Actually the 15'000hr Captain in that incident took over from the FO on short final, whilst the FO was saying he couldn't see the runway.

Actual Dual FAC Failure incident. Plane did NOT drop out of the sky.
 

Someone knew who to fly (Weather/Altitude significantly different)

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 749287

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : DEN.Tower
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use.SID : N/S
Airspace.Class B : DEN.B

In all my years of flying I have never heard of that idea being expressed or taught whatsoever.

You'd probably prefer it if we went back to the days where FO's kept their mouths shut if they were unhappy with the Captain's actions

Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
 

Well manually turning off the FAC in this manner sounds like a very desperate attemtp to regain control of the aircraft... Rightly or not they muss have felt that things were completely out of hand...
From the partially leaked report should we understand that they actually managed to recover some sort of control (I.e that turning off the FAC did indeed "work") but where just to far behind the curve ?

Experience - how?
 

We keep seeing people criticising the level of experience of new co-pilots, but just how are new pilots supposed to build up that experience? I had 2000 hours on a/c like the Dak and B170 before I even flew a turboprop - where can you get that sort of flying nowadays? I agree with everything that has been said but this is the real world and the only way to change things would be to make the licence requirements tougher and I can't see that happening. Someone has to take on ab initio copilots and, if it's legal, they will.

toffeez,
I don't think either one of us indicated that PR people had any status or power over the lawyers, manufacturer, airline or anyone else. I did not write that the PR people would "command" the lawyers, I wrote "convince", as in advise. The lawyers might seek the advice of PR people. For instance, they might want to know "How do we go about portraying Airbus (or whomever) as the victim?".

The incident reported in the AAIB bulletin 1/2015, concerning a C525 CJ2 may be worth reading.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...CR%2001-15.pdf

Seems to me
 

Seems to me from the various different interpretations of the logic of the aircraft systems on this forum from people that fly this type , that any time you design a computer system and complicated logic to join control stick to control surfaces, in unusual situations you've got potential problems.

We need to see, if the leak is indeed true, whether the FAC CB pulling was before or after things went wrong?

If I lost control of an A320, I'm not sure unstrapping and pulling FAC CBs would be high on my list of priorities :eek: But maybe that reflects poor tech knowledge on my part?

That is what I said two days ago in a post that got deleted but in any event it is only one possibility. Another possibility is simply that the cpt. got angry at the flaky computer and decided to pull the plug in a fit of spite. The PF was unprepared for the reaction of the plane to this radical step and the rest is history. I don't want to believe that this other possibility is true but similar things have happened before. :uhoh:

Think about this.

YOU have a computer fault in a highly computerized plane...

do you continue towards a thunderstorm

or

turn around and stay in the clear while dealing with it, improving your position with regard to your home airport?

I'd turn around, follow the checklists, STOP when the checklist said: STOP and go back and land

Futzing around with things...hoping things will get better, trying to ''fix things'' in flight...hmmm sort of sounds like an MD80 off the LA coast a number of years ago.

PROBLEMS? Control the plane and head towards a safe airport while dealing with things. Fix the problem? It still doesn't hurt to land and have it looked over.

Don't fix the problem...you are headed towards a safe airport and use your wits and get down in one piece.

Mmm! In that part of the world could mean no job.

@glendalegoon

Well said, follow the QRH checklist. I would be interested to see which QRH sections refer to touching the breakers. That would give an idea of the indications that led to the breakers. I really don't think capt would try to invent his own engineering procedure without a blessing from the ground support via satphone.

I do that all the time in my 737. Still alive.

I may have missed something in the last 140 pages, but why is there a need to pull the CB's? Surely the push buttons on the overhead panel do the same thing?

QRH preamble
When a digital computer behaves abnormally, as a result of an electrical transient, for example, the Operator can stop the abnormal behavior by briefly interrupting the power supply to its processor.
The flight crew can reset most of the computers in this aircraft with a normal cockpit control (selector or pushbutton). However, for some systems, the only way to cut off electrical power is to pull the associated circuit breaker.
To perform a computer reset:
Select the related normal cockpit control OFF, or pull the corresponding circuit breaker.
Wait 3 s if a normal cockpit control is used, or 5 s if a circuit breaker is used (unless a different time is indicated)
Select the related normal cockpit control ON, or push the corresponding circuit breaker
Wait 3 s for the end of the reset.
WARNING:
Do not reset more than one computer at the same time, unless instructed to do so.
Note:
In flight, before taking any action on the cockpit C/Bs, both the PF and PNF must :
Consider and fully understand the consequences of taking action
Crosscheck and ensure that the C/B label corresponds to the affected system.
The computers most prone to reset are listed in the table below, along with the associated reset procedure.
Specific reset procedures included in OEB or TDUs are not referenced in this table and, when issued, supersede this table.
On ground, almost all computers can be reset and are not limited to the ones indicated in the table.
The following computers are not allowed to be reset in specific circumstances:
ECU (Engine Control Unit on CFM engines), or EEC (Electronic Engine Control on IAE engines), and EIU (Engine Interface Unit) while the engine is running.
BSCU (Brake Steering Control Unit), if the aircraft is not stopped.
In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table, or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.

From what is being leaked it seems that the circuit breaker pulling caused the subsequent loss of control. But why would he resort to such an unorthodox action if he did not believe that they were already in dire straits?

In the documented prior defects of FAC1 perhaps a previous crew used the circuit breaker to resolve a problem with some sucess, and that informed the captain's actions on the accident flight?

Getting back to flight without protections: as ManaAdaSystems alluded, most planes do that just fine every day.

The frozen AOA event experienced by Lufthansa recently, the one that generated the OEB to all operators, seems to indicate that in some scenarios, at least, you must think outside of the ECAM/QRH box in order to save the aircraft. And smartly, in this case, there was no time to do anything other than act, maybe **** oneself, contacting company engineering for a leisurely chat not an option.

That is contrary to everything pilots are taught with regard to the use of proper checklists, SOP, and the way things are done in the Airbus world. In creatively solving problems under pressure, the Lufthansa event has perhaps generated negative training for all of us, whilst at the same time shown us what very sharp, knowledgeable and competent crews are capable of, kudos to our German friends.

This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.

I am sensing the press leaks are designed by the big players to lay significant blame on the pilots of this accident aircraft, as one of the above posters has suggested, something that needs to be resisted until all evidence has come to light.

@bugg smasher
Would it make sense to have an easier way to revert to direct law without checklists/power off 2 out of 3 ADRU's. That way direct law can be entered in a safe and simple process more akin to AT and AP. The pilot then has a simplified baseline to return to in extremis when there is no time to decipher exactly which protections and control law they are in. Disabling 2 of 3 ADRUs creates a single point of failure in the last ADRU and is overkill when all that is desired is a direct law without protections. A second procedure could be followed once in direct law to stabilize a/c, configure to a safer place in the flight envelope and minimize the loads on the air frame e.g. reduce FL, set pitch and thrust. This would immediately remove overload from flight crew and put the a/c in the safest possible configuration.
Having to unstrap and leave the left seat is clearly a dangerous activity in an emergency.

Does the QRH say what to do if you've reset the FAC several times and the problem keeps returning?

don't you guys get it?

the guy was trying to fix something that should be fixed on the ground

limp home and get it fixed on the ground...don't futz with it in the sky

unless there is no hope for anything

my QRH says that a FAC 1+2 reset should only be done on the ground. Seems pretty clear, to reset in flight with the CB's means this crew was in unknown territory and effectively became test pilots. The interesting thing will be WHY this course of action was taken, if it was the result of a 'last ditch effort' to save the plane then fair enough. If it was a non-standard reset for something minor like a WINDSHEAR detection fault then all these people have been killed for no good reason. Only the report will reveal the answer.

@glendalegoon

I understand your allegation however do not subscribe to it.
What would be his risk vs reward? You are alleging that ground maintenance was performed in the air for the sake of expedience by the captain. I do not buy it and in any case would never tarnish a dead pilots reputation without knowing all the facts. Capt reportedly had an exemplary aviation career in military and civil - not appropriate to condemn him when he is unable to defend.

If the computer is not faulty, but the inputs to it are, no amount of resets will make it behave differently.....which behaviour may be preventing the pilots from doing what is necessary for saving the plane.

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it. I bet it was after the zoom climb. Doesn't sound like the sort of thing to do just for fun in the middle of a thunder cloud.

Tough question xcitation. This airplane works very well when all the computers are agreeing with each other; that number, by the way, is eighty nine.

The Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) are one of the most astonishingly high tech units on the aircrfaft, they parse instantaneous aircraft energy and vector from a variety of inputs, provide a range of protections, and represent the very core of Airbus technology. Brilliant stuff.

But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode; as an old school pilot brought up on DC-8's, I don't have a problem with that.

We have a training issue here, as well as a technology issue that not only outpaces, but supersedes aforesaid training. Airbus is at fault here, they need to man up.

OK...think about it x citation

the article indicates the captain was out of his chair to futz with circuit breakers



IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?

He could easily have the copilot play with the circuit breakers while having all that flying experience ready to handle anything.

It doesn't take Charles Lindbergh to pull a circuit breaker.

The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground.

Could it be that ground mantenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?

They were concerned about apparently significant TRWs ahead.

It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.

@glendalegoon

Your logic is solid and convincing however I just don't believe it to be the case.
Maybe they were already in a loss of control situation, a/c in abnormal attitude and unstable. He reasoned that it would be best for him to reach the breaker being trained and experienced in extreme "g" environment and best person to quickly pull breaker in a disorienting situation.

XCitation

I don't like pointing the finger at a dead pilot. I really don't. I mentioned that with only dribs and drabs of data instead of actually having the CVR transcript and FDR data, we are left to our own ideas.

AVIATION World Wide would be better served by the indonesian govt releasing all data right now.

Xcitation...I have seen company men try to fix things instead of just writing them up and having the plane grounded for awhile.

Anyone know if AirAsia is represented by ALPA or another pilot union?

One other thing that is eating at me is the age of the copilot vs hours. Is it possible the captain saw an older copilot and figured he had more flying time than he really did? The copilot was 46 and had left a career as some sort of engineer to be a pilot. Age without experience is not good.

The final report will vindicate him if appropriate. In the meantime, speculating on possible motives for pulling cb's does serve a useful purpose as it is at least a cautionary tale. Maybe the faulty FACs were tripping the AP and the cpt was not comfortable with that. He perhaps knew from experience that a hard reset would fix the problem. Inexperienced PF then gets thrown into alt law for the few seconds it takes to reset and overcompensates when he hits turbulence at the same time. How does the rudder respond in alt law with protections off?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Path_dependence

He'd encountered a similar situation on the same plane before. To understand his frame of mind, walk in his shoes.

I think it is obvious that nobody gets up and pulls the FAC CBs unless they have a problem. And it has been said earlier in the thread that there were log entries indicating issues with the FACs.

But a problem with the FACs does not mean that said problem caused a loss of control. Look at Adam Air 574 -- the pilots became engaged with a problem with the IRS and that distracted them from a much larger issue that caused their crash.

Perhaps focus on the FACs reduced the attention they were paying to other parameters.

@glendalegoon
I would think it reasonable to expedite things by resolving minor issues however there is a safety line somewhere. If that means having to return and make maintenance replace an error prone flight computer module then so be it. Otherwise the reality is that such fixes are only work around's which can mask symptoms from others e.g. engineers. Capt is the last fail safe device and default responsible for whatever happens - so he/she needs to be the voice of reason.

"my aircraft ?"
 

Thousands of stick and rudder hours would have helped them in anyway? or rather ab philosophy requires master knowledge of computer operator?
Because...

I disagree. They were not overly concerned with TRW's as they had requested and were given a deviation around them. The weather was not a major obstacle as many other aircraft had passed through the same area.

It is starting to look like they were "troubleshooting" the faulty FAC and got much more than they bargained for. Once more details are released, I would not be surprised to find out that the weather played no part in this accident.

bug smasher said
 

I believe a genu wine Airbus pilot and a close read of the manual would explain that absent pulling multiple breakers ( not resets ) full (NO protection) control is NOT available. :sad:

HAL wins again !

The process of manually flying a jet in cruise is normally a trivial exercise. The hardest part is accurate altitude maintenance. This used to be done with 1/2 dot pitch corrections and a few degrees wing down to get back on the exact heading desired.

With RVSM airspace, when does anyone get a chance to practice even this simple, almost mechanistic skill?

If this was really a case of PF hauling the nose up as is being intimated in some of the news leaks, then AF447 was not an outlier.

Meanwhile, I remain skeptical that a 2000+ hour copilot would have difficulty manually flying in level flight in cruise, even in Alternate law. The explanation that the crew did it is just too pat.:suspect:

Reuters report of captain leaving seat is false.
 

Rough translation of NTSC news conference:

This accident is going to be a classic example of the Swiss cheese model. I'm sure it's going to be studied carefully.

Lots of factors, a chain of events, bad timing for things to happen, some poor decisions maybe......
It's gonna be a long report!