Point taken! OK - right where ATC would want to line one up number three or four in the "string of pearls" to intercept a hypothetical ILS for 22L - whether one wanted them to or not. ;)

As a pax, I've ridden on a 737 doing a circle to land 22L out of an ILS to 31C at KMDW. Winter, light snow, but otherwise better wx than was available for the SW crew (5 miles+ vis, 2000' ceiling.) But with scud at 900' and 1.5-mile visibility in rain, not an option on this day at this time for this crew.

FltPathOBN:

All the A/T's I used flew Vref +5 unless I commanded a higher KIAS.

If the 737 A/Ts command 140 KIAS when Vref is, say, 114, KIAS, then the aircraft should not have been qualified for RNP AR, at least not with A/T.

I assumed NG's my friend... and yes vref +5...

SPOT
 

There seems to be a lost technique of the power on spot landing. I refer you to "Stick and Rudder" as he explains slowing down prior to the fence.

Certainly I am not advocating a full stall landing in the 737 or jet transports of any kind...however the idea of keeping the spot in your windshield and reducing speed to touchdown in a sort of blended flare starting somewhere near the middle marker /equivilent seems to have been lost.

as you approach the touchdown point, properly trimmed, reduce power slightly and maintain the glideslope/approach angle to touchdown by pulling back a bit, granted you lose speed, and pull back the power a bit more, pull up a bit more lose more speed blending this smoothly to touchdown on your aim point at vref to vref minus five knots.

this takes practice, skill, willingness to add power if you get too slow.

The current trend of auto throttle, mindless automatic cutback of power and going for a greaser is starting to bite people in the butt, or shall I say empenage?

in driving a car, we learn through practice, how to pull up to a stop sign smoothly...tha same sort of sense can be developed for a spot landing in flying. Our over reliance on auto EVERY FRIKIN THING is removing our chance to practice.

There has been no information about the landing other than he is off the end of the runway. We do not know if: He/She
Landed long
Landed hot
Hyroplaned
Had a greezer not tripping the WOW
Had equipment malfunction
Got caught in the Boeing throttle quadrant reverser trap.
Some or all the above.

Well there may possibly be someone getting a blow to their ego, mud on their cowboy boots and a hicup to their advancement here.

VFD

mud slide
 

Maybe the crew didn't want to stress the airframe with a go-around and have the roof rip off. Seriously, having been to MDW numerous times you really have to try hard to park a jet in the mud.:D

This would indicate the CB never went over the field. It was SW moving E and in 16 minutes later it was SE moving E.

The Southwest pilots have had some challenges staying on the approved surface. There is a culture there of flying fast, taxiing fast and treating regulations as guidelines only. It has worked for them for many years but they are edging closer and closer each time to a catastrophe.

Since Southwest was majorly responsible for the age 65 approval in the states and allowing TWO OVER 60 pilots to fly together. I wonder if any of this combination was together on this flight????

controllers and wx
 

IGH

About 17 years ago I watched a jet go down in extreme weather in CLT. ATC was on my radio and NO warning was given of lightning, green sky, winds that were rocking my jet while sitting on the ground or heavy rain.

I personally went and spoke with the deputy FAA administrator, demanding action to , in effect, create a CONREP...a controller report similiar to a pirep. Further investigation on my part showed that:

Controllers are not really trained WX observers and the FAA and NAT WX SVC have largely CONTRACTED OUT the METARs we now see. Indeed, getting a "SPECIAL" is actually quite tough.

I also found out that indeed the controllers only have what is called, MORAL AUTHORITY to speak up when things look like crap. Very few pilots know this . They also don't know that awhile ago Severe and Extreme turbulence forecasts were replaced with MOGR that is MODERATE OR GREATER because every Flight Ops manual prohibits flight into severe or extreme turbulence. Forecasting same would ground all flights.

Given that the FAA did nothing in 1994, I followed up with the FAA Administrator Jane Garvey in 1999 with the same request. ATC looks out the window and sees crappy wx and they are obligated to at least WARN pilots if not actually deny them clearance.

In the rush to replace the striking controllers of the early 1980's, some short cuts were made...and the loss of wx training was one of them..

After complete failure with the FAA I went to the tower at CLT in uniform and asked the controllers to at least use their moral authority when things went to hell.

I sure would value an observation by the tower being passed on to me, and I directly ask them, if, for example, my radar picture is unclear, to check wether it is the city or a TS above the city I am seeing on my scope.

But to have them deny takeoff or approach is not what I'd like to see. It is PIC decision, and should stay that way.

Just as it is the PIC's responsibility to keep clear of terrain in a visual app. In Italy they have punished an ATCO for a f***up of a Citation Crew in Sardinia. Stuff like that should not be happening.

Nic

..."ingesting a taxiway light during the excursion..."

Well, at least that's a change from the usual birds and grass. ;)

In the current issue of FLYING - ILAFFT column - a PP reports being cleared for an ILS into KLUK. When he reported in to the tower, the controller had the good grace to tell him "You do know there is a thunderstorm right over the field?"

He made a 90° turn and went elsewhere.

I welcome input and information from controllers - I don't think they should have to take on the burden or responsibility for my flying decisions, though.

"Everything not forbidden is compulsory" is a really bad way to manage human interactions, even professional ones.

sevenstrokeroll:


That accident was quite notable:


From the NTSB web site:

Title: Flight into Terrain during Missed Approach USAir 1016, DC-9-31, N954VJ Charlotte/Douglas International Airport Charlotte, North Carolina July 2, 1994.
NTSB Report Number: AAR-95-03, adopted on 4/4/1995
NTIS Report Number: PB95-910403


There is a copy of AAR at:
http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR95-03.pdf


There is interesting discussion by US NWS personnel on the TDWR at CLT:
National Weather Service Forecast Office - WFO Greenville-Spartanburg, SC


I recall talking to a guy at Raytheon, the manufacturer of TDWR, about the mid 1990s, after CLT. He explained that is supposed to very automatic for ATC personnel. As I try to avoid T-storms in my C-172, I have no idea how useful ATC personnel or pilots have found TDWR to be.

By the way, in my opinion, the NTSB title for this accident is quite "original."

SWA is not too lucky now at Midway, are they?
File:Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 -1.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

ATC should advise the aircraft what is happening but the crew has the ultimate responsibility of how to respond to that information. No controller should tell you to go around because he thinks the weather is too bad. If an aircraft is on the runway and a separation problem exists he has the job to say go around. The PIC is in command of his aircraft, ATC is in command of separation.

Nice flame douchebag. Not sure who you work for, nor do I care, but what do you say about the marketing departments about the other airlines who fly out of MDW and BUR - they don't count? What about SNA? Pretty short runway there too - shorter than MDW - and pretty good mix of everyone there. or, just SWA are the cowboys there too?

Rapid D:

I was defending the SWA pilots, but that was apparently lost on you.

SNA is not a great operation, but it seldom snows there.

450' past the threshold. Seems to be nice flying from that observation by the NTSB.

We'll just have to see what other details the investigation offers before we commence with the lynching. :sad:

bubbers is right that the PIC must decide...but information is helpful.

I've discussed the situation as I've listed, tower folk not wx observers etc...and I tell my pilot friends just say: I need you to tell me what you see out your window RIGHT NOW...plain english...and not read me the METAR.

It helps.

and if you are going around in bad wx...more power is better than less power, stay on instruments...the CLT crash...the pilots didn't push the throttles up to full GA power right away...and even delayed firewall power...

SSR is absolutely correct in that the metar last reported has nothing to do with landing weather minimums. That is history. Only what is reported now determines if you can do the approach with the existing visibility. The ceiling is advisory and only needs to be considered to prepare you for the approach. We can all tell war stories about going around even though visibility was legal because at DH or MDA we have to have visual reference to the runway or approach lights. I guess if a tornado was zipping through the tower should just say go around but other than that we have our job and they have theirs.

Southwest Airlines flight 1919 Runs of Midway Runway
 

Video: Southwest plane caught on camera skidding off runway | TERMINAL U | Travel News

NTSB released video of accident which happened last April 26th...

Absolutely no expert and fishing in the blind - question to the expert: Shouldn't you use spoilers and thrust reverse in Midway in wet situation given the relatively short runways, history, proximity to public streets etc...? Don';t see them on the photos deployed...

Grimrrad, try and read the report :hmm:

I know, it says:
The thrust reversers and speedbrakes were not deployed according to Southwest Airlines’ procedures. Speedbrakes were fully deployed 16 seconds after touchdown and the thrust reversers were deployed 19 seconds after touchdown which resulted in insufficient deceleration during the initial portion of the ground roll for the aircraft to stop before the end of the runway.

But a) why do I not see any on the pictures, unless thy were stored again but that seems not SOP to change settings in the cockpit after you crashed and b) why is it SWA SOP not to use those at MDW - didn't they learn?

I think the notable thing is that with 27,000 hours combined experience in the cockpit this can still happen. We should all take note particularly regarding reverser and speedbrake position on short runways. Interesting that lightning should strike twice as well!

Well, I (non native English speaker) read it that the fact they weren't deployed was not according to SWA sop.

I read it that way too - It's quite ambiguous language for an accident report! :confused:

I read it to be as in they didn't deploy them on time (took them 15-ish seconds to do it)

Check the books! Manual brakes stops 500 ft. shorter than MAX AUTO brakes. Why wait on the auto brakes!

is the friction coefficient of the runway anywhere reported?