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thru all my career, from PPL to Comm to ATP, 17000hrs (retired) Capt B737, I was always taught about weather "AVOIDANCE", but the norm nowadays seems to be for weather "PENETRATION" albeit in the "least return areas" of the WX Radar. Irrespective of Boeing or Airbus, it is the duty of all airline Captains to deliver his passengers safely at destination, and that means "AVOIDING" the weather, rather than punching into weather, and hope to find the smoothest path thru, then do so. The passengers didn't sign up for a "test of the pilots skills" or for a ride with the the most brave and daring Captain, and it is thus not our place to give them the ride of their lives, but rather a smooth uneventfull ride, where the only complaints are about the lack of bubbles in the champagne in business class. Before I retired, in my company there were Captains, who's level of bravery exceeded mine, when it comes to weather penetration vs weather avoidance, and minimum fuel uplift, thus no options but to barge on straight ahead. I am glad that I made it to the "old pilot" phase beyond the "bold pilot" phase, and now I can sit comfortably at home trying to make sense of this lot. The basic approach used by military training is aggression, "punch through at all costs", "the aim is to win, no matter what", and to take every risk possible, to achieve the targetted outcome. In a 100% civilian busdriver training environment, the stated or implied aim is to "take no risks", "turn back before you get into trouble", "remember you have many lives in your hands". It was raised as a point of serious discussion by BASI, that it is difficult to get someone who has been trained in a military/fighter jet environment to totally reverse all their training, all their thought patterns, their aims and objectives, to ones that are completely at odds with their initial and early aviation learning, when they convert to RPT flying. Cap Iryanto had 6100 hours on the 320, and over 20,500 hrs in total - but how many hours of those important early hours were on F-16's and F-5E's, in the 10 years he was in the military? In this case, I wonder if Capt Iryanto was reverting to his basic fighter pilot training in attempting to punch through what was obviously a very dangerous CB? |
If that data surveillance chart is correct it explains clearly what happened in one easy glance. |
"I wonder if Capt Iryanto was reverting to his basic fighter pilot training in attempting to punch through what was obviously a very dangerous CB?"
A poor deduction. If you have flown around pulling up to 9G you are even more conscious of how flimsy an airliner is. And it doesn't even have an ejection seat. |
... thinking spiral dive and overspeed 'may' now be equal likelihood
to that of stall. |
Dave
The a/c hit the water at 3.623S and 109.712E. The coordinates at FL240 are approx 3.615S and 109.695E. The two coordinates are within 1nm. Rate of descent from FL370 to FL240 approx 6-6,500ft per minute. This data certainly tells me something about what happened. |
So what does it tell you?
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BTW 6,500 ft/min = 64.18knt (73.86mph)
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Uncooperative ATC in certain parts of the world.
In some areas of the world, ATC are uncooperative to requests for deviate around WX.
The reply is negative or standby! These ATC units are still operating 1980s separation rules even though they have ADS. Several times I've had to tell ATC that we are deviating. We have TCAS displays that can show if a conflict would occur. Pilots need to be trained to be more assertive in communications with ATC in these situations. |
C_L
Indeed it is. From FL240 to the whitecaps was then approx three and half minutes during which time they traversed approx 1 nautical mile. |
" HarryMann's equal opportunity?
Not in my book! In this case consider the water entry speed of each scenario.
Compressed can or can more or less in pre-entry shape. A spiral quite often above VNE with a very high ROD; a stall, relatively low IAS coupled with a relatively lower ROD due total surface drag. But is there a third option? Perhaps a partially recovered spiral and almost under control on entry?? |
And at least a fourth: a breakup at low altitude due to rolling G at which time the radome may have detached..
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8/8ths
Quite possible given the damage to the undertail section but there can (IMHO) be no doubt he was in a flat or spiral with little or no elevator or rudder control. As to the thrust and trim position, only time will tell. You may well be right that he simply ran out of altitude during a partial recovery. |
Originally Posted by training wheels
(Post 8835002)
According to Detik.com, this data plot was received by a reporter from someone in the Department of Transportation. The plot shows the climb from FL320 at time 23:17:1.7889 to FL373.5 at time 23:17:43.210 (ie a climb of 5350 ft in about 41.4 seconds) with a turn to the left. End of detection was at FL240 at time 23:19:46.352 in what looks to be a spiral or spin?
http://i.imgur.com/I9ilH6Q.jpg Source: Detik.com |
From FL240 to the whitecaps was then approx three and half minutes during which time they traversed approx 1 nautical mile. |
Dave
Correct. But I do not believe that in the absence of any advance upon Singapore or retreat to Surabaya he decided to conduct a joy flight over Borneo in the intervening minutes. |
In the Straitstimes website there is a report from 8.51am today in which there is a statement:
"The plane climbed steeply very rapidly but its crash was not due to icing, said Mr Tatang Kurniadi, the chief of the agency investigating the accident, in debunking an earlier suggestion. "No similarity with Air France 447. No indication (of icing)," Mr Tatang, who heads the National Transportation Safety Committee, said on Jan 21 during a discussion on aviation safety with foreign journalists." |
Another plot from ADS-B data that's circulating on twitter. Not sure of the accuracy of the rates of descent but with such tight turns and bank angles, can we assume they were no longer in normal law?
It would be great if someone can overlay the weather for this time frame at these coordinates. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B77u2M4IUAAz8mR.jpg Source: Twitter |
From air net
_ User currently offlinemandala499 From Indonesia, joined Aug 2001, 6991 posts, RR: 78 Reply 181, posted Wed Jan 21 2015 23:30:32 your local time (7 hours 46 minutes 55 secs ago) and read 4154 times: Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 164): Regarding the continuous left turn, and reversion to alternate law, there were reports a number of years ago of FAC (flight augmentation computer) faults on A320s resulting in "runaway" rudder trim. From Youtube (not "runaway", but ... My understanding (Pihero, Mandala499 correct me if I'm wrong) is that FAC failure will also result in a reversion to Alternate2, with a number of protections being lost. You got something there... Ironically a local media called me today and asked about MELs related to: AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM (and 2) ELAC 1 FAULT Rudder travel limiter 2 fault identification and MEL Cat C allowances AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS FAC 2 FAULT This... they said was from the aircraft's write up... Quoting Pihero (Reply 168): "Safety Recommendation 2010-092 It is recommended that Airbus alert all operators of A320-series aircraft of the possibility that an electrical power generation system fault may not be clearly annunciated on the ECAM, and may lead to uncommanded rudder trim operation.", Uncommanded rudder command or rudder trim is being suspected. |
Originally Posted by onetrack
(Post 8835103)
This post by Romeo E.T., outlines the concern raised many years ago by air safety people in BASI (Aust) - the difference in approach to driving between those who receive all their early training in a military environment, and in jet fighters - and those who receive all their early training in a 100% civilian environment.
The basic approach used by military training is aggression, "punch through at all costs", "the aim is to win, no matter what", and to take every risk possible, to achieve the targetted outcome. In a 100% civilian busdriver training environment, the stated or implied aim is to "take no risks", "turn back before you get into trouble", "remember you have many lives in your hands". It was raised as a point of serious discussion by BASI, that it is difficult to get someone who has been trained in a military/fighter jet environment to totally reverse all their training, all their thought patterns, their aims and objectives, to ones that are completely at odds with their initial and early aviation learning, when they convert to RPT flying. |
Originally Posted by klintE
(Post 8835337)
Worth to notice that time interval between reported positions on that screen is up to above two min.
Even if there were some intermediate points not shown on graph, generally it doesn't work continuously but in rather large intervals. Therefore, no "ping" between FL240 and impact, doesn't implicate (for me) in-flight break up. |
Question on g limitation & flight laws: is 1.75 or 2.5 G (not sure why those numbers are in my head) where the system doesn't let you pull any more G in the A320? With the idea that they got it stalled, and on the way down finally got it un-stalled (which takes some altitude, and might be a challenge if doing it in the goo in very turbulent air) they might end up in a dive but only be able to pull "x" amount of G and not be able to break the rate of descent before impact with surface.
Does that fit the impact being such that the break up spread the major pieces out more? :confused: |
@onetrack
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8835103 Your post from 22. January 2015 time 8:54 does not hold any value in general, and not for this accident and this crew either. But you may keep your view of the suicidal military pilots if it suits you. If you read up on "Turbulence and Thunderstorms" in the T.O. 1F-16 under section 7-2, which is on page 532 of the pdf file below, you will find the following information: Avoid flight in turbulent air, hailstorms and thunderstorms. There is a high probability of damage to airframe and componenets from impact ice, hail and lightning. .......... |
The idea that the military train their aircrews to 'punch through' should be retired.
Afaik, the military hate to lose their assets. Consequently their rules are to avoid weather, rather than bulling ahead. That makes sense because an airplane that has gone through the mixmaster may then be incapable of completing the mission. |
Military Flight Safety Standards
I agree with Retired F4. My son is a USAF pilot. At the UPT graduation ceremony where he received his wings, the father of one of the new pilots gave the graduation speech. The speaker was a retired Major General who had many hours in combat flying F4s and F100s. His topic was safety. He explained that it was a mistake to think that because combat was dangerous, the safety procedures taught to new pilots could be ignored. In fact, it was expected that all risks that could be minimized, be properly dealt with. Of course, some risks in combat are out of the pilot's control. But whether or not a pilot is assigned to a war zone, some officer's primary job is safety, and monthly safety briefings are required.
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I flew out of Surabaya to Jakarta a few hours before Air Asia 8501. I flew over the java sea enroute to Jakarta. The radar did pick up a lot of CBs over both land and sea. Though navigable, it was easy to navigate around.
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I suppose its a coincidence that ATC were unable to make contact a few mins before the left turn and rapid climb but have any of the unofficial reports or briefings mentioned or implied they heard the crew speaking or just alarms sounding?
Edit: Nearest I can find is.. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/worl...icle-1.2087107 The voices of the crew were drowned out by the warning alarms, said the investigator from Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee. http://www.wsj.com/articles/airasia-...825697?tesla=y “The warning [alarms] kept on screaming, and in the background, they [the pilot and co-pilot] were trying to recover the plane,” said the crash investigator. “But what they said wasn’t clear,” the investigator said. |
“The warning [alarms] kept on screaming, and in the background, they [the pilot and co-pilot] were trying to recover the plane,” said the crash investigator. “But what they said wasn’t clear,” the investigator said. |
Presumably cockpit sounds and pilot communications are only clearly differentiated if the pilots are wearing headsets. I understand that pilots don't routinely wear headsets all the time in the cruise. Is this right?
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I am new here and reading with great interest.
I have read that there was a write-up on this aircraft and a swap out of ELAC2 and FAC2.... And that uncontrolled rudder trim is now suspected. I am not a pilot so hope the experts here can perhaps shed more light. Do the past issues with runaway rudder trim on AB have potential importance here? Many thanks and enjoy this forum!!! |
Presumably cockpit sounds and pilot communications are only clearly differentiated if the pilots are wearing headsets. I understand that pilots don't routinely wear headsets all the time in the cruise. Is this right? I'll defer to the sea lawyers here, but I think the requirement to wear headsets below FL180 on most 'modern' airliners does indeed come from CVR regulations. |
LONE WOLF 50`S QUESTION
"Question on g limitation & flight laws: is 1.75 or 2.5 G (not sure why those numbers are in my head) where the system doesn't let you pull any more G in the A320? With the idea that they got it stalled, and on the way down finally got it un-stalled (which takes some altitude, and might be a challenge if doing it in the goo in very turbulent air) they might end up in a dive but only be able to pull "x" amount of G and not be able to break the rate of descent before impact with surface. Does that fit the impact being such that the break up spread the major pieces out more? :confused:" I would have thought unlikely, pancake with the surface would confine debris field. Aggressive external control inputs resulting in possible aerodynamic excessive yaw, resultant from loss of external data. Roll beyond the vertical plane with negative G on horizontal stabilator more likely rather than back pressure on side stick, and in-flight break up of fuselage and empennage. |
Originally Posted by Andrewgr2
(Post 8835851)
Presumably cockpit sounds and pilot communications are only clearly differentiated if the pilots are wearing headsets. I understand that pilots don't routinely wear headsets all the time in the cruise. Is this right?
Originally Posted by Airbubba
(Post 8835884)
I generally wear a noise cancelling headset while in cruise, especially when flying internationally. Many of my colleagues take off the headset and switch to speaker above FL 180.
I'll defer to the sea lawyers here, but I think the requirement to wear headsets below FL180 on most 'modern' airliners does indeed come from CVR regulations. CVR's record all conversations with or without headsets. 23.1457 Cockpit voice recorders. (a) Each cockpit voice recorder required by the operating rules of this chapter must be approved and must be installed so that it will record the following: (1) Voice communications transmitted from or received in the airplane by radio. (2) Voice communications of flight crewmembers on the flight deck. (3) Voice communications of flight crewmembers on the flight deck, using the airplane's interphone system. (4) Voice or audio signals identifying navigation or approach aids introduced into a headset or speaker. (5) Voice communications of flight crewmembers using the passenger loudspeaker system, if there is such a system and if the fourth channel is available in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section. (6) If datalink communication equipment is installed, all datalink communications, using an approved data message set. Datalink messages must be recorded as the output signal from the communications unit that translates the signal into usable data. (b) The recording requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of this section must be met by installing a cockpit-mounted area microphone, located in the best position for recording voice communications originating at the first and second pilot stations and voice communications of other crewmembers on the flight deck when directed to those stations. The microphone must be so located and, if necessary, the preamplifiers and filters of the recorder must be so adjusted or supplemented, so that the intelligibility of the recorded communications is as high as practicable when recorded under flight cockpit noise conditions and played back. Repeated aural or visual playback of the record may be used in evaluating intelligibility. (c) Each cockpit voice recorder must be installed so that the part of the communication or audio signals specified in paragraph (a) of this section obtained from each of the following sources is recorded on a separate channel: (1) For the first channel, from each boom, mask, or handheld microphone, headset, or speaker used at the first pilot station. (2) For the second channel from each boom, mask, or handheld microphone, headset, or speaker used at the second pilot station. (3) For the third channel—from the cockpit-mounted area microphone. (4) For the fourth channel from: (i) Each boom, mask, or handheld microphone, headset, or speaker used at the station for the third and fourth crewmembers. (ii) If the stations specified in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section are not required or if the signal at such a station is picked up by another channel, each microphone on the flight deck that is used with the passenger loudspeaker system, if its signals are not picked up by another channel. (5) And that as far as is practicable all sounds received by the microphone listed in paragraphs (c)(1), (2), and (4) of this section must be recorded without interruption irrespective of the position of the interphone-transmitter key switch. The design shall ensure that sidetone for the flight crew is produced only when the interphone, public address system, or radio transmitters are in use. |
“The warning [alarms] kept on screaming, and in the background, they [the pilot and co-pilot] were trying to recover the plane,” said the crash investigator. “But what they said wasn’t clear,” the investigator said."
The guys in the lab can take unmolested, digitized factory copies of each standard Airbus alarm voice or sound, make it 180 degrees out of phase (make the positive voltage negative and vice versa) and sum each with each corresponding alarm on the CVR recording, increasing the amplitude until each alarm sound is at zero amplitude. This should leave the remaining sounds, including the pilots voices, easier to hear and understand. This could take a day or two, then it might take a little while to figure out what it all means, but it should be in plenty of time for use in the preliminary report. |
Joejosh999
I have read that there was a write-up on this aircraft and a swap out of ELAC2 and FAC2.... And that uncontrolled rudder trim is now suspected. I am not a pilot so hope the experts here can perhaps shed more light. Do the past issues with runaway rudder trim on AB have potential importance here? Early Boeing 737 had issues with stuck rudders and even rudder reversal. That was a long time ago. What do you mean with uncontrolled runaway rudder trim? Do you know what a rudder is? |
"I'll defer to the sea lawyers here, but I think the requirement to wear headsets below FL180 on most 'modern' airliners does indeed come from CVR regulations."
In my memory it was introduced aeons ago for UK CAA reg'd aircraft as compulsory headsets + boom mics below FL150. All this following a botched RTO at major UK airport where the DC10 Captain was attempting to communicate using hand-mic whilst trying to do other things requiring his standard issue of 2 hands. Now the selection of speaker and hand mic, above whatever, seems to be favoured by that group of F/Os who like to appear "cool" whilst reading the paper/Ipad or whatever THEY think is their function in the upper levels. I think it is a practice to be discouraged, if only to protect what's left of their hearing after a (short) lifetime of personal stereo earpieces and industrial noise-level bars and clubs. Yes, I'm a grumpy old fart and proud of it! := |
Crew voices drowned by alarms?
If the headset was active but not being worn then a voice could easily be drowned out by ambient noise. Where are the alarm speaker(s) located? Try taking your headset off to see the extent of the effect. When the speaker switch is activated then the panel mounted mics would become active? If so where are these mics located? |
Originally Posted by Coagie
The guys in the lab can take unmolested, digitized factory copies of each standard Airbus alarm voice or sound, make it 180 degrees out of phase (make the positive voltage negative and vice versa) and sum each with each corresponding alarm on the CVR recording, increasing the amplitude until each alarm sound is at zero amplitude. This should leave the remaining sounds, including the pilots voices, easier to hear and understand.
This could take a day or two |
since it was discussed so many times here...
on this forum, thought this might be of interest.
NTSB Calls for Better Ways to Find Aircraft Accident Sites and Retrieve Critical Flight Data January 22, 2015 WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today issued a series of safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration calling for improvements in locating downed aircraft and ways to obtain critical flight data faster and without the need for immediate underwater retrieval. The Board also re-emphasized the need for cockpit image recorders on commercial airplanes. Recent accidents have pointed to the need for improved technologies to locate aircraft wreckage and flight recorders lost in remote locations or over water. In the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, it took almost two years and $40 million to find the recorders. Investigators are still searching for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370. So far the search has involved 26 countries using 84 vessels and numerous aircraft. “Technology has reached a point where we shouldn’t have to search hundreds of miles of ocean floor in a frantic race to find these valuable boxes,’’ said NTSB Acting Chairman Christopher A. Hart. “In this day and age, lost aircraft should be a thing of the past.” Last October, the NTSB held a forum, Emerging Flight Data and Locator Technology, which explored these issues in detail. Among the recommendations to the FAA are to equip commercial airplanes with a tamper-resistant method to broadcast to a ground station sufficient information to establish the location where an aircraft terminates flight as a result of an accident within six nautical miles of the point of impact. The NTSB also called for the FAA to coordinate with other regulatory authorities and the International Civil Aviation Organization to harmonize implementation of several of these recommendations. The NTSB also repeated recommendations for a crash-protected image recording system that would record the cockpit environment during the last two hours of a flight. A link to the recommendation letter can be found here: go.usa.gov/Jsaz A link to the recorder forum page is here: go.usa.gov/JsCW |
8/8ths
Yes correct I wasn't suggesting the aircraft spiralled into the sea. Just that a spiral dive could well have played a part sometime after max. altitude |
Fortunately there is already ready-made sophisticated audio spectral editing software for this, e.g, Izotope RX4. It easily allows a skilled forensic analyst to null out specific spectral patterns such as alarms which obscure speech. I didn't mean to insinuate this is a new idea. I just wanted to give some understanding how the lab goes about it. In fact, they may use a purpose built CVR sound editing program, where they just select "Boeing" or "Airbus", so it knows which alarms to filter. |
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