That would be equally flawed.

The door has no way of knowing whether the key is being used by the crew member or by a terrorist who has gained possession of it by duress. And if it's the latter, you have taken away the ability of the cockpit occupant(s) to deny access.

cabin crew on flight deck
 

why the assumption that henceforth CC could be a risk on the FD? unless things have changed since my day, any of them can and do go there already in the course of their duties and so far as I know none yet have turned out to be
hijackers or worse. demonising them in advance is not conducive to good crew relations.

More specifically, the sole flight deck occupant denied access. That, of course, is what's behind the two-person proposal.

I agree that your chip-and-pin idea might work, but frankly I can't think of any proposed solution that doesn't risk unintended consequences.

Sure, so let's state what's known at this time...

Fact: moments after reaching cruise, the captain left the cockpit (source: CVR)
Fact: moments after the Captain left the FO dialed in ALT 100' (source: ADS-B data, FT24)
Fact: the captain was unable to reenter the cockpit (source: CVR)
Deduction: the FO locked the door to ensure the captain could not return to the cockpit and intervene.

So we have a few indisputable events that indicate this was an intentional act by the FO to crash the plane.

The more recent pages here are speculation as to the FO's motive, contributing factors .... and whether this type of incident can be mitigated in the future, or not. The press is naturally having a field day, but the special investigators and prosecutor have plenty of leads to pursue

Though I'm concerned how this will affect the flying public's perception of pilots and the illusion of safety, in a "mass murder" scenario such as this I wonder whether the normal air crash investigation rules can apply. (and to be clear, in no way do I condone the leaks of CVR or anonymous reports from investigators in the know, which seem to have sparked this circus in the first place)

Still lots of doubt about the suicide scenario IMO... no evidence that captain actually used the keypad, a controlled and stable decent profile, no attempt to erase the CVR just before impact... one would either want to scream at the cruelty of the world or else keep it completely secret and erase the CVR. Absolute silence and normal breathing isn't a plausible third choice!

I continue to remain absolutely astounded that an individual with 630 hrs TT accumulated over 7+ years was allowed to be a crew member on a modern, complex airliner in saturated airspace!

I am a pilot for 30+ years (non-pro) but also a physician. When we credential physicians for hospital privileges, we very carefully examine any significant time hiatus in someone's career pathway.

Unfortunately, but understandably, airline pilots are always a single medical event away from losing their medical clearance.

Anyway, count me as one who feels that a "rush to judgement" is happening here

There have been several proven, or very likely, past instances of mass murder by pilot suicide. Why suddenly now do we start a witch-hunt against depressed pilots? We have accepted the risk in the past. We could continue to accept the risk, but with greater vigilance.

In the USA many hundreds of people, or is it thousands, are killed each year by guns, but the pro-gun lobby has convinced that country's politicians that guns should be allowed, even encouraged, rather than give up their democratic freedom. They value their freedom and accept the attendant risk.

Maybe we should accept the risk and stop the witch hunts and media hype.
Maybe we should get rid of the locked door now we see the risks it imposes.
Maybe we should scale back airport security in line with reality. How many bombers has airport security found and stopped, worldwide, in 20 years? They did once confiscate my nail clippers, just in case I attacked my copilot with them. Honestly, I had no intention of crashing my 767 into London.

Stopping terrorist attacks, and the mass shootings like in Norway, Dunblane and Columbine, and this latest aviation mass murder, is more about surveillance and infiltration or terrorists and keeping a friendly eye on family, friends and work colleagues.

The big giveaway there were problems was the alleged impulsive purchase of 2 brand new audi cars. Smacks of severe manic depression on a high.

If this guy was recently prescribed anti depression medication and was taking it unsupervised, it apparently can be not a good thing.

The question we have is how we maintain a certain level of patient confidentiality whilst protecting the wider community.

This isn't just an issue for aviation, this affects all areas of high consequence inductry, be that oil, nuclear or mass civilian transit. If it is managed incorrectly, it will make the situation worse by pushing those with illness underground. Time airline insurers recognised terms, conditions and company procedures that could support these individuals? Makes pretty good business sense.

For people stating that they don't like the idea of a '2 person' rule - or who are uncomfortable with the extra person being a FA. Perhaps it is worth looking at the rest of the world - specifically at the USA where that IS the rule. How many pilot killings have been on US carriers operating that rule? It seems to be zero.

The '2 person rule' is not a perfect solution - that doesn't exist - but the evidence to date suggests that it is an important, simple and inexpensive precaution that appears to be largely effective. Which is presumably why it has been implemented (in true stable-door fashion) by many carriers in the last few days.

No, the primary role of the FA is PAX flight safety.
The point here is that there is IMHO a higher risk of a rogue FA with terrorist intent getting inserted into a flight crew than there is of a pilot with a clinical mental issue alone on the flight deck or of a rogue pilot with the terrorist intent driving the plane.

Are you suggesting all the non-pilots should stop making posts about FD door security procedures? Where do think they got this information? It is readily available all over the internet.

As long as the specific door codes are not revealed, I have no problem with it.

Interesting and, in my view sensible, development.

The Latest: French pilots' union files lawsuit over leaks about Germanwings crash - 3/27/2015 5:49:34 AM | Newser

French pilots suing over crash leaks | Toronto Star

Sky marshals appeal to some but try googling "cop goes crazy with gun" and enjoy the rich delights of what comes up. And I'm sure we recall that US Arways "Federal Flight Deck Officer" whose gun went off in the cockpit some years ago. Not to mention recent high jinx with the Secret Service.

I've encountered the very very occasional "odd" cabin crew member. I guess if we want the most trusted member of the cabin cew, that would likely be the CSD/CSM/FSM/Senior/Lead, or whatever they are called in one's airline. But there was this one CSD.... Airline management and cabin crew unions would/will almost certainly wail about effect on cabin service. But that can be worked out. Edited to add that they are also so much of the fun and camraderie of the last decades that the "second person" sounds fine to me.

And many mental health professionals are mandated to report any ideations of suicide or harm to others. It seems to me that in this already multi linked chain of events, the buck kind of stops at the point where he was able to get on the aircraft, much like the security system has failed if a potentially dangerous passenger makes it onboard. What can be done to catch people with inappropriate mental health issues earlier? Punishing everyone for the misdeeds of one in a million is pointless and there seems to be a variety of missed opportunities in this case. While Cheapo Airlines might think it adequate to come up with a "sanity self assessment checklist" for us to complete on check in, to be placed in the circular file immediately thereafter, seriously, what can be done to catch a disturbed individual before things get out of hand? But then what's to prevent someone from saying they drive a cab when they seek help?

From the Daily Mail article linked to above:

It seems unlikely that the forward loo was fixed during the turnaround, so the co-pilot would know that the loo break in the return flight would take longer than a few seconds. Also, this would tell him that the pilot did not have a personal embargo on visiting the toilet during a short flight.

It is unfortunate the current portrayal of this event has made the greater flying public feel unsafe. Regardless of the copilot's actual medical status, the fact he might be able to choose to still fly with an adverse mental state without being stopped is of concern..understandably.
The captain should have overriding access to his 'ship's' deck.
These people should have fast easy access to a toilet, that's bloody ridiculous they don't.
Looking forward to reading the final assessment of this tragic accident that includes the fdr data.

It's not the door, it's who got inside
 

I'm a little flabbergasted reading the extensive discussion of door mechanics here. The door is not the problem: Post 9/11 doors have been designed to keep somebody out of the flight deck if the person(s) inside don't want them to enter. That's what this door did. Any possible override systems render the whole thing moot.

The problem is rather that this particular person got a seat in the cockpit in the first place. A company (and by extension, an industry) that drags somebody with a documented mental condition along and puts him in a high risk position has a serious problem. Hell, I wouldn't even be admitted to the initial test because I'm too tall (and too old by now probs). And a guy with a history of major depressive episodes – which is not a "burn out" but a serious clinical diagnosis – gets to become FO?

Also, regarding the "2 persons on deck at all times" rules, I think most of you here are missing the point. It's not about the FA wrestling control from a rogue pilot. And it's not about the FA opening the door, although both might be an added bonus in some scenarios. It's about not creating an opportunity. I'll go out on a limb here and speculate that this wouldn't have happened at this time with this particular flight if the FO hadn't been left alone in the cockpit.

As somebody from the med field already pointed out in this thread somewhere, suicide-crimes like this tend to be premeditated, but not meticulously planned. Perps think a lot about how they're going to do it. But they need an opportunity (and maybe a trigger event), and when they see one, they act spontaneously. And this is a coward's crime. The Germanwings FO wasn't somebody who'd go mano-a-mano with his captain or somebody else in the cockpit.

And on what basis do you form that opinion? Any precedents that would suggest that kind of scenario is likely?

And I hope you realise that flight attendants regularly visit the flight deck anyway and have been doing so since day one. Flight Attendants being asked to accompany flight crew on the flight deck whilst the other is on a visit to the toilet is standard practice in my airline and I'm sure in many others too. Indeed they are there for your safety and are highly trained for that purpose. I'd be much more worried about untrained passengers intervening with onboard security issues, which, by doing so, has the potential to inflame an already tense situation.

I cannot see why so many are opposing the two-crew rule.

This guy was emotionally weak despite his ability to hide his illness. Just the presence of cabin crew on the flight deck would have prevented this tragedy. Never ever would he have tried to overpower fellow crew. Only the thought of being entirely in control allowed him to carry out his plan.

I appreciate why many pilots perceive agency cabin crew with only two-week training as a potential threat and why the rule makes it easier for extremists to get past the cockpit door in flight.

However, as far as I am concerned thus far this rule has been successful in the US and to my knowledge there have not been any female suicide pilots, let alone loonie cabin crew trying to overpower flight crew. Not saying this will never happen though.

Why not further restricting the two-crew rule to only the purser allowed on the flight deck with only one pilot present and the door shut?

Being appointed the role of the purser requires longer employment with an operator plus a decent performance record. Also, cabin crew allowed onto the flight deck from now on are to undergo a more thorough background check including a more restrictive medical similar to a flight crew's.

Of all the nonsense being spouted about this event, this has to rank high. Pace is absolutely right. The pilot in command left his seat when his bladder informed him of the need so to do. He did not leave his seat at precisely the right moment to allow his fellow pilot to set a descent profile to crash somewhere which he knew well.

What is the interest in propogating the bollocks that the Mail comes up with?

Dr's Confidentiality
 

There has been much talk about the fitness to fly (and even in the UK down driving too), the problem is the individual is still the missing link, they have to make the decision on their own fitness in many scenarios.
Surely there is a case to say that Dr's should be obliged to inform an airliner/ employer/ regulatory body when a pilot is unfit to fly (or a condition affect their ability), thus cutting out a whole chain of events that would/ could occur ( from depression to sleep apnea).

I don't agree with that view at all as the FAA has already had the second non pilot person in the cockpit during loo breaks etc rule for several years and there have been no suicides by flight deck persons incidents at all in that time.

Generally someone who acted in the way this co-pilot did acts that way because of the feeling of unlimited megalomaniacal type power that being in sole charge of a vital life preserving system of this kind overwhelms them with because it is a way to compensate for the frequent feelings of inadequacy, self loathing and/or lack of control over their own life that they often secretly hold. The various psychopathic hospital nurses and also Dr Harold Shipman all had very similar psychological motivations. So generally those who have taken this kind of action seem to be largely motivated by the very fact that they can do it in secret without being subject to the criticism of and comeback on their actions that they face in their day to day life.

However as the vast majority of pilots are still male and the substantial majority of flight attendants are still female and relatively slightly built the chances of them overcoming the remaining pilot on the flight deck seem to be relatively low. Also the ground security checks that crew are now subject to mean that in general they couldn't usually get a knife or blade or gun on board to allow them to overcome the pilot/co-pilot left without a major struggle, the outcome of which would be highly uncertain. Of course there does still seem a small risk that members of a terrorist cell might take employment with a small airline as both say a pilot or co-pilot and/or co-pilot and flight attendant and then wait until the day to arrive when they were both serving on the same flight.

However the one additional feature that could be added to all passenger aircraft and that would probably have avoid both this crash and the Helios crash is providing a means in the main passenger cabin for flight crew to always be able to contact either ATC or their control bases and for either ATC centres or an airline's main control base to be able remotely send a signal that would immediately release the cockpit door. On the other hand as soon as potential suicide terrorists know that these protections are in place they will undoubtedly tend to try to instead crash the aircraft and kill everyone on board by putting it it in to an immediate and irreversible stall (in the manner of Silkair Flight 185).

So the big question is really how many years will it be before we have aircraft where an auto pilot flight path cannot be set that will fly the aircraft directly in to terrain (surely can't be difficult with global GPS now available everywhere) and how long it will be before the flight crew cannot make any control surface inputs that the auto-pilot and flight management systems know will stall or crash the aircraft. And if we do reach that stage then there are still going to be aircraft that crash due to faulty software design or faulty vital components in safely controlling the aircraft (eg altimeter, Pito tubes or even an uncontained engine failure damaging vital flight control surfaces) that might have been able to be avoided had we still had two pilots on board with the ability to access full manual control of the flight (the Lockheed TriStar crash at Sioux City for instance immediately comes to mind as a case where with full automation the flight would almost certainly not even have got anywhere near the ground).

So in short there is no perfect solution that a determined terrorist may not get around (including hacking in to any automated remote control systems with malicious and malevolent intent for aircraft with systems designed to land the aircraft remotely in the event of dual pilot disablement) but one suspects that ensuring crew in the cabin can always contact ATC and/or the airline's main ground base at all times and providing the ability to send a cockpit door release signal remotely (from the ground) would both be useful initial steps in the right direction.