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-   -   Malaysian Airlines MH370 contact lost (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/535538-malaysian-airlines-mh370-contact-lost.html)

SeenItAll 24th Mar 2014 01:35


A 180M track ends up too far east of the present search area.
The present search area is not the area where the authorities think the plane went down. It is the area to where the authorities think the wreckage will have drifted over the past two weeks. Given that the general direction of drift is eastward, don't discount the 180 track yet.

Hogger60 24th Mar 2014 01:42

Yankee Whiskey, I guess being quoted by numerous media outlets for getting this post up on Wired.com wasn't enough, so now you have to spout you nonsense in full on PPrune too.

My second favorite part of your theory (my first is that the raging electrical fire that killed everyone onboard mysteriously went out, letting the autopilot stay engaged even with no electrical power) is that the PF was headed to Langkawi, even though it was closed, a very dark place to land even when the lights are on, and a one direction runway for approaches (the opposite direction he was heading), Penang was closer (and open 24/7) with approaches on both runways, and full firefighting support. Both pilots had flown into and out of both of these airfields many times, and both knew one was closed one was open. Push the ALT button in the FMC and head direct to PEN.

I am sure you like the "simple" theory since it appears you did minimal research (if any) on B777-200ER's, Malaysian Airlines, or the area in which contact was lost with MH370, because you would have had a much more informed and valid argument if you had.

onetrack 24th Mar 2014 01:44

To those obsessive adherents to the "aircraft fire" scenario that disabled the crew but left the aircraft flying for many hours afterwards - I have just one question.

Skywriting aircraft produce copious amounts of highly visible smoke from the injection of a relatively small amount of low-viscosity oil into the hot exhaust manifold.
Tyre fires on the ground produce enough black high-density smoke to blanket large areas of cities.

A large aircraft flying at high altitude with a substantial fire on board would produce a smoke-containing contrail so highly visible, it could be seen with a naked eye from the ground - even in early dawn light.
This contrail would surely be highly visible on weather satellite pics, would it not? The projected flight path is over a number of high-traffic shipping lanes. And yet no-one on a ship has reported seeing an extensive smoke contrail?
I look at Tim Vasquez's excellent contrail examination site, and there is only one vague contrail picked up in the Southern latitudes - and this contrail is regarded and examined as a regular contrail - not a smoke-filled one.

I consider that a total lack of any space images showing any contrails from serious amounts of smoke from a major, aircraft-disabling fire, and a total lack of eyewitness reports of smoke contrails, to be a total lack of evidence supporting a fire theory.

SpannerTwister 24th Mar 2014 01:51

Don't put battery fires out?
 
I'll leave it to you pilot types to cover the "Pilot Stuff" while I'm turning the spanners !

However, from the PDF someone posted a page or two ago regarding aircraft fire systems,

Page 17-2

Class D—fires involving combustible metals, such as magnesium, titanium, zirconium, sodium, lithium, and potassium.


And from Page 17-10

However, do not use Halons on a class D fire. Halon agents may react vigorously with the burning metal.

Anyone got a chemist friend who could comment on what "vigorously" might mean in this event?

What would happen if a small or otherwise controllable lithium-battery fire occurred and the pilot discharged the Halon extinguishing system on it?

cribbagepeg 24th Mar 2014 01:59

Halon at very high temperatures - um, phosgene, no? Just a little bit poisonous. Halon works well on flames as it is inert and heavier than air. In the case of incendiary Magnesium, Titanium e.g., a bucket of sand is a better way to go. Early Teflon (tm) research by duPont killed at least one scientist when the fry pan under test got a bit too hot. According to the legend.

Capt Kremin 24th Mar 2014 02:11

Updated diagram
 
Some refining here...

http://i1275.photobucket.com/albums/...psa43d63f2.jpg

I refined the initial no wind 197 degree green line track to 200deg M/515 knots GS from the initial point and am pleased to see it closely resembles Selfins much more professional effort which incorporates the winds.

The pink direct track now has hourly markers at 485 GS. From there I extrapolated psuedo-satellite arcs based on the distances from IOR of these hourly markers; the thinking being here that if they were roughly equidistant from each other then there is a good chance that would indicate that the aircraft took a direct track to the search area, taking into account GS changes due to wind changes.

They appear to do that.

Extending the arcs through the initial 188 deg M track and the 200 deg M track reveal large discrepancies at different parts of those tracks, indicating that the aircraft did not take those tracks.

I stress: A lot of this is supposition but it appears to support the case I made earlier that:

The attitude of the Malaysian government that the aircraft was deliberately taken to this area stems from the fact that the evidence supports a direct track taken to reach the initial search area.

A direct track can over that distance can only be practically achieved by a FMC entry due to the massive changes in magnetic variation. That in turn implies technical knowledge and intent.

There is also no reason for a southerly heading to be in the HDG box to send the aircraft south after reaching a route discontinuity, particularly as this would have have to be been turned that way over an hour after contact was lost.

I acknowledge the suppositions. There are many technically/mathematically inclined people reading this who can possibly comprehensively disprove those assumptions if they are flawed. Please feel free to do so if you are able.

bcpr 24th Mar 2014 02:11

Lithium battery-Halon fire tests-PowerPoint file from FAA:

www.fire.tc.faa.gov/ppt/systems/lithium%20bat%20060602.ppt

Chris2303 24th Mar 2014 02:13

Pardon my ignorance but if there was something at the bottom of the ocean surely the MAD in the Orions would find it?

Control Eng 24th Mar 2014 02:19

@DaveReidUK
 
Can you please check were I stated that I

have been involved in ADS-B development
or that these were

original ADS-B transmissions
or that I inferred that the messages were

transmitted by an aircraft in that form
as you yourself quoted, I said


I am assuming that the raw data presented reflects directly what was received by the ADS-b ground station

ATC systems receive ADS-b data from ground stations over data links. The links transfer data packages that contain combined squitters of ADS-b transmissions.

The data package formats were ADS-b receiver manufacturer specific but content wise were remarkably similar to those displayed, however they did have validity flags.

I am fully aware that FR24 relies on enthusiast Mode S receivers but am amazed that you seem to consider that this particular programmer was astute enough to be able to write a program that selected just these two particular messages to drop the altitude (while keeping the lat/long from the same squitter) when all his other messages were presented in totality.

bratschewurst 24th Mar 2014 02:23


"I found 4 or 5 incidents of pilots deliberately flying aircraft with passengers into the ground over 30 years. I haven't tried to figure out how many fatal accidents there've been amongst airlines during the same period, but I know it's way, way more that that. Pilot suicide causes a tiny proportion of what is already a tiny number. "

I'll say it again.

There are very few instances of airliners being lost in the cruise with no immediately apparent cause. Of those, the instances of suspected deliberate pilot action form a significant fraction.

There is no statistical argument against it being a possible cause in this case.
No. It is of course a "possible cause." But there is an argument against it considered being more likely than other highly improbable causes. The difference between 1 occurrence in 1 million of explanation A and no occurrences of Explanation B in the same one million is not significant enough to make predictions about whether A or B is more likely to have actually happened in a given case.

Mahatma Kote 24th Mar 2014 02:24

@titania


To give an idea of just how nitrogen can be toxic
80% of the air we breathe is Nitrogen. It's only poisonous at great pressure such as deep-sea diving.

At sea-level pressure or lower it can only harm by displacing normal air completely and so eliminating the oxygen.

Gases that can kill or render unconscious are rare in aircraft. As you point out CO - Carbon Monoxide is one.

Another one very relevant to aircraft is HCN gas - Hydrogen Cyanide. It's a by-product of heating certain types of plastics and was the primary cause of death in at least one otherwise survivable accident - where a plane crashed and a small fire started that generated smoke and HCN from seat cushions that killed most passengers before they could exit.

However HCN would be very unlikely to be generated without large amounts of smoke.

auraflyer 24th Mar 2014 02:24


Anyone got a chemist friend who could comment on what "vigorously" might mean in this event?
Halons are haloalkanes -- carbon skeletons with fluorine, chlorine or bromine instead of hydrogen atoms.

The most common ones used as suppressants are called Halon 1211 and Halon 1301 (respectively, CF2ClBr and CF3Br).

The FAA did some tests on Halon 1301 and Li-Ion batteries a decade ago: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/04-26.pdf

From the executive summary:


"Halon 1301, the fire suppression agent installed in transport category aircraft, is ineffective in suppressing or extinguishing a primary lithium battery fire. Halon 1301 appears to chemically interact with the burning lithium and electrolyte, causing a color change in the molten lithium sparks, turning them a deep red instead of the normal white. This chemical interaction has no effect on battery fire duration or intensity.

The air temperature in a cargo compartment that has had a fire suppressed by Halon 1301 can still be above the autoignition temperature of lithium. Because of this, batteries that were not involved in the initial fire can still ignite and propagate.

The ignition of a primary lithium battery releases burning electrolyte and a molten lithium spray. The cargo liner material may be vulnerable to perforation by molten lithium, depending on its thickness. This can allow the Halon 1301 fire suppressant agent to leak out of the compartment, reducing the concentration within the cargo compartment and the effectiveness of the agent. Holes in the cargo liner may also allow flames to spread outside the compartment."
To answer the question, it does not appear that the vigorousness of the reaction with the halon is the main thing; rather, it is the participation of the intended suppressant in the fire and its consequent failure to extinguish it. The report suggests that the halon did not make the fire worse (which you would expect if the reaction added anything to the combustion process).

From p 9-10 you can see that the Li reaction is indifferent to the presence of the halon, but other reactions are affected:


"The color change of the lithium sparks indicated that a reaction was occurring between the lithium and the Halon 1301. This reaction had no effect on the fire progression, neither hindering nor promoting the spread of the battery fire. The vented electrolyte fires, normally pale red in color, turned bright red when exposed to Halon 1301.

The battery fire continued to propagate until all batteries were consumed, continuing long after the 1-propanol fire was extinguished. The halon also had no effect on the peak temperatures in the test chamber, peaking at about 1400°F. This is similar to the peak temperatures exhibited in previous unsuppressed fires. However, the overall temperature profiles were lower, due to the extinguishment of the 1-propanol and battery plastic coating fires."
The FAA also tested Halon 1211, which is also ineffective: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/09-55.pdf

I suspect this is likely because lithium is very reactive and, compared to fluorine and chlorine, bromine is the most reactive when attached to a carbon atom (the basis for, e.g., Grignard reagents). The two together are thus able to undergo reaction, especially given the temperatures produced by the primary failure. The whole thing is worth reading in its (scary) entirety.

All in all, a Bad Thing.

oldoberon 24th Mar 2014 02:25

Chris2303

Most of airframe etc non magnetic and very deep water. Suggest MAD for merchant ship detection (after sinking)

Control Eng 24th Mar 2014 02:33

@LASJayhawk
 
But the mode S (ADS-b) lat/long data is present, just the altitude is missing (0?). How do you select which ADIRU is used by the SSR/ADS-b?

Airbubba 24th Mar 2014 02:34


Pardon my ignorance but if there was something at the bottom of the ocean surely the MAD in the Orions would find it?
Nope:


To reduce interference from electrical equipment or metal in the fuselage of the aircraft, the MAD sensor is placed at the end of a boom or a towed aerodynamic device. Even so, the submarine must be very near the aircraft's position and close to the sea surface for detection of the change or anomaly. The size of the submarine and its hull composition determine the detection range.
From: Magnetic anomaly detector - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sheep Guts 24th Mar 2014 02:43

SpannerTwister,


What would happen if a small or otherwise controllable lithium-battery fire occurred and the pilot discharged the Halon extinguishing system on it?
This is transcribed from the Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods manual Red Book.

Lithium Ion Batteries UN3480 have an ICAO Dangeroous Goods Emergency Response Drill code(issue 2013/2014) of 9 F Z

Meaning the following from the Table 4-1. Aircraft Emergency Response Drills


Drill No. 9

Inherent Risk-------- -------No general Inherent Risk

Risk to Aircraft- -------------As Indicated by drill code

Risk to Occupants- ----------As indicated by drill letter

Spill or leak procedure------ Use 100% oxygen; establish and maintain maximum ventilation if " A " drill letter

Fire Fighting Procedure------All agents according to availability- use water if available on " Z " drill letter; no water on "W" drill letter

Additional considerations----If " Z " drill letter consider landing immediately otherwise, none

ADDITIONAL RISKS:


DRILL LETTER : " F "--FLAMMABLE


DRILL LETTER: " Z "--- AIRCRAFT CARGO FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM MAY NOT EXTINGUISH OR CONTAIN THE FIRE; CONSIDER LANDING IMMEDIATLEY


So basically use everything you have on lithium ion batteries but containment is not guaranteed. Seems insane to put Lithium Ion batteries on any pax /cargo aircraft in any quantity really.

Titania 24th Mar 2014 02:50

@Mahatma Kote


At sea-level pressure or lower it can only harm by displacing normal air completely and so eliminating the oxygen.
Precisely.

I am not talking of a plane that has depressurized, I am talking about a plane with normal pressurization, somewhat a little higher than sea-level.

If such quantities as shown in the Mexican pool example were liberated, then this nitrogen would rarefy oxygen. It could be another oxygen-scavenging gas than nitrogen (but we'd need a chemist to tell us which).

If the liberation of the gas was slow and not due to explosion, but due to damage to containers, and if the placement of the nitrogen allowed it to seep to cabin and cockpit through defective venting systems (air conditioning, pressure differentials between different parts of the aircraft), then one could posit that there would be a slow hypoxia onset for all living things in the plane.

That theory of slow-setting hypoxia, where I put forward that such damage to nitrogen (or other similar gas) cylinders may have been caused by a lithium battery fire (although it could be something else I suppose), is the simplest that takes care of all aspects of the flight, the behavior of the pilots and the end result.

Ohoh, I've been mod-ded too!!! Better quickly save the interesting posts before they disappear...

jugofpropwash 24th Mar 2014 02:50


I wondered why it took so long for this CNN story to show up on this forum. What happened to the 45,000 feet deal??? This is just another example of most of the "facts" all these gullible "experts" are going by, are ones they get via the Malaysian government and are subject to change at any time. I don't want to hear any more of this "We all know..." stuff, when NO, we don't "all know..."!
Keep in mind that CNN's 12000ft story came from "sources" too - so whether it's any more or less accurate than anything else we've heard is debatable.

The story has changed so much and so many times that I'm not even totally sure there ever was an airplane.

Coagie 24th Mar 2014 02:58


Quote:
"Halon 1301, the fire suppression agent installed in transport category aircraft, is ineffective in suppressing or extinguishing a primary lithium battery fire. Halon 1301 appears to chemically interact with the burning lithium and electrolyte, causing a color change in the molten lithium sparks, turning them a deep red instead of the normal white. This chemical interaction has no effect on battery fire duration or intensity.

The air temperature in a cargo compartment that has had a fire suppressed by Halon 1301 can still be above the autoignition temperature of lithium. Because of this, batteries that were not involved in the initial fire can still ignite and propagate.

The ignition of a primary lithium battery releases burning electrolyte and a molten lithium spray. The cargo liner material may be vulnerable to perforation by molten lithium, depending on its thickness. This can allow the Halon 1301 fire suppressant agent to leak out of the compartment, reducing the concentration within the cargo compartment and the effectiveness of the agent. Holes in the cargo liner may also allow flames to spread outside the compartment."
Is it possible if an aircraft still used a Halon fire suppression system, that, in the course of fighting a Lithium-Ion battery fire, that all the Halon might be emptied from the tanks and extinguishers in a futile attempt to extinguish the fire, and all the Halon expelled displaced enough oxygen aboard the aircraft, to make everyone pass out? I know in places I've worked that employed Halon fire suppression, there was an audible alarm along with a strobe light that warned that the Halon system was about to go off, and you had a certain number of seconds to either get out or disable a false alarm, because you couldn't breathe, once the Halon came out.

Coagie 24th Mar 2014 03:05


Keep in mind that CNN's 12000ft story came from "sources" too - so whether it's any more or less accurate than anything else we've heard is debatable.
I kept it in mind. We all should.

The story has changed so much and so many times that I'm not even totally sure there ever was an airplane.
Jugopropwash, I'm with you there!


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