Double runway incursion at Okinawa
 

ASN News » ANA Boeing 737-800 in serious double runway incursion incident at Okinawa Airport, Japan

OK, the first one I understand, but the second? If you are ordered to go-around by the tower just before landing, aren't there situations where a GA might not be the best option? (note, I'm not criticizing anyone here, merely asking the question - no doubt there will be an investigation and I'm happy to wait for a transcript of the report in English).

Double runway incursion at Okinawa
 

Double engine failures generally preclude a go-around on a twin-engined aircraft.

Whilst that is true, it's not what happened here!

Doubt it applies here, but a missed approach initiated inside the MAP may not clear terrain, thus hesitancy to do anything but land.

This event sounds like either 'ear' trouble for 2 out of 3 captains or perhaps more likely, 'mouth' trouble for 1 out of 1 controller.

Not sure how tower communicates at OKA but all participants most likely are native Japanese speakers.

Can't think of one...

Once flying, you have 3-dimensional maneuverability. When rolling down the runway which is already occupied by another airplane, you have few options.


Not even CLOSE to a valid reason! Terrain clearance criteria are based on one engine inop, so there is never a reason (that I can think of) to even THINK like that when both engines are running! You already have flying speed at the approach end threshold, and are at or below max landing weight. The conditions are WAY better than for initial takeoff!

Go fly in the mountains, review a few IAPs and you're going to have an epiphany.

Read what I said again, starting the missed approach from inside the missed approach point on certain approaches. There are certain special IAPs JNU, ASE, EGE to name a few) that don't assure terrain clearance started inside the MAP.

Sorry, but that is not correct. The public criteria is based on all engine gross/net climb performance.

Tailored criteria does account for OEI performance for missed, and even balked.

You should have procedures for a rejected landing at terrain critical airports even if a engine fails. If not your airline has some serious safety issues. In general the procedures usually mirror the engine out departure procedure.

We do, but often don't mirror the OEO procedure. They're proprietary procedures provided by our performance provider designed to extract the aircraft where there is no published procedure. To tie it back to the original question, I'd consider taking my lumps on the runway rather than a single engine extraction, at night and/or in WX.

SItuational Awareness/ Airmanship
 

Few words describe this incident for the landing B737, lack of situational awareness/Airmanship. Listening on the radio and looking out the window, the Captain would have been aware of the highly dynamic situation at play.

Seeing an aircraft stopped on the runway doesnt need ATC to tell you to Go-Around. The ATC instruction should have been the last resort and it was still disregarded. Both approaches are over water, there are no terrain considerations, the missed approach will keep aircraft low (1500') due to the nearby American airbase.

KABOY:
 

Radio issues aside, do we know what the RVR was?

Looking at the video it would have been greater than 10km.

Did not watch the video in the link earlier. Thank you KB. Now that I have, it is interesting to observe, despite the obvious risks of a collision, how much of a non-incident it "appears" to play out on video - the helo seems more potentially threatening than the following flight. All that aside, with daytime ops and visibility like that, it seems a bit odd that both transgressions occurred - radio difficulties or not.

Obviously there was a breakdown in comms. In trying to visualize what the landing aircraft saw, without knowing the intentions of the aircraft already on the runway, I see landing behind the better option compared to a GA over an aircraft that has the potential to become airborne and a rising threat below me.

Nasty one from the look of it.

Watching the video a few times we don't know where the intruding Chinook had got to so the approaching aircraft could have been faced with go-around to a mid-air with the Chinook or take the landing against traffic you can see. Either way it's a judgement call and no one got hurt.

The landing 737 pilot had a tough call as a go around could well have resulted in a midair. Since he's alive to read this he made the right one! I'm surprised to see him facing criticism, particularly when there's not a word against the Chinook crew whose gross error caused this near catastrophe.

The majority of the video appears to be a computer rendering, not CCTV. If it is a graphic artist's reconstruction, I would not read too much into it.

"The landing 737 pilot had a tough call as a go around could well have resulted in a midair. Since he's alive to read this he made the right one! I'm surprised to see him facing criticism, particularly when there's not a word against the Chinook crew whose gross error caused this near catastrophe."

Finally a sensible comment.

In airmanship, quick decisions based on the big picture are essential. Humbleness is also a good quality which not many here demonstrate.

Did we watch different videos?

Then let me give you a hint: A big powerful helicopter on the missed approach path with an unknown direction, when you are bank angle limited, and no TCAS in the world will save you.

Runway direction is 18/36, helicopter was tracking from East to West. I don't see any conflict with a missed approach, the helicopter was well clear of the centreline by the time the other aircraft touched down. If you maintained some situational awareness, a small track correction would keep you clear of the helicopter's fligh path. A chinook is not going to change direction that rapidly.

I wouldnt have liked to be the ANA captain vacating the runway knowing another aircraft touched down behind me, against an ATC instruction.

Well, sitting here with a cup of coffee and being a judging keyboard astronaut is easy and comfortable for the ego when the facts and results are available in afterhand.

Having to take the decision in a split second where you might not even have been aware of the presence of a camouflaged helicopter is not as easy. Even though my eyesight is very good, when flying to military airfields I often struggle to establish a visual contact with camouflaged aircraft more than 2-3nm away, aspecially during a bright sunny day with a windshield full of mashed mosquitoes.

If you know the runway, your aircraft and distance to preceeding aircraft you have a pretty accurate estimate of where the aircraft will come to a rest. I would usually prefer going off the edge of the runway at jogging-speed rather than running the risk of a midair collision.

I agree that a missed approach usually is the safest option but when it's no longer a safe option you might have to use your judgement and skills rather than manuals written by lawyers to stay alive. Therefor I will not judge and criticize the airmen in question.

Type 1V, you may a good point about awareness, if he was aware of the Chinook, but couldn't see it then it's a really tough call. If he was unaware of the Chinook (ie didn't even know of its presence) and terrain was no issue then there is a real problem here.

A camouflaged (matte painted) aircraft is actually easier to see against a bright sky (where it would be once the airplane descended to its altitude), as it initially appears as a 'black hole'. Also, a Chinook broadside is a LARGE aircraft, so it should not be too hard to see at 5 miles (much less 2!), especially if you are aware of the general area of the traffic.

Notwithstanding a couple 'way out there' scenarios (such as the mountainside airport), there is almost never a reason to fail to go around when so directed by tower.

In this particular situation, the helo was well out of collision range of the landing airplane; it would have only threatened the airplane taking off immediately after rotation. The tower made a good 'go around' call after the helo pilot misheard the takeoff clearance. The Captain of the landing aircraft made 2 significant errors: landing when another airplane was still stopped on the runway, and disregarding the tower's instructions. Each of those was a higher threat to his airplane than the helo or the terrain.

Hardly far out there. It may not be a concern for you but it will be for me in just a few hours as it was for many others today as well. In a flatland scenario with nothing else complicating the situation, I would likely agree with you though

Those unfamiliar with Naha may not be aware that Naha approach, tower, ground etc operate dual VHF/UHF frequencies down there, the P3s, F15s, T4s on UHF, the Chinooks I have heard on both, occasionally you will hear the tower transmitting a call on VHF whilst talking to a mil fighter on UHF but they actually transmitting on both, other times they will transmit on the designated frequency only. This could possibly have been another factor, not saying it was, just trying to make the picture in Naha clear, go arounds during the day by civilian airliners due to F15 formations not clearing the runway in time for example, is an everyday occurance here.

Work on a second runway has finally begun but that is still years away. With such an eclectic mix of traffic in Naha, Islanders to F15s, Chinooks to 777s, on the single runway with 2 busy US airbase's airspace surrounding Naha, ATC working multiple frequencies, PAR approaches throughout the day, it is slightly surprising more of this doesn't happen on a regular basis.

At the end of the day, everyone is still safe and now the JCAB and JGSDF will start their multiple inquiries and eventually something will come out.

That's a serious assertion, how do you know that he knew about the helo just taking off? If someone made an RTO due to a helicopter over the clearway and I didn't see it or know where it was going I would probably have done the same.

Now, that's very easy to point out with facts in hand afterwards. How would the pilot know beforehand?

I have colleagues who have been on final reserve fuel and I've had predictive windshear warnings beyond the runway in very mountaneous areas myself. A grass cutter not responding on his radio for example, would not get me going around in that situation (seen that too).

Again. This is difficult to know until the scenario is over. There's a chance that the only sight he got of the helo was the traffic advisory on his ND. If we weren't there to have the all facts ready, we shouldn't judge.

Did you even watch the video?

Yes, I watched the video.

I've also had the opportunity to engage multiple F-4s and F-14s with varying paint schemes. The matte painted airplanes were definitely easier to find in a bright sky.

If he had the helo on his ND, he either had an RA or did not. If he did, it would NOT have been a "Descend" advisory at that low an altitude. If he did not, he could have avoided it visually and/or via the TCAS display.

What we DO know was that the tower told him to go around, but he did not. There would have to be some extraordinary circumstances to validate that decision, and so far we have seen none.

OTOH, it IS possible he did not hear the go-around transmission. If so, he should still have gone around due to the airplane stopped on the runway.

Much ado about nothing. There was very little chance of a midair with the angry palmtree and very little chance of an "up the bum" prang on the runway. :ok:

That's a pretty unreasonable position, Intruder; none of us know exactly where the Chinook was at the critical moment but the landing airline pilot was in a better position to make the call than the controller. It's entirely your speculation whether or not it appeared on his TCAS but even if it did it wouldn't guarantee he could avoid it.

Again, with ALL else as speculation, we KNOW:

The controller called for a go around.

There was an airplane stopped on the runway.

WHY did the pilot land anyhow?!? I would have gone around with EITHER of the 2 conditions! To land with BOTH of the 2 conditions was unconscionable, save for extraordinary conditions. WHAT WERE THEY, if any? We won't know for sure until the investigation report comes out.

Personally, I suspect there were none...

Go-around called after landing
 

According to this report in the local press (Japanese), the pilot of the JTA 737 claimed when debriefed that the controller called go around only after the plane had already touched down and applied reverse thrust, by which time it was not practical to comply.

I suppose it depends on where the JAL Transocean was when go-around was called. If it was a rejected landing scenario with heli traffic crossing the flight path, I can see how the pilots would have decided to stop. If the go-around call happened much farther back in the approach, perhaps it's another story altogether.

But there really isn't much to go on here is there. We don't even know if the landing aircraft got a TCAS RA. It's very hard to judge either way.

That is what I would assume happened, unless the GA call came after the MAP.

On the other hand...

Agreed. In addition, relying on TCAS in place of visual contact for avoidance of an aircraft that can move rather quickly in all directions (helo) in terminal airspace seems riskier to me than landing behind an aircraft well down the runway, of which it may not have been known its intentions either.

RAs are inhibited below 1000' and the accuracy of the TCAS, when used for determining the position of another AC is very bad. Therefor he couldn't have used the TCAS to avoid it. Even visually it would have been difficult since you are restricted to a bank angle of only 15 degrees and you might get the chinhook out of sight due to the big pitch up. Probably he didn't even see it at all and therefor decided not to go around.

Unknown aircraft, potentially in the missed approach path, with an AT THE TIME unknown direction and intention, is an extraordinary circumstance. A midair collision is a possible outcome from such an extraordinary circumstance.

We are pilots and not robots, we have to use our judgement and skills. If the tower's command is deemed unsafe, there is absolutely no problem for a captain to disregard the tower's command. It was as late as last evening that an approach controller told me to descend into the path of another aircraft coming head on 1000' below me.

A potential midair collision guaranteeing the death of all aboard from the information that might have been available at the point of decision making.

That's the reason why we should be more humble and not as fast when judging. After all everyone remains alive. If the track of the helo was different in combination with a GA, the outcome could have been much worse.
I suspect that there were

+1 to all of that, type IV, on top of which, why are we judging the 737 pilot at all? None of his options were risk free. And why a complete of absence of judgement for the helo crew whose major lapse in professionalism and SA caused this. Even allowing for them mishearing the clearance, how could they not see two liveried twin engined airliners with all their lights heading for their intended flightpath?

Assuming the following aircraft was committed to touching down, how much runway would be needed for a go-around, compared to coming to a stop?

The Chinook took off across the runway WITHOUT CLEARANCE!

So the aircraft cleared to takeoff aborted the departure, it was still on the runway when the 737 landed behind it. Apparently ignoring the tower instruction to go around.

If the handling pilot of the landing 737 judged he could easily stop in the distance available with the aborted departure still on the runway, I think he may have used good sense. The aircraft on the runway is not going to reverse, after all. The helicopter, already behaving without clearance, could go up, down, sideways, or backwards! So the landing 737 could well have decided it is safer to land with enough room to stop rather than to chance a midair with an erratic Chinook in the way.

Any Pilot must be prepared to go around until they have a landing clearance! To ignore a go around call and to then land without a landing clearance I am not surprised that the Captain has been asked to explain himself.
a go around call cancels a landing clearance even if one has been given

To land a heavy jet thinking you can stop with another aircraft already on the runway is on a wing and a prayer and not based on any computed data.

How does the pilot judge the runway available? Going around the pilot could always break right or left if there is another aircraft airborne

These are all good points, Pace, but I believe those wings and prayers might also be needed if the landing aircraft went around with difficult to spot/predict company in the vicinity: a.) helo changes direction, b.) a second, or more helos come up behind the first - unlike tankers and transports, small military aircraft are often not alone - and this at an airport known for incursions and complications between military, local forces, and commercial traffic, c.) the aircraft on the runway is not truly stopped and lifts off below where only TCAS can see.

It is a judgement call to be sure and the decision falls under the purview of the PIC in this situation. It will be interesting to see what truly transpired that day, have a look at the transcripts, and see what sort of if any action is taken.