Diamond Bob, #302, barek, #308....

Thank you both, I appreciate any information that helps me understand the pilots' situation that is absent vitriol and condescension. Many thanks....

At this point I would like to ask if information could be supplied in the same manner relating to the "AP2 ON" switch, throughout. It was left on like the FD, and I wonder if it had anything whatever to do with the climb, as the FD may have.....

The drill calls for AP OFF, and if left on, does that resemble "Re-Select" in any way? The accident might boil down to a drill unobserved, and if so, the tragedy assumes some logic, absent thus far.

It has been explained that AP is not available after degrade to AL, but does that mean Unavailable if re-selected, or does it include "if left on".....

jc, I agree with you, a good slap to the face of the PF could have saved the day. That being said, I see two GLARING mistakes; 1) Pushing back from the gate knowing the severity of the weather insteading of delaying departure for improvement of known severity of WX. 2) After making mistake #1, going to the back to take a nap with the IRO in the left seat with known severe wx to be dealt with. That pretty much sealed their fate. FWIW, I am not a Airbus driver, I have been in the Boeing products all of my career (727, 757, and 747) so my knowledge of Airbus is zip. However, on the Boeings, we are always trained, that when things are going bad and only getting worse: **** can ALL automation and FLY THE AIRPLANE. It is the first line on all Emergency Checklists. :confused:

jcjeant: thanks, inaccuracy corrected. You said what I was trying to say.

Buffet
 

I'm not a pilot, but have read the full report.

One thing I found interesting in the report was that the pilots may have mistaken the stall buffet for overspeed buffet (as mentioned in post 308) and yet the report asserts that the A330 doesn't suffer from overspeed buffet.

Is this true for other modern jets? And how many pilots know if their type suffers from overspeed buffet or if buffet is always stall buffet?

Hopefully all.......

svhar,
Your post #311 is essentially incorrect except for the Boeing part.
Those colors are in agreement with the local TV weather radar reports during episodes of severe weather, TS and potential tornados.

However, If you go back to ironbutt57 post #281 and click on its content, you will discover it does not refer to weather radar in the imagery at all except for one small image a vertical slice through the CB provided by NASA CloudSat. All the other major images are indeed thermal imagery from satellites, some enhanced by the author or others.

IMO, an apology is in order to BOAC for your snarky remark...

Do any of you know who BOAC is?

I do, and you'll REALLY eat those sarcastic comments if you learn the truth.

I couldn't see any reference to the crew giving any meaningful brief to the cpt on return . As it appears not to have been articulated is it reasonable to suggest that he never knew of the mode change and was therefore ignorant of the loss of some protections ?

Very briefly, guys, I appreciate your comments. I had 'blanked out' this buffoon on the forum and only now seen his latest comments. Best leave the creature to his own world, I fancy.

One you spend enough time on this forum you will find that it is a great mistake to guess at outting a person from under their name cover in a posting.

Best to just imagine them as idiots rather then blowing your own cover :)

Well I really AM one! ;)

It was my impression that the report said the met was just another night in the ITCZ. And haven't we put to bed this canard that they "flew into a thunderstorm"? Certainly there's nothing on the CVR (or the FDR) to indicate that, other than a cabin announcement about some routine turbulence with a bit more to be expected ahead.

My question above, Retired F4, had to do with the CVR, which quoted the Captain, "Wait, the Autopilot, (noise of switch, CAM)"......This occurred late in the chronology, and I assume it meant that the Autopilot (AP2) was left on. I know the AL defeats Reselect, but what does it do with an AP left ON? The Flight Director was left ON, and may have caused some mischief. What does the computer do with an Autopilot that is left ON?

Let me add my dudgeon to the snark directed at BOAC. I have found him to be a remarkably kind and patient expert here, and his credentials are probably understated, if I may say.....

LarryW727 you said So you obviously believe that all the other aircraft that successfully flew that route that night should also have delayed their departure? You might delay takeoff for bad local weather but not for routine ITCZ weather that requires en route deviations. Taking off when they did was not a mistake.

Actually Pulkovo climbed too well at 10 m/sec - they blamed the pilot overcorrecting the up down pitching for the crash

Utter rubbish. The income that sustains my employer comes in part from organisations with whom I disagree. Does that factor change my personal or professional opinion?

No - and any tenuous link you try to draw between the French state stake in Airbus and BEA conclusions is utterly reprehensible. Did the RAE skimp on the Comet enquiry despite the aircraft's state subsidies? Does the NTSB frequently do the same ("Hoot" Gibson case aside)? With all due respect I think you need to find another hobby.

It turns it OFF and latches it OFF until ground crews perform maintenance.

Sorry, Doze, I answered you in the other thread. Briefly, Airbus itself warns to turn OFF A/P with UAS. If it is latched off by the computer and cannot be reselected, why does A/B warn against its "re-selection"? Why bother, if as you say the A/P is shut down completely and forever until ground maintenance? The FD is obviously not treated in the manner you suggest, it came back on, in different modes, several times. Are you sure you know whereof you speak? No offense.

Layman

"I have found him to be a remarkably kind and patient expert here"

I concur. Most people are polite and helpful but there are a few who wish to show they know best by putting others down.

As PJ2 so eloquently sates in one of his posts "those who roast others without all the facts just want their name inlights perhaps, while those who know are either simply heads-downquietly doing the daily work or can't be bothered arguing."

Quite an interesting thread
 

Let me add a few points (from an engineer's perspective – If I am saying something stupid – I do expect a very strong – WTF are you talking about – see below).


1. We are fooling ourselves that human beings are capable of logical reasoning, especially when it comes to split-second decisions in a stressful situation. Decisions like that are made on instinct – driven by pre-programed associations. In most cases, when exposed to danger, a person instinctively runs from danger any way he/she was programmed to run. The hero of our story wanted to run from danger but he didn't know how.

2. For this reason, training is absolutely essential so that proper ways to run from danger are instinctive, which clearly was not present in this case. A kid who practiced for say an hour a day for a few weeks on a toy simulator on some game station would most likely have a better instinctive reaction to the stall warning than the hero of our story did.

3. For this reason, there is something fundamentally wrong, I think, with counting hours of watching autopilot do its thing as “flying experience.” With the emergence of present day-autopilots the process of judging pilots' experience should have been redefined long ago. One way to do it would be to count takeoffs and landings, which would promote pilots who did time on smaller planes long before they were allowed to touch commercial jets. However, I do not see pilots talking about changing that system. Maybe they should.

4. It is absolutely true that a true ace pilot, one that committed his whole life to aviation, could NOT be affected by even most illogical configuration of plane controls. Even if someone/something all of a sudden re-wired the whole damn sidestick backwards, a guy like that would figure it out in a few seconds, because he committed his whole life into merging his mind and body with every flying device he could put his hands on. But, the point is, many of the pilots probably are not aces like that, they looked for something to do and they did/learnt exactly what the “system” required them to do and absolutely nothing more. Now we are getting into my favorite model of stereotyping people into aces and vegetables, or wolves and sheep.

5. Clearly, the guys flying AF447 were not aces, and it was probably by design even if nobody will dare to admit it. Here is why: Every society outside state of war for survival just LOVES vegetables and tries to suppress the aces/wolves. At the end, this is extremely illogical process, but outside real emergencies, vegetables are so much nicer and easier to deal with. They like one another and don't fight with each another like aces do, they are loyal to the system not their trade, they don't cause trouble(at least until trouble finds them), they are not adrenaline junkies like some of the aces are, etc, etc.

6. For above reasons, the whole system was demonstrated to be a complete failure, and there is no way to see it anything but that. Someone allowed “vegatable” pilots behind the controls who were more than happy to do little beside watching autopilot do its thing. Then a small problem arises, the whole automatics shuts down and expects our heroes to suddenly, on a second's notice become ace pilots capable of handling the plane almost without any idiot-proof protections they instinctively learnt to rely on. The main idiot-proof system that still works (the stall-warning) provides completely fraudulent feedback (disconnects at deeper stall, reactivates itself at the attempts to recover from stall). Nothing wrong with this picture?

7. To make matters more interesting, due to lack of communication and specifics of the sidestick design, the PNF has absolutely no idea what PF is pulling back on the stick and that he is doing it even after he pretends to agree to not do it. When PNF finally masters enough courage to try to take controls himself, he has no idea that the other guy counters his actions, which discredits the only attempt to recover from stall as action that brings no result.

8. If you think vegatable pilots are bad, imagine vegetable engineers, people who never had any desire to create new things, and are perfectly happy to do little besides playing office politics. Yes – the corporate engineering is full of those and this is why good pilots should not be shy about criticizing stupid things the corporate engineering came up with on the premise that “they know what they are doing”. As every real-world engineering is ALWAYS over budget and late, fixing screwups found late in the process is very hard because it risks massive delays. Tremendous pressure is always put on those who, loyal to their trade and not office politics, want to fix the screwups. They are often portrayed by the bean counters as people who want to destroy the good company with their idiotic “nitpicking”. Therefore, the only chance to fix engineering screwups comes up after a major FUBAR.

9. I have never worked for Airbus, so I don't know how bad (or good) things are over there. But the companies I worked for, the things that I have seen made my skin crawl. Worse yet – if I told anyone the details, I would be sued and “the law” would destroy me rather than help me. That's today's corporate culture which in my view has nothing to do with healthy capitalism, which I always believed in.

10. My view that human beings are inherently illogical comes precisely from watching “vegetable engineers” do their thing. If you scratch your head over 2 pilots doing completely stupid thing for 2 minutes, imagine watching 30+ engineers doing similar thing for months. Having weeks and weeks to think about it and still doing it. Generally, one vegetable engineer, most likely the boss's top ass-kisser would come up with the idea in order to promote his position, then convince everyone that that's what the boss wanted. Then everyone goes along and does not dare to question things. Not daring becomes its own logic and so it goes. Not thinking is running from danger of risking the alienation of the management and co-workers. The only way to stop such nonsense outside complete FUBAR where the crew would lose their jobs would be someone being brave enough walking to them and saying something like: WTF are you IDIOTS doing? It is sad but in my experience only a strong shock like that can make people think in such lock-down situations. A direct, UGLY challenge where they have to prove they were not screwing up or lose face. Needless to say, being loyal to my trade first and foremost, I had the pleasure and the privilege to be the one doing it over and over. At one job, I was expressly forbidden by the boss from using word “idiot”, which I interpreted in my own way as a challenge to learn more English synonyms of the word idiot, which I printed out of thesaurus and framed on the wall. I never lost my means of survival doing things like that – but I would never lie to anyone and pretend that it was easy.

11. The “WTF are you IDIOTS doing” story brings up the last point. The PNF is half-aware that PF is not doing what he should be doing, but he never masters enough courage to properly assert this point. Calling for the captain to come to the cockpit is pretty much the extend of his bravery. If he mastered enough courage to do “WTF are you doing” and properly asserted taking over the controls, he could have prevented the disaster. When planning the shock/upset simulator training, it would also be a great idea to test the pilots if they are able to properly identify the situations where the other pilot does something completely idiotic, and assert control to prevent disaster.

As an addition: annex 3, page 2: The AP2 disengaged at 2:10:06, 3 seconds before ATHR disengaged, and never went on again. (AP1 not shown.) By the way, the FD1 + FD2 were off for the better part of the last 3 minutes, so no "flying after the FD all the time" as suggested somewhere else.

As to the BEA relation to Airbus or Air France: Despite I had my doubts before (mainly due to the mishandling of the Mulhouse case), I don't think anymore that there is any relevant or "protective" link. Perhaps BEA knew about their public image since they almost always invited experts from other countries (at some points they had to according to ICAO annex 13) and documented crucial moments with pictures such as the openings of the flight data recorders. All facts I can crosscheck are correct, the conclusions I can draw from the raw data in the annexes are basically the same as they did, no major discrepancies found so far.

Perhaps we should face that supposed-to-be-professionals screwed up entirely for more than three minutes, not just for one wrong hand movement in the wrong second.

Why are certification requirements not adapted to recent findings? Why are aircraft marketed with bold statements like "the pilot can't do wrong, the plane sorts out his errors"? Did this add to the mental picture the PF had? As someone said, handing back from computer to pilot as a safety backup strategy does not work anymore for a generation that is flying computers immediately after ATPL. Do we have to rethink safety strategies?

They weren't suicidal, they fought for their own lifes as well and sadly lost. But how come that their abilities were so limited, despite thousands of hours?

As individuals: How come that flying manually is something not much appreciated in the industry? How could they build up certain skills when "managing computers" is the work description? How could they avoid wrong reactions (TOGA at high alt) when this is standard sim drill, since high altitude flying is almost entirely ignored? Why is basic flying in simple aircraft not fostered more in order to build basic skills?

As a team: The captain wasn't in his seat, and due to his CV I'm convinced he would have had the abilities to handfly without major problems. But how was he trained and tested to lead a crew? Great pilots are not automatically great leaders. Did he overestimate the skills of his PF? Was he reluctant to interfere more vigorously, being a nice guy? Hierarchy was a negative factor in KLM4805, JAL123, ... but without any hierarchy (clear roles) seems to be just as bad. Where was CRM??

There wasn't before. The BEA did nothing wrong during that investigation - but in order to pre-empt the criminal proceedings, Capt. Asseline's lawyers spread a lot of muck around via the press in the hope that some of the mud would appear to stick.

The irony of the situation was that the BEA's AF296 report itself lay most of the cause at the door of Air France (due to serious organisational failings), and had Asseline's lawyers not tried to muddy the waters by making it about Asseline vs. Airbus, then Asseline himself would have probably got away with not much more than a slap on the wrist.

Actually, experience suggests that some are and some aren't. The problem is that it is very difficult to tell which person will fall into which category until it actually happens.

Speculation with no supporting evidence. There's a *massive* difference between experiencing the sequence in the sim versus doing it for real (especially when doing it for real involves a body clock expecting circadian rhythms). Also, the chances of making a successful recovery hinge on being prepared - I hadn't touched the controls of an aircraft since I last climbed out of a Chipmunk trainer in 1993, yet managed to recover an A320 sim with the AF447 conditions programmed. This doesn't make me a pilot - my advantage was entirely because I knew what to expect.

Then please explain why there are at least five dead astronauts and cosmonauts who were lost in training accidents. No matter how good you are, sometimes it's just not your day.

With all due respect, I find your use of "aces/wolves" versus "vegetables" not only insulting but incredibly distasteful. It's a lot more complicated than that.


Not when developing new products in aviation you don't.

Were any of those companies in the aviation business? I've worked on many software projects, running the gamut between being brilliantly run and managed and being a complete train-wreck, but I don't think the latter methodology would wash in a top-drawer aviation engineering department. Airline management is another story, and PJ2 absolutely filleted some of the more modern practices in a post on the other thread.

As for Airbus, my old Software Engineering Prof (RIP) - who was a dyed-in-the-wool FBW sceptic - visited Toulouse in 1994 and came away impressed. Mind you, he still held their feet to the fire in public...

Every profession has these vegetables. They rarely rise to command where processes are defined against standards and regulated by outside sources.

Thus in this case it's only imagination

Accoustic signals from ULB
 

Page 83 Final report
I don't find any explications about why the signals were not detected
I don't find any in the BEA report about investigations on this problem (if the beacons were active at time .. or if they find some defects for explain the failure of detection ...)

No need to apologize, harshness was mine.

Agree it could turn out to be fun & interesting, not necessary for the same reasons, though.

Agree, but big picture is autopilots resigning almost daily in cruise levels (no need to have UAS) and most of the occurrences getting sorted out without anyone noticing. AF447 is just a detail, very significant and very ugly though.

Aviation has it covered in certification processes. As soon as robots show functionality and reliability of human pilots, we'll have pilotless aeroplanes. Don't hold your breath waiting for it, key issue is still functionality, with latest computers being no significantly better than ENIAC.

My point was that since a) level of safety currently achieved makes sample very small b) there are so many variables that affect the outcome, if we want to learn something in order to further advance aviation safety, we can not rely on statistics to get any meaningful result. That is something known since at least mid 90ies (that's about time I started paying attention) - at the time "swiss cheese" and "accident chain" analogies were accepted and it was recognized it wasn't enough just to analyze accidents but also a close calls, where all safety features failed except one or two and result was no one hurt, no damage when it could easily ended otherwise.

Now if we apply numerology, and boldly and deceptively call it statistics, to the sample provided by BEA in interim 3 by assuming that survival means no problem while crash means manual handling of the aeroplane deficiency, we'd come to conclusion that it's not such a big deal if just 3% of crews are unable to control the aeroplane when hit with UAS. Of course it is deeply wrong conclusion and you were on the right track when you mentioned "survived for wrong reasons". To discover what were wrong reasons, we need detailed case studies, not just statistical analysis of contributing factors. BEA has analyzed 13 out of 36 discovered cases of UAS and added one which couldn't be analyzed; case of TAM 332 on Nov 12 2003. Both pilots pulled as airspeed was lost but then pushed when stall warning went off so we need to resolve why some pilots perceived and understood the warning while some didn't.

Chapter 1.17.1.5.4 is also pretty damning.

I'm not holding my breath.

Insufficient data to tell whether it was unrecoverable. No one felt suicidal enough to fly the AF447 profile for real.

Something of no concern on A330/340.
Not trim, crew.

Not quite, THS remained at full nose-up, elevators moved from full nose up to half-nose up and that was enough for nose and AoA to go down. Good indication there was no deep stall but not definite proof - now this sentence should give ammo to conspiracy theorists.

I guess not, especially for those that need to have mach trim e.g. 757. Issue is that if you know procedures, recognize when they need to be applied and follow them, you need not to know whether your aeroplane suffers from mach buffet or not.

Most of the time, they are.

False. Air has no respect for anybody. It is ignorant who coined the phrase "beginner's mistake". Experience is double edged sword, as the experienced "ace" often does not recognize the times he tempted the fate and is bound to repeat the feat. With a bit of luck, such an "ace" can live to retirement.

You condemned the whole system based on single accident. Such a feat can not be excessively serious.

Vegetable is as vegetable does. Just because you don't like some aspect of the machine, it doesn't mean it's bad or that improving it would cause massive degradation of other aspects.

Care to elaborate?

Accident investigators have only the power of advice. Also their scope is limited to accident at hand.

They fought for their lives by tying the noose around the neck and jumping off the stool, without ever recognizing there's a rope.

PPRuNe is not the industry.

Have a go at BEA's report. While there were deficiencies noted, 36 crews given the manual control of the aeroplane performed well enough not to kill anyone. I doubt they had more manual training at high levels than AF crews. Some were AF crews.

If extend the scope to display flying, we may add Rimantas Stankevičius, Buran test pilot, to the list. Devoted, experienced, professional. One day overhead Salgareda he entered split-S too low.

It does not enter my mind to apologize to BOAC. He belitteled my first post ever on Pprune, and I have seen him do it to others in many threads on various topics. He thinks he knows it all. I have always detested such persons.

Who is so dumb, with only 20 posts, to argue with the king of Pprune with more than 15.000 posts. Only me is that stupid. When does he sleep? Time for family? Let alone, when does he have time to fly for a living? I know the type.

And even, if BOAC retired when he startet posting, it is like asking the Wright brothers to comment on the 787.

svhar,
I'm still a (non-piloting) newbie here, and I've been flapping my lips here for 200 posts in a quest for knowledge, no doubt revealing my utter unsuitibility to sit at this table. Please note that Clandestino, whom I often don't wholly agree with, has never once singled me out for public (or private) humiliation. Why not?

So you are forced to consider that an interaction between two people has two contributors, and one of them is you. Anyway, the problem will doubtless be resolved when the moderators realize that you're resorting to deeply sarcastic and personal remarks, noticeably lacking in any on topic content. :\

Hi Svhar, You wont get on with everyone on this forum and I dont either, but suggest you call a truce. Well done on winning the Eurocup in football by the way!

svhar,

I have to agree with you...

You are right, Organfreak. My respect to you. I'll withdraw from this discussion as from now. And sorry, BOAC, I just had to pay back.

Oh, you'll soon get used to that!

Seems unnecessary...

BOAC
have nothing to say to svhar?
No "secret" to reveal?
And I refuse to believe you are so venal as to give your opinion only on payment.
I repeat always three, four, five ... times my advice to my students.
If we want to reform this "kind of aviation" with our experience we must not stop withstand the exuberance of youth who want to follow in our footsteps.

I beg Clandestino's pardon; apparently I was confused about who was fighting with whom. Guess it was BOAC. Ooops!

- no. I suspect the 'put down' referred to was under another of svhar's usernames.

The rest leaves me bewildered. Can we return to the thread topic?

Capital idea.

This thought seems to be worth comment within the context of the accident under discussion.

There is quite a bit to chew on regarding this nested set of thoughts. One of the ways the "system" mitigates for errors in selection is that there is a team, a crew, on the flight deck who are, if you believe the CRM principles in vogue, in a position to detect and correct one another's errors, or help out when task loading factor is greater than one pilot.

This isn't the only accident where two pilots were not enough, due to a variety of factors.

Also, I find "takeoffs and landings" a bit misleading, since the entire terminal phase, and into landing, is a more apt area for needing experience. Wrecks in terminal phase are often marked by failure to reach the runway.

As to "takeoff," I'd want to address the entire departure phase for experiential basis.

AF447 happened during cruise, which is not the most common phase for mishap.

Quote:
Quote:
I know the AL defeats Reselect, but what does it do with an AP left ON?
It turns it OFF and latches it OFF until ground crews perform maintenance.


BBB... Right....but the A/P appears to have been "ON" throughout? Isn't that potentially lethal?

Kinda reminds me of Rip Van Winkle. If we are discussing the AF447 in this thread, then AP dropped off and was never re-engaged. My apologies if it is me who is posting in the wrong thread.
Huh? What? Why? Whatever.

Training
 

Contacted:How about not trained at all?
I have never been in or seen a (high altitude) full stall in the sim. Only the customary straight-and-level bleed the speed off till the buffet comes.

Quote from Boeing'sAerodynamic Principles of Large-Airplane Upsets

High altitude full stall recovery training is making its way into the sims. I did it last week.

In the Boeings you have to work at it to keep it stalled, but we were doing a falling leaf, descending at 11000 ft/min, 10 degrees nose up at firewall thrust.

The recovery required 20-30 degrees nose down and lots of patience (and altitude) waiting for the speed to build to the point where the stall to became a nose down unusual attitude you could fly out of without entering a secondary stall.

I do not have any time in Airbuses. I can say that all you folks who are saying it should not/would not happen and to whom it would not have happened were not (thankfully) there in the middle of the night in the middle of the ocean in the middle of the weather dealing with contradictory information in a situation that went from straight and level to deadly in the span of a few breaths.

I bow to your mad airmanship skills.