Breaking Story:
Below is Roger Rapoport's latest response to Air France 447 developments making headlines around the world.
The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447
And:
Pilot briefing 'could have prevented Air France tragedy' - World news, News - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk

I read the first line of the first paragraph of the first chapter (the introduction, actually) of the book, and it alone is such buehlchit that I went no farther. Totally misinterprets what fly-by-wire means.

You'd make a very bad literary criticism with such a method of reading :)

Ya think? As a literary "criticism"--which I actually do for a living, thank you, since you can read my reviews at Air & Space Smithsonian and Aviation History Magazines--it saves me a lot of time.

jcj;

In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").

I think that that is a major fault in a book claiming to present to readers an informed discussion on this accident specifically, and an explanation regarding these very different ideas generally. From the introduction alone, I couldn't take the book seriously as a technical explication.

Whether the author is able to clarify the differences between these three things for his readers in the rest of the book is unclear from what is available.

I agree but ....
If you read the article by the author (on the blog) you have to wonder if the purpose of his book is to be an explanation of what the FBW is .. or another subject
Personally I do not believe that his book have aimed to explain what is the FBW .. but rather to highlight deficiencies (from many parties) that would have made the AF447 accident happen

A couple of thoughts

Roger is an aviation expert?
OK, so both crews had trouble implementing procedures, or recognizing what the malfunction was.
Sorry, but I find this to be deliberate ignorance.
Professional pilots know how to fly on instruments, using reference to attitude indications displayed on their primary flight instruments.
You can refer to the artificial horizon and fly with reference to it, just as the captain on the other flight flew with reference to the real horizon.

The other link has the above.

Sorry, a malfunction is not by definition a crisis.

For people who write for a living, they sure go out of their way to get words and meanings wrong ... if they are selling themselves as aviation experts. :p

I read the blog. He writes inaccurately and argues poorly. His is not a work I would go to for any explanations regarding anything aviation. The credibility just isn't there. He's selling, even in his explaining and those who take this stuff seriously know the difference.

Lonewolf_50;

Good examples. The research and the writing is Reader's Digest quality.

I have read most of the posts with regard to this accident. Many people pontificating about this law or that law etc etc. Does the AB have standby instruments? If so are the crew trained to use these in times of uncertanty.
If not why not?
They have been a big help to me in times past. Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.

I think you need to read the whole thread(s), and the report?

Airline pilots are trained professionals, and the planes are safe machines.
This is what is pounding in public for years .. as an advertising slogan
Is that this slogan has to undergo some corrections after the accident of AF447?

Neither statement is a lie. However, not being 'wrong' does not make them adequate...

As an adjunct to your post, Lyman, the statistical probability of you or I getting on to a commercial air transport and arriving safely at our chosen destination is in the 99% + range.

That doesn't make 100% a valid expectation, or reality, nor does it make the tragic exception, like AF 447, any easier to swallow.

BOAC: to be fair, rogerg cuts to the meat of the matter, in terms of what one would expect as a standard means to deal with an instrument problem during IFR flight. Yes, it may be a bit reductionist in scope. :cool:

That said, when all of the Airspeed indications are Tangu Uniform, one is forced to use cross check and secondary scan for performance, getting out the checklists, and follow that with a methodical and sound crew response ... gee, we are back to a core point of his, that of training.

A well trained crew does these things.

- no, he/she does not! It is plain the report and thread has not been looked at

1) There was no need for 'Standby Instruments' for attitude.- unless you or Rogerg know differently to the BEA, the primaries were fully functional.

2) There were no 'standby' ASIs fitted

..and as for "Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.?"

Oozlum time?

Lonewolf50, BOAC

If the primary displays were reputed fully functional, why are video recorders the new clamor? Displayed information is not recorded? Puzzle...

With all that was going on I would like some basic indications that did not involve the normal systems. Like some "standby instruments" it seems that the AB is lacking.
Flying should not be that complicated.

That's a good one ..
Another ..
I read in the TV programs that on PpruneTV was programed the documentary "the whole truth about the crash of AF447" on Tuesday 7:45 p.m.
When I looked PpruneTV at 7:45 p.m. ... I saw an ad for a flying school ... and after .. apologies for the delay for the documentary
Sometimes .. what is written in the book is not what one sees on the screen :)

What we have is no proof of what pilots were seeing on the panel. I have seen. "What the ECAM would have looked like...." but we do have proof from the CVR: "we have no indications..."

Let's say Bonin survived, bloody but alive, 227 dead, and he is up for manslaughter. Is the jury PPRuNe? Do we ignore his protests of "We had no indications..." in that case, his testimony would have to be allowed, why is the CVR being ignored?

Way back, because the displays are not saved on DFDR, new guidelines are in place to record the PFD.

Other Airbus wide bodies have had incidents of loss of displays with loss of speeds.

Read the CVR with a synthetic bias toward pilots who were flying an upset jet without instrumentation, and see if the story starts to answer more questions....

Why did Dubois not intervene? If the screens were black, everybody's experience is at par; replacing either pilot in a seat would be bad, they were at the start, Dubois had no clue.

With even a minimum of trust in these three guys, one has got to allow for some mitigating evidence that actually is available, but disregarded?

" I have no vario..." " I don't even have vario?"

Further, it explains the lack of comment, with black screens, what's to discuss?

What could Dubois have been after, "Wait, Autopilot ! ....click....."

I've heard the standard reply, what else could he be wanting from auto?


Mod: this is written by a pilot, to pilots, about pilots, and the report; what say you let this one remain?

We know that the PF kept pulling back on the SS. He was approaching a stall and forced the aircraft to continue to go into a full stall. Then he continued back pressure for about 39,000 ft to impact. End of story.

Except the part about THS. Take the THS out of the equation, and the a/c Stalls earlier, with both warnings, due higher a/s at break.

End of chapter

The Airbus does have standby instruments in the form of ISIS - in fact the Captain refers to them on the CVR.

Actually we have precise proof of what the PNF in the LHS saw on his panel.

There's a lot of room for interpretation in the latter statement - at no point does the PF or PNF clarify - but the Captain does make a reference to all three ADIs (l'horizon) functioning. This pours a lot of cold water on the idea that all MFDs may have been blank.

The LHS DFDR *is* recorded.

Not this Airbus widebody.

This is not the only occasion where a pilot who had a better handle on the situation did not intervene - I'd bet money on it being purely HF.

With even a minimum of trust in these three guys, one has got to allow for some mitigating evidence that actually is available, but disregarded?

Equally possible that the VSI (vario) was pegged against the bottom and was difficult to read due to vibration.

Were it not for the fact that the DFDR does record the displays on the LHS, you might have a point. Instead all I see is another attempt to make excuses.

Given that AP was OFF when he said it, and still off after the button was recorded onto the CVR, I'd say that's a red herring - he was probably just making 100% sure it was OFF.

From the BEA report I understand it was a smooth ride to the sea .... and event the cabin crew and passengers (and pilots ?) were not aware ...
Have vibrations that prevent reading instruments is not what I would call a smooth descent

" 10,000 Ft."

Just how was that announced?

In cold print it is not easy to work out whether this was just routine, something one has anticipated... Or was it a surprise?

In my words, it would have been a shock, an impossibility for a 330 to descend so far and so rapidly...

( Although the noise had been a bit unusual for the last few minutes.)

JCJ: there were several instances of the cc calling....and going unanswered. The unusual air flow noise and dynamics would surely be causing cc alarm, even if the pax were bemused and anxious rather than panicked. However, in the absence of any comments on the cvr, agree on vibration.

Or wrong CALL button was pressed as CM1 tried to get to captain, so CC picked up the phone and hang it up after receiving no response to hallos. Misdirected calls happen in normal operations, no reason why it shouldn't happen when tension was high.

Correct, but seems that rogerg is blissfully unaware that "standby instruments" have very discrete meaning in the aviation world and is actually trying to give it a whole new meaning.

Correct, phrase "loss of display" is used by the original poster with astonishing ignorance about what it denotes. Or agenda. Whatever.

Untrimmed aeroplane stalls at higher speed... how do you figure?

What upset jet? We're discussing AF447 here.

Looking just for the evidence that confirms the already established notion, eh?

That we will never know
This will be one of the many mysteries concerning this accident
Indeed page 60 final Report:

ˆ A first cabin crew or flight rest facility call (high-low chime) was heard at
2 h 10 min 53.5;
ˆ Vibration noises were heard in the cockpit from 2 h 10 min 54 until 2 h 12 min 57;
ˆ Five call signals were transmitted to the crew rest facility between 2 h 11 min 09.8
and 2 h 11 min 27;
ˆ The Captain returned to the cockpit at 2 h 11 min 42.5.

For the first call .. BEA has been written that it is bound for the cabin crew or to flight rest facility
For subsequent calls (5) .. BEA has been written that they are bound for the flight rest facility
How the BEA is not sure of the destination of the first call but certainly the destination of the other calls remains a mystery to me ..
And this is not a transcription error for that is exactly the same words used in the report in French

There is a serious incident report that refers to cabin comm. disruption following an electrical short circuit in another AB wide body. Perhaps since it occurred in a separate incident makes it less impossible to know in 447?

This is a problem with this report, it leaves possible areas of concern completely unaddressed....

Nothing would now surprise me. Perhaps they were blind and couldn't see the attitude and altitude, dumb and couldn't ask the pf what he was doing and remind him they were in alternate, so makes sense they were also deaf to the cc and stall warner......

Where? At least give us date, registration, company, whatever so we can look it up since you can't be bothered to link to it.

Lest we keep on readin your post, which says...
There.

They know something about the A330 you don't.

Seem's to me that they don't know more than me about those calls ...
For the first .. they don't know precisely .. for the 5 other they know (or suppose know ?)
Where is the difference between first and the 5 other ?

G-EZAC, EI-EAT 07/01/2002
 

"Where? At least give us date, registration, company, whatever so we can look it up since you can't be bothered to link to it."

G-EZAC. Serious incident. EI-EAT 7/1/2002.

This has much in common, but should not be considered as foundational. I cite it because it has commonalities with 447 in re: potable water plumbing ( see ACARS, early), cabin Comms issues, possible loss of ECAM, etc.

Clandestino, a good investigation is thorough, especially so in regards tech issues. I am not terribly impressed with HF, but airframe architecture, plumbing, EE bay, heating, avionics, radios, etc. must be exhaustively researched to find possibilities. In the biz, "nothing happens for the first time..."

I doubt this incident has value for most posters, but it interests me, and there are two more I have reviewed that show some merit in discovering possible mechanical issues. The value they contain is up to you, but believe me, BEA have looked at all the records and logs, and I have some disappointment in that the report is too succinct.

Comms
 

jcjeant

In the above incident, cabin communications were lost, affected along with NAV loss, ECAM blank, autopilot loss, etc.

It does for me.


Here: 1. report on EI-EAT, A300 freighter, 2. report on G-EZAC, Airbus 319.

So you are unable to tell the difference between A319 and A330. You are not even aware that 319 is not widebody. You have presented the false notion the stick control was lost as a fact.


This is complete fabrication. All the received ACARS messages were consistent with blockade of all three pitots, except cabin rate which was consequence of extreme rate of descent.
It was a good investigation. All tech issues were covered. No failures except those stemming from blocked pitots were found.

I wonder what kicks does one get from contaminating the discussions?

Correct. Seems to you. Investigators do know exactly how the particular aeroplane's comm pane was configured. Did it ever occur to you that phrase " A first cabin crew or flight rest facility call" might actually be lousily translated reference to chime sounding at both areas and not that investigators are uncertain about which area was called on INT.

How soon we forget.

Clandestino

Quote:
Originally Posted by Lyman
"I cite it because it has commonalities with 447 in re: potable water plumbing"


This is complete fabrication. All the received ACARS messages were consistent with blockade of all three pitots, except cabin rate which was consequence of extreme rate of descent.

Not fabricated, unless ACARS was faked. The aircraft had one lav inop, and also an audio panel inop....The lav issue is similar in that a tee valve leak caused a flooded EEbay, (in the freighter) which destroyed some electrical circuits, causing loss of autopilot, NAV, loss of ECAM, etc. The radio is interesting because both 447 (may have had) and freighter audio issues re: cabin Comms.

Show me the lav location?

I am sure you are incapable of confusion, so you must be impatient, there are two references.

EI-EAT is a wide body, a 300.

Whoa there... you have your sources contradicting the BEA?
Report makes the reference only that RMP3 was MELed. Page 31

Quousque tandem abutere, Lyman, patientia nostra?

EDIT:

So? Did it have problems with sidesticks? Were there problems with communication to cabin? :E

Read the report.

As you know in this kind of report (who is the result of meticulous investigation) each word have his weight .. some more than other I agree ...
If this is in both areas .. you don't use the word OR ( ou in french . .. like in the french report).. instead you will use the word AND ( et in french)
Or = choice (you can't have both)
And = addition (you can have both)
This word "or" (not used for the 5 other calls) still a mystery for me and you explanation don't help ..

Tunnel effect
 

Could, but

Very probably tunnel effect could explain this.

BOAC:
Let's watch this one on video taped replay.
I note that this is perhaps a reductionist approach, and wish to clarify a few things in re your response to my response, yours here.
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post7317776

We may be talking past one another.

There is a primary display in front of the First Officer's station (RH Seat) and a Primary Display in front of the Captain's Station (LH Seat).

There is a third array of flight instruments more toward the middle of the cockpit display area, offset to the left slightly (lefft of the E/WD screen) to favor the captain's position.
I note the names of those instruments involving flying here:
ASI and Altimeter(Which sure look like an airspeed indicator and an altimeter, hence Flight Instruments)
STBY Horizon(Sure look like an attitude indicator, or Artificial Horizon)
Nav/Compass/Needles
Clock

I would call these -- perhaps using archaic language -- a standby or back up display. Why?
You don't normally use that, since it isn't right in front of you and most of the time you use the instruments that are right in front of you.
I note from the information I have available that those instruments are differently shaped than the primary displays. (THough they are of a shape familiar to any pilot who was not born and raised on glass cockpit displays).

If that isn't what rogerg was referring to -- in re standby instruments -- then I misunderstand rogerg.

I also pointed out, in my response, that with all three airspeed indications unreliable (our best information is that this was the case initially as a trigger to the entire event), that a flying pilot's scan has to change to check performance by using cross checks. (Trends from VSI, trends from altitude, pitch attitude, power, etcetera). If he looks over at the standby instruments to see if his are the only instruments acting up, he'd either see a confirmation, or not, of what his problem is. Seems he looked a more than one instrument, as the remark had to do with "losing the speeds." But something may have been lost in translation there.

Standard Flying On Instruments. If you want to dispute that, I'd be stunned.

BUt TRAINING is an issue, whether or not we agree on what is or isn't a back up instrument.
It is to my thinking an issue of central importance since passengers are left wondering just how well Air France pilots can be expected to respond to a malfunction. (I hear the voices of the Pitch and Power chorus warming up ...) since an industry standard means of addressing malfunctions as a team in the cockpit, which more pilots are trained to do (or are they?) was not in evidence. (Declare, do immediate action items, get out the check list/ECAMS, go through the procedure step by step ... )

TRAINING issue. Air France appears to need to answer to that. That is where I feel rogerg hit on a core problem, even if that isn't what he/she meant. That doesn't render the other issues neglibible. And it may be that the entire industry, and not just Air France, have some issues to address in re training.

The matter of updating pitot tubes was in progress at Air France.

That's exact ... but it was a very delayed updating (not entire fault of Air France) when you know that:
In December 1995, Airbus had made the finding of a lack of certification for the pitot probe
In January 1999 the German BFU had recommended the amendment of the certification standards of the Pitot probes
What were the actions - responses of EASA .. DGAC .. FAA ... BEA .. NTSB .. etc .. ?
Findings had been made ​​.. there was taken into account? much too late or not at all .. and now .. in 2012 .. BEA has made ​​recommendations about Pitot tubes ... (they discover the problem in 2012 .. really ?)
2012 - 1995 = 17 years !