There are some wind/atmospheric conditions in which a wake vortex does not dissipate as expected but remains in almost a stable state. The separations are based on the probability of dissipation and the following aircraft's susceptibility to the vortices from the previous aircraft. With a light cross wind a wake that would have dissipated safely to the side of the runway may instead be carried along the runway by the ambient wind. These conditions where vortices are more stable are when LIDAR based systems like WindTracer ( WindTracer® · Lockheed Martin ) can be extremely useful.

Looks like some serious structural damage. Possible write off? The wake turb theory off the preceding 787 is very interesting. Irrespective of the reasons why, well done to the crew for getting the injured machine on terra firma safely.

If the down lock signal is lost on one or more landing gear (e.g. RH MLG not detected as locked down by the LGCIU in command), the LGCIU will open the landing gear doors. When all gear detected as down locked, the doors will be commanded to close. So the fact that all the LDG doors were open does not necessarily mean the gear were extended using free-fall.

Considering the thrust (Eng2 in flames) and flap asymmetry (RH inboard flap and trailing edge false work hanging in tatters) and the apparent twist on the RH wing (funny angle of wing tip suggests rear spar damage at Rib 5?) the crew did will to control the aircraft - lateral/roll authority will have been rather compromised. It would be interesting to see how much rudder/aileron/spoiler it needed to fly straight. Aileron reversal could potentially occur if the wing box torsional stiffness was compromised. *Shudder!*

Busbert. : Thanks for that info - makes sense. So you are saying the doors would be opened hydraulically in that situation therefore I Presume the crew would also therefore have had a gear "unsafe" indication to add to their woes?

miracle
 

??TE THY UÇA?ININ HAVADAK? GÖRÜNTÜLER?

With the persisting fire just after GA shown in this vid (and the (likely structural) wing damage shown in some twitter pics from inside the A/C), its a miracle that it held flight for 20 more min. It took about about 12 min to line up for a second approach onto RWY 05 (after having passed and re-passed over central Istanbul), which was aborted in favour of re-positioning in approx another 8 min more for RWY 33.

The chain of events reported are.
Tail strike, followed by stbd engine strike on attempted landing RNWY25, after go around in the hold for some time and declaring emergency with stbd engine fire, landed on RNWY35 where stbd gear collapsed on touchdown. Engine fire attributed to ground strike on attempted landing on RNWY25.

It would appear the crew were quick in shutting down engine and preventing an in flight fire from spreading.

The disturbing factor is an aircraft with engine fire, captured on video footage over a city with a population in excess of 15 million.

In this situation there would be a 'L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED' ECAM warning with a red UNLK indication and no green arrow for the RH MLG on the landing gear indicator panel (i.e. 2 greens for the NLG and LH MLG).

So inconvenient (and unusual) having an airport located near a major city!

I didn't think IST had a runway 25, no wonder they had so much damage!

Chronus,

According to Flightradar24, the initial landing attempt was on 05, the final landing on 35L.

https://imgur.com/a/2c7hf#0

(There is no runway 25, but there is 35L and 35R.)

There are obviously some aircraft types around that produce very heavy wake vortices, although they are not soo big/heavy. The 757 is one example. Does the 787 have some similar "reputation"? How does the Boeing "raked wingtip" on the 777/787 behave with respect to vortices ?

After the bounce we have seen some real good airmanship here :ok:

The disturbing factor is an aircraft with engine fire, captured on video footage over a city with a population in excess of 15 million.

So inconvenient (and unusual) having an airport located near a major city!

I'm not familiar with IST, but the question that might be being asked is could the a/c have been vectored over water for most of its recovery routing?

For wake separation purposes, the 757 is classed as a Medium (based on weight), even though it produces vortices comparable to some Heavy types (in the UK it's classed as an Upper Medium for that reason, to differentiate it for wake separation purposes from 737s, A320s, etc).

The 787, on the other hand, already belongs in the Heavy category based on weight, so it gets the same separation behind it as any other Heavy.

From the link above, most of its path was above water. Initial missed approach was over the city, since the city starts at DER 05 - I doubt they can change that...

Risky, lucky
 

Obviously can't comment at this stage cause of the first landing attempt anomalies, but clearly the FD judged it sufficiently "hard" to initiate a GA, as per SOP.

Don't get though why, 12 min after GA, they subsequently risk aborting the 2nd approach on 05 for another 8 minutes to reposition for 35L. If not from the FD, surely from the cabin all indications of a persisting engine fire and (structural) wing damage, should have prompted the crew to land ASAP, no matter RWY width and length.

On turning tight and short for the 2nd 05-approach they may have been too high and fast. But why turning in so short for this second approach?

Given the state of the A/C, why not make a much more wide and gentle right 180° after GA and with another gentle more or less 90° right turn position directly for 35L?

Hindsight probably, I realise, but it raises at least some doubts about the awareness on the FD. Not to mention that after the aborted 2nd approach on 05 the A/C made another couple of very tight turns to reposition for 35L.

Risky, lucky.....

Looking at the picture in post 15 it seems the right landing gear is at an angle (damaged by the first hard touch down). Wouldn't this cause the right landing gear to be worn down to the metal, and causing the sparks and the final turn by the aircraft?

Right LG was pushed up into the wing, hence the damage shown in the in-flight photo.

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2015/...9963976022.jpg

Landing on 35 gives greater length with two parallel runways to go for, 05 is shorter. Vehicle access is better to 35 as you can use the parallel runway as a road, 05 is like walking in fog. As to the " cause" probably we will never know, but the 787 is " heavy" and the vortex could well have been a factor. If landing following a Heavy the FAA guidance for ATCs is:
2.8.1 Specific Procedures
2.8.1.1 Landing Behind a Larger Aircraft - Same Runway (Figure 2.8-1)
Stay at or above the larger aircraft’s final approach flightpath.
Note its touchdown point.
Land beyond the touchdown point, run- way length permitting.
If unable to land safely beyond the touch- down point, go around.
The tail wind may have effectively " contained" the vortex on the threshold.
Anyone who flys in Istanbul knows that in a " non normal" you have to paddle your own canoe, ATC will accommodate your requests, not make suggestions.
The engine with fire was still producing thrust and the crew followed the SOPs as far as we can see. In fact, they (ALL inc Cabin) did a good job, looking at a destroyed wing and an engine fire is not a comforting sight..

Yes bSIEKER, you are quite correct, my mistake done in haste.
Apologies to all.

"From the link above, most of its path was above water. Initial missed approach was over the city, since the city starts at DER 05 - I doubt they can change that..."

The sound track of the video footage (which was posted earlier in this thread) of the aircraft captured from a wittness on the ground records the anguished remarks of the cameraman speaking to his mother. It ends with the cameraman stating that he would contact the airport.

Perhaps he did do just that, and if he did so and in time, then ATC may have been alerted of an aircraft reportedly on fire above the city and on receipt of the MAYDAY call would have been in a position to take appropriate action. As things stood ATC were not aware of the aircraft`s distress and nature of emergency. With the MAYDAY call all that they were told was that the aircraft had lost an engine and 35 was requested for landing.