Straw man argument, jcjeant. :ugh:
I would appreciate that you do not stretch what I wrote until the point of putting words in my mouth that aren't mine. Thanks :)

Can't planes crash? It's a known risk, after all.
Should we ground them all and drive/sail instead?
Oh, wait, aren't car and boat also prone to accidents, sometimes?


I'm certainly not kidding, simply recalling that the BEA indicates that the leak was so massive in Gonesse that It was unheard of. You may check this by comparing the description of the 2000 accident and the list of previous tyre-related events, also available in the 2000 accident report.

Now, is that to say I think the actions taken after Washington (and other occurences, some of them concerning BA planes) were enough? Of course not: Gonesse sadly proved that. But my judgment is biased here, because I know about Gonesse, as we all do. That's my point: it's a bit easier to say "I was sure about that"... afterwards.

Is that to say that I pretend Concorde's Achilles heel (the tyres, indeed) was unknown? Of course not. Best proof of that is that the solutions implemented between 2000 and 2003 weren't "discovered" after Gonesse: The kevlar liner had been studied years before. The reinforced tyres too (even if NZG technology perhaps wasn't available at the time).

I too, presented with the facts, first ask myself "why wasn't anything done?"
Then I check, and discover that recommendations were made, implemented (and I assume: deemed sufficient, even if history prooved otherwise) on both sides of the Channel, despite the fact that the severity of some (if not many) events had been reduced/hidden at first for "political" reasons.
-> It's wrong to pretend nothing was done (as in so many media reports).
-> It's wrong to pretend only one side of the Channel was at risk in 2000, even given the fact that safety records (accidents & incidents) show that AF was (and sadly surely still is) far more casual, even laxist, about flight safety than BA.

Exemple: Yes, it took AF 15 more years than BA (1981->1996) to stop using retread tyres. No, I'm not satisfied to learn that (among other things). But stopping using them in '96 didn't prevent Gonesse accident 4 years later.

From BEA

"• During the takeoff run, the aircraft would have had a tendency to deviate to the left if the left main landing gear had created abnormally high drag. However, its track was straight before the loss of thrust on engines 1 and 2 and there are no observable right rudder inputs. On the contrary, some slight (rudder) actions to the left are even noticeable before V1."



If the spacer was responsible for alignment and bearing, its absence would initially create less rolling drag on the left side of the a/c; this would explain the left ruddering on the initial roll..... Seemingly innocuous, this may have set up an uncoordinated ruddering later, after the carriage problem was enhanced by the loss of the tire. Any slewing would have exacerbated the tire damage. Was this addressed? Was there no evidence of axle slop causing shimmy in the tire/hub? Prior to blowout?

The question should not be who dropped the titanium, but rather if it was reasonable to expect that the concord would never come in contact with such materials on the runway given their use in aviation, and how the design was built to survive such a contact or procedures to avoid such events occurring.

A critical question seems to be if the aircraft was so susceptible to debris on the runway then why was an inspection not mandated before each movement. This was not the first time material had caused issues for the aircraft, and other factors combined did push it beyond the limits.

To believe that a commonly used metal would not appear on a runway during the life time of the use of this aircraft was a massive assumption. Many aircraft in the past have impacted such objects.

The strip was not commonly used, it was a scrap piece sculpted to replace a piece of metal with more forgiving wear characteristics. It is extremely important who dropped it, how it came to be affixed to the DC -10, and how its sloppy work as a certified repair was passed, for flight.

Imho.

That does not answer if one can assume that a material of that type will never appear on the runway.

It was attached with rivets, I believe, and sloppily done. The aluminum ordinarily used would almost certainly not have pierced Concorde's tire. A certified part would have performed to an expectation. The pirated Titanium was not suitable.

That leaves everyone involved in its attachment liable for a portion of responsibility in the crash. Regardless when, or even IF, it pierced the tire.

Wrong means wrong, and carelessness and shortcuts never ever pay.

The question is still not answered. It does not matter if it came from this mistake, an engine defect, another vehicle around the airport, blown into the grounds etc. The designers of the aircraft and the operating procedure for the aircraft must take into account the chance of the occurrence. Materials of this type have been, and will be, found on the runway. The aircraft must be designed to either survive such occurrences or methods implemented to stop them occuring.

This was not the first time the tyres of the Concorde has damage from impact, nor the first time this type of metal had been found on a runway. It was not unreasonable for them to foresee such an occurrence. It was negilant to operate an aircraft in such a manner knowing it was susceptible to this issue but not take action to avoid it.

The question is answered. What lacks is a judgment call.

BTW, I am in complete agreement:

"This was not the first time the tyres of the Concorde has damage from impact, nor the first time this type of metal had been found on a runway. It was not unreasonable for them to foresee such an occurrence. It was negilant to operate an aircraft in such a manner knowing it was susceptible to this issue but not take action to avoid it."

Hi,

Have you seen the state of the Concorde after the Washington incident ?
Photos are available
Check the state of the wing ....
He was so damaged that it was decided not to fix it !
There was no need to know the Gonesse accident to determine what to do immediately
In fact after Washington .. it was made nothing for avoid that the next time it was a gear problem .. the wings (and more important .. the F.O tanks) be pierced
The Washington event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and no fire and no victims (good luck)
The Gonesse event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and fire and victims (bad luck)
Before Gonesse ... Concorde was a lucky plane
Luck is not a safety factor .. and this was "discovered" !!! at Gonesse !
After Gonesse .. they put Kevlar in place
Maybe some have misinterpreted the first part of this Amundsen quote
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.

Not true - it (#209) was repaired and flew back to Paris three months later and remained in service until 2003.

100% agreed.

Yes.
But as I noticed in my previous posts, "Not taking action to avoid it" is not what occured.
"Not taking action efficient enough about the whole problem" would be a correct/honnest description about what occured.
It's not a judgement. It's facts.


Good luck/Bad luck: Yes.

Is that all? Are you sure the analysis should stop here? In the next Café du Commerce, maybe.
I for myself feel more confortable with a more torough analysis. And I'm not trying to find "excuses" for AF/French by doing so, whatever you may (seem to) think. It's of no use to try to convince me that AF/French side did wrong, I'm already convinced of that, thank you :)
What about other incidents/accidents from both AF & BA planes, involving tyres events & fuel leakages? Why "only" concentrate on Washington '79? Because it was the first/most impressive? Or because it suits the view that (all) the wrong doings lie on only the east side of some narrow sea? :rolleyes:

"It's not me, it the other". Oh yeah. Sure. (that partly true; but partly only).

I understand this view, but I would class it as not taking action to avoid it if it did not rectify the issue. Illusionary solutions are not actions to avoid it.

I understand your view, too.
But without hindsight, how can one judge a solution as efficient or illusionary?

It would be from the view point of a reasonable person in that situation with those expertise. So if they could reasonable see that something else could be done without an excessive burden, like a runway inspection, lining the tanks, not filling too high then that would be an example. But that's common law examples.

Nothing to do with AF or BA
AF will make nothing (as other) if they are not constrained by the demands of regulators
Because BEA produced a report about this event .. and some recommendations .. but certainly not enough (they don't bother of the wings F.O tanks fragility and exposure)
http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/1979/f-...f-fc790614.pdf
BEA - DGAC - and other regulators involved have not enacted binding recommendations
They introduced thus the luck as safety factor
Luck work fine ... for a limited time gap .. you can not always win the lotto
At Gonesse they no longer had the winning numbers
Nevertheless, all were cleared by the justice
Encouragement to continue business as usual

Two points:
1/ I didn't wrote "AF", I wrote "AF/French". That was meant to include the french part of the manufacturer, the french regulator, the french accident board...
2/ Doesn't AF publicly say that flight safety is their highest priority? In the discourse at least, they are concerned, and should therefore self-constrain.

In general, jcjeant, you seem to miss my point(s), therefore making the conversation digress/diverge. I cannot see how to explain it better. Perhaps would it be better if I posted it in french? I can do that (by MP), feel free to ask :)

The entire chapter is eloquent ...

• The AAIB was kept away from the evidences
• The judicial affected the technical
• But the BEA still pretends everything is normal

I agree with your first two points.
Not with your third, for 2 reasons:
- a quote from the BEA: "The BEA nevertheless regrets the difficulties encountered by the AAIB investigators and their advisers." => That doesn't feel like "all is normal" to me.
- two quotes from the AAIB: "Co-operation between the BEA and the AAIB enabled the AAIB to make an effective contribution to the investigation."
"In other areas [than the judicial 'blockade'], whilst the UK Accredited Representative and his Advisors agree with the evidence presented in the BEA report, the comments represent differences in the weighting of the conclusions."

Conclusions?
- The implementation of the French system of "2 parallel inquiries" was (far) too rigourous and inappropriate in 2000. This implementation was in contradition with international agreements. Clearly, that left room for improvment regarding full cooperation with foreign technical teams. Such improvments will show more transparency and consenquently less room for critics/accusations of partiality. (*)
- Now, was the situation so dark, in 2000, that the BEA report should be discarted as incorrect/partial in its entirety? (**) The AAIB didn't go that far, quite the contrary. On some specific points, the view of the AAIB differs from the view of the BEA. Those differences have been dully reported by the BEA. As such, the public has access to those comments (transparency: here at least, it's good), and is able to find that the AAIB agrees with the general scenario, e.g.: "This made it clear that the tank rupture had resulted from the effects of the tyre rupture." and "The evidence presented in the BEA report makes it clear that the fuel release, initiated when Fuel Tank 5 ruptured, had ignited within about 1 second of the rupture."

(*) It is my belief that improvments regarding transparency was notable since then (e.g. AF447). Kudos on that point: lesson was learned.

(**) It is legitimate to ask the question: after all, there certainly was a lot of tentation for some people/organisations to be interested only in covering their a**es, as is always the case in such events.

In short: My position?
- Transparency is the best cure against skepticism.:ok:
- Impartiality is the best course to counter partiality.:ok:

Agree totally (and with the rest of your post)

Well, quite! And publishing that remark was about the limit of what they could do. Their remit is strictly defined in terms of technical/human factors accident investigation - neither does it extend to passing public comment on other (e.g. judicial) aspects of the case (unless explicitly asked to do so), nor should it.

Again - like the BEA, the AAIB are essentially a branch of the civil service and would have been well aware that their Gallic colleagues' hands were tied on the matter - just as it would have been had the roles been reversed.

Something does not look right, if there was a scrap of titanium regardless of where it came from there should have been a quick runway check as is now a common practice in airport's today if this had been carried out then could it still be possible that the concorde would remain in the skies to day? I don't know about you all but when a fully laden fuel chugging aircraft capable of going-over the speed barrier is taking off on constant acceleration maybe some extra precautions would have helped. Anyway most aircraft incidents start off as small mistakes on the ground.

Not after every departure there isn't. Prior to every Concorde depatture might have worked, but still - the systems failure exposed by this accident was not fully understood, and even if it were the application of such a procedure could well have harmed passenger confidence in the type.

Possibly, but definitely not for much longer. The truth is that operating the type was incredibly expensive to start with - and even with BA's operation able to turn a profit, the increase in fuel costs over the last decade combined with the dwindling supply of spare parts would have rendered her obsolete well before the airframes became unserviceable. I admit and accept this reality despite being a huge fan of the aircraft (I watched the last three flights pass over Battersea Park where I was working at the time and felt a lump in my throat and a wrench in my gut as each one passed).

She may have been able to temporarily survive any one of the aftermath of the accident, the rise in oil prices or the slump in executive air travel post 9/11, but there was no way she could survive all three.

Hmmm. So there should be a runway check if there's debris on the runway ? That doesn't make sense.

The original poster has simply poorly worded his sentence (bad syntax)
If there was a check of the runway before takeoff of the Concorde Titanium piece was discovered
But there was no such inspection .. and there were three options
1 No one piece of Titanium (nothing can happens)
2 Piece of Titanium and tire does not touch (luck)
3 Piece of Titanium and tire passes on (bad luck)
Luck is not a safety factor

I understand that you have picked out an error in my comment thank you for pointing this out as I meant to say that even in regular runway check ups whether Concorde was to take off or be a regional jet the fact that debris on the runway is hazardous in every situation that occurs on a runway and therefore a runway check should have been made.

But the point I am trying to get at is that aircraft safety on the ground is as every bit as important as it is on approach take off cruise etc... The Concorde had been accident free for around 30 years it's a shame that it's only accident had triggered the chain of events leading to the demise of concorde.

Based strictly on what they have been given to examine.
But as they were "severely restricted" in their access to the evidences ...

So transparent that the Judge withold data from the proceedings.

Where is it then ... ?

No, not simply a grammatical error. As the poster has subsequently confirmed, he is suggesting a runway inspection prior to every takeoff:

No airport could possibly function with a requirement to check the runway between every departure.

OK I take good notice
So as it is commercially impossible and thus for economic reasons there is a general agreement to allow aircraft taking off even with objects on the runway that could cause a serious accident
From a commercial point of view it is indeed a good point of raisonement .. since the "Concorde case" occurs rarely and therefore it is profitable in terms of insurance costs that could result (in case of "bad luck")
Safety first as usual .. with "luck added"

Safety first make sure all parts removed from the aircraft e.g spacers are replaced in the right order.

Indeed, it is the first link in the chain ..( as other pieces)
A chain has several links .. so let us be sure this no other in bad condition

There are no absolutes where safety is concerned, it is always a trade-off against cost/economics.

It's very easy to look back, with hindsight, and say that a runway inspection after the CO DC-10 would have prevented the accident. While that may very well be true, it ignores the reality of how airports and airlines actually operate.

If the AAIB inspectors were unable to give an informed conclusion, they would have said they have doubts "about everything", they would not have written they agree with the general scenario, don't you think? ;)

What's the relation of that with the problem of "the judicial affected the technical" from Concorde days?
At the risk of repeating myself, I'm interested in aviation safety, not in lawyers fights.


Agreed 100% :D:D:D

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration??

Assuming that you mean the tyre disintegrating, rather than the entire undercarriage, what do you consider caused that ?

Did I read in an earlier post the Concorde's tires were not original, but were 'resurfaced'? That is not possible? 'Retreading a tire' is purely financial, and not compatible with rotation speeds. It would seem extremely unwise to fit this aircraft with such a component, given its history of undercarriage and tank issues?

That's why it wasn't.

I can't comment on the new/retread issue, I just don't know, but long ago my one time Concorde captain friend told me that there were two makes of tyres used by the airline he worked for ( he doesn't speak French ) and one manufacturers product gave more problems than the other, so each flight he would accompany the flt. eng. on the walk-around, and identify the 'mix' of tyre types.

When he eventually had a tire failure on take off he was able to make a guess based on knowledge of how many, and where, the 'worst' tyres were on that specific flight and which bogey might now have a failed tyre, and was prepared for some possible controllability problem on landing due to a failed tyre on 'that' side, and passed the info. to the emergency services, who positioned themselves accordingly.

Could have been wrong of course, and thankfully there was no problem -but the damage from the flailing and disintegrating rubber had only barely missed vital hydraulic controls, another Japanese 747 or Sioux City DC-10 loss of all hydraulics narrowly averted.

My search function isn't, and I am quite sure there were tire quality issues prior to Gonesse.....also unsure if related to 'recycled' tires.


"The appeals court's decision clears the way for a separate $19.4-million civil lawsuit being brought by Air France for damage the tragedy caused to its reputation."

I found "chutzpah" but is there a word for "shameless" in French?

merci....pas de quois

Indeed! As I read it, the judiciary would not allow the AAIB to view some of the wreckage directly - but they'd have had access to the rest of the wreckage, plus the BEA's photographs and diagrams of the wreckage they were prevented from seeing. If they had concerns about missing anything important (or at least anything that might prevent them doing their job) they would have said so.

Thank's for the info
Now I know that airports and airlines don't operate with max safety possible due to commercial reason
So .. as passenger and knowing this .. it's better to be in your lucky day when you board a aircraft and that your relative check as a preventive for a good lawyer ...

Sometime for aviation safety it's good that justice (with the help of lawyers involved) can remove from the loop some people when found guilty for prevent they make more mistakes .....
Justice can help aviation safety

they were "severely restricted" in their access to the evidences ...
How they can know they have missed anything important .. as they were "severely restricted" to acces of evidence ?
How you can know about something visual is important or not .. when you can't seen it yourself ?
Why they can see only photos (courtesy of BEA .... ) .. but not the real thing ?
Experts working (investigate) on photos .. when all material is available somewhere to be examined
Forensic working with photos of a deadman cause restricted to touch the body in the morgue ?
Weird isn't it ?