It's not only biz-jets. Over many years I've been amazed that as charges to XAA's have risen their active oversight seems to have reduced. It would seem that much of the standards enforcement has been passed to the operators. The airlines should have procedures in place to check their crews and maintain SOP standards etc. The XAA's should assess if these procedures are in place. The actual appplication and checking of those procedures is the responsibility of the airline. The airline writes its SOP manual, it's checking manual, its recurrent training schedule. These are approved. It is then their own responsibility to police that. At various intervals the XAA will check this is done. I think this is the current situation. Will others concur or correct me, please.

Gust Lock--
 

I stand corrected mr M..
good catch.
Wrong report wrong year.

So, are you saying that there is effectively no regulatory oversight of practical operations for business aircraft?

Complacency, I presume.
The feeling of "I've got too much experience/it cannot happen to me".
That's my take. And I blame only the pilots for this.

The amount of oversight depends on the nature of the operations.

This particular business jet was operated solely as a private aircraft regulated under FAR Part 91, so it has as little (or as much) oversight as any other private aircraft.

Other business jets are operated under more stringent FAR Part 135 rules governing commercial on-demand and commuter flights, and will have more regulatory oversight accordingly.

Part 91
 

Peekay4 - thanks again for the detailed reply. Makes sense when I think about it

I missed the Part 91 status which is very significant. From personal experience I can say that Part 91 operations have essentially zero oversight. It is a little hard to get around the fact that a GIV with a professional crew and an owner operated C150 are treated the same. You don't have to fly it, as long as there is no hire involved its all treated the same.

In many parts of part 91, oversight comes largely from insurance companies.

I guess in US, and other areas, that mega rich guys with private jets treat them like cars. I wonder if they leave all the oversight to the CP and have blind faith. I wonder just how much involved they get in their own safety, or do they leave it to the 'chauffeur' to polish the vehicle, kick the tyres and stock the bar. The Caddi chauffeur doesn't take a driving test every year, but the car gets a once over. No doubt the a/c has a maintenance schedule, but I wonder who does the pilot checks in a small outfit.
In EU there are some mega-rich guys climbing on chartered private jets expecting the same level of operational safety, comfort and experience, or even higher, than in the 1st class cabin of their local national airline. I wonder if it's always true. Same with race jockeys climbing on small twins hopping from grass strip to grass strip on nasty days to bag 5 rides at 3 different courses on the sam day. Blind faith. Most of the time it works; but would you do it?

I think "mega rich guys" or whoever is paying to travel on a private aircraft should expect to get a high level of care by the operators of said aircraft. from the ops department to the flight crew. to carry on the chauffeur analogy, one would expect the car to be checked by the mechanics, but for the driver to make sure the car was gassed up, with sufficient washer fluid etc before embarking on a long trip. as you would expect your pilots to to carefully carry out their pre flight checklist!

I am most interested by the human factors here, especially the complacency factor and how it can impact such experienced airmen. and it is not just the fact that they (almost) never did their checklist... it is the fact that they had several warnings, from the rudder not working to the power not coming up as usual, and they just ignored them! and then the time it took for them to react once they realized what was going on.

these were super experienced guys! PIC had more hours than the majority of posters on this site i would wager. (certainly WAY more than this poster!)

i am not trying to criticize them, but learn from this.

it seems that by flying with the same FO for 12 years in the same aircraft somehow deadened their senses and almost "zombified" them. pilots at major airlines fly with different crew every day, so they realize they have to be sharp and professional. but does that stop us getting complacent about ops at a field we fly into/out of every flight? how do we make sure we do not sink too deep into our comfort zone when it is the same dispatch, the same voice on the RT, the same SID/STAR every time?

asking questions and hoping to keep alert myself! if that kind of thing could happen to them, it could happen to anyone.

safe landings all

A G-IV is a very expensive airplane to own and fly as an exclusive private airplane (as opposed to fractional share, charter, etc.)

The owner, Lewis Katz, wasn't known for skimping on anything. He didn't have to. He previously co-owned YankeeNets along with George Steinbrenner. That's YankeeNets as in the NY Yankees baseball team and the (then) New Jersey Nets basketball team. They also owned the New Jersey Devils NHL team. Katz was also the co-owner of The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Both of the pilots were very experienced and took the G-IV PIC Recurrent course at Flight Safety annually (which costs an arm & a leg).

The PNF that day had worked as the personal pilot for Mr. Katz for 27 years. He had 18,200 hours logged, with 2,800 on the G-IV and another 4,700 hours on G-II/IIIs.

The PF that day was also a long-time employee (12 years) with 11,050 hours including 1,400 on the G-IV.

Similarly the flight attendant had worked for the Katz family for over 15 years.

Those long service years are indicative of a well-compensated crew. I'm sure the owner felt they were among the best in the business.

I think in this case, the owner probably did all that could be expected from a (non-pilot) owner.

Thank you for all the back-ground information. But it makes it all the more difficult to understand the WHY? As you said, so many clues ignored; AND it might seem that these were 2 captains and the more experienced and senior was PM, but he kept quiet. Astonishing, and we'll never know the answers. Such an avoidable tragic loss. Indeed, one of the most avoidable crashes we've ever read about on here. The flapless Spanair at MAD had a few mitigating circumstances, not enough to exonerate the crew. This crash seemed to stem from another source entirely.

Recently a North American Part 91 Gulfstream 550 operator attempted a takeoff from a Caribbean island airport without the benefit of starting both engines. In such a hurry to please the principals they failed to start the 2nd engine after a short taxi. Both pilots were very experienced and one of them had prior experience as an USAF 89th Gulstream pilot. The 89th is the Presidential Wing. I won't say who the operator of this airplane is but it's more than just a house hold name.

I know airline pilots have done similar things in the 727 so I'm not sure you simply blame the corporate operators but your right when observe the total lack of oversight that exists in most Part 91 flight departments.

Now that's a curious one, or are you saying guys in that area start jet a/c without outside guidance. It would be most odd if the ground guy didn't realise one donk was very stationary & silent.

Well, at Portland Intl. some years back (1998), the pilot of an Aerospatiale SN-601 "Corvette" Part 91 flight purposely tried to takeoff with one engine inop. :sad:

On takeoff the business jet barely managed to climb 10 ft before settling back down on the runway. It then veered off the runway and slid for 1/2 mile. It was a miracle that no one was seriously hurt or killed.

Post accident, the pilot then lied to the FAA and NTSB, stating that the right engine failed during the takeoff roll. Of course the CVR clearly recorded the pilot talking to the "co-pilot" and passengers that he couldn't start the right engine despite multiple tries. The pilot then stated that he was going to take off with one engine and try to "compressor start" the other engine in the air after the takeoff.

And although the SN-601 required two pilots, turns out the person sitting on the right seat was only a private pilot with no multi-engine rating and therefore not SIC qualified. :ugh:

I don't know that kind of enforcement actions the FAA took... I hope they were "appropriate". :E

NTSB Full Narrative N600RA

The full report of the Hanscom G-IV crash is now available.

Safety issues discussed include:

• Use of the challenge-verfication-response format for checklist execution
• Analysis of flight operational quality assurance data to define the scope of procedural noncompliance in business aviation
• Replacement of nonfrangible fittings with frangible fittings for any objects along the extended runway centerline up to the perimeter fence
• Retrofit of the gust lock system on all existing G-IV airplanes to comply with the certification requirement that the gust lock limit the operation of the airplane so that the pilot receives an unmistakable warning if the lock is engaged at the start of takeoff
• Guidance on the appropriate use and limitations of the review of engineering drawings in a design review performed as a means of showing compliance with certification regulations

Other recommendations include amendment to the IS-BAO auditing standards to assure compliance regarding the use of checklists.

Link to full report:

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/A...ts/AAR1503.pdf