As a TRI, I was dismissed for refusing to sign off a Captain
 

Several years ago, in Delhi, I was responsable for training an airforce CAPTAIN, a 2 seater recon flight.

To cut the very long, 2 year, story short he failed his TR check ride, unable to actually command an aircraft. Lost in the visual circuit, and had no idea how to fly the NDB approach.

Eventually I found out part of the reason, was that as a 2 seater, he was not responsable for navigation, or "command", always given a PAR from the back seater.

Upon advising the company for the last time that this guy should never be permitted to actually be in command of anything other than a TUK TUK, I was remined that if I did not sign him off, as Captain would have my visa recinded, for actions detremental to the country, and thus be unwelcome.

The next morning, I was woken up by a smile face, handed a cup of fresh tea, with real milk, and asked to fasten my seat belt. Welcome home, top deck of the 747 was never a sweeter place to be as the sun rose over Heathrow.

Nothing changes, glf

ps asking to come back last week, to work there again...Hope CID refuse to let me enter.

Hang on a minute...didn't I already post something on this earlier?
Where did my thread go?

Did the Captain ever complete his visit to the washroom?

After this, I imagine it was too late! :)

Throughout this debacle it's highly likely that the Flight Director System would have been commanding pitch guidance designed to a return the aircraft to its previously assigned (MCP) altitude, as well as providing roll guidance designed to return the aircraft to its (LNAV?) track.

The auto-throttle (assuming it was engaged) would have been managing thrust to maintain the airspeed (be that MCP or VNAV derived).

It's therefore truly staggering that these two pilots seemed unable to follow basic Flight Director System information, regardless of whether the aircraft was being flown via the autopilot in Control Wheel Steering mode, or not ?!!! :ugh:

How easy is to "accidently" disengage the autopilot and do this sort of "manoever"?. I was under the understanding if the autopilot remained active until the disarm "button" was pressed to prevent accidents like Eastern Airlines 401

p.s. I am just curious. My flight experience is upto the level of a Grob 115 and Microsoft flight sim. I am just trying to educate myself

Well, staggering that the copilot did what he did. The Captain rushed in immediately to recover the aircraft (which he correctly did, apparently), not before fighting with the "panicked" copilot for the controls :eek: :eek: :eek:

It is kind of easy to disengage the autopilot by just moving the yoke with sufficient force. Every type has its own "trigger force", so to speak. The aircraft will, however, under normal circumstances announce you (via aural and/or visual warnings) that you disengaged the autopilot (or that it disengaged itself) in an usual way. That was one of the reasons learned from EAL401, even though the A310 failed to get the lesson and subsequently didn't help to prevent one of them making a big smoking hole in the Siberia region, only this time it was a kid who flew the plane!

And by the way, what really prevents accidents like EAL401 (and most of other kinds as well) is called CRM :ok:

lets just hope that the -0.2g didnt come while he was mid-stream :}:}

On the contrary. The flight directors should never be used to recover from an unusual attitude. That is not their primary purpose. It may have been this blind reliance on FD indications that caused the first officer to lose the plot. All he had to do was to disengage the autopilot and autothrottles, get rid of the FD's and simply use his manual flying skills (presuming he had some in the first instance which seems doubtful ..) to return to controlled flight. Then, when he had the aircraft under control manually he could re-introduce the appropriate automatics at his leisure.

In fact under the heading of Automatic Flight, the 737 FCTM states in part: "Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory performance or a degraded flight path...reducing the level of automation as far as manual flight may be necessary to ensure proper control of the airplane is maintained".

The report is unbelievable. I would have thought a solo student in a Cessna 150 would have done better than that.

However, I do have one more concern. I notice that the F/O applied enough force to trip the autopilot into CWS. When are we going to train pilots in the use of CWS. CWS can be a useful tool (although I'm not a big fan), BUT, the crew must be properly trained to use it, to recognize when the autopilot goes into CWS, and above all, fly the bloody airplane.

The Goldfish:ugh:

captplaystation:

"I find it difficult to believe anyone could be quite this incompetent, and the aircraft was trying to help him by going into Alt Acq, while all he could do was pull the thrust back and apply even more push force."

They're out there all right. Reference Colgan 3407 in Buffalo, NY where the Captain pulled against the stick PUSHER. In the Colgan accident, fatigue was cited as a major player, whereas I didn't notice fatigue mentioned in this DGCA report (perhaps I missed it). Now I'm just a flight instructor, but it's sad when airline pilots cannot effect recoveries to upsets that a pre-solo student should be able to handle.

I also note the conspicuous absence of the CVR data after the Captain entered the cockpit. Did they sit in silence the whole time or did the Captain ask something along the lines of "what the :mad: just happened?" I'm sure he did. I wonder why that portion of the CVR wasn't published.

Meanwhile, after it appears that the captain saved everybody's lives after the F/O completely screwed up with total incmpetence, it seems the investigation board wants to focus as much blame on the captain as possible.

The captain did not take over control as per standard procedure. What is expected when beyond Mmo and 20° nosedown, a calm "I have control" and wait for the F/O to release the controls?

Then they state that the captain pulled too hard to recover by yanking the control column. What do they expect when the copilot is still pushing forward on the controls at mach 0.9(which was never explained how or why he was doing it).

The PIC, not the crew but the PIC did not do the RVSM contingency procedure done after the altitude deviation seems to be important in the report(good point to make but after an incident like this who would remember).

But they do take time to say in the conclusions that the F/O had no previous incidents.

So in the end the report recommends to "take the appropriate action against the involved crew" Let me guess, the F/O is local and the captain is an expat.

Having read many accident reports but this being my first Indian one, I suspect a low level of competence in their investigations. Seems to match the level of competence in other aviation areas I read about frequently on this board.

My suggested appropriate action is an award for the captain.

I fault the captain for leaving the cockpit with such an idiot at the controls.

GB

The more I read the DGCA report, the more I am reminded of cats covering over something in the "Cat Box".:rolleyes:
Heck yes. His only mistake was getting airborne with that turkey in the other seat. The captain did not cause excessive g levels. The aircraft was seconds away from exploring new airspeed territory. Why does DGCA seem to think they should be second guessing this captain? Now we are second guessing them!
Where is TopTup when we need him?

Graybeard:

If the captain cannot step out to take a quick leak, and trust a co pilot to ensure the trimmed/autopilot on cruise setting is maintained, there are issues well above and beyond the aeronautic skill of the pilot in the other seat. We used to call such things "supervisory error" in the aircraft mishaps I investigated while in the service.

IF the captain cannot do the above, there is no sound reason for that particular copilot to be sitting in ANY cockpit, no less a passenger plane with numerous trusting souls on board.

Distinct odour of 'merde du vache' here....

No surprises there then.

Indeed. Perhaps yet another annual medical will be an effective DGCA solution to such an occurrence.

Just re-read the incident report. I missed the contributing factor of the "Subsequent recovery actions by the PIC without coordination with the copilot"

YGBSM!

Goldfish

Exactly, Lonewolf. It's highly unlikely this Capt chose or had any control of scheduling this FO for this trip, so he had to deal with it. Before leaving the fright deck, it was his job to be absolutely sure it was safe.

GB

punkalouver - both Capt and the FO are Indian, so lets leave the expat vs local debate out of this one

You are correct in assuming the worst about their accident investigating capabilities, I doubt there was a single pilot on the board. If you see previous accident reports you will see that the DGCA like to use "pilot error" as a general cause or contributing factor to any accident. Its easier to blame someone rather than the system.