Sky9 said: Absolutely. Maybe not as far as 3 crew, but moving the door will finally separate pax from the flightdeck and stop the pilots being separated from each other.

Hi TriskelI'm afraid that solution is about as sensible as mandating that when one pilot leaves the cockpit, the other must do so also :ooh:

Frequently when I leave the Flt Deck, my colleague is required to speak to ATC, alter heading, navigation and FL - and primarily of course, be ready and able to react to any abnormal situation appropriately. And this is a flaw in the "2 in cockpit rule" - prior GW their role could be seen as in case of incapacitation and/or door operative. Post GW, unless and until it is clearly stated, people (including Cabin Crew) will see the role to "monitor" the remaining pilot, and be consulted over such actions.

Hence whilst I am not necessarily against a "2 in cockpit" rule, with it's implementation the role of said person needs to be very clearly laid out. You only have to read the last X million posts on this thread to see that role has been given many different purposes.

Prior to a pilot under training being assessed as competent to handle the above tasks by themselves, a 3rd (Safety) pilot is carried. What some posters above seem to be advocating with the "2 in cockpit" rule is removing that ability from all pilots - if that is the case, then the rule needs to be "2 pilots in the cockpit at all time", which effectively equates to 3 Flt Crew aircraft. Fine by me :ok:

xollop . . .
 

What's your solution to internet news portals in a world where news is everywhere instantly? Sit on the data for a week, for a month, before talking about it? Is the CVR audio in doubt? Is CVR audio less factual today than it would be a month from now? Is the FDR data in doubt? Is the FDR data inconclusive about altitude & speed changes initiated by someone in the cockpit? :ooh:

Think everyone forgets the aircraft hijacked on 9/11 operated with locked cockpit doors. :ugh:

xollob ...BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile) has a secondary role to assist the prosecutor in technical matters, as it was established to be a criminal act. Thus, primary jurisdiction is with the French prosecutor's office, which is not subject to ICAO protocols.

From (and more at):- Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'accelerated descent' - BBC News

RexBanner

But neither was a completely insane FO under the personal invitation of the captain? a sane one yes and that is obviously what this poor captain thought he had. That is the worrying thing if he didn't doubt him how would anyone else?

The hijackers on 9/11 took advantage of a window of opportunity that was only available up until 09:37 on Tuesday September 11th 2001 (the moment the Pentagon was hit). From then on it was apparent to the passengers on United Flight 93 and the rest of the entire world that the classic hijack scenario had ended and the tactics had now radically changed.

No aircraft that has been hijacked since will have its passengers meekly sit subserviently as they fly to their doom. Likewise air forces on the ground will prevent any aircraft getting near built up areas.

It is also highly probable that had the US Government actually been paying attention to the threat posed (they had numerous warnings from Mossad and German intelligence amongst others) and the CIA and FBI had been sharing their information, they would have apprehended Atta and the others before they got anywhere near commercial aircraft that morning.

But they are now unable to gain access to the Flight Deck - so they can do no more than the passengers on the Germanwings flight were able to do . . .

Though eight minutes doesn't seem enough time to react and respond - was there any evidence that the Germanwings flight was being intercepted?

I agree that there was no built-up area near by, but if the FO had maintained altitude there would have been no trigger for ATC to decide on action.
Could the Captain have contacted 'base' from outside the FD?

G-CPTN Read between the lines. That is my EXACT point. The flaw is in the cockpit door to start with and our entire approach to security and counter terrorism.

@NoD, Pace and others who object to the "two in the cockpit" principle.

None of the stated objections have real substance or come close to outweighing the immediate and real benefit of ensuring that a single pilot cannot easily exclude the second pilot from the cockpit without overpowering that pilot or at least one other crew member. Dealing with those stated below -

Are you saying there is a RULE that CC cannot enter the cockpit unless both FD crew are present?

Even if that was the case, which I doubt, the risk of a rogue CC overpowering the single pilot is hardly more significant than the risk that a CC will conspire to allow a hijacker or terrorist to enter the flight deck when delivering refreshments to the FD crew.

As above. If there is a rogue CC, the risk exists anyway and is hardly increased by the need for an occasional extra visit to the FD to guard the door.

There is always a risk that CC will refuse to obey the captain's instructions. This risk is not increased.

Honestly I am dismayed by what I have been reading. Your profession is facing a crisis of confidence and all you seem to have to say is "the risk of rogue pilots is tiny, no need to worry or take additional precautions". Well hello. Lubitz (and some others before) proved that the risk is real and exists NOW. True it has done for years but that is NO reason not to take NOW, immediate, simple, and virtually zero cost steps to reduce the risk.

More may be needed, which may take more thought and time, but this CAN be done, SHOULD be done and I am pleased that some carriers and regulatory authorities have faced up to that and taken steps to make sure it is done.

Waiting for a better long-term solution, if there is one (which is far from certain), is foolish and reckless.

In my world of corporate jet flying we fly with the same pool of pilots who normally become friends. We even meet up for a night out
We spend longer periods away together than the quick turnaround low cost carriers and will tend to know each others problems and usually discuss those problems with each other and yes pilots have problems like anyone else.

You can keep things hidden for a short time to someone you don't know but you cannot do that with someone you know very well.

Maybe rostering crews not to always fly together but to fly more together might part help. The fact that you get crews who have never clapped eyes on each other before the flight might not be a positive thing.

Crews used to be a unit years ago, there were benefits to that as well as negatives

But if Lubitz was devoid of any external emotions so that no one would notice then he was a very dangerous and thankfully rare character

Please confirm that you would "empower" the CC in this scenario to override the specific verbal instructions of the Captain?

It almost certainly would have, but then it would not have been planned in this way. You cannot look at one accident in isolation - you need to design a "system" to provide the minimum overall risk.

"Mentally ill pilot crashes aircraft and kills all on board". How best to address? Prevent the situation in the 1st place, or accept it as fact, and devise solutions that not only allow the mentally ill pilot to still achieve their aims, but opens up a whole range of new hazards.

PS I assume you do know the rules (or lack of) re CC operating with depression / mental illness / associated drugs, their medical checks (nil) etc.?

kcockayne

What the industry has traditionally done is to analyse events and figure out the best way to deal with them - and I am sure this will be no exception as I am sure the travelling public will be looking at who implements the best solution.

Short term I believe that there will need to be another person in the flight deck when a break is required. The build of the individuals concerned is just part of the discussion. In this case the FO was hardly a hulk and whereas CC tend to be more on the lithe side than the Amazonian, I wouldn't discount the abilities of anyone, however slight, to get the door open again if the alternative was certain death.

So we have initial FDR reports stating that there were deliberately entered speed changes (seems he wanted to ensure no survivors).

That should be that, no more he could have been unconscious, frozen with fear etc etc. It was deliberate.

Ah but I read, it could have been system inputs because they have not told us which method he used to make these speed changes, aand do they actually know themselves.

I fully believe if they did not have conclusive proof these were pilot driven changes they would not have siad so.

Time to accept the inevitable If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, IT'S A DUCK!

Cabin crew on FD:-

RE CC on FD, since 9/11 how many attempted incidents have there been on aircraft using CC on FD utilise the CC, to my knowledge ZERO, how many incidents on those not using it which may have been prevented, one maybe two (MH370), and yes I accept there was incident with both pilots on the FD.

Most terrorist organisations are not stupid they know which airlines use CC on FD, but do not appear to have used it as an aid to terrorism, on the other hand neither has there been a big terrorist incident on those airlines not using CC on FD. Conclusion is something else is deterring this avenue for terrorist groups.

Is this why they tried shoe bombers, underpants bombers, mix your own inflight bombers, and various bomb plots on freighters, clearly the total "ground side" is much much better, yes we have to win everytime they only have to win once in a while.

Hence the CC on flight deck to allow entry is an extra (but not ultimate) protection against crew lock out.

The article I read stated he was adjusting speed to prevent overspeed alarms from sounding. I suppose that means he was dialing down airspeed, progressively, to keep the AP from pitching up automatically during overspeed?

Nigel I am a corporate jet pilot so I know the rules re flight crew but not CC

Remove that door....
 

Remove that door and we are back with safety,and we have the original emergancy exit door, into the flightdeck from the cabin vv. and let the airports take care of security, The door today is a security gadget, and it dos not belong on the aircraft, and it is killing our pax and it will keep on doing this until it is removed.

MD80 Fanatic
 

Incorrect. the BEA site states that "à plusieurs reprises au cours de la descente, le pilote a modifié le réglage du pilote automatique pour augmenter la vitesse..." in English "several times during the descent the pilot adjusted the automatic pilot to increase the speed..." (emphasis added).

Quote:
Lufthansa states that only around 2% of those that pass the whole selection process fail during flight training and have to be let go. Those figures seem to be consistent for the last 30 or 40 years. There is something about that statistic I really do not like. It might tell us how good the selection filter is, but it might also be telling us how doggedly they hold to their initial, possibly incorrect, assessments. That nothing has changed over the last 30-40 years I also find quite troubling.


Troubling indeed. 2% fallout compared to what? LFT MPL training has a fallout rate of more then 50%.