Scio - in all probability the figures were instantaneous (or even 'max' for effect....) and not sustained.

Plank says sorry to rotary man - I read your post as assuming the wind had anything to do with the altitude 'lows'. It didn't really.

TBsix - this event has shocked me and probably quite a few other current and ex pilots. I have always held RY training and supervision in high regard considering the intensity and pressures that the crews operate under, but this (September event) has just blown my mind.

It is interesting seeing the addenda coming into the AvHerald report.

Is there some :8 who can calculate the average sink rate from say, 2,000 AGL till the lowest point?

They kept AP all the way???

2660 fpm average the last 1,000 ft they sank before reaching the lowest point and disconnecting

scaaaary

Was it an automation modes fucup?

Company totally not to blame.

Pilots with extremelly poor judgment and a dangerous attitude that renders them unable to assess risk

Unless it was an automation fuc up. They had AP ON all the way, maybe one was heads down reading a checklist, the other is too fresh, my god but they were at 210 kt what were they thinking about?

Most of us don't even know how 2,700 fpm feel from 1,500 to 500 agl in an airliner. It has to be scary.

CFIT??? They have add a new category, because this was not controlled at alll...

Microburst, you're not really telling us that Ryanair is 'totally not to blame' are you.

Ryanair's corporate culture and practice has nothing to do with it?

C'mon, really?

For one reason or another this looks like a loss of situational awareness.

One wonders whether fatigue might be a causal factor.

They were clearly thinking about making up for some of the delay they had accumulated. There is no leeway with such a short turnaround time, you know.

Witness the fact that they requested the visual approach because it would have put them on the end of the runway closest to the gate (shorter taxi time) and they explicitly questioned ATC about any speed limitations (ATC's response: 250 knots :ok:). Pity that they were then unable to conduct the approach they had explicitly requested. It's all in the BFU report, BTW.

Ciao,

Dg800

It always amazes me when you speak about RYR's corporate culture, I have a feeling you are just guessing.

I occasionaly work as TWR controller at an aerodrome where they are the biggest operator. And I'm yet to see an airline where crews are as rigid about SOPS, rules etc as RYR's. Tailwind component too big by just 1kt - they will take the runway that results in 10mins delay. Runway change - they will sit for 8 mins at the h/p for rebriefing, while the other operator would just press a button in the FMC for the new SID and off they go. If they are unhappy with sth, they will stop and you won't make them move until the issue is resolved. The list could go on and on. In fact never seen them in a hurry that would affect their procedures.

Quote
Ryanair's corporate culture and practice has nothing to do with it?
Yeah Bernoulli I am saying Ryanairs culture had nothing to do with it. Going through a landing gate not stabilized gets you demoted if a captain and fired if an FO. The culture is also one of blameless go arounds. If that's not a culture promoting stabilized approaches I don't know what is.
As for leaving the automatics in after being cleared visual approach would be considered industry best practice espically in an area with a lot of VFR traffic like FMM, reduces workload and frees up capacity to look for other traffic.

Um 16:39:20 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „SINK RATE“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe von 1 319 ft (AGL) bei einer Sinkrate von ca. 3 240 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach rechts von ca. 25 Grad.
At 16:39:20 the EGPWS generated the "SINK RATE" warning. Altitude was 1319 ft AGL / ROD appr. 3240 ft/min /bank right appr. 25°

Um 16:39:37 Uhr wurde der Autopilot deaktiviert.
At 16:39:37 the AP had been switched off

Um 16:39:40 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „CAUTION TERRAIN“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe vom 480 ft AGL bei einer Sinkrate von ca. 500 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach links von ca. 35 Grad.
At 16:39:40 the EGPWS generated the „CAUTION TERRAIN“ warning. The airplane was at a height of 480 ft AGL / ROD appr. 500 ft/min / bank left appr. 35°

Um 16:39:41 Uhr erreichte die B737 ihre geringste Flughöhe von ca. 450 ft AGL.
At 16:39:41 the B737 was at it's lowest height of appr. 450 ft AGL

Um 16:39:42 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe vom 460 ft bei einer Steigrate von 600 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach links von 7 Grad.
At 16:39:42 the EGPWS generated the „TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP“ warning. Airplane was at a height of 460 ft AGL / ROC 600 ft/min / bank left 7°

No - the crew decided to switch off the AP 5 seconds before the EGPWS hard warning.

Looking scary to me...

The Avherald report linked to in the first post has been updated to include a dissenting statement from the airline.

@Lederhosen:

This is turning into a phobia :p Let me know the next time you're going to Memmingen on a nice day, and the wing-waggling Cessna you see will be me popping over from Jesenwang to make an air-to-air photograph of you on the approach :E

Seeing as this is the reason the Captain himself gave for choosing this approach (page 67 of the report), I think making up for lost time was definitely high up in their list of priorities. This is also consistent with their query about any speed restrictions and with their maintaining a somewhat high speed (both vertical and horizontal).

Ciao,

Dg800

Or rather, by an airline's press officer who is not aware of the fact that EGPWS warnings are recorded in the FDR and will therefore later show up in the report. :E :ugh:

Fully appreciated; I intensely dislike the German practice of heavy IFR iron mingling it with light VFR traffic in Airspace E. I always give Memmingen a wide berth when in that area.

"Request an orbit" would have solved it all.

No, more like pushonitis, continuing on with a botched approach either to save face or because of commercial pressures. Fatigue? Call in sick, take a day off, take radar vectors whatever, no excuse for bad workmanship. It is the responsibilty of the Captain to ensure the safety of his pax and crew, flying fatigued, letting the FO fudge it, forget it.. As for accepting a visual approach and then flying it on the automatics? Well it isn't really is it? You might as well take vectors if you want to increase your capacity. Flying this visual through the MCP just made the situation worse, it was never going to happen. I guess that the handling pilot bottled it and continued bounding in to save face. A go around or vectors should have been called a lot earlier.

Was it 2 Captains or FO/Captain? Who was handling?

Preemptying
 

Incident: Ryanair B738 at Memmingen on Sep 23rd 2012, descended below minimum safe height
says:-

"rather than the crew preemptying"

What is pre-empty-ing? Is it part of your airline's SOP? :)

FO/Captain. Captain handling after AP disconnect according to the BFU report.