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AA 757 departed runway at ORD - no injuries
News reports AAL268 SEA-JFK diverted to ORD due to electrical problems, possibly a 757. Anyone have further details?
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AA B-752 Off the Runway in ORD
Looks like the plane the guy asked about earlier overran the runway with no reported injuries. BA and VS did go arounds behind it from what I heard on the ATC freqs.
American flight makes emergency landing at O'Hare September 22, 2008 FROM STNG WIRE REPORTS An American Airlines flight en route from Seattle to New York City made an emergency landing at O'Hare International Airport on Monday afternoon after reported electrical problems on board. American Flight 268, a Boeing 757 bound from Seattle-Tacoma International to JFK, made the emergency stop after an indicator light came on in the cockpit, FAA spokeswoman Elizabeth Isham Cory. The plane landed about 1:42 p.m. on Runway 22 Right and was stopped in the runway's overrun area, Cory said. Passengers were deplaning, as of 2:05 p.m. Fire dispatch reports said the plane was off the runway and emergency crews were checking the safety of passengers. No injuries were reported as of 2 p.m., but Cory referred all inquiries to American. American Airlines did not return requests for comment as of 2 p.m. A spokesman for the city Department of Aviation would say only that American Flight 268 was experiencing "electrical problems." Fire Media Affairs Asst. Director Eve Rodriguez said the plane experienced radio problems en route to the airport. An EMS Plan 1 and still-and-box response were called at the airport. The FAA will be investigating the situation, Cory said. ________________________________ Airliner overruns O'Hare runway, no injuries 50 minutes ago CHICAGO (AP) — Aviation officials say an American Airlines Boeing 757 has blown a tire and run off a runway during an emergency landing at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. The Federal Aviation Administration and the airline say no injuries have been reported in the Monday afternoon incident. |
BA and VS land on the 22R? are you sure?.
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I saw it happen. AA 757 went right off the end of 22R into the grass. Noone was injured and they were going pretty slow when they left the pavement. They blew a tire and skidded to the left a bit and off onto the dirt. Passengers walked off via airstair.
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I don't think that 22R has EMAS yet, it's just the one runway as far as I remember.
BTW we stick the BD A330 in on 22R, and comfortably come off at A (used to be C). Autobrake Med, and Max reverse works a treat. |
I've been in there on the BMI A330 on a number of occasions. Stops a treat and usually vacates with 2000ft to go.
I'd be interested to learn why the 757 didn't stop. |
No problems to use 22R for a 340 on a normal day. I'm sure BA wouldn't have any issues either in a 777 or 747.
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Here's an audio clip of ORD scanner traffic around the time of the incident:
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/ko...2008-1830Z.mp3 Around 10:55 into the clip AA 268 says he's declaring an emergency, seems to know he'll need a lot of runway and extra time to get off. Loss of left hydraulics with no PTU perhaps? At 14:41 in the audio clip BA 295 gets a go around followed by similar instructions to UA 679 and VS 39, not sure which runway they were going to initially. No problems to use 22R for a 340 on a normal day. I'm sure BA wouldn't have any issues either in a 777 or 747. |
Just the nose gear was off the prepared surface by a few feet.
Just saw a better pic. Looks like all the wheels are off, but no apparent damage. |
Just the nose gear was off the prepared surface by a few feet. The flight arrived at O'Hare about 1:45 p.m. and blew a tire as it touched down; the aircraft skidded off the side of the runway, leaving the main nose gear and the left main landing gear in some grass, according to Elizabeth Isham Cory, a spokeswoman for the Federal Aviation Administration. |
? Electrical Problem ?
Perhaps not relevant to this B757 case --
??? Electrical problems??? From slot#1: “... diverted to ORD due to electrical problems ...” Excerpt from press story in slot #10: “... arrived at O'Hare about 1:45 p.m. and blew a tire as it touched down; the aircraft skidded ...” In past examples of skid / tire-failure, an electrical problem had subtly depowered (failed) the Antiskid input to Brake System. No problem, unless (large aircraft) a pilot needs to apply any brakes during landing roll-out. |
Some observations from a grateful blogger:
That’s when the flight attendent came through. “We’re having a little electrical trouble with the PA. The captain thinks it’s important the he communciate with the flight crew, so we’re going to make an unscheduled landing at O’Hare. We’ll get a mechanical crew on it ASAP. It’s NOT an emergency, it’s just unscheduled.” I’ve been through worse landings. The plane bounced once, maybe twice and then the brakes went on, hard. Really, I’ve been through worse. But when I looked out the window, a bunch of heavy emergency equipment was heading our way. Fast. I didn’t think it was for us at first, but it was. The flight attendents came through again saying that there’d been some kind of electrical problem. The pilot landed the plane the old fashioned way, in an odd angle on the grass. I could see tarmac and runway under the wing on my right, lots of grass to the left. And loads of blinky lights, firemen in heavy gear… We sat for 10, maybe 20 minutes. The air conditioning was dead, the plane got really hot, really fast. The flight attendent told us we were waiting for the ramps, they’d be taking us by bus to the terminal. But we couldn’t get off the plane until they turned the engines off and the left one wasn’t shutting down. The fire trucks shuffled around outside, the firemen stood nearby with extinguishers that looked ridiculously small next to the huge plane wing. The pilot walked through the cabin, looking dead serious and a little old, asking if everyone was okay. He stood chatting with a group in the back of the plane, a round of applause went up as he headed back up the aisle to the cockpit. No one panicked or freaked out. The flight attendents were like angels, perfectly calm and in good humor. The passengers sat and joked, I snapped pictures of the fire crew out the window and as they boarded the plane. Finally the left engined whirled to a halt and a cheer went up in the cabin. |
? No investigation? -- Prelim later on 24 Oct
From press quote by NTSB spokesman:
"... the National Transportation Safety Board will try to determine what caused the mishap, said NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway...." As of October 10th, the Board's web-site does NOT show even a preliminary mention of this mishap. There have been numerous similar scenarios investigated by the Board. Not sure, but as of today, I suspect that neither the Board nor FAA will investigate, and there will be no report -- hope the Board does soon post a preliminary report, to show their intent to do their job. = = = = = / / Edit / / / = = = 24 Oct08, prelim' posted CHI08IA292 NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292 ... September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN ... American ... 268, diverted to ... O’Hare ... due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. ... originated from the Seattle ... intended destination ... JFK ... While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). ... QRH ... AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH. Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. ... over western Michigan and the captain elected ... divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago. While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass. As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway. After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs. Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received. With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered. |
NTSB reviews jet's skid landing at O'Hare - USATODAY.com
The pilots had switched to battery power shortly after leaving Seattle when electrical problems developed. The batteries last for about 30 minutes, but the pilots continued toward their destination until the jet's electrical systems began failing about an hour and 40 minutes later.:confused: |
There's got to be more to the story than the crew not following their QRH. Come one Seattle to Chicago is about 3 hours. Which means, if the story were true the crew flew for well over two hours without main electrical power.
Could this be more media hype?:rolleyes: |
The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. |
Is it possible they thought the RAT would carry them through the problem?
From an unamed source. The 757 operations manual states the following: "The ram air trubine (RAT) hydralic pump is located in the body fairing aft of the right main gear. Inflight the RAT automatically deploys into the airstream when airspeed is above 80 knots and both engines fail. The RAT then supplies power to the center system. Once extended, the RAT can only be retracted on the ground. At speeds above 130 knots, the RAT pro- vides adequate power for normal center syste[ operation. A Ram Air Turbine Pressure Light indicates the RAT is providing hydraulic power. The UNLKD light indicates teh RAT is not locked in the stowed position. Manual control for extending the RAT is provided by the guarded Ram Air Turbine Switch." The center hydralic system includes the center autopilot servos, spoilers, elevators, rudder, yaw dampers, stab trim, and elevator feel. Note that it doesn't handle the landing gear. |
The rat supplies hydraulic pressure not electrical power.
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With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.
********************************************************** It's not that they wouldn't have "main electrical power" R and L AC were fine. Battery's powering the standby AC/DC, batt bus and hot batt bus. As long as you have a battery you'll be fine. But with the Stby power switch in the BAT position the battery charger is disconnected. How long should you expect the battery to last? Uh, 30 minutes anyone? It lasted 90-100 minutes. :ugh: |
It appears that, other than the BAT SB discharge light, there were no other abnormal electrical indications. Once all 4 busses failed, they realized they had a total different set of problems than what the QRH led them to believe. They didn't want to go around to a longer runway with the flight control difficulties. All told, an excellent outcome. Well done guys.
73 |
"Other than the battery discharge light there were no other abnormal indications."
Shouldn't the battery discharging be a very big clue? |
What this crew needed was a battery charger mode switch.
Standard fit with most TriStars flying today, when switched to the alternate position, keeps the battery charger on line, charging the ships battery. Ahhhh, Lockheed, just a better design. |
Hard to say....hold fire
I can only comment if this happened on a B737NG.
1. If the 'Standby Power Off' light illuminates, the QRH gives a few lines on what's wrong. The corrective action is: STANDBY POWER switch.......BAT End of checklist. If there's excessive battery discharge (in the 737) the 'BAT DISCHARGE' light will illuminate. In this case the QRH states the obvious that's there's excessive battery discharge and Note: Fully charged batteries provide a minimum of 60 minutes of standby power. End of checklist. The second checklist is your heads up to get on terra firma. Can any 737 engineers tell me if the STANDBY POWER switch is placed to BAT that the batteries should continue to be charged? IR |
This is from the Boeing Maint. Ref. Manual
The main battery charger cannot go into the charge mode during any of these conditions: * Fueling station door open * Auxiliary battery overheat.* APU start * Standby power switch (P5-5) in the BAT position * Standby power switch (P5-5) in the AUTO position, battery switch ON, and DC BUS 1 and AC TRANSFER BUS 1 do not have power * Main battery overheat. The auxiliary battery charger cannot go into the charge mode during any of these conditions: * Standby power switch (P5-5) in the BAT position * Standby power switch (P5-5) in the AUTO position, battery switch ON and DC BUS 1 and AC TRANSFER BUS 1 do not have power. |
Possibly not relevant but.....it is a Boeing
B744 Standby Power Selector BAT- Powers...battery bus....from battery Disables battery chargers Note BAT position for ground maintenance only .... power is available for a minimum of 30 minutes. :hmm: |
While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). ... QRH ... AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. ... over western Michigan and the captain elected ... divert to ORD. It appears that, other than the BAT SB discharge light, there were no other abnormal electrical indications. Once all 4 busses failed, they realized they had a total different set of problems than what the QRH led them to believe. They didn't want to go around to a longer runway with the flight control difficulties. All told, an excellent outcome. Well done guys. 73 |
When we action a stadby power check on the ground on a B757/B767 we select Standby power to BAT. The Battery and APU battery discharge lights come on after a few seconds. We leave it at BAT for a minute then select AUTO. We look on the Elec Maint page and watch that both batteries recharge. It takes over a minute for the batteries to come back to normal.
I hope that lessons have been learned here. When the QRH says 30 mins, it does mean land at once. Perhaps this should be emphasised for those that don't understand. As this crew found out there are loads of circuits connected to the Bat and Stdby busses that make life difficult when they fail. With hindsight they would have been better off reselecting the Standby switch to Auto until they were within 30mins of landing. The battery lasted longer than 30mins because a lot of the systems were still using main bus power as it was available. The 30 mins is when you only have battery power. Many systems have dual supplies, they will use AC Main bus power when available, and change to Stdby power when it is not. |
Am I missing something here?
As I see it: The crew got a warning that the Standby Busses were not powered, and swirched them to Battery supply, giving them at least 30 minutes of power to both busses. Instead of using that time to get on the ground without further incident they elect to continue on to their destination. On all aircraft I have flown over many years, going onto battery power inflight is a lifeline of limited duration to get you on the ground as soon as possible. Is it possible that professional pilots understand their aircraft so poorly that they think everything is ok in this situation? The mind boggles. |
Is it possible that professional pilots understand their aircraft so poorly that they think everything is ok in this situation? The mind boggles. Crews nowadays are actually taught very little about aircraft systems at many airlines in my experience, so many times truly do not comprehend the possible problems involved. This ain't good, as one might expect.:( |
Am I missing something here? And he called maintenance control to see whether it was safe to continue. That's the rumors on another board, anyway..... |
...and probably switching the Stby Bus Switch to AUTO would have recharged the batteries so for the landing they would have had all necessary system...
Heck, alone placing the switch to AUTO without charged batteries would have restored each system except for the STBY DC Bus if I understood the situation correctly. |
The Captain was an instructor. And he called maintenance control to see whether it was safe to continue. Perhaps some now will understand just why I am, personally, so critical of American Airlines, and their so-called operating procedures. Landing during a big thunderstorm at Little Rock...with a system Chief Pilot at the helm, no less.... Cali, Colombia, rushed approach, no briefing, descending toward a clearly unsuitable waypoint, pulling up with speed brakes extended to avoid GPWS alerts.... A300-600 pilot induced rudder inputs, so that engines, vertical tail soon departed... Hello, anyone see a cause and effect here? I sure as hell do. The oldtimers in charge of training have long since retired, and the new bunch 'in charge' haven't a clue. Long story short...expect more of the same type of nonsense. |
411A.
Why the big agenda against AA? Maybe they turned you down? AA training is very good. Yes, they have had accidents that should have not happened but so has every other airline. Maybe you need to look at your need to look down at things that have happened accidentaly and listen to people that have questioned your credibility recently. |
From the AA Flight Department -
SUBJ: NEW ELECTRICAL CHECKLISTS A RECENT FLIGHT DIVERTED INTO ORD AFTER COMPLETELY DISCHARGING THE BATTERY IN FLIGHT. THE CREW FOLLOWED THE CHECKLISTS CORRECTLY WHICH COME DIRECTLY FROM BOEING AND DID NOT DIRECT THE CREW TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT. I WILL BE ISSUING A PINK BULLETIN THAT WILL REPLACE YOUR CURRENT QRH TABS 9 AND 10 CHECKLISTS AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE ELEC SECTION CHECKLISTS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE NEW CHECKLISTS WILL DIRECT THE CREW TO LAND THE AIRCRAFT AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT IF THE BATTERY IS DISCHARGING AS WELL AS ADD A LIST OF ALL ITEMS ON THE STANDBY AC, STANDBY DC, BATTERY BUS AND HOT BATTERY BUS. YOU WILL SEE THESE CHECKLIST REVISIONS SOON. FOR THE FLEET SUPPORT TEAM |
It was a good thing it was not a 767 200 domestic aircraft. No battery means no landing gear and no flaps if that is the only power available. Since this 757 had normal ac for main busses the 767 probably would have been ok. If the 767 200 gets down to battery only on domestic versions the battery is required for gear and flaps.
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Why the big agenda against AA? Maybe they turned you down? If we look at the accidents that I specified in my prior post, a pattern of we know better because we are American Airlines comes through loud and clear. I would appear to me that something is seriously wrong at American, as the root cause of their accidents simply does not lend itself to just random acts of forgetfulness. |
I am no systems expert but It always amazes me how many people (that are current and qualified on the 75/ 6) think that the RAT is a source of electrical power :sad:
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hey 411a,
fatigue is insidious, and in studies, equates to elevated levels of blood alcohol content. bad decisions are easier to make, as judgment is impaired. (LIT) some turbulence on departure (preceeding 747?) at JFK for the A300-600 (AA587)...and they really think the FO tore the tail off. yeah right. 2 or 3 FULL rudder throws were recorded...hmmm, I wonder if the rudder could have already been gone/flapping in the wind (AirTransat?), and maybe THAT'S why it was recorded that way. Like a pilot would actually go 3 full throws of the rudder- back and forth. but, it's always easier to blame the dead pilots, right? a real AA hater, huh? kc135777 |
Like a pilot would actually go 3 full throws of the rudder- back and forth. And then we come to the AA MD80's...how many was it that the FAA grounded? How big was the fine? And Cali...what excuse do you have there? The AA accident facts speak for themselves. A very sad story. |
A writer at the Seattle PI has questions from a former Boeing designer, asking why the APU was not used (link):
As the guy who designed the auxiliary power unit installation on the 757 in the early 1980s, you'll have to explain to me why the APU wasn't started to provide limitless electrical power for the airplane for the duration of the flight. I read the NTSB prelim report, and it did not mention the APU at all. An APU can be started at any altitude using its own dedicated 24v battery, and once started, capable of providing 90 kVA (same as a single engine generator) until the airplane runs out of fuel. Yes, some non-essential electrical loads must be turned off when only one generator is operative, but that in no way would affect safety of flight. It is permissible to dispatch an airplane with an inoperative APU (and with inop thrust reversers), but nothing was mentioned in the NTSB's prelim report. Strange. The APU is the primary backup for main engine generator failures. Sounds like the flight crew needs some remidial training or the NTSB wasn't telling all. Tim Repp (Boeing retired) Gig Harbor |
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