1. It has become abundantly plain from the release of more data from the CVR that this was not an accident therefore the rules for accident investigation no longer apply. This is now a criminal investigation of a mass murder.

2. It is also plain that the security rules in place in many airlines and enabled by technology, are not sufficient to prevent this type of event recurring. It is therefore urgent to ensure that all air carriers and regulatory authorities are immediately aware of the issues and can take action that they see fit to mitigate the actual safety risk to their passengers and aircraft. This approach of provision of information for immediate mitigation of a risk is standard practice even in an accident investigation.

IFALPA needs to get off its high horse and think about what has been published and what IFALPA should do to assist mitigation of an actual risk. As is often the case in criminal investigations, which this now is, the investigators have not leapt to judgment on guesses and have a lot more information from the CVR which had not been made publicly available when IFALPA wrote their letter. Their letter in hindsight may not look particularly well judged.

Whoa there, runaway steed. And what 'actions' may they be? And how will they 'mitigate risks'?

The whole problem is that nobody knows what the 'right actions' may be. The cockpit door policy post 9-11 was not fully thought through, as we can all see. (Some of us did warn the authorities.) So why rush in with new proposals, when these new ideas are equally fraught with unintended consequences? See my post here.

(A reply to my post.)
http://www.pprune.org/8924209-post2552.html

And nobody has replied to my primary question yet.

Would you want a nuclear power plant to recruit anyone from the streets, give them a few weeks training, and then place them in charge of the nuclear power plant's control room? And give them full authority to overpower the power station's highly trained controllers, whenever they feel like it?

That is what the CAA and various airlines are proposing. Is this sensible? Has anyone thought this through?

Problems with "medical" evidence.

Too much emphasis on either psychologists or psychiatrists will get us nowhere.

Neither school of thought has anything other than unproven theories. Very few peer reviewed published studies in either of these pseudo sciences advance our knowledge of the human condition. Unless, of course, they point out the bleeding obvious!

When I was at Uni, only the mad and psychologically unbalanced medics went in to Psychiatry.

Didn't mean to call it either suicide or murder....

And apologies if my post gives that impression....

Just wanted to give an example, from first hand knowledge, that we will never be able to know conclusively why the FO did what he did because he's no longer here to give us the reason(s)....Best guess / deductions, yes, but absolute certainty, no....

Class 1 medical
 

The class 1 medical is covering both Physical and Mental health issues.

In my opinion the mental part can only be covered by an expert that knows the aviation world inside out. The abuses by the low cost carriers have to have an impact on the mental health of the pilots. The fact that some have to borrow up to 150000€ leave them vulnerable.

But the most important issue is that getting a license has been reduced to a multiple choice exam and video game.

It is a serious profession and needs to be approached in a similar way. We have to get rid of these commercially exploited training schools as soon as possible.

The release of the "contents" of the CVR was not necessary to the general public . The release of a transcript or a summary of initial recommendations to the relevant stakeholders who could actually effect change may be the point IFALPA is making .
The actual CVR recordings could be in isolation prejudicial . As we can see , many experts here already KNOW exactly what factors caused this when all the data has yet to be collated and investigated . The public and media(Pprune included) cannot change the regulations , so the need for details are a unending desire in this e-centric cyber universe to know all NOW .
Unfortunately , the media does influence the politics of the decision makers .

Question:
 

Was lubitz on a regularly scheduled flight for him or was he called in on reserve?

Just one possible correction ZS-NDV , and some have already have posted it , if access is denied via the CDLS , the keypad is disabled . As with all Airbus , not sure what this particular MSN had fitted . Also , you allude to the fact that there is a lot of assumptions here , maybe most have no reason to get too involved in the emotive discourse and await the outcome of the investigation ?

ZS-NDV,

1.) First point is valid. Completely valid. I have flown some old dogs and I know at best of times it's impossible to hear yourself chewing on food let alone breathing!

2.) Regarding the altitude selection. I dunno, some a/c have knobs which do have the faint click click sound, other's don't but it doesn't matter as the altitude selection on the MCP was relayed via Mode-S. Even the anoraks picked it up

Putting 2 together from here and 2 from there results in me being convinced the guy just wanted to end his life in the most spectacular and selfish way possible.

I would highly recommend a review of this article for all.

Now that the cause of this tragedy is in the open and there were no technical issues, the time will come when it is a case of move on, folks - nothing to see here.

There may well be a lesson though, with reference to the normal practice of cadets from airline flying schools going straight into the right hand seat of jet transports following type rating courses. From the time these youngsters undertake their first flight simulator training in an Airbus or a Boeing, they are pounded on standard operating procedures and their training is primarily concerned with flying on automatic pilot. They have had no time to enjoy the thrill of real flying apart from the hard yards on the commercial pilot training courses.

What early enthusiasm and absolute love of flying they may have had in their first few dual instruction ab-initio flights, soon must wane as the competition increases for a future airline slot.

Assuming the cadet graduates with a CPL and no real aviation experience, he then finally passes a type rating course and is shoe-horned into an airliner.

From now on he hits the manuals every night. He might be unlucky enough to crew with an autocratic captain for his line training. We have all ben there-done that:ugh: All of his flying from now will be on automatic pilot and heads down into the button pushing with often constant criticism of his ability to absorb "instruction".

Is it any wonder some of these young people lose their enthusiasm and their initial love of flying since they first flew solo. It is not hard to see how disillusionment can set in when all they are now seeing is no more fun flying, but a future life of button pushing and SOP's. They learn these cursed SOP's as a defence against criticism rather than for a love of reading a technical manual.

Management who hire these cadets, must educate their captains to use old fashioned good manners and kindness when training these youngsters and avoid the carping and often destructive criticism that all pilots know can happen to the vulnerable. Cadet first officers should be encouraged to hand fly as much as possible where circumstances permit. Too often, captains forget that they once loved the thrill of actually flying an aeroplane, albeit years ago, rather than watch the automatic pilot do everything.

I wonder if the first officer that deliberately crashed his Germanwings A320 had been subjected during his Airbus training to a harsh training atmosphere where nothing he could do would please his instructors and check captains?

Investigators need to look into the personalities involved with this lad's training because rude and aggressive "instructing" can cause loss of confidence in one's flying ability. Heaven knows what demons then rise up when flight after flight is nothing but tension in the cockpit - be it simulator or the real thing. All of us have struck this problem during our flying career at one time or another. Some have the courage to kick back at the tormentors that occasionally occupy the left seat while others are helpless against it and need time to harden up.

All of this is not to say that the Germanwings first officer suffered unfortunate experiences during his training as an Airbus pilot. That will be left to the investigators to find out. But following this recent tragedy involving a new inexperienced cadet first officer, airline managements responsible for hiring cadet pilots should start to look more closely into their training personalities and training practices.

Young cadet pilots are far more vulnerable to the actions of irritable and impatient captains; much more so than experienced first officers - many of whom will have gained the confidence to tell the occasional autocratic screaming skull captains to show respect to the second in command and to back off or else.

Centaurus

Well written! I don't fly airlines but came through flying into corporate jets through 3000 plus hours of bashing around in numerous piston twins often single pilot and in conditions where you really had to think for yourself, Then followed by some ferry work! in jets too and often bottom of the pile old jets.

these youngsters rush into airline work missing all that out and it takes a different sort of personality to the flying I have done or would want to do.

Many fly multiple sectors hardly on the ground before setting off on another sector!!! bus drivers even if they are automated AIRBUS drivers (Not Pilots many of them ) but procedure and automation guys! such a soulless flying

But I still state even stressed or depressed people even people with suicidal thoughts don't harm anyone but themselves and certainly do not pre meditate the murder of 150 people if that is true and what appears to be the case.

That specific mental illness ( No different to any other medical diagnosis from Cancer to heart disease not a blanket he is ill diagnosis ) needs to be diagnosed and identified and people with that potential kept out of an aeroplane because be it an aeroplane or a school yard with a gun they are time bombs waiting to go off

I believe a "clicking" dial is a customer option.

Holey Cheese
 

Limiting this to the questions or comments about early release of the CVR information in a narrow sense, and the nature of the post-incident inquiries more generally:
Ian W's post quite properly cites the language of the IFALPA press release insofar as it relies upon the ICAO "accident" terminology. But is it really, either, or? In other words, when the French law enforcement cadres take charge - by the way, what is the standard for their taking charge? Some posters have reached the conclusion that it is "obvious" or even, that anyone not seeing the obviousness is in some kind of denial, that the post-incident inquiry must be predominantly a criminal one. Was this an adjudicatory decision by a French tribunal possessed of competent jurisdiction? Do the French authorities have a stated, published standard which demarcates the suspicion of a crime from the evidentiary basis to proceed to investigate one which the law of France deems to have been committed?
But leaving such legal issues aside, once the criminal machinery is switched "on", that is not the end of the cause and effect analysis. And indeed, does anyone NOT think that the criminal investigators lack a major degree of the aeronautical and systems knowledge held, first, by BEA, and more broadly, its companion CAAs around the world and as united by ICAO?
And then....despite issuance of two-crewmember rulings in the immediate aftermath, no one, let me repeat no one, is wise enough and well-informed enough at this moment to prescribe, proscribe or inscribe what the solutions will be to the various problems. There are issues in FO qualifications, clearly, but their analysis let alone solutions lie deeply embedded in the state of the air carrier business in Europe and globally. There are issues in aeromedical standards and their enforcement, but hardly any real facts yet are known. There are issues too in such more concrete matters, like doors and keys and locks and codes and the inherent propensities of flying aviators to pay attention to lovely hosties who visit up front. Wait, that isn't an issue? (oh well, the more things change, the more they.....)

Lots of truth in Centaurus post. I wonder if the investigators will take such a holistic view.

Centaurus, Pace

Interesting and good valid comments, I posted something similar in post 1441

Well blame the authorities for this situation, it was not that long ago when they more or less scrapped the self improver route, (PPL, Instructor, CPL, Turboprop, 1500 hours later ATPL and maybe the right seat of a jet) in the UK in favour of young button pushing wannabes coming out with a licence after 200 hours !!!!!

Could you explain what the implication of this is please ?

ZS-NDV

Suggest you research what is recorded by the CVR. Hint: it's not just the area mic.

Quote:
It is therefore urgent to ensure that all air carriers and regulatory authorities are immediately aware of the issues and can take action that they see fit to mitigate the actual safety risk to their passengers and aircraft

You should read what I wrote again. It is up to the air carriers and regulatory authorities to decide what action they need to take to mitigate the actual risk. Some like you may say we do not believe this is a problem, or the measures we have in place are sufficient, or we really can't think of anything we can do to mitigate the risk. But they MUST be told where the hole in their cheese is - as their passengers safety is their first priority (as we are always told).

So the air carriers and regulatory authorities are told - the evidence seems to show that this was not an accident and one of the contributory factors that enabled the intended crash was that a junior first officer, apparently with medical issues, was enabled by existing procedures and systems to lock the captain out of the cockpit. You may wish to consider your current cockpit security procedures.

It is the regulatory authorities who have decided what they think needs to be done. Which like the locked cockpit doors may be an incorrect reaction in some people's view. But it is their responsibility. Delaying telling the operators and regulatory authorities of a real hazard is not allowed even under ICAO Annex 13.

thank you
 

To Ian W - thank you for the explanatory post. Yes, there is a responsibility to communicate as you have described.
Perhaps the problem is one of perception, in that the media, the rumor-writers and readers, and so, miss the important contextual words and limitations, the "preliminary-ness" of the message as you described it.
And/or, to some extent, perhaps the messengers omitted some, or most, or nearly all, of the sense of "preliminary-ness".
But what you have said about how the system is supposed to work in such a factual context, spot on, and again, "Gratitude."

MartinAOA from what I have read which was reported as direct quotes from German physicians; per one the doctor has the discretion to do so though per another they would be rather reluctant as the legal consequences can be severe.