Fatigue does not exist in todays commercial aviation (at least that's what the mangers and regulators say. So they bear no responsibility if you screw-up redeyed, but you will get convicted)

Fatigue only starts at the moment you drive home (because if you injure someone upon leaving the companies car park, the police will tell you you were simply too tired to drive, and you will get convicted).

The NRT crew had started the evening before in the Philippines, hub-turned through Guangzhao and then up to Narita. No idea how long they had been in the asian time zones, but probably not more than a day or two. So yes, they were probably hanging in the straps that morning...

No other details yet. The Japanese are running the investigation, and the police are involved (as usual there). I'll post what becomes public.

FedEx reduces fleet size
 

Associated Press has just announced that FedEx is going to trim 14 aircraft -- 10 A310s and 4 MD10s -- by May 31 . The MD11 was not mentioned by AP.

www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/04/13/business/AP-FedEx-Fleet-Reduction.html

Given some of the comments here over the past few weeks, can this be interpreted as a vote of confidence from the carrier for the MD-11?

After a duty like that, fatigue does not play a part. After a long duty, fatigue does not play a part, either. Red herring.

- that is rubbish!

Anyone involved in avaition should know that you are talking about tiredness - fatigue is different and often arises through cumulative duties and time zone messing. You are, however, possibly correct in what you say regarding fatigue on THAT duty alone, but there are many other issues that decide fatigue. None of us here know the work/rest pattern of the crew prior to the crash - or do you?

BOAC, I hope Rainboe's post was just a poor attempt to be ironic.
As the Japanese Police are investigating and I am sure they will be pointed towards this site and the comments expressed therein ,I believe that any supposition as to the alertness and wakefulness of the crew.could be prejudicial.

Do they Japanese have an independent aviation safety organisation? or is it the police departments jurisdiction? If the latter, i fear the report, if ever released will be somewhat tainted, given the Japanese preference of arresting people (ie over Turbulence springs to mind).

Japanese track record has been good. I would suggest discarding any rumors of tainted investigations. Just expect thouroughness.

Perhaps a comment from a local would add some credibility here.

This is what a DAC Test pilot says about the MD-11
 

What happened here (in Narita) is the same as what happened in Hong Kong (to a China Airlines MD-11) and Newark NJ (to another FedEx MD-11) some years ago. The hard landings, which resulted in ALL cases from failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs, resulted in rupture of the wing spar by the main gear oleo strut, breaking the wing; the lift from the wing not yet broken then caused the aircraft to roll, and turn upside down. In the case this morning, both wings broke - first the left, and then as the roll angle reached about 80° LWD, the right wing also broke. this can be seen clearly on the video presented on the BBC News website.

The failure of the aircraft to respond appropriately to pilot control inputs is the result of certification of the aircraft despite the omission of a vital part of the aircraft flight control system: namely the rate command function of the LSAS system. This omission leads, under certain circumstances, to what can be described as a "cliff-like" APC* as a result of the extremely slow response of the airplane to elevator control inputs at high gross landing weights. Despite protestations by the Douglas Aircraft Co. that the aircraft flies "just like a DC-10" (which are blatant untruths) the airplane is inherently dangerous and extremely difficult to handle in gusty wind conditions, especially at high landing weights.

I have had many discussions with FedEx ( and Delta) pilots and instructors about the MD-11, and have invariably heard horror stories about landings. I feel a great sense of sadness for the families of the airmen who were victims of this tragedy, and I know that sadness will turn into anger when once again the NTSB/Boeing clique start to insist that this was all caused by pilot error.

I am once again reminded of a statement by the chief investigator of the Hong Kong MD-11 accident, Mr. Robert Benzon, who, in the presence of several Boeing engineers, the Asst. VP of flight safety at China Airlines, and myself, said: "...sometimes we have to burn a couple of pilots to protect the local industry..." Not this time, Mr. B.

"cliff-like" APC

Airplane-Pilot-Coupling - the phenomenon used to be called PIO, but the name was changed so to avoid the implication of pilot causality.

A more complete description of this aircraft design/response problem can be found in Aviation Safety and Pilot Control published by the National Research Council. ISBN-10: 0309056888

The MD11. What's she really like?
 

What do you MD11 jockeys out there say about the Test Pilot's comments?

It certainly sounds and reads (having never flown an MD11 but having read this thread from beginning to end) that this aircraft was a compromise and it appears to have been left with some nasty handling traits and constraints, particularly in certain landing configurations and conditions.

Is the plane dangerous in certain landing situations? :suspect:

Guys, I've flown MD-11's for two carriers, in both seats, including the accident carrier.

I cannot / will not post anything regarding this accident other than what has been disclosed publicly by the company.

But the video speaks for itself. Show me the PIO......

You dont agree the airplane is unstable in the landing environment?

The respective traits are much different in the DC-10 vs the MD-11.The common type rating on the MD-10 and MD-11 is a joke evidenced by the numerous tail strikes and incidents from the the carrier you mention you fly for. They are very different flying airplanes especially in the conditions that were present in Narita.

The technology exists to install on board load sensors to detect and record high landing loads. I find it hard to believe that the landing gears failed just from the damage incurred during the landing accident. I think it was progressive cracks from previous hard landings. No pilot wants to report a hard landing and they pass the airplane on to the next guy who ends upside down on a runway.. Since the same small stabilizer will remain and other landing damage will reoccur in future incidents, it is imperative to monitor the loads from each landing and take appropriate maintenance action.

This is not a slam on the pilots..........it is on the plane from someone who was on the certification Flight Test Team and is a SETP member.


Cheers

Huck;

Obviously "the PIO" cannot be shown because we don't have any data, nor is "demonstrating that it was PIO", the issue. Nobody can make that judgement from the video. The issue is, the MD11 has a demonstrated propensity for this kind of accident. Why?

I fully realize there are a lot of factors in deriving a set of truth-statements regarding this history. I realize that there exists a lot of economic and political interests which desire that their versions prevail, and most important as a flight crew member (now retired), the matter has a substantial human element for which I have greatest empathy.

The suggested reading on the notion of "APC" is at least interesting but it is a discussion of "APC", not a discussion of the MD11 specifically. I've downloaded the book, Aviation Safety and Pilot Control: Understanding and Preventing Unfavorable Pilot-Vehicle Interactions (1997) in pdf format, (takes about a minute on high-speed).

Basics
 

A simple explanation, perhaps too simple, but the MG struts attach under the Main Wing Spar, unlike newer types that separate the two by a Pillow Box. The 777 accident at LHR showed a better outcome at more than fail loads on the Gear. Up through the upper Wing skin, instead of severing the Wing Spar. There may be no connection whatever, but McD has built many types of a/c designed for the Carrier. Is there an Industrial memory at play in the design of this type?

I do not.

I don't think anyone does, since the software changes were implemented.

Not a SETP member here, but I am (or once was) a SFTE member. I know a PIO when I see one.

And that's all I better say for now. We'll chew the fat when the report comes out.

Has anyone in all of this speculation considered the effect of the first nose gear touchdown on the crew? I would think after getting your cage rattled as hard as that, it would take several seconds to get your wits about you (assuming they were not injured).

Although I am no pilot, I am a SLF with over 1 million FF miles. I spent many hours as a passenger on MD-11's with AA, Delta, Alitalia, Air Lingus and others. It provided me with some of the smoothest flights I have ever been on, and some of the roughest landings. One flight in particular was an Air Lingus flight into JFK just 3 days after the loss of Swiss Air 111 up in Peggys Cove. (our flight was Air Lingus Flt 111. Weird ) In any case, I have never been on an aircraft where so there were so many throttle changes and pitch adjustments in the last minute of flight. Even before we landed, I commented to my co-worker that the pilot really seemed to be fighting. It was a very windy day, and it was the hardest landing I have ever experienced. We bounced hard, and the second touchdown was almost as hard as the first, with the nose coming down very hard. Overhead bins opened in a number of locations. At the time I wondered how the crew was affected by the touchdown, because it certainly rattled my teeth in the first class cabin. I had no ideas there were concerns about the MD-11 at that time, but after that flight I avoided it if I could.

That the NG remained in place after those two impacts is both testimonial and message. The distance from the camera is deceptive, that is a very large a/c moving 1/3 its length in Nose up/down in what appears to be one second. I can't calculate the acceleration due to that bounce. To say the crew had their wind knocked out and their bell rung is to put it mildly. It is the equivalent I'd say of a free fall from at least a three story height, generally fatal unless cushioned, (they were seated). The 737 in Schipol experienced a similar nose impact, and the crew all died. I think after the initial bounce, they were incapacitated.

I guess I have a hard time believing that we as crew can on a normal day, find ourselves in a situation between Nose gear and main contact where we can create an incapacitation.

maybe I don't want to believe it so,

I am sure that should we touch down, pull hard, shove the power up, then dive back it can happen,

But the Fedex accident is not so,
we have all watched the video, this was crew reacting, not acting. The airplane bounced from the mains, to the nose, and back to the mains., then broke up and rolled. They did nothing from what we see to actually induce this situation.

I am pretty sure that the crew was unfortunately fully aware of what was happening, right through the roll, I would think that they succumbed to smoke, as the cockpit appears pretty intact.
I guess the report will confirm, but I don't think the FDR, CVR can determine at what point they were no longer aware of what was happening.
It is an amazing and really tragic outcome.

I believe the left wheel had collapsed making it rollin upside down.

RBpilot
am assuming the rollover in these MD11 landing accidents is because the airspeed at touchdown is on the high side and the wing still attached is still flying/providing lift. Gear collapse/ wing failure alone would not roll a plane with an intact wing/engine/some fuel on the other side.

Dont have a clue
 

The terms stability, stable, and unstable have specific meanings with respect to the flying qualities of an airplane. Those meanings are confined to "static stability" and "maneuvering stability" and refer to control force gradients vs. speed, and vs. normal acceleration ('g') respectively. Unfortunately, in common practice the terms are used indiscriminately by "aviation experts".


The software changes (implementation of the -908 FCS load, and some subsequent set mandated by the FAA to allow certification of the MD-10 on the same type cert) improved the predictability of the MD-11 in the landing phase; they did nothing to correct the omission of a simple lead-lag pitch SCAS (à la F-4) which was designed into the Rate Command CWS of the LSAS (which is there, but set to zero gain, making it non-functional), which would have compensated for the extremely low short period natural frequency of the airplane in the landing configuration (making the airplane prone to APC). The change in geometry from DC-10 to MD-11 made this item a required addition from a handling qualities standpoint, yet the FAA still certified the airplane. They also did nothing to correct the gross elevator load feel (force vs. displacement) gradients in the landing configuration, which make it virtually impossible for a normal pilot (and in particular a soft-handed airline pilot) to access the necessary deflections for control of the airplane. Nor did they compensate for the inadequate bandwidth of the elevator hydraulic actuators, which incur significant lags when rapid elevator control inputs are required (as in turbulence).


The DC-10, and MD-10, does not suffer from the above problems for several reasons: it has a lower max landing weight, and thus much reduced pitch inertia (Iyy), the elevator throws required for adequate control are significantly reduced as a result of greater elevator control power (area) along with correspondingly lower required control forces. Additionally, the DC-10 (as employed at most airlines) does not employ RCWS, a ludicrous, parallel roll control "enhancement" on most MD-11s; FedEx, incidentally, ordered its airplanes to have RCWS turned off; a wise decision.

I´m very sorry for the crew.
 

Turbogy, what you describe all sounds familiar from my experience.
I´ve flown analog 737s, FBW ABs and the MD11.

Gusty x-wind landings on the MD11 were always more than a "challenge":
- Rudder displacement didn´t "match" necessary aileron inputs.
- RCWS was a pain during just about every approach.
- The overall "sluggishness" at high gross weights coupled with an extreme G-load sensitivity at the same time.
- nose-up aircraft reaction after spoiler deployment forcing you to actually push the nose down (great "feature" after a bounce!)
etc., etc.

The point is that you have to have all paramaters (pitch, pwr, speed) for a stabilized approach absolutely stabilized so much earlier than with other aircraft, that consequently in some weather conditions it might become effectively impossible to fly a "stabilzed" approach with this plane more so than with others...

The point is that you have to have all paramaters (pitch, pwr, speed) for a stabilized approach absolutely stabilized so much earlier than with other aircraft, that consequently in some weather conditions it might become effectively impossible to fly a "stabilzed" approach with this plane more so than with others...
http://static.pprune.org/images/stat...ser_online.gif http://static.pprune.org/images/buttons/report.gif


Exactamundo! Buy that man a beer!

Cheers

This is an interesting thread with interesting 'Creep', however it seems we should wait till the investigation is complete , so we don't insult our good colleagues...but it would be nice to discuss the stability/controllability/ aspects of the type,...and engage in creep in Techlog,...with out referencing this accident too much,...look at what the buffula accident showed us,...but,....don't speculate here


Yes, I've read everything!!!

PA

Investigation Update
 

Hallo everyone. This is my first post at PPRuNe.
Before I begin, I like to inform the forum member that English is not my mother tongue, so if there is anything strange about the way I write, my apologies in advance.

I am now in Japan and would like to inform that NHK broadcast has televised a news yesterday(May9,Tokyo) that Japanese investigation authority is tracing the cause of FX80 accident to the faulty design of MD11. Namely, no machanical fuse between main landing gear and spar.

If my memory serves right, I remember reading a post (somewhere) explaining that when MLG of the MD11 recieves inputs beyond certain load, strut of the MLG bottoms and the impact force will directly convey to the spar of the wing and breaks them. Which could lead to rollover/flipover of the fuselage due to loss of LG and wing and immediate fire from a erupture of the fuel tank caused by MLG penetration to the wing structure.


Funny thing is, NHK does not show any news concerning this accident anymore on their website so I cannot provide you the URL ,so I guess I am risking creditablity from the start :( but I thought it was too important piece of information not to post here.


I was also unable to find any media relaying NHK news (in English) so I should recommend this information is kept as reference and not an official kind.

Thank you for your attention, and Good Day.

No surprise there as it has been known for many years. Of course it's only one causal factor and unlikely to be changed so I guess we'll have to look elsewhere for a solution. I wonder what their final recommendations will look like?

Copy the Past Report?
 

Dear lomapaseo-san

Pure speculation but since NTSB is assisting the Japanese Investigation Authorities, no suprise if they tipped about the findings in the past as part of their "assistance". Based on the fact that Japanese Investigation Authority's inexperience in investigating crash of a particular aircraft type, it wouldn't surpise me if this "tip and assistance" would have seemed somewhat tempting to them and effected the course of investigation somehow.

I hope the report doesn't turn out be copy&paste of the Newark crash report:\

Fingers crossed.

Thank you for your post Mr. Goh.

That was interesting information.

Welcome to PPrune.

Dear Huck san

Thank you for your kind welcome.

Hope the Japanese investigators and NTSB team members in assistance will be able to provide information to the aviation community (and to the families of the crew members) what FX80 experienced before it became unstable and flipover at Narita Airport.

(Just a thought but) I guess what happened between final approach and the second touchdown is unique to FX80 accident and this is where past investigation report on MD11 accidents involving MLG and spar design/structure failure does not cover.

Good Day;)

MD11 and DC10 main gear is fused at the trunnion pins that attach the main gear to the structural trunnion fitting on the rear spar however as far as I know this is designed to protect the wing against rupture caused by high drag loads such as an off runway incident not high vertical loads. The forward attachment pin is designed to fail allowing the gear to fold rearwards away from the fuel tanks. The L1011 uses exactly the same main gear attachment and fusing arrangement as the DC10/MD11. Possibly the design requirement only requires protecting the wing from such off runway incidents.

The design requirements cover both cases, vertical and horizontal overlod.

I think i did see a similar landing for some years ago were the Pilot after the first "bounce" put full trust and got in the air again.

Could that be possible here?

Will be interesting hearing/reading the full CVR on this one.

Does anyone know the current status of this investigation? Have not seen any NTSB postings nor for that matter anything from the JCAB.

Is it possible that a contributory factor in this tragedy, could have been "elevator blanketing" at the point of touch down? This can be prevalent on some aircraft at high AA, where the elevator and stabilizer is in "stalled air" from the main planes and is ineffective or control even unpredictable, until the nose is lowered and the elevator is back in clean air.

Just my 2 cents worth.

Apologies if it has been mentioned before but haven't the time to read every page of this thread.

Volume
 

Gear load specs are worthless after failure when the engine/wing contact ground at the variable of airspeed/ dynamic force. The gear "shear safety" info being discussed becomes a non factor after the fact.

To state that even if gear load factors had not been exceeded but a sufficient strike had occured on the wing or engine the outcome would have been the same. DFDR released data will clarify all of this.

Why all this speculation. Obviously the aircraft experienced a contact with the ground out of operational limits resulting in a bad landing, obsolute the only type of bad landing....

Respect the operating limitations of the equiptment you are operating, understand this through and through and the odds of safe operation are on your side.

slamer.
 

I am sure we can assume the CVR release will not surprise anyone in this case. Not much time to say anyting than the obvious.

The point being made is that the MD-11 is the only big jet that during a heavy landing enough to shear the gear, rolls on it's back because the wing breaks off. Just because you do a really bad landing that should not be the result.

muduckace
 

Maybe...and I dont know yet. But I suspect it (CVR) will be more revealing than that.

Not so sure the MLG sheared, that's the problem. Attached to the Main Spar, all load transfers to the wing, which broke off. The NLG surely didn't fail, if only it had. Any bounce is -G, not the wings strongest resistance format.

Had the MLG remained intact on the 777 at LHR, what might have resulted? Ruptured Hull? Instead, the a/c belly skid to a standstill, no deaths. The MD11 needn't be stressed to land on the Carrier, eg another McD, F-4.

Had the NLG failed, the a/c may not have bounced to pitch up and reload the wings, causing the roll onto its back.

Given the choice, I would prefer my wing remain attached rather than the gear.