'To this day on our Concorde tours almost everyone who has no industry knowledge truly think he could have saved it 'if they'd have let him'. '

Absolutely. And I go straight to orbit in a different way whenever anyone mentions that within my hearing, and disabuse them of that notion double quick.

BA really looked after her, treating her like the royalty she was.

Concorde tours? You're involved? It's a weird thing, but I've climbed over several UK Concordes during their flying days, and my mother got one of those Bay of Biscay flights as a present once, but I have never actually stepped inside one. Ridiculous, isn't it?!

I must remedy that one day, because I can't show the family some of the things I did without going into the cockpit, and the other things are in the engines, and not visible.

I'm still convinced that, had Thatcher still been PM instead of that dreadful little Bliar, both the French president and CEO of Airbus would have been invited over for a stand-up handbagging session at No.10......

Concorde was killed by French arrogance, complacency and incompetence. As was AF447. Any airline whose senior captain turns a gallic shrug to RTOW requirements and announces "Top!" (that stupid French thing) when 5 tonnes outside scheduled performance limits is one with whom I will never fly.

Incidentally, it was well known that Sir Richard Branson once said that the only thing he envied about ba was Concorde. A sentiment I share.

@Lyman

'A technological marvel, or a work of timeless and artistic sculpture?'

Well, obviously the tech side could be vastly improved these days in Concorde II.

But as for the shape, she isn't just a work of timeless and artistic sculpture; she is timeless because the laws of physics don't change. She is the perfect example of form following function, or maths in action, if you will. She is the shape that she is because the laws of physics dictate that shape. Whoever said mathmatics isn't beautiful?!

Concorde II would be more or less that shape (I hope), but with lots of twitchy little control surfaces responding in the blink of an eye to circumstances, and you would feel as if you were in a living, breathing animal!

As for AF, well, I wasn't going to mention that!

@Shaggy
'......and for the fleet to go into retirement with his airline logo on the side rather than BA's.'

Hadn't thought of that. Obviously he had. Glad it didn't happen. If she was going to be retired, at least it should be with the logo of the people who actually looked after her.

@Beagle
I have the honour to deal professionally on a weekly basis with a scientist who had the ear of Mrs T when she was still PM. The scientist made proposals, got a severe grilling from Mrs T (herself a scientist, remember), and when she decided this was good stuff she gave lots of money to the project. And then she was ousted, and all the money vanished.

Yup, politics instead of sense. Mrs T would indeed have given them a handbagging. I'm sure a lot of us would have held her coat.

Quite so, and the fact that it was never remotely profitable.

Guess what, That was Air France ignoring the rules. Odd that!!!
I was working in Alderney with Aurigny at the airport, and on hearing the sonic boom, and the guys there said that it was common as AF, when travelling down the channel, ignored the rules and went supersonic earlier than they should.

A good friend of mine reported that the boom was also heard in Bracknell..
He was told that the sound in effect bounced of cloud formation thus extending the noise area.

That is not correct. BA made a great deal of money on Concorde ops.

It's true that the aeroplane did not pay for its development, and overall it was not a financial success, but the early costs having been written off it was a very profitable aeroplane. It would have made financial sense to keep in the air making profits.

Operating profits (at least in BA.... who knows about AF?) were a reason to keep it flying, not to ground it.

Concorde payloads.
 

After 9/11 the passenger figures were low, a lot of top league business people died that day, and they flew Concorde. This had a major effect on the continued operation of the aircraft by British Airways. Reference the metal strip, I was informed that the repair was done in Israel, by a contract company for Continental, so were they responsible for the 'bodge job'? it can only be one of many mistakes that brought Concorde to an early demise, one beautiful aeroplane.

Beags, If Thatcher had been PM back in the 60's Concorde would never have happened.

Concorde was operated by companies that lived in the real world, it was killed by reality.

mini. Offspring of a Concorde design engineer, homestead adorned with pics, once was a BAC brat etc etc.

Allow me the French side of the story : * (for the sake or arguments )
I understand the BA side of the story is quite different, but allow me nevertheless: .

Concorde was a project of another era :the goal (for France) was to demonstrate to the world that Europe was as good if not better than the USA in manufacturing airplanes. It was political decision to make it was not an economic one.
Forcing cooperation between States on top technologies to counter North American leadership was another one.
And basically you can say it worked on the long run. We have Airbus now, greatly thanks to the Concorde pioneers.

That is how France saw , and basically still sees the Concorde story. not to make money. never was,as De Gaulle said many times, it was, :" Le Prestige de la France "

Concorde was never a profitable aircraft and could never be , the small number made and the hugely expensive support men and machinery needed to manufacture spares for engines and mainframe was huge and coud only be done as the State was subsidinding and paying for this.
Air France did made money for some time with them, because they did not pay for anything . the aircrfat were fee , the maintenance subsidised, fuel was cheap .Load factors were in the low 50's but nobody cared . Opening lines like crazy Caracas, Dakar, Washington, Teheran,etc.. .
In the end years , fuel was expensive and only remained the US routes : first twice a day, then only a single New york daily. with 13 aircraft and 50 or so crews to do that .
Add a few charters ( 2-3 per month on average ) but that was it .
How can it be profitable ?

After the crash the load factors went down further, price of fuel went up , but also 9/11 hit badly . Technical problems too. Remember the Rudders ?
Many JFK-CDG AF flights were cancelled due tech and pax transfered by 747 instead,with not enough First class seats, poor marketing, poor PR, but that is typical AF .Reliability, delays and cancelations are a problem when you market speed.

If my memory is correct , it was when EADS said they will no longer guarantee the spares , that it sealed the fate of the aircraft . Whether this decision was political or purely EADS , I do not know. But everyone agreed at the time it was time to pull the plug. Including the general public in France . It felt like putting an old dog you loved to sleep. Did not like it, but necessary to avoid further suffereing.

That is in a nutshell how the French side sees the Concorde story.
But still with extreme pride to have build the aircraft ( of course you all know that for the average Frenchman Concorde , like Airbus are French aircraft ;)

I understand that the final nail in the French Concorde coffin was the another near disaster after the Paris crash. An AF Concorde made an emergency landing in Halifax with very little fuel. This was after shutting down one engine and then not noticing for too long that they were still losing fuel from that engine:

http://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/8207...g-halifax.html

Following this, and another few incidents, AF could not take the risk of another Concorde disaster so they decided to ground it, and then went on to have a few disasters with other aircraft e.g AF477, Toronto B777.

I also understand that the French quoted BA £50M a year to maintain the design authority for the aircraft. This happened to exactly match the BA operating profit for Concorde, coincidence?

I have always thought Concorde was grounded after 9/11 due to pressure from the US government (remember the first proving flight following the refit turned back mid Atlantic on that day) because a high-jacked Concorde could out fly the US missile defense system.

A short diplomatic exchange along the lines of "ground Concorde and we'll give BA and AF some more routes or else..."

It did not make sense grounding an A/C that had a near perfect safety record and had just had millions spent making it even safer.

I have no evidence to back this up except the general paranoia that existed in the States following 9/11

From my understanding the aircraft was terminated operationally due to the inherent costs in the re-engining program and other modifications.

The fact that the TC was cancelled was nothing to do with costs, safety, or operability, just an assurance that no one else would be able to use one ever again.

stopping using an aircraft doesn't canx the TC, once the TC is canx it can never be flown again (outside of experimental with administrator approval) without undergoing the type certification process and meeting the requirements as set forth by the administering authority at the the time.

Soemone just sent me this :
Something at least the French did right : they Powered the static SD :

BAC-Sud Aviation Concorde 213 F-BTSD> Musée de l'Air et de l'Espace - Site officiel
.

and for a bit of nostalgia , 1,5 min of demo of a unique feature :
Descente de nez Concorde F-BTSD Sierra Delta> Musée de l'Air et de l'Espace - Site officiel

Revenant a nos moutons, I would never claim to be an expert on this subject, but I know several who really are, and none is in any doubt that the start of the chain of events that led to the Paris catastrophe was the mechanics' failure to reassemble the undercarriage properly, ie leaving the spacer on the floor where it was found.

The evidence that the fire started before the SST reached the Continental piece of metal is, in their view, incontravertible.

This will never, ever be admitted in France and there is little point in going on about it. Unless, of course, you are facing a civil suit for very large sums.

There is a "Fine", and a civil suit. Who is plaintiff? At some point, the reality of the pre Titanium fire will foreclose further action. Counter suit? Dismissal with prejudice? 'Denial', a national credo for France? Non, non, toujours NONS.....

Sheesh

The low speed, maybe. But the BEA also estimated the fire intensity would have destroyed "soon enough" the left wing/control surfaces for the aircraft to be doomed anyway.

May I remind that, as per the BEA technical report:
- No strip = no accident; even with the tail wind, the (slight, given their calculations) overweight, the missing spacer... etc.
- OTOH, still as per the BEA report, once you include the titanium strip => tyre explosion => fuel leakage => fire into the scenario, then the aircraft is doomed, whatever anyelse. Even if she was not overweight, if the wind was head, if the #2 was kept running, and if the spacer was where it should have been.

And by the way: I'm nevertheless "happy" with the appeal, which seems more "honnest" in assessing responsabilities/faults. Indeed, I think AF/French authorities in general took "too lightly" some issues with the plane (namely: tyres, and the Michelin NZG fitted for the return to flight were an excellent thing). IIRC, the exact same scenario (rolling on the strip) with NZG tyres would not have had such catastrophic outcome.


I disregard the "pre-strip fire" reports, as those reports always were not precise enough to be relevant IMO (unless one wants to "make a story", of course ;)).
Capot, on that very topic, if you have any evidence/documentation (i.e. something more tangible that "every knowledgeable people know..."), I would be more than pleased to take them into account to, if needed, change my mind & be corrected. Indeed, why not try to answer BEA's "denegations", if the "truth" is so easy to demonstrate? (bearing in mind that once again, in my eyes selected testimonies of witnesses are not that conclusive). And I'm no expert either, I just can read & understand ;)

I, too, have my doubts about the 'fire before the metal strip' theories. Is there any hard evidence for it?

However, I do beleive that the other factors were 'holes in the cheese' and the metal strip was only the final one of those. I'd say 'no overfilled fuel tanks, no accident', as well, even with the tyre disintegration.

Did the fuel tanks were overfilled when the Washington event happens (big leak of fuel .. multiple important holes) :confused:
And why no fire ?
Maybe it can be considered that for Gonesse .. it was some hot post for igniting the fuel (other than engines) .. and this can drive again to a problem with the gear (spacer) ?
Note that this particular plane (Washington event) was considered beyond repair
Ironically the replacement plane was the plane who crashed at Gonesse .... :uhoh:

My point exactly. I believe the answer is "none". Keeping an open mind, I stand to be corrected, if need be.

Yep, I do agree. What I do not remember is if the #5 tank was overfilled? Or simply filled full as in standart/normal procedure at that phase of flight?
Will have to check... If any knowledgeable people comes around, don't hesitate to press that particular point :)
I notice §1.16.7.3 of the final report saying the #5 & #7 tanks were not used for the taxi, and were then "fully full" during T/O, and that "only" 21Kg of fuel from that #5 tank had been used at the moment of the said tank rupture.
In the same §, it it said the tank was at 94% full from the gate, and still at that value when the event occured. Interesting to note is the longitudinal acceleration effect, that led to the tank being considered as full in the physical sense when it ruptured.


As said above, I can't comment (at the moment) the overfilling or not of the tanks.
However, BEA said the two events were very different:
- Whashington '79, the tanks were punctured by several little/middle sized pieces, which led to (comparatively to CDG) small leaks (*), which didn't ignited (and weren't able to, given their flow rate)
- Gonesse 2000, the #5 tank was ruptured because of an hydrodynamic effect inside the tank, leading to the ejection of a large piece (320 x 320 mm) of the tank wall, and to a massive leak (**), able to ignite (and stay ignited in the airflow).

(*) "Dégonflement puis déchapage du pneu n° 6, entraînant l’éclatement du pneu n° 5, la destruction de la roue n° 5 et des perforations de petites dimensions des réservoirs 2, 5 et 6."
"La fuite de carburant résultant de toutes les perforations était de 4 kg/s."
Reference: Concorde accident final report, §1.16.4.2.1 "Evénement du 14 juin 1979 à Washington".
(**) estimated by 3 different means in §1.16.8.2: 60kg/s, 20-130kg/s, 60kg/s. Or more than an order of magnitude superior to the Washington leaks flow rate...

AZR

Air France failed to produce the "Fuel Loading Sheet" and "Aircraft Loading Sheet". Documents that legally should have been retained.
So just how overweight and overfuelled the Aircraft was will remain a matter of speculation.

Before the France-trashing gets out of hand, it's worth remembering that France had the UK government over a barrel in the 1960s and stopped the project from being cancelled several times. So without them, there might not have been Concorde at all.

And again worth remembering the contribution made by Airbus after the accident to get the aircraft back in the air. You might also factor in the fact they wanted to divert engineering resource away from Concorde and towards the A380 which at that point was two years from first flight.

From the AF lawyer with the smile : "That spacer was useless anyway"

Not exactly clear since when designers add useless parts and weight on aircrafts ... ?

Actually you can thank Julian Amory for that (a Brit politician). He inserted the clause into the contract that committed both sides to meet the costs even they pulled out, because the Brits thought the French would renege. In fact it was Harold Wilson who wanted out!

It should never have been grounded. At least the BA ones shouldn't have been. They were using an improved tyre and following correct operating techniques.

Indeed, so why not stick the price of maintenance up until it becomes unsustainable to keep the bird flying? Especially after AF had ducked out.

It is to be nicer :)
Concorde is a nice aircraft ....

So, in your mind, a BA Concorde taking off - off course following correct operating techniques - and rolling on the (in)famous titanium strip would have been safe? :confused:
Why? In what way were BA tyres sufficiently improved (??) to be immune to that strip?
I'm aware the water deflector were better secured on BA fleet, but that's not the point. There was no NZG tyre on any Concorde in fleet at the time.
OTOH, BA & AF Concorde had numerous tyres bursts, not only in their first years of exploitation. In fact, from 1990 to the accident, 7 tyres events were recorded for each of the 2 companies.

Overall, AF certainly was more laxist than BA, given the recorded evidences (and others events), and for that the company (and the country) could be blamed.
But that's no sufficient reason to assess that BA Concorde were safer regarding to the danger of such a FOD on the runway.
Hence, while the problem was being worked on, I think grounding both fleets was a correct decision. Once again, I stand to be corrected if need be (keeping in mind that I suffer from a very Cartesian mind). :)



Of course the spacer had a raison-d'être. Now, lawyers being lawyers, if the absence of said spacer had no influence on the events, then you can say (being a lawyer, remember) that it was useless.
And what said the technical report about that topic? Let's see:
.

BEA is short of words ...
For a complete conclusion about the spacer problem .. this was to be add
"but however demonstrate the incompetence and lax of the Air France technical crew in charge of the Concorde maintenance"
Wonder if the chief of this technical crew (the one with the stamp) remained on the pay list of AF ...

if the aircraft was overweight for T/O, it should never have begun its take off roll. ergo, then the metal strip is also irrelevent.

unusual that loading sheets, suddenly failed to be be produced. :suspect:

AZR - no Zero Growth tyre, but an inmproved design over that then still being used by AF. But that's not the real reason I'd say BA was safe. The real reasons I think a BA Concorde running over the strip would have (probably - we can't be sure) have survived is because:

They'd have used an into-wind runway

The undercarriage would not be missing a vital component

It would not have been overweight

Most important of all, the tanks would not have been over-full (with no air gap to compress!)

In the event of engine damage, the FE would not have closed down a power-producing engine at that stage of flight

SSD

It may be different on Concorde but from my Military days the first priority was "fly the aircraft."
The FE should not have attempted to shut down anything until the aircraft was safely clear of the ground.

From my Tornado days. Engine Fire Warning at Rotate.

First action. Throttles (plural) to Combat Power.

OK thanks :)

Granted, that's more than probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.

As demonstrated above, not vital. Argument dismissed.

Granted, that's probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.

I agree that this is the most important of all.
That leaves my question unanswered: what is the "normal" fullness of tank 5 on that phase of flight?
- if less than 94% (estimation of AF accident Concorde) then I'll accept that a BA Concorde (or any not "over-filled" Concorde) would have been safe;
- OTOH, if this tank was meant to be that full on perfectly normal operations, then the argument must be dismissed, and one can only conclude a BA (or any not "over-filled" Concorde) would not have been safe.
My understanding of BEA's final report §1.6.3 is that the "overfill" was in tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. Not in tank 5.
The same § indicate there was a procedure for overfill, allowing up to 1630 liters. The accident aircraft used "only" 300 liters, less than 20% of the total overfill capacity.

Granted, that's more than probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.


Now, my point is: as soon as the massive leak occured and took fire, the aircraft was doomed. No matter what the crew could do right or wrong (and AF personnal certainly did a number of mistakes on that day/a little before).
Then a BA Concorde rolling on the strip, if subject to the same "tank #5 fullness", would not have been safer than its AF counterpart.
Why? Because of the intensity of the fire, which was quickly destroying the left wing and its flight control surfaces. See chapter 1.12 of the final report, and particularly §1.12.2 (debris between the RWY and the crash site) and §1.12.4.6 (study: structure vs fire).

All that is by no mean an excuse for AF people mistakes (even if, of course, their lawyers will try to push that way), but what is important (IMO) is that the aircraft itself (and not AF aircrafts only) was subject to a high risk from specific FODs.
Such risk was assessed after the crash (new tyres "NZG" + liner in tanks), and I think Concorde was safer after 2003, and that the grounding of both fleets was the correct thing to do (another interim solution would have been to make runway inspection mandatory before each take-off, but I'm not sure it would have been practical?)

It's not different for Concorde. Having spoken to many Concorde FEs, P1s, and P2s, they are increadulous that anyone would shut down an engine during take off, especially after V1 but before a safe rate of climb (or even lift-off in this case!) had been acheived. And even then, maybe they wouldn't depending on other factors!

Sorry, but his words leave no space to interpretation :
"The spacer appears to have no utility"
I would like to see him arguing with the engineering team who decided to put that spacer in the first place ...

I take note of the technical report quote.
In the meantime, let me quote the following :

AZR - you cannot simply dismiss the downwind takeoff, the overweight, and especially the missing spacer as irrelevant to the crash. They were all factors, and if any one (never mind all) had been absent it might have changed the outcome. Especally the spacer (it wasn't designed by the manufacturer to be there just as added ballast!).

The overfilling of the tanks so that there was insufficient air space to allow some compression and therefore obviate the hydraulic overpressure is a crucial factor.

If the FE had not shut down No.2, they'd therefore have a lot more power and less drag as they'd have got the gear up. That might have enabled them to attempt some sort of landing (Perhaps at Le Bourget) before the wing burned through. Or the fire might have got them first. We'll never know.

Either way the inexplicable FE's action raises questions in one's mind about AF's operation of this complex and demanding airliner.

The post return-to-flight near loss of another Concorde (Halifax NS) and AF's decision shortly after that to ground their fleet reinforces that question.

I am confident, having spoken extensively to BA crews who express similar views to the above, that no such situation existed in that airline.

For documentation
Another analyze of the Concorde crash (unfortunately no translation in english)
Crash du Concorde: la loi de Murphy

Google translation :rolleyes:
Google*Traduction

Titanium Strip
 

The conclusion the authority made in their report exudes a skill in legalese. It is conclusive, and defensive. This is not in the mission statement, and reminds one of the ad hoc release of a memorandum exonerating Airbus from "additional" mechanical issues with 447.

Be that as it may, the photography post crash shows me no aggressive abrasion from the concrete on the Strip. It is unlikely the strip pierced the tire, then encountered no further contact with the runway such that it was not grooved, and beaten up with extensive deformation. It looks rather pristine having survived what is proposed.

As to the spacer, i need to read some metallurgical forensics of both the axle and hub to conclude there was no result from a missing thrust bearing. I would be looking for signs of friction heat, loss of surface metal, etc.

If the lawyer concluded the spacer was redundant, unnecessary, then there would need to be proof of same. Not so sure the fire might not have originated with sparks from the 'H' frame, or Hub..... How is it the tires were recovered intact, were they thrown clear of the fireball?

If your read precisely what I wrote, you must have noted that I'm not trying to justify the lawyer's words. In fact, I'm not interested in lawyers fights.
I'm concerned, however, about aviation safety.
One can say (and be right about it): BA was more serious about procedures than AF.
One cannot stretch to the point of saying: BA aircrafts were not at risk.


Yep, I know that last quote too. What about the entire chapter? The comment from the BEA about that point is interesting, too:



It's not me who dismisses anything. I do no more than quoting the BEA, here. And my reading of the BEA final report is precisely that: those "factors" being absent would not have changed the outcome.
Of course, you can always argue that "we'll never know for sure", and be right about that. But that's not my point.
My point is the strip/tyre interaction alone was enough to put the aircraft at risk. Be it an AF incorrectly operated Concorde or a BA perfectly operated one. Hence the grounding of both fleets was justified (and both countries certifications authorities could be regarded as guilty for not having exiged modifications sooner, if one wants to stretch the point).

May I aslo remind what was the first Preliminary Recommendation following the accident? (my bold)
Ref: §4.1 of the final report, reproducing Preliminary Recommendation from earlier interim report.


I'll say it again: Until proven wrong, I consider that the #5 tank was full (94% = full) but not overfilled as per the BEA report.
What's more is that an overfill procedure existed (was approved, I assume) and F-BTSC was fueled according to that procedure. Once again, if that procedure is deemed wrong, then surely it applies to both countries/companies aircrafts.

I don't share that confidence regarding the specific and very important issue of the #5 tank filling, as written above.

AZR, you seem to saying that 'the BEA report says XYZ, so XYZ was the cause'. I think a few of us on this side of the channel, including perhaps our own AAIB, would't consider that BEA report even good enough to be used as bog paper!

This is a very good recommendation indeed
Unfortunately, this recommendation would be made ​​already after the Washington incident
This neglect or lax of BEA was paid cash at Gonesse

Yep, that's it. Until proven otherwise, of course: Errare humanum est, BEA is composed of human beings (I think). ;)
It's not about blind confidence, it's because the report is the most detailled work about the accident I've come across to, and because its conclusions seem accurate & logical (damn my Cartesian mind, once again).
Now, if you want to convince me that BA's Concorde were safe and should not have been grounded following the 2000 AF accident, there is a simple thing to do: to demonstrate that BA's Concorde never took off with 94% full #5 tank (or that RWYs were inspected/wipped before every such take-off).

I'm aware of that. My problem is when those people - from whatever side of whatever sea/border/planet (we have such people here too) - fail to bring anything consistent (in my eyes) to support their theories. So far, I acknowledge question marks alot, but few (if any) definite/hard evidences answers.

Uh? I'm not aware of the AAIB having such a negative PoV about the whole report. Remarks they made, yes. Some specific points of analysis differed, and were dully noted. But disagreement on the facts or conclusions/recommendations?

BTW, I feel useful to also remind that I'm perfectly OK with your comment here:
Yes indeed. Whatever specific role the (in)famous titanium strip played on this sad day of summer 2000, that should not be an excuse to forget or dismiss AF (french) other faults/mistakes when operating that wonderful aircraft. It feels right that the court - finally - acknowledged that. :)
Nor should OTOH those other - and numerous - faults/mistakes be an excuse to forget or dismiss the inherent risk (which is no more french/AF than british/BA or Kinglon for that matter) of the strip/tyre/tank interaction.



Even with the intense political pressures at that time, recommendations were made after Washington. And after other occurences, in both AF & BA fleets.
What wasn't "imagined" is the massive leak resulting from the 2000 specific scenario (it was significatively different from the Washington and other incidents, as already said here). Measures were not taken to contervene an unkown risk. Is it a fault? A neglect? Perhaps.
Perhaps it's also a bit "too easy" to say so... afterwards. :rolleyes:

You are kidding I suppose ?
Leaks of fuel are unkown risk ?
Fuel is not a combustible ?
Fuel can't burn ?
Check the Concorde design
F.O tanks , gear and engines locations .. and you will understand why the risk was know already when for the first time the Concorde shows his Achilles heel ( tires )
On the many other incidents .. this was a luck factor working
You can't expect this will work fine everytime ...