I'm going to side-step the opportunity to respond in "like manner" ... as I've made the points that I believe are relevant and I'm quite comfortable in having done so. It's up to each reader to determine the level of competence and accuracy they wish to attach to each. I wish you all a comfortable coming week!

@AirRabbit
 

I have carefully read your contributions and your analysis of the Air Florida crash and I took the time to read (parts of) the NTSB report. Your knowledge about this case is impressive and so is the polite language that you use while telling your side of the story. Not that it matters, but just for the record: you have convinced me. What you are saying is very plausible indeed. I would however respectfully like to suggest you to stop arguing with some of the members on this topic, simply because it's a waste of time. You said what you needed to say and did it very well. :ok:

Thank you for the very kind remarks ... and for the excellent advice ... which I had previously considered doing ... but will now adopt.

Air Rabbit

For my two cents.. (or kopeks)

A well reasoned discussion is always welcome. I appreciated your comments.

The manual paragraph you have quoted is referring to inflight icing. What it has to do with attempted takeoff with ice contamination of the upper wing surface, accrued during ground operations, which happens to be the subject of the thread?

There is no dissenting opinion included in the NTSB report. NTSB is pretty clear that too low power did not cause the accident on its own but that without it, the catastrophe would not have happened: The story about NTSB member disagreeing with it comes from the anonymous poster on the anonymous forum where every post comes with caveat:
As presented, it is a perfect tautology. However, NTSB has quite comprehensively documented the method of getting to conclusions, while on the other side...

...most of those disagreeing with NTSB conclusions just say it-was-not-so, without further reference or with unverifiable reference at the best. Every individual is entitled to his own opinion but in my humble opinion that no one is entitled to his own set of facts should not be debatable.

Actually, we shouldn't be knowing that. The effect of ice contamination is dependent on so many variables that it is impossible to quantify it except in the postmortems. In Air Florida 90 case, Cd was affected far worse than AoAcrit, so the crew got the stickshaker before stalling - which combined with misplaced belief that stall always comes before stickshaker when wing is contaminated resulted in some wrong theories. What you referred to is worst case scenario while the best case contamination scenario happens any given snowy day; certification margins are not entirely eaten up at half-the-wingspan height and aeroplane happily flies away.

They can command the pitch that would lead to flight path that would lead to AoA exceeding AoAcrit of contaminated wing, however, chances for such adverse contamination combined with low V2 are very slim. "Pilots" have to determine how lucky they feel. Pilots de-ice and anti-ice if needed but do their best to ensure nothing except de-cing fluid is on their wings as they push the thrust levers far forward. Wordgames such as the exact meaning of "adherence" and "takeoff" don't come into play.

Frankly, I find AirRabit's analysis and comments very persuasive. I appreciate them very much.

Question: Given that most accidents involve a chain of causal elements ("but for ..." the accident wouldn't have happened), why elevate one (or more) to be the "probable cause" and relegate the rest to "contributing to"?

I know the NTSB may be charged by statute to do this, but does it really make sense? I believe that other jurisdictions (Canada?) just identify the causal elements and don't attempt to elevate any to being "THE Cause"?

Last point. It is called the "probable cause", not the "proven cause". So why the vitriol when someone posts a dissenting opinion?

So how do you answer AirRabbit's conjecture that the B737 characteristic for alarming and uncontrollable behaviour with leading edge contamination possibly occurred and all that greater thrust would have achieved would have been that the aircraft and its occupants would have reached the point where the tragedy was inevitable marginally quicker?

Addressing that one point would be appreciated, my apologies if I have missed where you have addressed it.

With my respectful apologies to sabenaboy after having agreeing to take his very appropriate and very worthwhile recommendation … I feel one last rebuttal may be in order.

Of course there is no “dissenting opinions included IN the NTSB report … that’s not what NTSB reports do … but that doesn’t mean that there are NOT a large number of aviation professionals who have dissenting opinions about what that report says. As the investigation revealed (and referenced here) the “low power setting” of the engines did not cause the accident” … but the only way an airplane could have continued flight – even with all the power both engines were capable of producing - would have been if the attitude of the airplane was such that the engines – even at Max Thrust – could have pushed the airplane through the air at the attitude achieved at that time. Recall the video of the F-100, with the afterburner lit? Recall it wallowing through the air prior to impact? … this was THE specific event that generated the term “Sabre-dance.” That F-100 SuperSabre was at a pitch attitude that even with the A/B blasting everything under it into small dust particles – there was insufficient thrust to push that airplane in the direction opposite to that thrust. So too was that B-737 … the pitch attitude of that B-737 – caused by the uncontrolled pitch-up caused by the incorrect deicing/anti-icing procedures applied – was such that all the thrust of both those engines – and I don’t care what power setting they could have selected – would have resulted in exactly the same end … just like what occurred to that F-100 SuperSabre. Just in case you forgot, jet engines produce thrust to push the airplane in the direction opposite to that thrust vector – nothing more – nothing less. With any thrust, an airplane would be able to be pushed only in the direction opposite to that thrust direction. In both of these cases, the F-100 and the B-737 … there wasn’t enough thrust capable of being generated even with the added thrust of the A/B in the F-100 case … even with full power, maximum power, throttles-bent-over-the-fire-wall power in the B-737 case – there wasn’t enough thrust to push the airplane “forward” sufficiently to achieve sufficient lift to maintain flight. And, before someone points out that "they did it in a simulator." Yeah. I know something about simulators as well ... and given the right knowledge and time at the simulator's input keyboard, I can make a Cessna 152 simulator "fly" just exactly like the space shuttle.

This is probably the “question of the thread,” thanks, M.Mouse!

As I pointed out … way back on April 17th in post #276 …
Had this B-737 flight crew kept the airplane on the ground until achieving a forward speed sufficiently high to have produced lift even somewhat evenly along the entire length of both wings – the asymmetrical longitudinal lift components may have been small enough that the pilots could have maintained control. However, when the F/O brought the control column back to a neutral position – in anticipation of rotating at the computed "rotation" speed (however he was planning to rotate – to whatever attitude he planned to rotate) – the airplane took over … snatching the pitch control completely away from that pilot and taking that airplane up to an attitude that achieved a rather severe stall buffet only 3 seconds after having all three gear (the nose and both mains) on the runway. THAT was the reason the Captain was recorded as saying - at THAT specific time ... "Easy!" Conservative estimates say that the stall buffet wouldn’t have been reached until the pitch of the airplane achieved something like 24 degrees – so, the pitch attitude was at least that high. Some witnesses (forming angles with their hands when specific numbers made no sense to them) indicated to investigators that the airplane may have been at an attitude of more than 40 degrees nose up. Think about that for a minute … 40 degrees nose up! With the airplane's forward momentum (which is what got it from the runway to the 14th Street bridge - it certainly didn't "fly" there) it’s almost anyone’s guess as to what Angle of Attack was actually achieved. So ... was it possible for that crew to make that B-737 "fly" at that pitch attitude ... with that AoA ... with a measley additional 15-20% thrust? Not at that kind of airplane attitude – talk about “son-of-Sabre” … as I said previously, an Atlas Booster would have had problems getting that airplane to "fly."

For Reference:
Aviation Video: F-100 test flight crash (Sabre Dance) | Patrick's Aviation

How could I possibly answer that? I am not an aerodynamicist familiar with 732. Heck, I'm not even rated on her, but I can easily find an expert opinion on the matter:

Hope this helps. The report goes into great detail how the conclusions were made.

So how come some PPRuNers get convinced by the theories that are at odds with the expert analysis and have no traceable source? PukinDog nicely analyzed one such contribution:

The picture certain poster has painted has some true details, some true yet grotesquely exaggerated, some completely irrelevant, some that are so-pulled-out-of-the-thin-air they cannot be verified at all and some brazenly false. When the details are put together the composition reveals what was the message (original term was "the truth") that the contributor wanted to get through: the poor, hapless crew was tragically betrayed by almost everyone. They were betrayed by the de-icing crew that poured water instead of glycol mixture on their wing. They were betrayed by FAA by not having developed the holdover times at the time. They were betrayed by the Boeing co designing the aeroplane that would pitch-up when stalling with iced leading edge. They were betrayed by the ATCO using too little spacing between them and landing Eastern. Basically, it was everyone else's fault, they were just the one who died. There was nothing they could do. They were doomed.

Realistic picture, eh? Not at all. So how come it is believable? Basic HF: people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced. If reading the accident report pages where crew's mistakes are neatly explained fills you with horror and, despite the facts, you want to believe that QH90 (or any other) crew did their best but it was tragically insufficient, to sooth your anxiety you would do well to listen to alternative theories of e.g: de-icing with water, composite fins being weaker than metal ones or Airbus cockpit being a deathtrap by design.

However, if you are into learning something from mistakes of others, lest you repeat them, it's far better to read and understand what is written in the official accident report. Stress is on understanding as it will help you recognize skewed reports produced under undue political pressure or when the good report is unduly smeared as false.

Whatever suits you, terms of the PPRuNe use do not preclude going whichever path you choose. Outcomes might differ, though.

I cannot refrain from intervening because it can be deadly for your seeds to sprout.
"Quousque tandem abutere, AirRabbit, patientia nostra?"
You know me and the pulpit my words come from.
Can I say the same of you?
I don’t think you’ve ever been (sitting at the front row of a plane and not in front of a 6-Drawer Oak desk) in such a situation:
Typical winter night in Europe, about to leave from an airport during a dreadful snowstorm.
In addition to the usual procedures we had to:
- Take a place in the queue for the de-icing
- Wait every few tens of minutes for the runway in use and taxiways to be cleared from snow.
- Based on the estimated time of completion of the aforementioned procedures, request a slot for departure.
- Calculating the synchronization of all of that to determine if and when to surrender to the pressure of ramp agent who wanted the passengers to be embarked.
I had long since given up the scheduled departure time.
It's obvious that it was wishful thinking to have all the above operations completed all together.
If the runway had been cleared, the plane was not yet being deiced / anti-iced, or vice versa, or the slot provided had expired and reassigned half an hour later, and then we had to go back to the starting point.
If the passengers had boarded, we had to invite them to remain on board for not losing the priority acquired; maybe we prayed the flight attendants to serve a refreshment.
Finally everything was ready to start (there was a tyrannical "holdover time"), but not without having alerted the Purser not to hesitate to advise if he saw some snow on the wings.
And then:
There were conditional procedures to apply: special operations, "Cold Weather Operations" and "T.O. and Landing on Contaminated Rwys ".
They had to be performed, with the contribution of PF and PNF; a flight controls test at the beginning and at the end of taxi, a test of extension and retraction of the flaps / slats, the activation of Engine Anti-ice (with engine run-up every ten minutes to remove any ice formed on the intake of the engines and on PT2 probes), and the predisposition of the Airfoil anti-ice, after start.
After rotation we were expected to cycle the “retraction / extension / retraction” of the landing gear in order to shake any slush from it.
It's absolutely clear that avoiding all of this fuss would make life much more easy, and I confess that more than once I found myself in the embarrassing
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."
CONTAMINATION ON ANY PART OF THE AIPLANE: NO GO!

"It's absolutely clear that avoiding all of this fuss would make life much more easy, and I confess that more than once I found myself in the embarrassing
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."

If anything is going to be learnt from the vid of the flight from SVO its that us passengers are far more likely to accept your explanation than was so even a few months ago.

When M.Mouse asked about the B737 characteristic for alarming and uncontrollable behaviour with leading edge contamination, you answer with …
…and you come up with the following??

The NTSB’s words (not mine) … “in most other reported incidents … the flightcrews had sufficient control authority…” Most? What about the other incidents? Just how many “other incidents” were there? Did any of those other incidents include an absence of control authority? What happened in THOSE cases?

So the “expert opinions” you settle on are these? Do you have an opinion on which of these diametrically opposite expert opinions is the one you care to believe? … which is it? …The crew could have recovered but failed to do so … or … the crew was unable to recover? Did you flip a coin … or are you prejudiced and don’t want anyone to know?

While I will stop way short of claiming to be an aerodynamic expert on the B-737-200, I am rated on the B-737 and I do have considerable time in the -200 series aircraft (even more in other makes/models … despite some here, like Mr. Doves, who choose to disbelieve my “profile” information – which, of course, is their – his – individual choice – even if, however self-serving it may seem to others to be, I will continue to believe that I am my own best judge of my own knowledge and experience.) … it is my contention that the NTSB selected a “middle-of-the-road” response by saying (see NTSB AAR82-08, page 68) “The reports since 1970 by other operators who have experienced abrupt pitchup or roll off immediately after liftoff of B-737 aircraft indicate that the B-737 may have a greater known inherent pitchup characteristic than other aircraft in this regard a result of small amounts of frost, snow, or ice on the wing leading edge. The Safety Board could not determine whether the aerodynamic design makes the B-737 more sensitive to pitching or rolling moments when the wing is contaminated, or whether more frequent operation of these aircraft in environmental conditions conducive to snow or ice accretion during ground operations, coupled with the near to the ground wing placement, accounts for the higher number of reported B-737 pitchup/rolloff incidents, Regardless, the Safety Board concludes that the pitchup tendency of the aircraft because of leading edge contamination contributed to the accident.”

It sounds as though the NTSB recognizes that it’s not as damning to accuse a system or design feature of an airplane as having contributed to an accident as it is to say that particular system or design feature actually caused an accident. Libility … cost … reputation … etc., get to be really stupifyingly large issues that no one in a political arena would be willing to challenge. Now, I suppose you’re going to tell us that government officials don’t protect themselves and their organizations when they believe that is the proper or prudent thing to do … sure … we all know that.

Contrary to Clandestino’s claim that “a certain poster” (could he possibly have meant someone other than me?) has submitted “…some true details, some true yet grotesquely exaggerated, some completely irrelevant, some that are so-pulled-out-of-the-thin-air they cannot be verified at all and some brazenly false.” With the amount of information I’ve posted – I’ll not offer an all-encompassing denial … but I will – and I do – deny that anything I’ve posted is knowingly wrong, knowingly inaccurate, knowingly exaggerated, knowingly irrelevant, and certainly NOT “brazenly false.” To the contrary – everything I’ve posted has been relevant – or I wouldn’t have posted it (still don’t understand that accusation) … some of what I posted is directly from our friends at the NTSB – everything I posted is, to the very best of my professional knowledge and training, is true … at least as the facts that support them are true, without any exaggeration or limitation – and nothing – absolutely nothing in any of my posts was “pulled-out-of-thin-air” – and were I not trying to keep this discussion on a civil level (for everyone and everything concerned) that kind of comment could have been taken in a way that, had it been offered personally in the local pub – there is at least a reasonable chance that both of us would have been taken away – one to a local medical facility and the other to a local constabulary – and I would have hoped he had resilient recuperative abilities. While some here may think lying to be an acceptable, perhaps even an expected, part of this business, but I don’t … I don’t lie, I don’t expect others to lie, and I particularly don’t appreciate being accused of doing it. If anyone here can point to anything that I’ve posted about which you have legitimate concerns as being untruthful or inaccurate in any way… please let me know and I’ll do my very best to provide whatever additional facts, theories, reports, or other information that may be appropriate to rectify that issue – but, as many of you know here, I’ll stop short of providing information that may give away my identity. As I’ve repeated here often … if my employers knew of my participation, I’d likely get an opportunity to refer to them as my “former” employers – and that is a step I’m not quite ready to make – it also requires me to be a bit more informative in my posts – as you would then either agree or disagree based on the merits of what I post and not be tempted to agree or disagree with me because of the positional authority I may hold. For example if I were a senior NTSB investigator – you might tend to believe me more – but my bosses on the Board might think I’ve overstepped my agreed-to responsibilities and other oaths I may have taken.

What I continue to find hard to believe is that throughout history professional aviators have not appreciated the label of “pilot error” that gets affixed to more than a fair share of difficult to analyze accident or incident situations. Sure pilots make errors – even very good pilots make errors – I’ve certainly made my fair share – perhaps more than my fair share. Sometimes errors wind up contributing to or causing accidents or incidents - sometimes they do not. Sometimes accusations are true and accurate … sometimes they are not.

Mr. Clandestino alleges that I (he uses the term “contributor” – hmmm … wonder if there is a sinister concern for being caught in a slander?) believe that the crew “was betrayed” by a whole series of people and events – concluding by stating that “…people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced…” and even describes the flight crew as “poor and hapless … tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” An aside here, for a moment … it is clear that Mr. Clandestino understands, or at least rather easily uses, “figures of speech” in his communications … where the particular figure of speech he chooses to use here, described as “irony,” is used in his description of the crew here … where, clearly, he says one thing but the intent is clearly to convey the opposite thing - that the crew members are not “poor and hapless” and were not “tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” For everyone’s benefit, the use of an “ironic” statement, as defined in most English textbooks, is the following: “Irony - the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” Some here may recall the allegation made that the flight crew deliberately taxied behind a preceding airplane to “get his wings deiced.” And they based that on a CVR transcript that read, as I recall “Don’t do that Apple, I need by other wing done.” Is it so out of bounds to even remotely consider that the intent of this statement would also be an ironic statement? As the definition says … “the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” As an exercise, try tape recording your next departure from engine start to level off and see if, or how many times, you and your “mates” use Ironic statements to punctuate or add to the conversation. It just might scare you to realize that what you said, would be what everyone would hear if you were to die in a subsequent crash of that airplane.

He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was Well – what did the de-icing crew pour all over the airplane? According to the NTSB report the airplane “…was deiced with 100 percent water and the final overspray was applied with a 20 to 30 percent deicer to water solution selected. Subsequent tests of deicing fluid/water solution taken from the Trump vehicle showed that the mixture dispensed differed substantially from the mixture selected. The percent of deicing fluid in solution was about 18 percent rather than 30 percent.” A fact that was also revealed during the tests conducted on the Trump vehicle but not included in the NTSB report, was that the mixture of 18 percent (rather than 30 percent when that value was selected) was measured at nominal, or close to zero, flow rate. The content with any additional flow rate was extracted almost exclusively from the water tank and virtually none from the glycol tank. The specific numbers were not available as the flow rate “pulsed” with the RPM of the drive pump and there was the residual amount of glycol present at the nominal flow rate. At the completion of the test, it was evident that the volume in the water tank was lowered by approximately the amount calculated for the time additional flow rates were used, but the volume in the glycol tank was not appreciably changed during this period of increase flow rate.

He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was I’m not sure of this reference, as there is no mention of “holdover times” or “HOT” in the Accident Report anywhere that I can find. Perhaps he could provide all of us with a reference for his thoughts on this issue?

He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was Let’s see about this one:
NTSB Report Page (ii) “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 1 “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 34 “…Since 1970 there have been a number of reports by operators of B-737 aircraft, who have experienced an aircraft pitchup or rolloff immediately after takeoff in weather conditions which were conducive to the formation of ice or frost on the wing leading edges. The Safety Board is aware of 22 such reports during the period.”
NTSB Report Page 35 “…The continuation of reports of pitchup/rolloff occurrences prompted The Boeing Co to examine further the B-737 aircraft sensitivity to leading, edge contamination. In 1977 plans were formulated for wind tunnel and flight tests. Even before conducting these tests, The Boeing Co. on February 23, 1979, issued Operations Manual Bulletin 79-2 to advise flightcrews of a possible inadvertent pitchup/rolloff after takeoff due to ice accumulation on leading edge devices. The bulletin stated that several operators of B-737’s had reported pitchup and/or rolloff after takeoff caused by ice accumulations on leading edge devices and that such incidents had usually occurred following the application of reverse thrust while taxiing on snow-covered taxiways.
NTSB Report Page 35 As part of its investigation of the reported incidents, The Boeing Co. flight tested a B-737-200 advanced airplane in the fall of 1980 to quantify the aerodynamic effects of contaminated leading edge slats. The leading edge slats were coated with an epoxy potting compound and the surface was roughened with a paint roller to simulate a coating with corn ice. A series of stalls was conducted with flaps up, and at flap positions of 1, 15, and 40. The stall characteristics with both symmetric and asymmetric leading edge contaminations were characterized by a very apparent pitchup, yaw rate, and rolloff. These characteristics were more pronounced at flap settings less than 5…

OK. OK. I think you get the picture. Betrayed? Maybe? If YOU were flying an airplane that had these kinds of “known” tendencies … and knew that they had occurred more than 20 times … would you like to know?

He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was Well, it is true that the accident flight was cleared onto the runway at 1558:58. Subsequently, they were cleared for takeoff at 1559:24. Those times don’t look too “pushed” until you realize that there was moderate snow falling throughout this time – and the taxiways and the runway had some accumulation. Do you taxi from a snow-covered taxiway onto a snow-covered runway using the same techniques you would use if the taxiway and runway were clear and dry? Of course not! Is everyone aware that the tower controller could not “see” the approach end or the departure end of the runway at that time? So, maybe we can see if they were “betrayed” by looking again at the CVR transcript:

1600:03 LC Eastern fourteen fifty-one, the wind Is zero one zero at one one you're cleared to land runway three six, the visual range touchdown two thousand elght hundred rollout one thousand six hundred/
1600:04
1600:05 CAM-2 Ah, that's not right
1600:06
1600:07 CAM-2 (Well) ---
1600:08
1600:09 CAM-1 Yes It is, there's eighty
1600:10 CAM-2 Maw, I don't think that's right
1600:11 E451 Fourteen fifty-one cleared 'to land over the lights

Now, I should point out (not that you weren’t aware of it – just reminding everyone) that one of the difficulties in reading a CVR transcript and understanding what took place just prior – during – or just after any point on that transcript is not recognizing that some things are said in a second or less … other things take a bit longer to say … for example … the Local Controller’s clearance to EA1451. It’s on the CVR Transcript as having been said at 1600:03. Try reading that statement and see how long it takes. Also, you have to know that controller had to view his “bright” scope, the indications for wind speed and direction … and … make that radio call. Was all that done in 1 second? I doubt it … in fact, I suspicion that as the Local Controller unkeyed his microphone after issuing the landing clearance, the Eastern pilot immediately responded – even though the time of that radio call is shown to be at 1600:11 – fully 8 seconds after the Transcript indicates the time of the clearance being issued. Throughout this Eastern-Tower exchange the accident flight crew was busy making a takeoff.

Don’t let me put thoughts into your head – you decide. You’re the Captain on the B-737. You’ve received clearance onto the runway, taxied out, begun the line-up turn, pushed up the throttles to get the engines spooled … the F/O takes control of the airplane. He further spools the engines up toward TO EPR setting – what are you watching? The throttle position? … the engine EPR gauges?… the centerline of the runway? Your F/O sets what he believes is or is close to TO EPR and you prepare to take over monitoring of the throttles. At that time, he says something like “Geeze – look at that thing? That don’t seem right, does it?” Where do you look to see what he’s talking about? … remember, you’re blasting down a snow-covered runway, with the windshield wipers on – unable to see very far ahead … do you care what progress you’re making? … do you care what your airspeed is now? By the time you ask yourself those questions, he again says “Ah … that’s not right” All this while you’ve heard the tower controller issuing landing clearance to that guy behind you … You look at the airspeed … 80 knots … and you decide to let the F/O know where you were and your airspeed … so you say in a calm and clear voice, “Yes it is, there’s eighty” … and just as you get those words from your mouth, you hear the landing traffic over the tower frequency respond to the tower controller’s clearance by saying, “1451 cleared to land over the lights.” WHAT?!?!? OVER THE FRIGGIN LIGHTS!?!?!? What do you do, now … abort?

It would seem that Mr. Clandestino is “hoisted by his own petard.” By way of example he states:
Or … perhaps this could be said somewhat differently … “people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced. If reading the accident report pages where crew's mistakes are neatly explained fills you with satisfaction and comfort because you never make those kinds of errors, and, because of these facts, you want to believe that you are insulated from similar potentialities of crew error or confluence of other apparently dissimilar circumstances such that your anxiety may be soothed, you would do well to read only the report and not challenge any aspect regardless of how familiar that aspect may sound.”

Again, a worthwhile quote:
One additional quote from the Accident Report - once again leading interested readers to the conclusion that the airplane was "auto-rotated" to an unrealisitc and unrecoverable pitch attidue due to the wing contamination caused by impropter deicing/anti-icing procedures and equipment.
A slight tendency to pitch up - slight tendency - 30 to 40 degrees nose up? Really?

Don't worry, chances are they won't. Pilots who know a bit about aerodynamics can have good laugh at some propositions aired here. Those who don't, probably won't look up to PPRuNe to expand their knowledge. Those who are ignorant of matters aeronautical, yet easily influenced into accepting as true the lethally wrong theory, when appeal to their emotions is made, are very unlikely to have any chance of putting the wrong theory into practice. Main reason being the lack of piece of paper, unequivocally showing that relevant authority deems them capable of safely slipping the surly bonds of earth.

The fellow plays his own tune for his own audience.

No need too feed him.

@AirRabbit
 

Well, great post once again. You convinced me -and many others, Im sure- even more!
But... I still think you should have followed my advice and stop responding.

He said it himself: "No need to feed him" (He's not worth the trouble and he's just harassing you. Don't take the bite.)


(English is not my mother tongue. I apologise for not being able to respond as eloquently as you can.)

Got away with the snowy wings - again!

Interestingly, when you open the video on YouTube, first suggested similar video is:


It's about AirFlorida 90. Recommended if your Russian is better than English.

rainbow100,
Interesting, but would not alter my operation one bit.
That snow should have been removed.

Only exception to my mind would have been overriding military requirement.

Maybe its time the FAA updates its FARs?
According to FAR 121 ,Aeroflot did not break any of its rules..as reckless as its pilots actions may have been..

@de facto

How on earth do you conclude that aircraft could possibly have complied with:

Never mind that conducting an inspection from outside the aircraft within 5 mins of takeoff at a Russian airport is probably impossible without the security guys getting very excited.

I don't think the reg you quoted means what you think it means. All that says is IF a part 121 operator does not have an approved ground deicing/anti-icing program, they may still take off when weather conditions could create structural contamination on the aircraft if they do a pre-takeoff contamination check within 5 minutes of takeoff from the exterior of the aircraft. If there is no ice or snow adhering, they may take off.

If the airline does have an approved ground deicing/anti-icing program, then that program must be adhered to.

Basically, if I had a little commuter operation out of San Juan, it might not be worth it to me to come up with a ground ice program in my ops specs. If a freak snowstorm hit the Caribbean, I could still take off if I was able to perform the pre-takeoff contamination check AND the airplane was clean. If anything was adhering to the wings, or any other critical surface, no takeoff.

With that in mind, from that video the Aeroflot plane would have been in violation.

Taking what FAR 121 actually says:-

"(d) A certificate holder may continue to operate under this section without a program as required in paragraph (c) of this section, if it includes in its operations specifications a requirement that, any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the aircraft, no aircraft will take off unless..."

Then if conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably expected NOT to adhere.. then it does NOT apply.

So in properly cold countries, some of which have an almost infinite number of words for different types of snow, it is possible that a pilot with that knowledge might know that it was dry snow and not thick enough for the weight to cause melting on a very cold wing/tail. And that a couple of sweeps with a soft broom confirmed that he was correct.

I live in balmy Surrey and even I can tell which snow I need to clear from my bonnet, and that which I know will have blown off by the end of the lane.

I'm not saying that I wouldn't have been raising hell in the cabin on that flight, but that FAR 121 does offer a get out clause.

Boguing


That is a very misleading quote since it leaves out the conditional statements after the word "unless"

That regulation is what it is, and not subject to personal intertpretations by exclusions and/or additions.

Lompaseo, you are one of the last people that I would dare to open a debate with - for fear of losing tragically!

I'm really not trying to let this crew off the hook.

But the 'unless' is irrelevant if the earlier test (reasonably expected..) is not met.

I don't even know whether FAR 121 was relevant to this flight.

Your first quote of my quote - if you follow?! Was lifted from preceding posts, so if it was wrong, mea culpa.

The second quote you used was all my own words.

And I stand by it. If you reasonably expect the snow to fall off without any help other than airspeed, then I read that you are 'good to go'.

I think reasonably is stronger than "a hunch." An inspection with a wand reveals nothing adhering, then you can reasonably expect. Not wanting to de-ice because you've got a waiting devushka u vodka at your kvartirye, is a reason, but not reasonable.

I don't know how much more clearly I can say that if I were there I would have been terrified.

But there are many people who could determine what is and is not dry snow. If that happened to be a teetotal Russian, I would not bet against him/her.

I'm just pointing out that local knowledge is valuable, and the test of 'reasonable' might hang upon that.

So many laws are open to driving the proverbial coach and horses through. This seems to be one of them.

Apologize for leaving you all without new developments on this story.

Having received that reply from aeroflot (snow was blown off, no violations, etc) in the beginning of April, I was looking to receive another statement, as I sent them a brief outline of regulatory provisions which were apparently violated. Since there was no reply and it seemed that the story was about to get lost amongst others, I launched a dedicated website, link (it's all in russian) on the 1'st of May. Narrative is about 5000 words: facts of the case (differentiation between 'wet' and 'dry' snow, speculation about possible presence of ice, etc), violations (quotations from AFL's SOP, FCOM, Russian Air Law), outline of effect of wing contamination on aerodynamics (basic theory, quotations from Airbus, ICAO, NTSB, FAA, statistics on a number of fatal accidents caused by contamination on takeoff).

This website has caused quite a tornado in russian internet, and is now widely quoted on different websites (unfortunately not much media interest though). Finally russian aviation community woke up to the fact. Generally public (aviation-affiliated) condemns actions of aeroflot personnel and of their top managers who made the statement. Almost all airlines in russia and in CIS are now aware of this case. Aeroflot guys visit the website at least 5 times a day from their offices (IP-tracking). According to my sources, there is a sence of moderate panic among managers of aeroflot, and particulary among two individuals who made the statement (Mr. Chalik and Coldunov). This case is also widely discussed among aeroflot pilots.

I sent letters to EASA, SkyTeam, Airbus, IATA and Bermuda CAA. IATA indeed got interested and contacted russian CAA with fury (apparently) about the incident and aeroflot's reply. There was also a SAE conference on Aircraft De-Icing in Prague in the beginning of May, two of the people I know visited it and they reported loads of tea-room discussions condemning aeroflot's actions as well. Also, as you probably know, most russian airliners are registered in off-shore states, such as Bermuda. I sent them a quick letter and got the following reply (7'th of May):

http://snowafl.ru/graphics/VP-BKY_BERMUDA_CAA_REPLY.jpg


Bermuda initiated talks and does take it seriously, how about russian CAA? Keep on reading...


Here starts the interesting part

A few days ago I wrote a public petition, signed by 80+ people, addressed to aeroflot and demanding apologies for gross misconduct of relevant regulations concerning removal of contaminants prior to takeoff.

Yesterday (on 14'th of May) I made a call to russian CAA (just out of curiosity), to the head of safety inspections department. To my total amazement his exact words (amongst other bluff) were: there were no violations of FCOM/SOP/Russian Air Law (1), snow was dry (2), there was no danger to people on board (3). I tried my best to almost quote excerpts from FCOM and SOP, but he delicately attempted to avoid my direct questions. Since I was not recording this call, I decided not to interrogate him further. So there is no case to answer, no one was punished, incident almost got lost quietly [almost, but not anymore :) ].

At the moment i'm preparing another petition, to russian CAA. By russian law, as a state department, they must respond to any inbound queries. So that will be an interesting reply to read. I very much doubt they will dare to confirm that there was no direct violation of FCOM/SOP or that the snow was dry indeed.

PS. For those of you who don't know, as per russian air law, it is not permitted to takeoff with wet snow (amongst other contaminats), unless otherwise stated in FCOM. Aeroflot A320 FCOM and SOP is a standard Airbus-recommended text, so it prohibits to takeoff with any contamination on the upper surface of the wing.

Anyway, their argument will be very weak, if they produce it and don't change their mind. Snow shown on the video demonstrates qualities of a wet snow, so that's a violation of russian air law (1), FCOM cleary prohibits to takeoff with any contamination - another violation (2).

Once we get a reply from CAA, if they still argue that there were no violations, we'd probably forward the whole case to transport judiciary for their own independent inquiry.

BTW, Russian CAA is very well known to 'cooperate' with aeroflot. For instance recently they lost a case in court to other russian carrier for not allowing them to compete with aeroflot on certain routes, where aeroflot operated solely alone and held a monopolistic share.

PS. I also received accounts from pilots of aeroflot who reported captain of that flight to be totally arrogant, impulsive and cowboy-like. On one occasion, he called a group of queuing junior second officers in front of medical room 'shut up puppys and let me go' and skipped the queue. On the way out when they questioned him, reply was 'you'r too junior, or wanna speak?'. I'm also in contact with other AFL pilot who reporting him being arrogant on a flight deck [will post more details once I got them].

PS2. Please don't quote FAR requirements in this topic about 'adhering', it's irrelevant. Under russian air law, the key word is 'wet snow' (presence of).

PS3. Here is the video of another aeroflot takeoff, difference being - it is a dry snow - kind of thing which is allowed as per russian air law, but not as per FCOM -


PS4. To those guys who fly to russia - you are welcome to takeoff with snow -- as per russian CAA :)

hey ! do not expect to get another reply since they will not mess up with a major russian carrier to satisfy some heated internet discussions for a thing where finally nothing happened.

law prohibits a take off with snow on wings, not the take off run. drag calculations are given for operations in contaminated enviroments- and additional drag is also given with a deicing slush on the wings before it sheers off.

deicing alone is not the magic word for safe winter operation, it depends on many factors and real life serves you more questions than any fcom wil give you answers.

on the other hand...

the more interesting think you stated here is the arrogance and cowboy style of the captain. if he really is thatlike he should be eliminated not because of any snow , but because of intentionally operating close to the edge , with passengers on board.

there are far more situations than snow that blows off not instantly but short before rotation where a cowboy may run out of luck- in summer or winter !

UUUW: may we ask why you use up such resources to nail down this captain ? something personal?

cheers !

UUUWZDZX

Seems to me that the problem is not the Captain's personality. judgement etc. but an edenmic shortfall in their CAA for promoting and fostering a unique difference in interpretations of the regulations in the world wide community.

For this corrective action one must start at the top of the chain and the pilots will follow.

I feel that too much criticism is being directed against the last guy in the chain (the captain). If continued nothing will be improved for the benefit of the flying public

in english slang, thowing the guy under the bus

I don't consider this as a significant campaign... No, I don't know this person.

It seems every time I post smth in this topic, it's outrageous :)

Been browsing AFL A320 SOP and found very familiar Boeing words, opened Boeing QRH and was lost for words...: SOP of Aeroflot for A319-320-321 (approved by CAA) includes upset recovery procedure - COMPLETELY copied (and translated) from B767 QRH. There is NO mention of FBW at all: bank angle, high AOA & pitch attitude protection, abnormal attitude law, etc..

On the left - AFL A319/320/321 SOP, on the right QRH of B767-300ER:

It's all copied word-to-word, even punctuation.

https://p.twimg.com/As9mZcFCMAAmCwG.jpg:large




You might say it's an error (copied erroneously). Unfortunately it is not. Look at the next page. They copied actual procedure as well, BUT changed 'elevator' to 'side stick'. WTF??

http://snowafl.ru/NHR.jpg

https://p.twimg.com/As9q_7YCMAAoiaM.jpg:large






It might be partly applicable to any conventional aircraft, but how about FBW logic?

Bank Angle Protection:

High Pitch Attitude Protection:


Abnormal Attitude Law:

This would leave AFL crews "fighting" with FBW (especially those, who poorly know FCTM). Why posting such critical information in SOP without reference to aircraft systems, their capabilities and limitations? Also, why include references to the use of stabilizer trim without out any additional details -- in auto (under normal law) or manual mode?

Sorry if silly question but..Does the A320 side stick have a stick shaker or did they change that bit when they did the translation?

I did look in the A320 Flight Crew Training Manual but can't see a reference suggesting the A320 has a stick shaker. The word shaker occurs just once in the section dealing with protections and that's to do with the A320 protections making it easier to fly at stick shaker AOA.

There is no stick shaker in the Airbus FBW aircraft. There are aural warnings, such as "SPEED-SPEED -SPEED" or "STALL" when speed / energy targets are reached, but in normal comtrol laws,you can hold the sidestick at full back and the aircraft will fly at the lowest speed and it will adjust pitch / thrust accordingly to maintain it.

"Been browsing AFL A320 SOP and found very familiar Boeing words, opened Boeing QRH and was lost for words...:"

And you are suprised?

Fake Diplomas = Fake Modernization

Take two examples of a recently "relected" president who never left.

You are evidently just touching the tip of an enormous iceberg in a country where something like 50% of law degrees are fake, engineers work at Sukhoi with fake qualifications and fake companies are used to launder stolen companies.

...that is exactly the point about contemporary Russia: there is no proof of anything that happened.
Documents are missing.
People have disappeared or changed their identities.

Major companies are owned by nonexistent shell companies, and they mysteriously do the president’s bidding...

Have you been asleep for a decade?

Wake up smell the coffee! :D

Presumably an unconnected development ...

Russia may blacklist air passengers, pilots - NY Daily News

And the person behind that move in the Duma, is none other than .....the...

Vitaly Saveliev, chief executive officer of Russian flag carrier Aeroflot, who cut his teeth on .....?

"...when the Sayano-Shushenskaya HEPP was completed, Vitaly Saveliev returned to Leningrad"..
..the same HEPP that was one of the greatest post war industrial disasters after the 1986 Chernobyl accident.


...a particularly well placed and appropriate personality it should be said for legifering into the pilot recruitment & safety of companies other than Aeroflot and protecting AFL's monopolies.


Just in case you see no connection in the obsessive "safety regime" in Russia watch

this.

A catastrophe that was completely avoidable like so many others.

My understanding is that both Boeing and Airbus worked together to produce upset recovery procedures that are standard across the industry.

That is why they are the same.

a case to study not only contaminated wings takeoff performance but a egocentric personalities as such. :ok:

Just where is the evidence of such:confused:

in the cockpit

in the airlne management ?

in the CAA ?

Until the facts are in, assigning personal traits specifically is out of place

Evidence on a rumor network, that's the best joke I've ever heard. You've made my day amigo therefore you deserve another hint. Empty vessels makes the most noise. Go figure. :}

The FAR 121 is stating The 'MAY BE REASONABLY be expected to adhere...' is leaving a lot on the unreasonable PICs out there...therefore maybe time for a review more strict FAR.

FAA is all about Would/should/could.....maybe its time it uses SHALL NOT more often.....

Some years ago, I got SLFed through ORD while a low was dumping considerable quantities of lake effect wet snow over everything. We got deiced with what must have been type IV at the gate and then joined the conga line to departure. It took more than 5 minutes while considerable snow accumulated on the wing which I could see quite well. The several a/c ahead of us were not turning into fireballs on takeoff; so, I decided that the deicers knew their job and did not put up a fuss.

At about 50 kt, the blanket of snow sheared off in what looked like a single piece and the takeoff proceeded normally. I don't think ORD was removing the dumped snow after each takeoff, but I would not be surprised that clearing operations were in progress on the next runway to come in use.

UUUWZDZX has posted a video showing how easily dry snow comes off -- quite a bit quicker and more cleanly than the wetter stuff at M01 in the first video. Snow close to 0C worries me more than snow at -10C on both a/c and roads, but we also have to take account of surface temperature.

The videos show that there's different degrees of adhesion. If the adhesion is good past Vr, it's definitely too much. In the first video, the adhesion got pretty close to Vr and in some locations exceeded Vr. Not much margin there.