises the caution is meaningless and there is ample room to land- tries it, screws up is crucified.

Or captain obeys caution and sticks to rules and diverts but Oh dear the diversion airfield has a shorter runway, plane goes off the end , captain gets crucified, should have used discretion and landed at first airport .

Very hard for you guys up front these days especially working in blame focussed cultures

The crew did what they did based on what they saw that day.

If the plane could not land at the destination nor alternate then someone stuffed up the flight planning - dispatching above the RTOW which more than likely was MLW (Structural) limited.

On any given day you should have 40% more runway than a maximum performance stop on dry and another 15% margin on a wet runway.

Yes test pilot figures some will say but the humble line drivers have the 6-7 seconds from 50 feet to touchdown plus 15% which is achievable...unless you float or hold off for a kisser.

These should definitely fit into the test pilot figures with a reduced margin. The ROW/ROP differs in that it calculates an auto land so slightly longer flare but the similarity is the MAX BRAKING.

More to the story than what's on AV Herald. Irrespective if you had x or y margin, classic airplane with or without RAAS/ROW/ROP you'd be crucified if you went off the end.

1st GA - justified, rest I can't judge yet without the full story but have an idea.

Helen
Im just wondering how they have managed to land in AKL with 2300m or so of LDA at the moment at close to MLW all this time? Given of course MAN is considerably longer.

Presumably because they didn't get the warning!!!!!

So then Helen, it would appear "resilience" isn't a term well understood on the wunderbus? Again the reason I say this is based on the plethora of various notes about "spurious" RAAS and BTV warnings all across the network, surely given the rather large quantity in effect there must have been at least a dozen or so similar incidents resulting in diversions etc. What makes MAN so special? or different for that matter, that is what intrigues me.

This would be the first ROW incident that I would be aware of Moanarch. There have been several ROP activations in the past. But as you know that's a completely different thing. BTV is of course yet another completely different system, as I am sure you are aware.

News from AVH:

Donald, you'd be wrong, I am pig ignorant of the wunderbus and its ROW functions, I wrongly assumed that ROP ROW etc etc was one in the same, moreover, it's the reason I asked the question in the first instance given that surely if the automation isn't doing what you need from it, you switch it off. So, can it be switched off in the event of a PET de ce?
How does one ensure that the ghost in the machine won't ruin your day?

This is marvellous news. To hear that the Flight Ops Dept. of some of my competition has such enlightened views is music to my ears. I hope they get even more retentive.

PM

It was totally my mistake Monach. Sorry about that. I just assumed you must have had some knowledge of the system before slating your colleagues resilience.

After asking a close neighbour Donald, who BTW is also a wunderbus chap, he is baffled as the resilience that you speak of is based in no small part on a computer with a French mindset....

I am not going to judge the captain on his decision here.

However, the aviation industry is headed nowhere good if we have come to this point.