Airbus prepares safety warnings following A321 incident
 

BBC reporting as follows:
Airbus is drafting a worldwide safety warning about electrical problems on some of its aircraft.

The company is investigating a fault that temporarily affected primary cockpit displays and computer controls on a BMI flight from Khartoum to Beirut in August.

The standby instruments on the A321 plane did operate normally.

The pilots eventually regained control of the aircraft - but by that time it was 20 miles off its course.

The pilots reported that without warning the aircraft began to shudder, banking steeply on its own - failing to respond to pilot commands over a period of several minutes.

The twin-engined jet with 49 people aboard was cruising at 36,000ft.

The crew said they were bombarded by a stream of warning messages before cockpit screens turned grey and then went blank.

The aircraft's left wing suddenly dropped without any input from the crew.

For years, safety investigators have been concerned about electrical system glitches resulting in dangerous shutdowns of flight control computers.

But such incidents are hard to understand and replicate. Airbus says it is helping both the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the BEA in France with the inquiry.

But it has been reported that investigators have already urged Airbus to alert all operators of its A319, A320 and A321 planes about the potential hazards stemming from such electrical faults.

A321 out of control after generator fault
 

AVHerald reports an A321, G-MEDJ of BMI, flight BD996, went out of control after having electrical problems with its generator #1: Report: BMI A321 over northern Sudan on Aug 24th 2010, electrical problems

Quite a serious incident imho.

thanks for this interesting post.

Us old retired graybeards tried to tell you this years ago.

Have they any suggestion as to what the airlines might do?

For those who are interested...the respective AAIB Bulletin:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf

Regards,
ihg

Yes, stick another OEB in the back of the QRH, to join all the others, another page in abnormal procedures and hope for the best.

Sorry to add yet another biased view of a confirmed luddite, but is anyone over the age of, say 40, truly surprised by this.
Too clever is TOO clever and this is yet another incident, that, had it happened at a different altitude or place ,would have joined the list of, at least partially, unexplained airbus whoopsies, headed ignominously by the AF A330.

Hi,

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6056913

Agreed! That worries me - I was hoping that deviant electrons fleeing a faulty GEN would automatically be trapped by at least one of the thousands of logic gates.

ECAM actions for GEN 1(2) FAULT usually calls for turning the GEN off then on again, and if it still doesn't work, turn it off & leave it. You loose the main galley and CATIII Dual - no big deal. No mention in the FCOM about what effects may be caused by a system that half works.

I'm curious though, if the crew followed the ECAM, they would have turned off GEN1 & kept if off if they knew it was faulty, unless the other faults e.g. side-stick fault jumped the queue (being more critical failures) thereby masking the real cause of their problems. Was it a condition with a remote possibility of reoccurrence, or is this an example of when the ECAM logic was inappropriate?

I really hope that this "deviation from design objectives" doesn't get swept away to OEB heaven, and that maybe just perhaps it will work it's way to the italic notes below the GEN 1 FAULT procedure in FCOM3.
................
Oops, just read the link above and the report http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf
Riveting stuff.

Imagine this happens on an arrival or departure in a mountainous area. Can see the TRE's working this into the next sim check scenarios :ouch:

A former A330 driver told me a decade ago that the airbus aircrafts have many traps and the Airbus techies were generally very overconfident; he reckoned that there would be many accidents/incidences caused by those traps caused by transient electrical problems which can not be proved or even replicated. Even in labs and bench tests, a lot of electrical or electronic transients cannot be replicated. Looked like we have the Air France A330 off the African coast and many more which might not make the big headlines........we are all very lucky so far.

People and techies who think a world of themselves ( airbus supporters ) keep burying their heads in the sand. Likewise people who debunks every anecdotal evidence of cell phones usage in aircrafts which lead to the occasional electromagnetic transients which combine with right circumstances can cause great harm to other vital electronics. try as they may, the lab boys cannot never replicate every circumstance surrounding an accident/incident.:ugh::ugh::{

So thank goodness the computer remembered to alert to a duff generator. Hats off to FBW!! Let's don't be hasty, let's wait for the final report.

Passe: "What's it doing?".

Now: "What am I doing?"

Next: "101101 10 01101 101?" (What's he doing Now?)

bear

Flying out of Reagan one night in a Lear Jet in a 30 degree bank to clear the prohibited area had the voltmeter peg out as the left generator went off line. I shut off the right generator and the left one picked up the load with normal voltage. Later I looked through our checklist and found no procedure for our fault. The overvoltage on the right generator kicked off the good left generator. We would have probably fried everything if we had not done what we did. We had some high level Hollywood celebs on board so it would have been interesting if we had followed the checklist.

Tho I am no fan of Airbi aircraft and B4 this goes the normal A vs B routine....
I am reminded of the Boeing/ FAA; "hey jeepers folks, the 737's that intermittently roll over and auger in, well they are perfectly safe, nothing to see here, move along."

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf

"The aircraft manufacturer has indicated that a reset of the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), caused by an electrical power interruption, may cause a small incremental offset in the rudder trim. Multiple electrical power interruptions can result in multiple increments which could, cumulatively, produce a significant rudder trim input."

:uhoh:

Does anybody else think 20 miles off course insignificant? That takes a lot of rudder trim.

Depends how long the trim goes unnoticed whilst the crew were sorting out the other problems.

Always thought this was a weird foible of the little Airbus, on power up the trim is never zero and usually some random number. Would've thought that was something that could have been engineered out in all the year its been in service.

To read some of the posts here anyone would think aircraft only started to crash (or at least do something unexpected) when Airbus put their name on the side. :rolleyes:

Last time I read the phrase "a stream of warning messages" was in relation to the Air France accident.

Hi,

Certainly not .. aircrafts crashed in the past and will crash in the future no need of Airbus for keep this going ......
The probs is that Airbus planes (with all their rings and bells) were announced (or believed) to be protected of crashing .... you know .. like the Titanic can't sink ...
Pure arrogance ......

airbus anomalies
 

I remember some years ago, a colleague recalls a situation in the hold at Ockham. An aircraft bust it`s level, he instructed BA-XXX to turn left immediately (Not the offending a/c) and then observed on radar that it was in fact turning right. He then instructed BA to turn left,left immediately. BA-XXX said I AM TURNING LEFT!!!!! The pilot took control of the situation, turned left and resolved a nasty situation.

Additionally, a friend of mine, having been left without an aeroplane with the demise of Concord, was on an A320 command course. I asked him how he found it and his reply was `What the xxxxxxx hell is it going to do next.

Dave :uhoh:

I know the stats don't currently support it, but it will be interesting to see if the level of computerization that there is on any modern Airbus results in more accidents overall than more mechanical types.

Various bodies burying their heads in the sand aside, how many crashes of an Airbus have been unexplained, either in whole or in part, compared to any other type that crashed? Would be an interesting statistic to look into.

ECAM Actions.

sciolistes
 

I think there were quite a few of those messages from the QF A380 too !

Dave:ok:

Can I please ask all contributors to this thread read the AAIB report? It's not quite as dramatic as this thread makes out.

Found here :- http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf

As another contributor asks, how many 737's have rolled into oblivion?

LD

>> It's not quite as dramatic as this thread makes out.

Locked door: I politely disagree. Loss of control of the aircraft (due to an electrical fault no less) is second only to the aircraft actually crashing IMHO.

The crew were extremely lucky they were able to re-gain control, eventually.

That said, I do agree that the A380 was a different incident (accident?) altogether, and can't be compared to this one.

ECAM Actions.

ECAM Actions,

Locked Door is right. These loose and overly sensationalistic descriptions create false impressions of what occurred that aren't supported when you read the actual incident report.

Your response is a perfect example. Nowhere is it stated that the crew lost control of the aircraft or believed they had lost control of the aircraft. They certainly encountered difficulties with control, but those difficulties were not so severe that the captain felt a need to declare a Mayday and at its worst the bank angle was only 10 degrees. So, no "loss of control second only to the aircraft crashing" and no "re-gain control, eventually."

A likely guess is that the judders experienced were a function of the incremental movement of the rudder trim with each of the multiple FAC resets. The left wing low condition then coming about from the trim position as a result of the sum of those movements. Nobody's going to suggest that either condition should occur or is acceptable, but while disconcerting neither posed a serious problem to maintaining aircraft control.

While the reflex reaction is to bang the drum about those darned electronic airplanes, it is worth noting as some others already have, that many steam driven types have suffered far more severe unexpected control problems with far more deadly consequences. So, perhaps we should keep the scale of the event in perspective.

Personally, I'm more curious about how a GEN #1 fault could provoke a loss of both CM1 & CM2 primary instrument displays.

Regards,

ELAC

Its quite possible that there are semantics here.

Could I ask what control was lost and how long and just how was a safe landing eventually made?

It's quite possible that only some functions were lost while others were only temporary in nature and that the crew was able to use back up control finctions to land safely. Thus no luck was involved just adherence to knowledge and training

regarding the 737 rollover...at least there is a procedure for dealing with it in a mechanical fashion.

one can also use assymetric thrust to deal with it...relatively easy

so, is the airbus procedure, start writing NEW CODE and enter it into the computer?

I don't care for the 737, but I flew it.

I hate the Airbus and didn't fly it, even though I would have earned more money.

what a POS!

That makes sense. Is it also what was thought on AF447 flight deck ... ?

That event reminds the Martinair 767 over NY ... the issue was a battery not properly installed, if I remember correctly.

Protectthehornet

Typical ridiculous comment from a well balanced individual who does not wear blinkers! :rolleyes:

Almost turned into a different sort of ash in a matter of minutes.

You could always try reading the report. Link supplied in a post above.

From the AAIB accident report, page 3:
That could be interpreted as a kind of loss of control, if the aircraft does not respond to control inputs as expected, couldn't it?

Remembering AA 587
 

Remembering AA 587 control problems
That NTSB Report aside, there were 15 SDR reports not seen there of uncommanded rudder/yaw, hard-overs, ‘kicks and ‘jolts’. Some samples follow >
Before loss of AA Flt 587
6/27/96 >SDR #, AWXA9960293, America West A-320
11/15/98 >SDR # AWXA9800221, America West A-320
2/12/99 > SDR # 99UAL900100, United A319
6/27/00 > SDR # AALA20001276, American A300
12/22/00 > SDR # 00FDEA0093, Fed Ex A300
9/19/01 > SDR # 2001UALA02074, United A320

After loss of AA Flt 587
1/17/02 > SDR # AALA20020060, American A300
6/3/03 > SDR # AALA20030633, American A300
8/13/03 > SDR # CA03081900, Part 129 A310.
8/21/03 > SDR # AALA20030886, American A300
1/6/04 > SDR # AALA20040029, American A300
11/12/04 > SDR # AWXA200401278, America West A320
3/22/06 > SDR # F3LA200600010, Frontier A319
5/13/07 > SDR # NWAA07186325251, Northwest A320
8/2/09 > SDR # UALA2009080302310, United A320

And during this same period of time, and not included here were nine ASRS reports; #s 347914, 451388, 470552, 484141, 536451, 540100, 644939, 734999 and 790707.

To access the full texts for these Service Difficulty Reports, go to FAA Link >
FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page] and just enter SDR control number.

To access the full texts for these Aviation Safety Reporting System reports go to search Link > ASRS - Aviation Safety Reporting System and enter the report number

Lastly, also a good read > “Over Controlling the Rudder Still Possible After 2001 Crash” By David Evans Aug 10, 2010. Story Link > Over Controlling the Rudder Still Possible After 2001 Crash|Aviation Safety Journal

--------------------

Easa Ad 2006 0280
 

I would be very surprised if this incident was not caused by the condition described in EASA AD 2006 0280. i.e. Burnt pin(s) in the #1 generator feeder engine disconnect plug.

Airbus said yesterday that they are not going to release a "safety warning" but are working on new advice to pilots informing them about the possible electrical fault and how to deal with it. Airbus pledges to continue working closely with the AAIB.

The AD Explains flickering cabin lights, very common problem that has never caused this level of failure. The main cause of concern is how computers recieving feeds from different buses were knocked out simultaneously. DMCs/FACs.

I lost all power on a ground run once, very scary being in the pitch black with the engines running, even the standby failed, apu not avail. Never followedup the fix.

And if there was a rudder hardover below 1500ft on takeoff, the procedure of unloading the airplane and accelerating worked well IN THE SIM. But fortunately no one had to actually try it in the air. It was anything but 'relatively easy' when one considers how many times many if not most pilots had to repeat the exercise. And 427 and the crash at Colorado Springs proved that combined with startle factor, low altitude, etc, it was not 'relatively easy' for even an experienced crew to resolve in time.

As for the 'what a POS', you do yourself a disservice by posting such comments, -hornet.

It appears however once again we are going to lapse into the Boeing/Airbus version of the American game "Ford/Chevy" and not focus on the real issues. Complex systems fail in complex and often unanticipated ways. Offered as sheer sarcasm, maybe we should go back to open cockpits, fixed gear, biplanes with cables to the flt controls so we can avoid all those complexities.

It's interesting that (to my knowledge) Airbus has never stated in any flight crew documentation that reports from the cabin of flickering lights are a common indicator of a problem in the electrical network, usually being either a bad IDG or a bad GCU. Experienced engineers know that this is one of the first things to troubleshoot when such reports are made by the cabin crew.

Ah.....but you forget DOUGLAS and LOCKHEED [the Cadillacs].
And.....you'll have to admit that if we never got into these "complex" systems, we would NOT be having these problems.

I gotta go with the -protectthehornet- as well.