Ops Gp Rpt vs the NTSB's P.C. "final"
 

observation just above, Re' the landing-ARC at CLT 13Dec09 :The NTSB's main offense springs from their attempt to formulate a "probable cause" statement: The Ops Group Report (52-pages, see docket) includes most of the omitted information. The writer of the Ops Group Rpt provided a better quality document, and provided information that contradicted the NTSB's "final". That Ops Group Report was completed in March 2010 [fifteen months prior to the NTSB's release of their "final" P.C.].

Advice: Pilots should disregard the NTSB's final -- instead get the Ops Group Report, that clarifies most of the uncertainties of the Board's P.C. "final".

Advice for the Board: Lacking resources for careful consideration, you shouldn't even try to formulate a P.C. [Most of the time your official P.C. leads your reader off-course; with protecting the USA's airline, regulator, and manufacturer as NTSB's highest priority.] Another err in the NTSB's "full narrative" (web), was your omission of any FDR analysis; there are lessons for pilots in the FDR-data after the human disconnected the Autoflight: Loc-dev goes from bad to worse with the human's "visual" over-control while in low-visibility near the runway (look at "bank angle" plot during last three seconds of flight). Docket offers only the "preliminary" time-history plots of selected data, docket contained NO FDR ANALYSIS. Each of three FDR-plots mistakes the MD80's "Air-Ground Sensor" (NLG strut compression) as instead "weight-on-wheels": the Abnormal Rwy Contact occurs about 4-seconds EARLIER than the time-line labeled "B" (right end of green shaded interval).

See "docket", Ops Gp Rpt Operations - Specialist Report to the IIC
-- pg 26, Figure 7: Right inboard trailing edge flap damage.
-- pg 41, Figure 13 Left edge of 36C approach end; tire ruts [photo of ruts in grass outboard of the concrete but INBOARD of the Rwy Edge Lights].
-- pg 42, Figure 14 Left main landing gear covered in dirt


Aside from the ARC [Abnormal Rwy Contact], the Ops Grp Rpt suggest this case as "USOS" taxonomy:= = = = = = = = ==

"… During post incident interviews, both pilots stated that they selected flaps 40 as a final flap setting." ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 47]

"… chart depicts the bank angle limit versus the pitch limit (in degrees) …" ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 48.]


"… dispatcher also wrote 'CREW WAS CAT 3 ACFT [aircraft] WAS CAT 3 … and further wrote “RECAP: CAPT, ACFT AND AIRPORT WERE ALL CAT 3.' …" ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 51.]

= == = == = = = = =

The NTSB's "final" P.C. repeatedly states that those mishap-pilots were flying a Cat-3 (low vis approach). However, the Captain's own write-up in the Mx Logbook contradicts that investigator-assertion:Since the Rwy 36C-Loc did not provide rollout guidance (note #4 on approach plate), that ILS-Loc was NOT authorized for AA's MD80 Cat-3 Autoland: On final at 300' the pilot disconnected the autopilot, and did a manual landing. All the NTSB's paragraphs discussing Cat-3 Approaches lead the reader off-course [since both Autoland and Cat-3 were prohibited and the pilot did neither].

In several respects this ARC-, USOS- mishap [13Dec09 at CLT] is similar to the AA low-vis USOS- event at DEN/ 21Nov04 DEN05IA027

Not all Cat III require auto roll out, ie cat IIIa

I have been thinking the same as you, sleeper, - Cat 3 Autoland and Cat 3 Autoland with rollout are separate things. It is perfectly possible to do a Cat 3 Autoland (or Cat 2 Autoland) and disconnect the autopilot after nosewheel touchdown! :rolleyes:

Cat-3 contradictions (see various "OpSpecs")
 

Observation regarding Cat-3 ILS (low visibility approaches), from just above:The Ops Group Rpt cites the various conflicting restrictions [see docket, Ops Gpt Rpt, pgs 37 & 38] facing those mishap-pilots, when considering a low-visibility ILS approach, with a fail-passive autoland system, to a rwy without rollout guidance. The conflicting rules are mind boggling.

This statement sort of gets to the PROBLEM: neither the mishap-pilots, nor the investigators, seemed capable of sorting-out the various contradictions, cobbled together, to get CERTIFICATION of an MD80-style "fail passive" autoland system.

This CAT-3 evolution since the late 1970's, regarding very low visibility landings, has now is become foggy. The MD80 was certificated during 1980. By 1980, the L1011 had almost a decade of low-vis autoland history. At Boeing, in 1980, one customer had order ten B747SPs, but they wanted full Cat-3 autoland on that new "model" SP [new because of the Autoland cert'].

That test program (B747SP w/Autoland) proved to be a show-stopper: That test-version red&white B747SP stayed-on at the Test Center for about 10 months extra, with the customer getting late-fee payments, from the manufacturer, for every day-late.

Meanwhile, down south at Long Beach, the MD80 Cert' seemed to get some sort of odd certification for a Cat-3 ILS landing system, employing a human's Decision Height (rather than the usual Cat-3 Alert Height), with only a Fail-Passive Autoland System: Something goofy was happening!!! This stretching of the Cat-3 philosophy, just to get that "Fail Passive" product certified, was leading us to the sort of COMPLEXITY that neither pilots nor investigators would comprehend. And this "fail-passive" Cat-3 Certification WEAKNESS (complexity), is NOT mentioned anywhere in the NTSB's P.C.

Lack of a Fail Active rudder kept the MD-80 and 737 from even being considered for Cat IIIb with its rollout steering requirement. They are only Cat IIIa qualified. The 737NG got a Fail Active rudder in 2000 or later.

GB

non-Cat 3 runway

Sorry my sloppy writing. According to the NTSB report the company were not allowed to execute a Cat 3 approach to 36c by their own company rules. It was that that I was using.