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-   -   ethiopian airlines aircraft down near Beirut (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/403249-ethiopian-airlines-aircraft-down-near-beirut.html)

Avenger 30th Mar 2011 08:09

This article assumes the crash was "probably spacial disorientation", ( see summary of accidents at the back) , considering it was partly compiled with Boeing. interesting, they have more access than we enjoy.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1372.pdf

I would have thought if it had been a lightning strike it would have been audible on the CVR.

lederhosen 30th Mar 2011 10:40

You are of course right BOAC and I have to say I suspect that if there were concrete indications of instrument failure some suggestion might have already got out. Has it been clarified who was pilot flying?

Lemurian 30th Mar 2011 11:25

Avenger,
 

This article assumes the crash was "probably spacial disorientation"
That was some find !
Thanks for the link.
Very useful for classroom purposes, I think.

Tee Emm 30th Mar 2011 12:19


There are some operators that are manual until Flaps UP. daft, but true, especially on such a stormy night
Probably a wise policy if the pilots do not have the skills to fly manually:rolleyes:

blind pew 30th Mar 2011 12:19

Centarus post 385
In real life, there is no way both pilots in a 737 would have their eyes closed and head down if an unusual attitude occurs.

Although the point wasn't mentioned in the Trident Staines crash inquiry BEA had a procedure which required ALL pilots to write down ATC clearances upon reception.
This was the probable reason why P1 and P3 never got the premature droop retraction.
Whether this has any relevance to the accident I do not know - but it is food for thought.
BEA kept this foolish procedure for several years after the crash as the management line was protecting their a***s and blamed the accident on P1s heart condition.
Turning your head and bending your neck one wouldn't notice the acceleration of the aircraft as the attitude changed.

Tee Emm 30th Mar 2011 12:30


IMO that's enough recipe for somatographic illusion.
A thoroughly over-worked terminology. Why are there not hundreds of aircraft crashing all over the world as they depart into stormy nights. The rapid acceleration of jets on take off into IMC and at night probably happens every minute somewhere on earth. And fighters shot off aircraft carriers at night? The fact remains there will always be very good pilots and lousy pilots. Same as vehicle drivers. The lousy ones are the one's at most risk.

hhorta 7th Apr 2011 12:13

Ehtiopian,
 
another accident waiting to happen,, they fly their Pilots up to 120 hours a month,, fly them to death. Fatigue is the major cause of accidents and here they seem to think they're not vulnerable. Machismo and arrogance is a bad cocktail of death.. Plus their FOs are overworked and underpaid, stressed out and unhappy, another bad cocktail...

maDJam 17th Jan 2012 10:24

Ethiopia Airlines denies pilot error in Lebanon jet crash
 
January 17, 2012

Ethiopian Airlines said Tuesday the 2010 crash of its jet off Lebanon was likely caused by sabotage, a lightning strike or was shot down, rejecting an official Lebanese probe blaming pilot error.

"The aircraft disintegrated in the air due to explosion, which could have been caused by a shoot-down, sabotage or lightning strike," Desta Zeru, vice president of flight operations for Ethiopian Airlines, said in a statement.

A Lebanese government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told AFP Tuesday that its investigations blamed the crew's mistakes in piloting the jet when it went down in stormy weather on January 25, 2010.

However, the airline's own accident report released Tuesday said witnesses saw an explosion in the sky before the jet crashed into the sea, indicative of "external damage" inflicted, Desta told reporters.

The airline had already rejected an earlier draft report from Lebanon, and instead maintained the pilots were alert at the time of the crash, according to black box evidence.

"It's biased, it's missing facts, [it includes] hypotheses and conveniently excludes hard facts. We totally reject it," Desta said.

Desta accused Lebanese authorities of omitting the majority of the wreckage from the investigation and said Lebanon "ignored crucial information," such as security footage and autopsy records.

The aircraft crashed into the Mediterranean less than five minutes after take-off, killing all 90 people on board.

Lebanese authorities and Ethiopian airlines have been investigating the cause of the crash for two years, but have disagreed on its cause.

Lebanon news - NOW Lebanon -Ethiopia Airlines denies pilot error in Lebanon jet crash

maDJam 17th Jan 2012 10:37

Lebanese probe points to pilot error in jet crash
 
Wow, nothing on this story for quite some time and 2 releases in one day!

January 17, 2012

A probe into the 2010 crash of an Ethiopian airliner in Lebanon in which all 90 people on board died points to pilot error, according to an official report issued Tuesday by Lebanese authorities.

"What is clear is that there were errors on the part of the pilot and co-pilot who are entirely responsible for the plane crash," Transport Minister Ghazi Aridi told AFP, referring to the January 25, 2010 crash.

According to the report, the pilot and co-pilot had been working non-stop for 51 days and were exhausted when the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800 went down minutes after taking off from Beirut, killing 82 passengers and eight crew.

Aridi said the plane was sound and a transcript of the exchange that took place between the crew and the tower control on takeoff showed there was no problem.

He said the Lebanese report on the crash was in line with findings by French and American investigators.

An earlier preliminary report on the crash said the accident was due to pilot inexperience and a series of errors by the pilots who failed to take into account signals emitted by the plane's instruments.

The pilot erroneously believed the jet was on automatic pilot and as a result he and his co-pilot failed to heed the alarm signals as the plane veered dangerously off course before crashing, the preliminary report showed.

Lebanese officials have previously said that data recovered from the plane's black box showed all instruments were working well until it plunged into the Mediterranean in a fierce storm.

They have also ruled out sabotage.

Lebanon news - NOW Lebanon -Lebanese probe points to pilot error in jet crash

wozzo 17th Jan 2012 11:25

Report Online
 
Final Investigation Report (PDF)

More on that page:
Lebanese Civil Aviation Authority

Skipskatta 17th Jan 2012 13:43

Total confusion in the cockpit. And again, the wrong-stall-recovery-scenario!

sb_sfo 17th Jan 2012 14:28

Just 3 pages in, the IIC has the wrong date of the accident? WTF, did anybody proofread this?

PPRuNe Towers 17th Jan 2012 16:32

The second of the stalls:


Contrary to any stall recovery procedure, the control column was initially kept backward and gradually increased over the next 17” (seconds)

BOAC 17th Jan 2012 16:47

It should be blindingly obvious to all that yet again the crew did not understand that they were stalled, so any comments about 'incorrect stall recovery action' are meaningless.

Once again, an 'ineffective' F/O - apart from calling 'speed dropping' there was little else. If it was not so tragic, the Captain's exhortation to the F/O then 'OK try to do something' would be laughable. As skipskatta says "Total confusion in the cockpit".

keitaidenwa 17th Jan 2012 17:43

Ethiopian airline has decided to go paranoid:

Ethiopian | Press Releases

And their criticism against the report:

http://www.flyethiopian.com/en/docs/...nal_Report.pdf

Their theories in nutshell:

1. The computer went crazy, causing the erratic manoeuvring, showing crazy things in instruments and causing uncommanded trim adjustments
2. Captains 188 hours on new type in 51 days with absolute minimum rest could not have caused fatigue since it was within the limits of the regulations of the Ethiopian CAA and Company SOM.
3. Likewise the comments that Ethiopian paired a 188 hours on type Captain with a FO of 350 Hours should be replaced with "FO and Captain met the requirements in the FOPM approved by CAA".
4. Because the final FDR recording was diving 407 kts at 32 degrees nose down, left bank roll 61 degrees at 1300ft... ...The only logical conclusion is that the plane exploded at that moment in a orange fireball.

So the theory, as described in a official press release is:

After all the stalls and extreme bank angles, airplane nose about to hit the ocean, there was a "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightening strike". Thus, any characterization of Ethiopian pilots or flight operations is pure fabrication.

What an epic load of :mad: :mad:.

Telstar 17th Jan 2012 19:13


What an epic load of :mad::mad:
The well known and dreadful affliction known as loss of face.

Greytraveler 18th Jan 2012 03:10

gotta say that the tone of the report in part is far from professional - lots of use of rhetorical questions and even exclamations marks - such as:
What really happened is completely opposite to that!

someone enjoyed writing this

Sqwak7700 18th Jan 2012 05:32

Maybe, but one need only read the CVR transcript and ATC tapes to know that there was not even the slightest chance of sabotage. Just two inept individuals doing something beyond their abilities. Flying is not hard when things are going smooth, but incompetence kills you very quickly when things start going pear-shaped. The task load then goes up exponentially and it is exacerbated by the threat of personal harm, unlike other professions were the stress is not accompanied by threat to oneself.

The fact that Ethiopian mentions eye-witness reports of a fireball in the sky is laughable. Everybody who knows even the slightest thing about aviation accidents and eyewitnesses would know that it is very common to have such reports, even when there is no sign of fire. It is a psychological phenomenon due to the speed of the events, and you often see it with race car crashes as well. Besides, since when do aircraft accident reports rely on eyewitness accounts to tell them what happened?

I've always known to stay away from traveling on most African carriers, but I thought some were a little more progressive than this. What an embarrassment to aviation this airline is. I have a hard time understanding why they are not on a black list. Their reaction to this investigation shows a complete lack of any safety culture, not to mention the other blaring safety concerns exposed in the investigation.

The_Steed 18th Jan 2012 08:25

As SLF, this is really scary...

Allegedly - the airline is lying about the cause of the accident, presumably to protect revenue and reputation, and so if I believe their version of events I should conclude that they are a safe airline to fly with since the accident was caused by technical problems. However, if the allegations are true, then flying with them is putting my life at a greater risk than necessary due to the proficiency of some of their pilots.

Not sure how they can get away with that (if the allegations are true)...


jet-lover 18th Jan 2012 08:49

1. a captain with only 188 hrs on the type and FO who is fresh graduate from a cadet program with total time of 650 of which 350 is on the type

2. a particularly bad weather on the day of the accident as confirmed by other pilots also. There was a lot of wind shear and embedded CB’s it was a dark night and we all know even a pilot with decades of flying experience can get caught sometimes. Weather reported about the time of the accident (00:35 UTC) was:
OLBA 250000Z 31008KT 280V340 8000 VCTS FEW020CB SCT026 13/06 Q1014 NOSIG= [00:00 UTC; wind 310 degrees at 8 knots, variable from 280° to 340°; visibility 8km; thunderstorms in the vicinity; few clouds with cumulonimbus at 2,000 ft; scattered clouds at 2,600 ft; temperature 13 degrees C, dew point 6 degrees C, pressure 1014 hPa]
OLBA 250100Z VRB03KT 4000 SHRA FEW020CB BKN026 12/07 Q1014 NOSIG=

3. ATC initially issued LATEB 1D SID but changed it to ’’ immediate right turn direct to chekka ‘’ just before takeoff which understandably puts the crews in uncomfortable situation considering the deteriorating weather.

4. Crew not complying with ATC instruction. ATC instructed an immediate right turn after departure to heading 315 but FO ( pilot flying at the time ) overshoot and continued the turn till 003 degrees. on CVR, captain was heard telling FO to follow ATC instruction. then ATC instruct left turn to 270 and crew acknowledge but again overshoot and roll out on 180.
5. A total of 10 ‘’ bank angle ‘’ warning with in 2 min.
6. normal climb until 7700 ft then activation of stick shaker warning for 29 seconds while at the same time the AOA was 32 degrees followed by sudden descent to 6000 ft
7. then the crews managed to gain temporary recovery and climbed to 9000 ft at which point there was another stick shaker warning for a period of 26 seconds, sharp left bank then the plane plunged to the Mediterranean sea

8. The FDR registered top speed to 407 kts and bank angle of 118 degrees before impact
9. All instruments were working and recoding data until impact. after all these overwhelming evidences, ET still believes there is some sort of sabotage. what an epic ignorance and stupidity. in fact this was a disaster waiting to happen. flight deck crew has repeatedly complained about the pairing of crews with low hrs but it fell on arrogant deaf management ears.

I'm talking this from self experience. i have gone through the same ET cadet program and was put on the same aircraft few months after graduation. the transition training we got was a nightmare. no observation flights, no indoctrination class of whatsoever. ET is till denying their problem so i wouldn't b surprised to see another similar accident soon.

Other than the expats, basic salary for a 737 captain is 2000 usd after tax and normally one can make up to max. of 4000 depending on flight hours in a month. FO basic salary is 600 usd after tax. pay check is on the average around 1000 usd after flight hrs. so no wonder everyone works like a mule. busting max. hrs of a week, month and year is common stuff. i myself flew 126 and 119 hrs at one peak season in 2009.

Refusing to accept flights or challenging management on such practices is an immediate threat to anyone's job security.

Ethiopian CAA is puppet organization. rather than ECAA being a regulatory body, its the other way around. its ET who orders ECAA of what they want to b approved. this way, ET was able to operate its F50's which would have been stamped NOT airworthy so many years ago. there is a lot of buzz about the huge new aircraft orders made so far ET and the brand new 787 coming in june this yr. the fact of the matter remains, ET is an organization ROTTING from its root. the former CEO ( mr. Girma Wake ) was replaced by ruling party loyal Mr Tewolde Gebremariam. many of ET's senior engineers r leaving for a better pay and working condition in the middle east.

In a recent incident, 60 engineers were denied permission from immigration office to leave the country. after recent negotiations between the pilot association and the management failed, there is a new exodus of pilots to companies like fly bubai and emirates. the problems in ET r countless and the denial of its managers makes the situation even worse.

infrequentflyer789 18th Jan 2012 09:27


Originally Posted by Greytraveler (Post 6965867)
gotta say that the tone of the report in part is far from professional - lots of use of rhetorical questions and even exclamations marks - such as:

What really happened is completely opposite to that!

someone enjoyed writing this

And the airline's response too. Looks like both parties have been at odds for a while. Regarding the engineering sim sessions:
The Ethiopian party had notified the IIC that they will attend but did not show up.
The Ethiopia response comes close to amusing, if there weren't so many dead bodies involved. The repetition of "loss of integrity of the pitch flight control system" flying in the face of all evidence brings to mind the Iraqi information Minister...

If you manage to read past all that there's a couple of gems near the bottom:
The operator should consider developing his safety
oversight program in order to detect such potential flight
crew performance.
Gets the response:
Ethiopian Airlines has SMS program in place. The FOQA uses the
monitoring and trend analysis by IATA/CAE-Flight scape. This
program does not include trends related to in flight break-ups.
And finally, right at the end they drop this in:
The autopilot system on B737 aircraft needs to be modified to
engage regardless of forces applied to the controls and to provide
an alert if the autopilot does not engage.
So, the crew didn't have a clue what they were doing after all then ? [but it's still the a/c at fault...]

The airline attitude seems to be:
  • Airline and crew did nothing wrong, ever
  • The crew flew into a fatal storm cell because ATC told them to
  • Control inputs being all over the place is because the flight control system was broken first
  • Their crew would have recovered (even given the broken control system...) from a 400kt+ spiral dive when already pulling over 4G, but unfortunately someone blew them up / shot them down at 1300ft, and why isn't anyone investigating that because it's obviously the real problem...
:ugh:

Swiss Cheese 18th Jan 2012 09:40

The Pilots usually get the blame....... again
 
We all know it takes a chain of causes to make this sort of tragedy happen.

It is not surprising that the manufacturer gives itself a clean bill of health (again). Keen pprune watchers will recall the rudder pcu saga and remember United 585 or US Air 424 and indeed Silk Air? More recently, KQ509 (a 737-800) makes for interesting reading, given that the entire wreckage was left to be pillaged in the swamp outside Doula.

I was interested here to check the issue with the Trim Tab.

"In addition, a motivating factor for examination of the left side tab mechanism is the fact
that the inboard attach bearing was found with all of the bearing balls missing. It was
subsequently found (see Enclosure 2 Metallurgical Exam) that this condition existed at the
time of the accident."


That's all fine then, because the pilots got it wrong, so let's forget about the AD on this issue and any manufacturer related issues...



Dani 18th Jan 2012 11:16

That's the difference: When it's a Boeing, it's always pilots fault. When it's an Airbus - it's always Airbus' fault, even when the crew faults are apparent...

On a more rational note: Silk Air 185 was definetly homocide.

fireflybob 18th Jan 2012 11:47

I would hope that if Ethiopian Airways cannot accept the report's findings in the light of clear evidence that their airline will be banned from using other States' Airspace.

jet-lover 18th Jan 2012 13:01

@fireflybob:

on a press conference held for local journalists, the CEO is even blaming CIA and mossad. his main argument being, in the document leaked my wikileaks, in a memo sent from embassy of US in jerusalem to washington, it says ET will have hard time ahead because the investigation most probably will reveal pilot error. ET CEO said, how can he americans say like this unless they r aware of some sabotage. while he was clever enough to dig arguments like this, he intentionally goes blind when it comes to the overwhelming evidences which support pilot error.

misd-agin 18th Jan 2012 13:52

Report mentions that the a/c was frequently, or constantly, out of trim.

737-800 is sensitive to control wheel pressure/inputs while trying to engage the autopilot. I'm not sure if an out of trim, or significantly out of trim, a/c will allow the A/P to be engaged. Maintaining attitude would require force on the yoke and releasing it would display it from neutral as it seeks the trimmed speed.

Automation 101 - push a button and VERIFY that the correct action took place. No assuming, verify.

Sqwak7700 18th Jan 2012 14:12

SwissCheese:


That's all fine then, because the pilots got it wrong, so let's forget about the AD on this issue and any manufacturer related issues...
As an airline pilot, I would agree with you on not taking the easy road and blaming the pilot all the time. But you can't ignore the CVR and FDR data. At no point do the pilots discuss any difficulty with flight controls. They were clearly lost and overwhelmed by the situation they found themselves in. Their communications sound more like the Colgan Air Q400 crash - pure confusion of the situation they were in.

Take a look at the UPS accident report. Their flight controls began failing almost immediately due to the raging fire in the main-deck. Right away, you see a discussion between the CA and FO about the apparent lack of controls (caused by the slacking of the control cables due to the heat).

No-one here denies that both Airbus and Boeing have their issues and have had some accidents which bring up the questions of mechanical failures. But this doesn't seem like one of those.

lomapaseo 18th Jan 2012 15:03


I would hope that if Ethiopian Airways cannot accept the report's findings in the light of clear evidence that their airline will be banned from using other States' Airspace.
This is not how things work in an ICAO environment.

The airline can say what it wants and dispute any investigatory findings and recommendations.

Whether the believe them or not, or just want their investors to have faith in the airline is immaterial.

It is up to their regulator to take any action they deem appropriate to follow up. For all we know there is nothing now to be done if the airline has already addressed any possible issues without admitting legal culpability.

For the rest of us aviation professionals, there is only the lessons learned in our own minds

Clandestino 18th Jan 2012 20:56

No faults were recorded, yokes were interconnected and captain had 21 years and 10 233 hours under his belt. I might have missed something but I don't recall KLM ever fully accepting the Spanish report regarding the loss of Rijn.

Now what?

captplaystation 18th Jan 2012 21:57

Or Turkish aportioning the blame for AMS fairly between Boeing & themselves.

As you say "now what". :rolleyes:

Callsign Kilo 18th Jan 2012 23:20

Absolute nonsense. The FDR and CVR depicts pandemonium. Yes the environmental factors were challenging; high terrain on the coast, convective activity, heavy rain and darkness. But these two shouldnt have been let anywhere near an aeroplane. You can take the FO out of the equation, he added nothing. The Captain completely incompetent, his control inputs erratic. The breakdown of situational awareness goes as far as suggesting subtle incapacitation. I am very aware that it is the easiest thing in the world to read an accident report and cast opinion, however this was deplorable. And Ethopian's response is criminal. What a disgraceful organisation.

lomapaseo 19th Jan 2012 00:06

callsign kilo


Absolute nonsense. The FDR and CVR depicts pandemonium. Yes the environmental factors were challenging; high terrain on the coast, convective activity, heavy rain and darkness. But these two shouldnt have been let anywhere near an aeroplane. You can take the FO out of the equation, he added nothing. The Captain completely incompetent, his control inputs erratic. The breakdown of situational awareness goes as far as suggesting subtle incapacitation. I am very aware that it is the easiest thing in the world to read an accident report and cast opinion, however this was deplorable. And Ethopian's response is criminal. What a disgraceful organisation.
I accept your right to an opinion such as this and I have no arguments against it.

However I doubt that there can be a judicial finding of crimanality or even any kind of futhur action against Ethiopian Airlines. Based on these findings

to err is human.

hopefully ET has addressed any shortcomings in this regard

Callsign Kilo 19th Jan 2012 00:48

The use of the word criminal was not to infer that ET had created a criminal act in response to the reports findings. It was to highlight the disgraceful response to an accident which can be boiled down to little less than negligence. The combined experience on type on that Flightdeck was 538 hours. The Captain had accumulated his 188hrs in a 51 day period with minimum rest. Although jet experienced, his previous command type was a Fokker 50. There's a massive difference. He was also dealing with an extremely inexperienced and ineffective FO in challenging circumstances. The report underlines deplorable handling ability,a complete lack of airmanship, non existent situational awareness and workload management. This is all topped off by ET's refusal to acknowledge gross error. They talk about a FOQA program (which could offer little to no value) and blame Boeing on their design of one of the most successful commercial aircraft that they ever produced. Yes, the -800 isn't without it's flaws, however the very fact that the autopilot cannot be engaged when control column input is applied is actually quite logical. I would also suggest that Boeing have covered the area relating to the provision of an alert signifying that the autopilot isn't engaged. Large green letters above the AI and below the FMA stating 'CMD' will not appear.

Again, Im not really in favour of sitting back and firing both barrells of judgement at accident findings; however this all amounts to a very sad picture in commercial aviation safety.

blablabla 19th Jan 2012 01:10

I agree totally with Callsign Zero....in everything you have said....and Boeing trainers even say if you only ever going to read or check 1 FMA then make sure you check and read the CMD FMA as pressing the autopilot button then releasing the controls to look out the window whilst the other pilot is heads down writing or talking to ATC/Changing frequencies can kill you...so read and check that when you press for the AP you get the CMD green FMA...Boeing even made it bigger on the NG than from the CLASSIC to help all us old men with poor eyes.

fireflybob 19th Jan 2012 02:53


This is not how things work in an ICAO environment.
Over the past few years several operators have been banned from using/landing in various states within Europe due to low standards.

Flight Safety 19th Jan 2012 22:09

If the CEO of Ethiopian Airlines is going to react badly to the official accident report and engage in a misguided public relations battle, instead of doing something constructive about the airline's safety culture, then SLF should vote their disapproval by keeping their wallets closed.

Mega 19th Jan 2012 22:21

I couldent agree more FS!

Swiss Cheese 20th Jan 2012 09:56

Criminal conduct - things will actually happen
 
Interesting that professional pilots are talking about criminal actions here. The perceived wisdom is that criminal sanctions are counter productive to air safety and a safety culture (vs blame culture).

Do you recall the Lebanese Criminal Court last year convicting the Directors of a West African Operator for a Boeing 727 crash that killed a number of Lebanese nationals? 20 years jail time with hard labour... for the individuals and criminal compensation of US$500k to each of the families (over and above any civil compensation).

Given that 50+ Lebanese families lost their loved ones on this flight, I would expect there is sufficient national interest to commence a criminal case against the Airline and its management. Watch this space.

mini 20th Jan 2012 22:34

The ET response is a pity. They really dug themselves out of the generic African carrier model over the last decade, even the ditching added to their kudoss.

Sadly, it seems that Africaitis strike again. :confused:

Swiss Cheese 15th May 2013 09:22

Blacklist benefits to air safety
 
Airlines find themselves on the European Commission Blacklist for a number of reasons. The interesting point is that airlines on that blacklist are more likely to have accidents, than non blacklisted operators. In terms of self fulfilling prophecies, Lion Air is a good recent example.

Blacklisted airlines also find themselves paying higher aviation insurance premiums, given the enhanced risk. Additionally, totalling a 737NG for US$50m will also increase your renewal premium considerably.

The IATA IOSA programme has had proven benefits to enhancing the air safety of participating airlines, with premium reductions by Underwriters acknowledging that fact of risk reduction.

So, the EU black list is not perfect, but it is a good start given the US does not have the political/commercial will to name and shame.


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