@Strongresolve

http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

fatal hull loss rate for 731/732 as 0.79
fatal hull loss rate for A320 family 0.23

so your 0.53 is way off, even if you consider the two new accidents in 2007 and the TACA one

Hawk
 

Please, read again the begining of the line of my post.

It said:

Fatal accidents by 1 million departures, not faltal hull rate

And another thing, you posted hull rate loss, not fatal hull rate loss.

The correct number for fatal hull rate loss for the A320 0,37.

And I picked fatal accidents per million departures, because de B737 fleet is bigger and does more flights than the A320 fleet, so is normal to expect a higher rate in the big numbers.
Faltal accidents per million departures is more objetive.

But again we are trying to compare an almost 40 year old 2º generation aircraft with a 4º generation aircraft. Why you dont compare it with the B737NG or the B717?

And the thing that most worry me about, is that most A320 accidents are due piloting errors or man-machine misunderstood comunications, not technical failures.

Ok, we have to open our minds, as the bus lovers say, we dont know the plane enough and we need to study it more, but this thing have been flying for 20 years, and do you think that it´s normal that we be still here talking about the same problem time after time.
It is a 4º generation high tech plane. We are having the same discursion since 15 years ago, and the problem is still here. Most pilots should get used to the A320, but the thruth is that they dont get used, and they are acussed of lack of knowledge of the plane.
Probably in 10 years we will be talking about the same, if the craft is not made for the man the problem will prevail.

A bit mystified by that, Dream Land. According to a mate of mine - who, in connection with the Hamburg incident, emailed me a section of the A320 FCOM - Airbus' advice is not to use the rudder at all on the approach - 'crabbing' only - because the 'autotrim' automatically assumes that rudder application is evidence that you want to turn, and therefore applies roll as WELL?

"Before flare height, heading corrections should only be made with roll. As small bank angles are possible and acceptable close to the ground, only small heading changes can be envisaged. Otherwise, a go-around should be initiated.

"Use of rudder, combined with roll inputs, should be avoided, since this may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks. Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level, with the sidestick in the roll axis."

Must admit that that passage gave me a touch of the horrors. I'm being presumptious - I've only flown gliders and singles and the odd twin - but I'm one of those lucky people who got the hang of crossing the controls in crosswind conditions very quickly. Telling me not to use the rudder as WELL as the ailerons on a crosswind approach would have been like telling me not to lean a bicycle over when turning a corner.......so would telling me to 'keep the wings level' instead of dropping one slightly into the crosswind........

So why monitor the rudder pedals? - when the 'book' clearly says that you shouldn't use the rudder at all in a crosswind approach in an Airbus, except at the last moment before touchdown, to 'decrab'?

Because it "..may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks."
Which I interpret as 'handbook-ese' for "Send you sideways into the deck at high speed."

As appears to have come within literally a few inches of happening at Hamburg?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAl1IJYx0C8

The Airbus bashers are out in force again.:rolleyes:

Strongresolve has already done the AIB work and decided that it is the same cause as the other A320 accidents.:ugh::ugh:

Why can't all the Monday morning quarter backs just shut the **** up until we hear from the AIB.

Bubbers44 - we airbus pilots don't have a delay before selecting the reversers, the call is to confirm they have deployed automatically. If I remember correctly thats what happened on the 757 as well, when they were armed - so they did go through a logic! The call is normally "spoilers - REV green - decel".


As forSurely with your superior skills, as a pilot, you would know instinctively what input to put in order to control the aircraft, you surely do not need to know what inputs were made before. Plus if the situation was that dire close to the ground a GA is the only option!! Saving "pink bottom" over "pride" any day.

Yes Doug: ''Text Book'' and probably emotional too ...
Congrats for such a career, obviously you might be entitled to talk about ... Experience !

Pink Bottom over Pride
 

Mr. Iceman- I take it to mean saving "Pink Bottom over Pride" to mean a presence of Ego in your cockpit. If your Head is in to face saving at all, you are fatally (perhaps) Behind the A/C. You cannot always save face and ass concurrently.

You can instantly interpret what input is critical by a snapshot of A/C posture? You are not talking out of your face.

Airfoil

Four star, not porn star. My flight attendant wife was also in the jumpseat. My regular FO on that flight was the fellow in the tower who cleared me to land. He has property there and happened to be there on that flight. The video shows how important it is to land in that 700 ft touchdown zone just past the displaced threshold. Clearing the runway you can see the cliff they went off. The 1,000 ft you should never need for stopping is past that taxiway before the last one at the end. Rolling to the end keeps the brakes cooler.

Again we have arrived at bashing one manufacturer over the other.

It is impossible to compare A320 losses with early B737 losses. For a start we would have to take into account the improvements in all aspects of commercial aviation that have been introduced over a 40 year period.

It would be more correct to compare the B727 to the A320 as the AB was designed to replace the 3 holer but again, we must look at 40 years of improvements before making any judgements/comparisons.

Once the data has been collected and analysed we will know exactly what happened.

I wonder was a GA initiated when they realised they didn't have enough runway as it may explain flap and t/rev position. Judging by the slat position at the crash site it looks like 1+F.

I am not a pilot but an engineer on both types AB/B, don't want to pi$$ on anyones chips

Brgds
SB03

@Strongresolve

negative, look again plz

fatal hull rate loss for the A320 0.23
hull rate loss for the A320 0.37

fatal hull rate loss for the 731/2 0.79
hull rate loss for the 731/2 1.55

all per 1 million departures of course, so what are you getting at? making a difference between a fatal accident and a fatal hull loss doesn't get us anywhere, I believe (= marginal, if any) ;)

I don't see a problem there, scarebus03? Both companies are commercial entities, and they are in competition with each other. Boeing is largely sticking to 'traditional' design principles, Airbus has opted for radical change in the whole area of flying controls.

Surely, since all of us are consumers, we are as free to exercise choice as we are in any other service field? Even more so since we are all aviation enthusiasts, and most of us are pilots or ex-pilots of one sort of another?

I don't happen to like the idea of Airbuses - the design differences are too radical for my taste. So far I have managed to avoid them when booking flights, and I advise my (grown-up) sons and daughter to do the same.

Isn't that my (and their, if they choose to accept my advice?) choice as consumers? If only because we're paying a ****load of dollars to fly in the things?

Certainly, in face of two serious landing accidents within a year (and one 'incident,' Hamburg, which came close to being the most serious accident of the lot, namely a 'cartwheel') I'm in no sort of hurry ever to set foot on an A320. :)

Having a recently laid new asphalt surface (#115) is an aspect which has been in previous accidents / incidents. IIRC events at Bristol, and a BAe146 overrun at Puerto Williams many years ago.
The possibility of an oily film / greasy surface should be considered by operators / airport authorities.
There are links to this subject in previous threads. Also see the technical paper on runway surface texture and risk of hydroplaning.

Sorry hawk, I not readed well the numbers, but anyway A320 performance in safety is not very brillant for a 4º gen aircraft.

In reference to the runway status.
The controler said in spanish to the pilots of taca flight 390 "The runway is damp (humeda)" not wet (mojada o contaminada.)

Big numbers are important because tells how well an aircraft is performing in safety matters.

I´m not advancing any AIB, but having in mind all last events that have not ended in a hull loss, wing tip strikes, hard landings, overruns, I dont expect any surpise from Airbus. They always find a scapegoat.

The real problem is the essence of the aircraft, it is a money making machine, not a real plane, so it never will perform like a real plane in dificult fields or strong weather conditions.
Others will do it better. (Always working inside plane limitations)

In this situations always is better going around that risk your theeth.

Re Actually I do use a rudder to de-crab the aircraft in cross wind conditions, a nice increasing pressure during the flare works well, it's the bit that the students have a hard time learning, I believe Airbus says no more than 5 degrees crab at touchdown (could be wrong).

Sad accident. Very interesting exchanges on the subject, it seems, as often, without thinking of course it is the only cause for the crash, that the pilots underestimated the slipperiness (??? english?) of this runway, recently re-asphalted.
Concerning the A320 which I have flown for a few years, I was never afraid of it, but I certainly found it the most exacting plane to fly in a rather long aviation life:
Although serious and curious, I can tell that I never really understood how it worked.I knew what was in the books, but that was really little, compared to previous generation aircraft. I found that it was very easy to make mistakes, using the automatisms, and that a go-around, for example, with both engines working, a light plane (like the A318) and a level-off at two thousand feet can, will, be a sobering experience. When you have someone in the jumpseat, he is a little surprised! The variometre (climb rate indicator) is a sad joke, and when associated with a T-cas alert, the small needle disappearing you don't know where, aerobatics are in sight...
But all that said, if you are not over-confident and treat it with the respect you show to a depressive pitbull, it serves you well.
And I forgot...it can be fitted with a Head Up Display. We had it for some years before gradually it disappeared (cost versus un demonstrated efficiency: the management only saw the seldom used possibility of taking off with very low RVR, but we saw a wonderful tool for visual approaches).I see that my company has become wise and will have the HUD on the A380. If you have a HUD, as a captain, you will know without any doubt wether the landing is feasible or not...and take the decision.

Security camera caught Taca A320
 

Apparently a security camera caught the Taca A320 on the runway right after touchdown.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIolQOhB0xE

No reversers and no spoilers that I can see.

Deja vue all over again.

I would not dare to pronounce on spoilers and reverse ... ?
But speed looks very impressive so late on that wet runway ...

CONF iture, I agree, that's why I said "that I can see".

I'm not sure how far past the end of the runway the accident site is, but it doesn't look too far from the end of the runway, thus this doesn't appear to be a high speed runoff. The security camera seems fairly close to the touchdown area and thus higher speed might be expected there. Since this runoff might be a lower speed runoff, they might have had some braking during the rollout.

All subject to correction and some more facts of course.

The location of the camera appears to be at a point on the terminal building about half way down the runway. They just recently installed those jet bridges. Guess they won't be needing them any longer.

Not necessarily. Don't forget, you are looking at an optical illusion here: the camera pans to the right, whereas the object (A320 in this case) moves to the left. This is an old cinematographic trick to enhance the impression of speed. Pure coincidence here, of course.

censorship
 

video have been remouved...why?

The video is still there... !!!!

I agree bubbers 44. Not being able to manually select ground spoilers with Config full is a deal breaker. Using Config 3 on short and slippery runways was to me an unsafe "workaround" due to increased speed and increased tendency to float.
My record: 10,000 + on short and slippery/icy runways in 732, about 1,000 in the 320. Caveat emptor.

Slight misunderstanding, Dream Land. As I understand the Airbus recommended procedures, you can use EITHER ailerons OR rudder, but not both at once.

First of all, that would seem to rule out crossing the controls (banking into wind balanced by a touch of opposite rudder) to reduce the amount of crabbing required to stay in line ("Before flare height, heading corrections should only be made with roll").


Secondly, the procedure appears to rule out use of ailerons during the 'decrab' ("Use of rudder, combined with roll inputs, should be avoided, since this may significantly increase the pilot's lateral handling tasks. Rudder use should be limited to the "de-crab" maneuver in case of crosswind, while maintaining the wings level with the sidestick in the roll axis.").


Don't fancy having to do it that way one bit. Apart from anything else, I was always told, besides using the rudder to de-crab,' to drop a wing slightly into a strong crosswind, to make sure that the wind didn't get under the wing and also that, if anything, the upwind wheel got 'planted' first? According to the quoted procedures, you can't do that in an Airbus?

Airfoilmod - Rwa
 

AIRFOILMOD

Suggest you re-read the post!!:ugh::ugh: You are the one that seems to have the problem.
My comment about "pink bottom over Pride" in simple terms for you means that MY and everyone else's bottom on the aircraft is MORE important than MY pride and it should be for every pilot. If you do not know what inputs to make to correct the aircrafts attitude without seeing what the "yoke" is doing I suggest you get another job.

RWA

Unfortunately you do not know what you are talking about!! A lot of you guys are failing to understand that this is an aircraft and funny old thing you actually have to fly it sometimes. What do you think means?? Using rudder with aileron!!!:ugh::ugh::ugh: We are in the flare here RWA. Boeing say you can use wing down or crab technique on the approach, Airbus just suggest crab technique to reduce possible PIO's with wing down.

RWA, In a crosswind condition, I fly this airplane as if it were a DHC-2 on floats, a little rudder pressure and lower the wing, the upwind MLG gently touching down, all well under control, where one must be careful is landing in extreme and gusty crosswinds as often seen in Funchael, Madeira Island, it's easy to get a wingtip and or donk this situation, better served to use a runway more in line with the wind or divert.

Do you know that trajectory is usually a result of earlier control input and / or external interferences ?
So why not stay one step ahead ?
Why a new technology should deprive us from such live and vital information ?
Because Bernard Ziegler thought it was not necessary ?

But you pretend that ‘years of experience’ provide you with the FP control inputs knowledge … I really don’t see how and you remain pretty secretive on that but if you’re ready to share … PLEASE DO !
I’m afraid I’ll have to retire before I discover that enigma on my own.

Put the HAM case in a Airbus 310 and there was no restriction as long as CAPT was able to confirm that the adjustment was done at the proper time in the proper direction and with the appropriate amplitude.
Monitoring and supervision at their best

But your only cure is: “the captain (or most experienced) should be the handling pilot”
You put here your finger on the point and indirectly acknowledge the following:
FBW Airbus pilots must know supervision is restricted compared to all other technologies, therefore, the Pilot in COMMAND should act in consequence ...

It does not mean FBW Airbus tech is crap, VERY far from that, it just means it does not allow the same level of crew interaction therefore the same level of supervision.

No change to this earlier post

Have a look also to that one

Dream Land, could it simply be you haven’t seen it … YET !?


Many airliners are born since the eighties and none of them has yet replicated the Airbus sidestick architecture and / or philosophy … maybe the next Bombardier, let’s wait and see ?

iceman50
 

I merely meant that a snapshot of attitude doesn't inform the non-flying Pilot of the most recent History of the Flight Path. Basically you may be called on to recover from an unusual attitude not knowing if a Roll was gust driven or pilot induced (input). If, as A/C is Rolling left, you assume a crosswind, your Roll right (after taking control, again, without knowing the immediate cause), your continued input is based on what you guess is the cause, you may overcorrect. What if the Roll was control induced and the crosswind is calm? If you make corrections based on a delay you are close to PIO in my opinion. With an A/C that "thinks" you have a third "Pilot" to consider. Why induce an additional "thought Path" into a dicey mash? Why not fly a "dumb" A/C that responds instantly and mechanically to input? Yoke movement is a redundant call out; instantaneous, un-biased, and free of "interpretation" and software. It is precisely, exactly, "communication", an aspect of CRM that some don't or won't acknowledge. "Rolling Right", nose Down, Back, End Roll, Nose Up, etc. As an AB Pilot, you must wait for the A/C to notify you of its "condition" rather than know ahead of time by seeing the "command".

If my post offended you, I do Apologize, but I stand by my conclusions about moving redundant Flight Controls.

Airfoil

I just communicated with my friend at TGU and got an update of the accident. The wind was 190 at 10 knots or a direct tailwind when they landed. The tower told them the active runway was 20 and the runway was wet. Taca said they would land on 02 because they didn't think they could keep the runway in sight if they circled on 20. He said the flaps were not in landing position and the left gear was not locked down when they crashed so speculation is they may have attempted a go around. Also they touched down about 100 ft past the taxiway 700 ft past the displaced threshold which was our go around spot if we were not on the ground. The FDR will tell the story when it is examined. I asked if they had attempted a straight in landing on 02 over the hill on final but haven't got a reply yet. That would be a total no no for us.

DREAMLAND:RWA, In a crosswind condition, I fly this airplane as if it were a DHC-2 on floats, a little rudder pressure and lower the wing, the upwind MLG gently touching down, all well under control, where one must be careful is landing in extreme and gusty crosswinds as often seen in Funchael, Madeira Island, it's easy to get a wingtip and or donk this situation, better served to use a runway more in line with the wind or divert.
I could not agree more! And the A320 family (with a little extra caution for the A321 which I found sometimes unpredictable during the flare) has a characteristic: the less you touch the stick, the better the approach. At the beginning we have an urge to "overpilot it" if that is the right word. But in gusty weather, don't touch it, a wing lifted by turbulence will settle back exactly where it was before, only slight corrections to keep the axis are needed, do not look at the stupid speed trend(oversensitive) jumping all over the place and it will be a gentle approach. If you look at the videos (Airbus, crosswind etc...on Utube) of the demonstration flights including the A380 in Iceland, with 40 knots crosswind, the test pilot keeps the crab with horizontal wings until the very last moment, than just pushes the rudder...No fighting with the plane...

Just got the reply from TGU. Taca did overfly the airport and make left traffic for 02. For some reason Taca didn't feel they could keep the runway in sight landing on 20. Sometimes arriving from that direction clouds are on the downwind side west of the airport requiring a descent to get below them. With 2,000 broken clouds he could maneuver easier overflying the runway and descending below the clouds landing on 02. I have pushed a high approach to 20 with a last minute runway change because the captain is on the outside of the circle and has a difficult time seeing the airport in a low visibility approach. Minimums there are 5km, 3miles and typically they show multiple visibilities above and below minimums in several directions. If any visibility was 5km I did the approach even though some directions, as in this case, were below. We use prevailing visibility in the US for limiting. Down there the prevailing visibility is meaningless terminology. Nobody, including the FAA, could say what visibility was limiting. Everybody down there thinks it was pilot error landing long with a 10 knot tailwind on a wet runway so hopefully they will eventually open TGU again for jets.

Bubbers44: "He said the flaps were not in landing position and the left gear was not locked down when they crashed so speculation is they may have attempted a go around."

Does the speculation that they were trying to go around make sense given the (relatively) minor damage to the airplane?

My thoughts too. Just repeating what my friend in TGU said. Why didn't they have landing flaps if they were landing? Maybe circling they forgot? Landing with a 10 knot tailwind on a wet runway there is not an option.

I am quite surprised that no one has thought of making some basic computations on this flight :
At an - estimated - OEW of 42,000 kg
- an estimated traffic load of 12,000 kg (124 passengers plus some freight )
- a reported 6,000 kg of fuel remaining (2,000 USG )
The landing weight is in the vicinity of 60,000 kg

At that value, the required wet runway length - from the *in flight performance* charts would be 2100 meters

The final approach IAS would be 130 kt which translates into 138 kt TAS and a ground speed of 148 kt with the 10 kt tailwind.

With the above in mind and considering the available runway length, the displaced threshold, the reported *slippery* surface, and a challenging circling approach with marginal visibility, I would say that in order to remain inside the runway length, every aspect of that landing had to be perfectly right and the margin for error close to NIL.
I might add that the influence of operating reversers is worth some 8% of the required landing distance, i.e some 150 meters.

Conclusions ?

Thanks Bubbers44 for the information, and for getting back to the thread, we had an over run where I work not too long ago, shorter, wet runway with a 20 KT tailwind :eek:, floated and touched down halfway down the runway and a long delay for reverser's. :ugh:

To me your number is a bit exaggerated ... I agree with your weight estimate but I would stop it at 1500M ... NO MARGIN ... even better with thrust reversers.
Now I may have miscalculate something ... (?)

bubbers44, for comparison do you know what would be the number for a 757 ?

Dream Land, a bit disappointing you attack someone but you're not able to back up your statement. Apology does not hurt either ... especially from a 'check airman' and your guys will appreciate.

Can't understand that - surely the post-crash photographs showed the flaps deployed? Do you think he could have meant the spoilers; another of the photographs showed the starboard wing with only the outboard spoiler panel deployed (which I believe is the in-flight spoiler)?

English translation of ATC communications here:-

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0016

Not conclusive - but captain clearly says, "Tower, TACA three niner zero. We have the runway in sight. Circling runway zero two."

PS Found that phtograph on Page 1 of the thread - Post 15. Flaps down, outboard spoiler panel only deployed.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=329140

Good estimation CONFiture! My perf manual shows ALD for 60t A320, on wet rwy, conf full, 10kt tailwind, at 3000 ft amsl to be 1600m. However I operate under JARs and RLD for me in this case would be 1.92xALDdry and that's 2120m.

I cannot comment on TACA's required margins, though.

Also 60t is an estimate. At the time being, we don't know if it was the real weight. We don't know what was the speed over the fence. We don't know where was the touchdown point. We don't know when the braking was started and if it were manual or autobrake. we don't know wheteher spoilers were deployed. We don't know if thrust reversers were activated. So untill FDR and CVR are read out, at least 85% of this thread will be pure speculation.

Vital to some, obviously not to others, taking into account all of the safe operations throughout the world on the Airbus.

RWA,
I think the word choice in the description is not as clear as it could be. Flaps not in landing configuration does not necessarily mean stowed. From a flaps full landing configuration to go-around would mean repositioning to flaps 3. From flaps 3 landing configuration to flaps 2 for go-around. Flaps full and 3 are considered normal landing configurations.

The spoiler panel deployed appears to be panel 5. Panels 2-5 are used in flight to varying degrees. It is difficult to tell if the position of the left aileron is consistent with slight roll being commanded or just normal aileron droop with flaps deployed.