Salute!

IMHO, the CVR will be more revealing than the FDR.

The FDR will show the impact speed and altitude and heading and control inputs, but how the plane got there will likely be revealed by the CVR.

Yes, I thought this, but I'm waiting with baited breath to see if they do more than gasp at their last seconds.


This now, is the whole issue. Planned, or trapped? No one can know, and I pray those poor souls had time to reveal to us why they were there in that wrong place at the wrong time.

I think that Gerry Soejatman did a good job in his blog articles to explain how these pilots could end up heading for Mount Salak, without doing anything unusually stupid or daring. (For those who haven't read them: He based his analysis on photos taken in the cockpit on the first demo flight, where both pilots' flight displays and the paper maps on their clipboards can be seen. And he points out that the main difference between the two flights was a change of runway, from 24 to 06.)

Nevertheless, this accident should never have happened in an aircraft equipped with EGPWS (or TAWS, or T2CAS, or whatever you call it). That's what I'd hope to learn from the CVR: was the TAWS trying to warn them at all?

How are you qualifying the descent below MSA over those mountains?

This accident should never have happened in any IFR equipped aircraft on an IFR flight plan, regardless with or without the terrain avoidance gadgets.
It´s wise to plan and fly in a way, that those systems keep quiet all the time.

It might be interesting, wether the system was operational, operational but malfunctioning, operational but not switched on, but mainly in relevance to the mindset of the crew.

If operating IFR, then ATC will have a large part to play in this accident.
When would ATC give clearance in mountainous terrain below MSA unless for emergency reasons? Other than when established on the approach.
My understanding is that they are responsible for your terrain clearance while IFR. It is our responsibility to comply as far as able with those requests.

I would hardly think the approach would take them up a mountain valley when the is obviously clear ground either side of the mountain.

The request for this new lower altitude came from the crew. Shouldn´t be some thinking and sense before requesting? And also before complying with an ATC request?

And obviously the crew was not able to comply with their own request granted by ATC, as the flight ended in the mountains.

Or am i misssing something?

You are gravely mistaken. Except under the unique case of "radar vectors" ATC are never responsible for your terrain clearance. It is pilots' responsibility to refuse or delay execution of any clearance w.r.t. charted minimum altitudes. ATC is there to separate us from traffic, not terrain.

Flightdetent, absolutely correct. I am still waiting info as to what the exact flight plan was, what was executed in real life afterwards and if they did cancel IFR at some point, or if words like : "request descent visual" were used .

The R/T exchange recording is available already and would clear that up very quickly.

You can dress this up any way you like, but this is a catastrophe for Russian civil aviation. As a previous poster has alluded to the Sukhoi was made in Russia but filled with numerous western systems. It was a genuine and credible attempt to break into the Airbus/Boeing/Embraer world, but it has, alas, fallen at the first hurdle. Most western airlines would be extremely wary of associating themselves with Russian designs, due to their perceived association with lower levels of technology and an 'accident culture'. Trouble has followed Russian-built aircraft and their associated airlines since aviation began due to all sorts of unpalatable reasons - but principally the operating culture they have found themselves in. Whether it is this crash or the Polish presidential debacle, the same basic issues always jump up - and are always shoved down again in a West versus East entrenched debate.

It is clearly not true to say that every Western pilot, engineer, legislator, supervisory body, airline owner, airport operator etc is better at their job than their Eastern European colleagues. What is true to say, however, is that a frightening cultural mix of complacency, accepted deviation from SOPs and established practice, corruption, poor maintenance, financial pressure to compete regardless of the shortcuts taken, distorted cockpit gradients and poor training repeatedly come together to bring disaster in that part of the world. Until someone in the East is willing to humbly recognise the truth of this and accept that, for all the West's faults (which are numerous), Western aviation is many years ahead in all these areas and consequently has a vastly superior safety record, this situation will never change.

I have no doubt the Captain of this aircraft was a very capable guy and probably a way better pilot than I am. Nonetheless, he lost sight of the fact this his number one job was not to kill everyone on board and that everything else had to be distant seconds and thirds. How could this happen to a guy of that talent and capability? Culture, culture and culture. It was somehow acceptable for him to not research correctly the terrain and weather issues on this potentially dangerous flight. It was somehow acceptable for him to request a flight below MSA in IMC. These are harsh words but the truth hurts. How will this ever change? Someone very high up in Russia, which still has massive influence over aviation in many parts of the world beyond its own borders, needs to say enough is enough. A root and branch assessment of every aspect of Russian thinking and practice needs to take place which results in fundamental changes to the way business is done in aviation. Will that ever happen in my lifetime? Probably not, but unless it does there will be numerous more accidents like this with the same old wrangling - but with absolutely nothing done to change the inevitable. Safety is not an accident - it is planned.

NSF sobering thoughts.
One of the problems here is that many passengers have no choice but to use their own national airline and I suppose we tend to accept culture within culture. However we also live in a world where passengers of Western cultures seek low prices and some of the central european airlines offer just that. These passengers blindly assume that the standards of any airline will match those of their homeland and this is blatantly not so.
As seems to emerge here, it's not only the engineering and sophistication of the aircraft but the culture within some countries which leads to an arrogance in people with positions of responsibility and rank.
Passengers always have some degree of 'fear of flying' and publicity aimed at the travelling public will never be totally honest about the variation in risk depending on the carrier chosen. Of course it may be 'safer than crossing the road' but depends on which road you choose to cross.

Related to what ATC may or may not do, just a personal anecdote, but a few years back I was on an IFR flight plan from Bali to Halim and descending inbound from the north east, when the controller told me that I was "visual and clear for visual approach"...only problem was that I was still solid IMC in haze generated by the forest fires and had to reject the clearance and insist on a procedure.......just don't think we can take for granted what ATC may or may not have been thinking or doing here.

No doubt Russians have some of the best pilots in the world and this cpt was probably one of their best ,so why is this happening?

I used to fly for a major EU airline for more than 30yrs in various positions, e.g. FE, FO, SFO and as a CPT (all without further duties). When the **** hit the fan, most of the time it wasn't a standard crew compostion. Managing CPTs, additional crew member in the cockpit, two CPTs (no FO) and so on.

Too bad there are no statistics about that phenomenon.

Harbsheim (AF), Wien (Hapag Lloyd), Warsaw (LH), Perpignan (XL) and many others come to my mind...

Bishop of Hounslow,

With all respect but...
Stop behaving like a typical British **** who thinks shat only his country is God's gift to aviation where in reality, they are anything BUT.

Russian design has always been as good or better than anything made in the West, especially any crap coming from the UK.

The last European Testpilot who crashed his airliner ( A333) was... British and was solely to blame to destroy a perfect operating aircraft.

British ATC is using NON ICAO phraseolegy that is not only non-standard, but also dangerous (eg. turn left heading 010 degrees:ugh::=) Cleared ILS is just that, not "decend with the glideslope" bull.

Do NOT compare the Russian operating conditions with European ones. Have you ever flown in Russian Winter?

I fly for a local airline in Indonesia and ATC will not give you clearance to descend below MEA/MORA/MSA unless you declare your flight conditions as VMC.

"Someone very high up in Russia, which still has massive influence over aviation in many parts of the world beyond its own borders, needs to say enough is enough"

Absolutely 100%.

However our "lame duck" "yes man" Mededev blamed the planes, especially after the TU and Jak killer accidents of last year.

W:mad: can you do when the actions are laughable from a string puppet, who then becomes "prime minister".

Massive influence?
So long as an ex-KGB man is at the top of a corrupt vertical power structure, which he personally built,-

There is NOT ONE HOPE of a change in "culture".
Innocent PAX will continue to die in plane accidents at the average rate of a total hull loss every 2-3 months, whether the A/C is 30 yrs old or brand new, whether it's warm summer sun or -30C.

That should make everyone shudder, but it's a statistical fact of life.

Often the pilots are absolute heroes in comparison, landing a failed TU154 on a disused military airbase 400m too short in midwinter, or out of control after some engineer wires the controls wrong, or improvising by landing an AN on a frozen lake.

All you can say is W the ...:ok:

Russia and Ukraine purvey an almost total lack of any concept of a safety culture.

Whether it's boats that capsize drowning scores of innocent kids, night clubs that people light fireworks inside with inflammable ceilings, driving in totally clapped out trucks or cars over clapped out roads, keeping trains running with absent shock absorbers, distorted rails, running turbine generators overspeed with clapped out and hairline cracked turbines, or flying with snow on wings...
(There you go that's accounted already for about 600 dead people)

You want any more examples from 2010-11?

Did the "snow on wings" thread not say it loud and clear enough, after the Tiumen ATR tragedy?

Absolutely no-one, least of all AFL takes a blind bit of notice & frankly doesn't give a flying :mad:.

I understand from some news sources that the authorities in Indonesia have given up searching for the flight data recorder.

Questions
 

I was about to write the same as Kulverstukas !!
Lets return to the fact finding and not speculate about differences in culture or habits or what so ever.
I have copied a map that Mr. Soejatman has published in his blog. Origin is from Lido/Lufthansa.
http://www.globalsim.web.id/publicse...04/HLP_AFC.jpg

If he - Mr. Soejatman or his friend reports correct - the crew of the SSJ didn´t have this map on board, instead an approach chart and an airport map and their electronic flight display. According the source neither of these did show the situation of the terrain they were flying to.
Again if this is true, where should they - the crew retrieve the necessary information from to be able to refuse the given unconditioned clearance.
I agree with the foremost posters that the final responsibility for terrain clearance remains with the crew - except for Radar vestors -

However, let me ask a rethorical question: What answer can the request of an IFR-flight to descend below MORA and MSA expect from ATC ??
I believe its either: Negative, descend not possible due to terrain !
or conditional clearance: cleared to descend to 6000 ft after passing 25 DME inbound to Halim VOR.
Said this I come back to questions posted before.
1. Why did the crew ask for a descend below MORA and MSA ??
2. Why did the responsible controller approve that request unconditioned ?
3. How well was the crew briefed by locals and how useful were the
information they had at hand for their flight ?
I think it´s not easy "black and white" - all blame to the crew!!

All Systems Normal
 

Excerpt from news article suggests that the aircraft and its systems were functioning correctly up to impact. This based on early analysis of CVR

Black Box Shows Superjet Had No Malfunctions | Russia | RIA Novosti

As I've mentioned above in my earlier post, it's standard here, that when a pilot request to descend below the MORA/MSA, the controller will ask the pilot for the flight conditions. Approval to continue the descent below MORA/MSA will be given if the pilot reports back that flight conditions are VMC. The onus is on the pilot declare that he is visual with the terrain.

Even if a controller gives you clearance to descend below MORA/MSA and flight conditions are IMC, would you, as a responsible pilot, continue your descent below MORA in IMC? My point being the PIC is ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of his/her flight, despite what ATC instructions are given.

I can't believe they'd give up the search for the FDR. There is too much riding on the contents of the recorder that would influence the future sales of the aircraft. Like AF447, they will likely spend lots of money and effort to find it.

This recent news article suggests they have brought army specialists in to help in the search:

Sukhoi Crash Probe Gets Army Support in Hunt for Data Recorder - Businessweek

ST27;

The linked story illustrates that news from Indonesia needs to be confirmed with a number of sources before it can be accepted. The story referencing the "end of the search for the flight recorder" was part of a regular (and reliable) aviation news source which is clearly in conflict with the Business Week story - not the first time that directly-opposite news reports have been issued.

One hopes that the search for the flight data recorder continues. I think they will quickly discover that the CVR alone will not provide the entire picture and that wrong conclusions can be drawn without all available information.

No evidence of malfunctions on (voice) recorder found, T2CAS was on and alerting the crew about dangerous proximity to ground

Google Translate

This article (in bahasa Indonesia) states that the contents of the CVR will not be made public. The reason being, the investigators do not wish for the public to speculate the cause of the accident. Probably a good idea, so that we all wait for the official accident report to be released.

detikNews : Hindari Spekulasi, KNKT Tak Akan Siarkan Data CVR Sukhoi Superjet 100

Again, this article is in Bahasa Indonesia, but gives some info regarding the CVR analysis. I'll do a quick and dirty translation of the article here. The gist of it says, that there are three pilots who are involved in creating the CVR transcript, 2 of whom are from the NTSC (Indonesia) and one from Russia. The transcript will be made in English. They have 2 hours of recording from the CVR which includes data from the first (non-event) flight of the day. The data that is relevant to the crash investigation is in the final 20 minutes of the recording.

detikNews : KNKT Selidiki 20 Menit Percakapan Pilot Sukhoi Sebelum Kecelakaan

Actually, there are many problems, not just one man at the top of structure. Russia is dying and has no future, the most one man can do is to slightly prolong or shorten the agony.

"Russia is dying and has no future"

Bit brain dead remark?
What has this got to do with a culture of safety?

The rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated.....

A couple of things...
Training wheels: Terima kasih untuk terjemahan anda yang cepat dan akurat!

PJ2: I talked to one of the senior people at KNKT (NTSC in English) today and they are NOT abandoning the search for the DFDR.

Retired F4: In two posts within a short time you strongly opine that weather was not a contributing factor. Though I have re-read the posts several times I cannot follow your logic. Please try again to convince me that Wx could not be a factor (whether the aircraft was IFR / IMC; IFR / VMC; or even VFR. I can cite many accidents / incidents worldwide wherein Wx was a contributing factor in all of the above combinations of flight conditions.

General statement: I have spent more hours in the air over Indonesia than I care to remember (including the area of this accident). I was in that area twice in the week before this occurrence; once in the morning and once at about 3pm. The flight conditions (visibility, turbulence, rain, towering CU or CB, etc.) were very similar on those days -- as they often are -- with the afternoon conditions developing as if viewed on a video on "fast forward". The visibility even in the early part of the day in question (May 9) was reduced in haze (combination of smog and smoke from burning) such that the reported prevailing vis was an "optimistic" estimate. Anyone who flies regularly within 60km of Jakarta will tell you that there are few days when the visibility is greater than 5 - 6 km. And the days leading up to this accident were no different. The lovely skies and excellent visibility of some of the stock photos of the area are not representative of what it is usually like -- and was like on May 9.

To suggest that Wx is somehow to be ruled out as a contributing factor at this stage in this instance shows little understanding of local geography and meteorology, human factors, and even accident investigation principles.

Thank you for your interest in my oppinion in regard to the probable or existing weather in the accident area.

I´ve never flown in indonesia, but marginal weather for flying can be found anywhere in the world, especially also in central and northern europe.

Aircrews flying modern equipped transport aircraft (and by the way that applies as well for GAT and MIL aviation) are expected to handle the preparation and execution of a flight under all kinds of weather and flight rules to the max extent possible. That means plan according the weather forcast and execute the flight in accordance with the regulations implemented for IFR or VFR flight rules under observation of the actual encountered weather situations.

In short, if you plan to fly VFR, than do it only when the weather will allow it. If you run into unsuitable weather under VFR, then terminate flying VFR and reopen an IFR flight plan. If you are on an IFR flightplan and intend to continue under VFR, it is your responsibility to make sure, that the weather is apropriate to do so. It´s the pilots responibility to orient the planing and execution throughout the flight by respecting the actual weather situation.

We are looking at a flight with a planned flighttime of less than one hour, therefore the forecasted weather should be pretty close to the existing one, including the local weather developements in hilly terrain like you describe it very well. There should be no surprise factor there, if the flight planning and weather briefing was done in accordance with existing rules (which i dont know from indonesia, but they shouldn´t be that different).

Those weather phenomena you describe so well will only influence a flight under visual flight rules. Under IFR it´s no need to see anything except for the final moments of the landing. Only enroute hazard would be thunderstorms , which can be avoided by correct operation of the onboard WX radar.

As far as we know at the moment (that might change, when the CVR or the FDR reveal anything different) the flight was conducted under IFR and the crew requested an descent below MSA / MORA, and ATC granted that descent. Wether that descent was requested and conducted under IFR rules in IMC or VMC or wether it was under VFR / VMC does not change the responsibility of the crew to not descent below the MSA / MORA under IFR/ IMC or to stay well clear of clouds and terrain when operating in VMC.

There might be reason for the crew to descent below MSA /MORA and not be able to maintain VMC close to the ground, but there is none known until now, and i can´t think of one. But i´m open minded, if you see reason in the actions of the crew. The argument, that weather itself was a contributing factor in other accidents is noted and accepted. Icing, turbulence, extreme headwinds, suddenly closed airfields, runway contamination due to precipitation comes to my mind (there sure might be others as well).

But bad planning and bad execution does not make up for your suggestion, that the weather could be a contributing factor for the tragic outcome.

They just had no sound reason to be between those mountains (neither in VMC nor in IMC) below the MSA / MORA, and it was not the weather that led them down there.

That´s no condemnation of the crew, there might be other factors which led to the accident, which we don´t know yet (i.e. technical issues, human factors), i only objected the theories concerning weather and malfunctioning terrain avoidance gadgets being causes or contributing causes to the accident.

Just for the record, that is my personal oppinion, and you and others are entiteled to a different one.

Hi RF4.
First, thanks for a quick and well-written response re my comments on your comments.

I agree with everything you say, except for a difference we have in what constitutes "contributing factors". I especially agree with your assertion that poor planning and poor execution are often the underlying causes – even in weather related accidents.

But, in examining the “why and how” of an accident we must (IMO) include contributors to the chain. So, if poor planning and/or poor execution leads a crew into a situation where they hit terrain that that didn’t see in time to avoid (mountain top obscured by fast developed cloud, vis drops significantly in haze or rain shower, etc. then the poor planning / poor execution is a prime factor and the weather would be a contributor.

So, I think we agree in essence. I am simply considering a longer chain of causal events.

ad hoc profile
 

Yeah, Sam, I wanna hear the FIRST mission audio. i realize that the weather may not have been much of a factor but did they fly the same profile?

Seems things go south when we change the flight plan and haven't plotted our exact course and turns and such. Even then, we have to have an escape maneuver/turn/climb when things aren't what we planned for, ya think?

Many of us here have flown in mountainous terrain that had rapidly changing weather. But those of us still posting here prolly had our abort plan ready, and it was well-thought out and could be executed in a second or two. in other words, we didn't have to improvise. Luck is when preparation meets opportunity.

I predict that your words above -- and Retired F4's comments about "planning and execution" -- will prove to be central to this occurrence.

According my sources the aircraft was flight planned to do the demos in a training area where MSA is below 6000 , ATC cleared a/c to descend to 6000 in that area. Aircraft made evolutions in the area as planned but then ,apparently without clearance and radio contact ,left the area and flew towards the mountain. If this is confirmed it gets more complicated.

ATC Watcher
 

There is another (second) blog of Mr. Soejatman where he has charted a possible flightpath of the second flight. This descripton covers your post contents.
It appears to be possible that the flight received that descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace. performed there what ever they had planned.
It will indeed raise new questions about what made them fly without clearance towards the mountains at that too low altitude.

Some posts have mentioned that the search for the FDR was abandoned. It appears that this is only correct for the SAR service. The search goes on, too valuable source of information would be lost otherwise.

one point worth thinking about is that there aren't many places in Russia with abrupt changes in elevation & weather as we see around Bogor

yes, I know that as professionals they should fly by the book and stay on a flight plan but I'm sure the dangers of cumulo-granite weren't as near the front of their minds as it would be to someone who flies out (say) Seattle or Vancouver

This might be true of European Russia. However the Superjet is manufactured at Komsomolsk-on-Amur, in the Russian Far East, between Khabarovsk and the Pacific coast, in a decidedly mountainous area.

despegue

You answered like a typical churlish and rude Russian.
And hey... what danger did you find in that very phrase "turn left heading 010"? I have heard such a command many times in different parts of the planet... Quite standard one, betcha!
Respect others, and look around and at the mirror more frequently.

By the way, copy-past the post you have cursed into Google Translator and try to understand that he did NOT say the test-pilots of SSJ are (were) idiots. Contrary to what you have perceived.
Cheers.

Gentlemen,


Greetings from Russia. Having had a privilege to know very well the captain of the SSJ who was really an outstanding pilot and personally a great man, I am very interested in every detail about this tragedy happened to my friend. And I am glad to read reasonable, professional and valuable comments here, with this forum.



I am not a pilot, but has been involved in various R&D projects in space and defence for more than 3 decades already, and would like to share some thoughts on an issue that likely was not yet raised here (sorry if I overlooked).


Putting aside the questing why they found themselves in the mountains, I assume that, while there, they relied to a certain (if not large) extent on the T2CAS (and here its TAWS part matters). As far as I can see in the publicly available publications, this system uses the digital terrain data, more precisely DTED (Digital Terrain Elevation Data) and some look-ahead algorithms.


So, I tried to figure out what digital maps are used in the civil aviation: Terrain Awareness Warning System Databases for the Civil Aviation Industry


Here is the link to DTED for those not familiar:
DTED - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


And the question immediately arose about the DTED Level of the map available for this particular Salak region. It is well-known that interpolation errors on steep slopes can be huge. This article provides a good reference with quatitative estimates:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/sass/gall...%20DATA-11.pdf
E.g. in page 5 it is written that on a rough terrain in Alps, the elevation error for DTED Level 0 can be up to 307 meters (!!). For level 2 it was about 25 meters, and I assume that for Level 1 the error would be somewhat in between (and still high enough).


I would be happy to be mistaken, but it seems to me that Level 2 and higher (30 m post spacing and less) is not available for the Salak area. It would require too much effort to implement, while this area seems to be not much in use.


Thus, I would have a concern on performance of the TAWS on such a rough data, if it is of DTED Level 0 or 1. It's not a matter of avionics or onboard math, but if your input is that much «over-noised», your output would be hard to predict (e.g. the system may «shout» in a safe situation and keep silence or make a mild warning in danger).

What do you think?

Terrain avoidance question
 

Background ...

ATC Watcher
According my sources the aircraft was flight planned to do the demos in a training area where MSA is below 6000 , ATC cleared a/c to descend to 6000 in that area.
Aircraft made evolutions in the area as planned but then ,apparently without clearance and radio contact ,left the area and flew towards the mountain.

Annex14
There is another (second) blog of Mr. Soejatman where he has charted a possible flightpath of the second flight. It appears to be possible that the flight received that
descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace
[then] performed there what ever they had planned.

Soeman then speculates that their final turn towards the airport may have been delayed because of difficulties contacting ATC at their busiest time of day.
[The implication being that their flight plan did not appreciate the imminent dangers of continuing on their current flight-path. Perhaps because of the use of
inadequate maps/charts.]

Comment ...

This starts to look like it could have been a gentle "taxi ride" that went wrong.

From posts earlier in the thread, visibility restrictions may well have prevented them seeing the developing danger.

Question ... if the above scenario is approximately true, and considering the nasty nature of the terrain they were to meet:

How well would you expect the terrain warning system to perform?
Would you expect it to have warned them in good time to take effective avoidance action.
How much would be down to luck. For example first contact being a ridge or a valley.

last two posts ...
 

good points raised.

possible database "latitude for error" especially so (A van).
The implication is that whilst we put trust in the system performance day in day out, if there are accuracy disclaimers in mountainous regions (and lets not beat about the bush .. this is the last hole in the cheese model) it's a point worth examining and bringing our collective experience of TAWS to the table.
My own is that pre-TAWS (basic GPWS) I had one hard warning due to an ATC slip-up .. post enhanced GPWS/TAWS .. no incident or observed false warning ... but others have a contribution to make in the light of experience, and more system related in depth knowledge perhaps ?