It's elementary, my dear Watson, but we need the FDR to tell its story first.

Normal Landing at Toncontin airport, Tegucigalpa Honduras
 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_z5HtME9n8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlMOo_jNSbE

Two shocking videos of planes landing at this airport.

I was talking to a friend of mine about his experience of approaches into different airports and he showed me these videos. It was only a month or two ago and I remember saying it was an accident waiting to happen.
Rest in peace to all those victims. This is never nice to hear.

...
Don't see anything shocking in those, just call them spectacular visual approaches, similar to a circling in Split, visual into Lugano 19, low circuit at St Tropez La Môle, the guided turns into 33 at Reggio de la Calabria or some other interesting approaches into some Greek islands...

Shocking is rather the other crash in itself, same deep inside feeling each time... RIP guys :(


live 2 fly 2 live

Here is another video, from the cockpit. Definitely not for the inexperienced or fainthearted.

The numbers must be right from the beginning, no room for error.

Just a pity that something had to happen!

I'd say they are fairly shocking. Perhaps it is a visual illusion but no-one seems to cross the threshold at 50 feet, in fact one of the AA757s appears to touchdown prior to the threshold. Where I work that would definitely involve tea and biscuits with the management! Obviously you wouldn't want to land long but the runway isn't that short, at a guess you could stop a 320series twice using autobrake medium - and with manual braking & max reverse I imagine you'd need about a third of the runway.

F4F, you have beaten me to it. Nothing shocking at all in the two videos. OK, obviously not an easy field to approach and land but if you do the numbers, like thousands have done in the past, you are fine. TACA accident is the only thing shocking, lucky there were no more casualties.

100% wrong.Give me an airport in Europe with these 3 combined:
a)short ungrooved rwy
b)surrounding terrain..not just distant mountains,but sloping hills right in close...big difference.
c)spectacularly short airport perimeter..no control of overrun..no clearance on app flightpath

The ones you mention pale in comparison.Reggio Calabria/Split,what a joke.Samos has (a) and a little bit of (b) and (c) but thats about it.Funchal has (a) and again a bit of (b) and (c).I would rate Samos/Funchal as 7/10 when considering stick/rudder skills(and judgement!).I would rate this one higher at 8.The spoiler call is mandatory prior reversers for sure.

The VOR DME 02 approach looks like a straight in arrival to land but because of the hill on final approach requires a circle to the left to land to stay left of the hill.
Flying directly over the hill would make the descent angle too steep. We had a pattern to overfly the runway and make the same downwind as doing the 20 approach.

d) Also Elevation AMSL 3,294 ft

A classic risk management case. I don't think anyone would disagree that this is one of the more challenging approaches of the world. More challenges = more risk to manage. More risk to manage = more likelihood of an incident / accident. The real question is, where do we draw the line...

The youtube video of the AA 757 is obviously a visual approach, so the approach plates are immaterial.

Strangely, seems like the video has just been pulled from U-Tube within the last few minutes. Not sure I understand why. :confused:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAs...eature=related

this clip as previously posted is pretty impressive

Intresting approach I assume they fly a VFR circuit as thats how it looked to me . (As a humble PPL)

More risk to manage = more likelihood of an incident / accident.
 

More risk:-
In addition to any downwind component during the landing, runway 02 has a down-slope (-69ft).

My meagre translation of the warnings on the airport chart indicate that during June-Dec the touchdown zones are ‘extremely slippery’, presumable this applies in any wet weather.
NOTAMS advised caution in the rainy season w.e.f. 16 May. IIRC ‘Slippery when wet’ classifications (ICAO) indicate a runway friction in the order of 0.4, there is no indication of such a warning in this incident or of any maintenance check of the runway to indicate this condition, or is that the intent of the chart warning and NOTAM?
Judging from the photo (#30) there is a lot of rubber on the runway surface;– a poorly maintained runway?

The airport chart indicates that the threshold for 02 is displaced. Measuring the chart, the landing distance appears to indicate 6190 ft – the stated length of hard surface. However, the depicted PAPI location and photo (#30) support the notion of a shorter distance due to a displaced threshold.
From the type A obstacle chart the landing distance for 02 appears to be only 5410 ft (poor translation capability, Spanish experts please confirm). Also, that the clearway (02) is approximately 225 ft, presumably the tarmac/grass before the overrun down slope.
There is only one fixed distance marking, so that there is no clear indication of the touchdown zone.

The threshold displacement appears to be due to the higher (down sloping) terrain on the final approach. From the charts a straight in approach is not authorized from the VOR/DME, thus with a slightly steeper, circling approach, a higher obstacle clearance plane might enable greater landing distance.
From an operational aspect, circling to runway 20 from a 02 VOR approach (lower minima) might be easier (and into wind) although Captain would be on the outside of the turn - circle East only.

“The real question is, where do we draw the line...” (77300ER #51) … well … further away from the current edge as indicated by the norm in some parts of the industry. This would require that the boundary of operation be determined for all runways likely to be used. The boundary – the edge of a safe operation, is not defined by any fixed standard as there are many variables involved requiring individual judgment. At airports such as this, special attention is required to avoid unnecessary risk.

The operating crew can draw a line, but this is usually limited to the immediate circumstances and conditions – last chance.
An analysis such as above, should be undertaken by the operator (ops planning), the airport management, and the regulator – proactive safety.
If more people were involved in ‘drawing the line’ perhaps it would be thicker so then the crew could choose the safer edge as their boundary.

It's all about training, local knowledge and experience. Here is a 5300 footer that a 737 operator used several times daily for decades with no incidents or accidents. There were others in the route system almost as challenging and they all featured ice and snow in winter and frequent windshifts at any time. This one was daylight only but the others were used day and night.
The road in the foreground is used as a 3 degree "VASI" as you turn final from left base using 30 degree bank and rolling out just before the threshold.
CYCG.
http://www.ourbc.com/travel_bc/photo...ort_01_640.jpg

Runway in sight yet?
http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/6...4/IMG_6621.jpg

Here is an easier one except for night time circling in precipitation.
CYYF
http://www.ourbc.com/travel_bc/photo...ort_01_640.jpg

The 737 let's the pilot fly the aircraft without having to outguess or fool the machine.

Caulfield you're not right... sorry...
 

Dear caulfield,

I couldn't disagree with you more on what you say abot Funchal... Sure it still is a difficult aerodrome to land on, but it it is far easier than it was on the 70's. Back then the runway had only 1400 meters, now it has more than 2700 and a wonderful pavement.

It still implies a whole lot of judgement, but it is far from being a short ungrooved runway...

Greetings.

P.S.: One thing I would like to see discussed from those who really know the thing. After the accident with the A346 of Iberia in Quito, the A320 of TAM in Congonhas and now this A320 of TACA in Tegucicalpa isn't sounding a bit alarming? Apart from the judgement errors that seem real on all three accidents doesn't it rings a bell on all the automations on the Buses? I know nothing about flying Buses and Boeings and really don't need a discussion of Airbus vs. Boeing, but for me as a pilot these accidents seem to have some things in common... Anyone cares to talk about this?

Hm Pattern
 

As Robert says, and I will admit it is a personal intuition, not a fact, the Boeing flies consistent with a century of training and experience. That there is still a discussion about relative merit is more unsettling than relaxing. Moving a small stick, independently of the Other Pilot, and then letting it pop back to "neutral" seems like it would take more than a little adjustment. Measured control input for commanded control movement, in consonance with deflection, is just an intuitive gestalt. Having both yokes move in unison is a mechanical repetition of a communicative piloting effort, where the Airbus seems isolating and competitive. I can't easily erase the FP at Hamburg putting in 14 degrees left roll in a scary dicey rightxwind gusty landing. One would hope the FO (or Captain) in the Boeing would be on top of that blunder in a blink.

Rip Cesare
 

I Have flown for TACA in the region and to the same airport on the 737 2/3.
The airplane performed very well. When the company Changed to an all Airbus fleet, pilots were concerned for the performance of the A320 on that particular airfield. Incidents have happened before at Toncontin on the A320.
No need to expand but the A320 is not suitable for that RWY. If you approach bit faster plus other factors the acft "floats" to much......
This one was tragic.

Hope they close that airport

RIP Cesare ! It was great to share good moments at TACA !!

A mourning friend.

Another impressive video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1PY_7GNfIw

I'm a massive fan of airbus but one of the things i would say about it is that it is quite easy to float it prior to touchdown (320). This is mostly alright, but on shorter runways with a tailwind and a wet runway things can become dodgy quite quickly. While i think the Airbus 320 is a great aircraft, I think other planes, like the 37 would be more suited for this particular airport.

Here you can hear ATC coms just before the accident (in spanish) http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mh...2008-1530Z.mp3

It seams they asked for rwy 02 due to reduced visibility which was worse for rwy 20 approach. On final the wind is reported form 190 with 10kts and the runway was wet.

Lots of the contributing factors for an overrun got together...

Overruns happen to every plane, don’t blame airbus on it, at least before we know what really happen, besides knowing some of the factor normally present on overruns where there we have no more information.

A320s fly on a daily basis to LPHR in the Azores, which has only 1585 meters available for landing. Sure not a lot of terrain around and its almost at sea level, but you can’t say airbuses can’t do short runways. You just have to follow the operations procedures.

I agree with you, I know several of them and enjoy El Salvador a lot, I remember the famous TACA pilot that dead sticked the 737 onto the levee in New Orleans. :D

At a glance, looks like a great place for the folks from Naverus to build an RNP/RNAV approach.......

http://www.naverus.com/

Communications
 

flyinGuppy, thanks for the link that you sent, is it possible to know in some way how official is that? http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mh...2008-1530Z.mp3
Because according to that recording the pilot made an IFR approach to runway 20, made visual contact, asked the particular 02 runway after that because of the conditions, circling to land, recived report of wind from 190 at 10 kts. and was specifically advised of the wet runway conditions.

I may recall the news that day, there were actual passengers on board that confirmed that the pilot made previously an approach attempt, and then the second one to land, with the consecuences we now know about.

Thanks for the link flyinGuppy, and as you say, whatever the aircraft technology, it does not look too good with a 10 knots in the tail on that specific WET WET WET runway ...



???
So I need to learn something as well , and I'll be more than happy to !
Because to this day, except from the rudder pedals inputs, I know NOTHING from the PF flight control inputs ...
Dream Land ... you tell me !?

Looking for previous posts
 

Sorry guys, was trying to get a copy of my post #61, does anyone have a copy? Also, some other previous posts in this same thread, please let me know how I could get them.
:confused:

Read in the news (Proceso Digital, Honduras) that Palmerola would be open to commercial flights in 60 days for airliners that used to land at Toncontin. The reason for the delay would be some work that has to be performed to get Palmerola ready for international operations. In the meantime, these flights would be sent to San Pedro Sula.

Does anyone know for sure if an airport can be changed from a military landing field configuration, and then fully certified to ICAO standards in just 60 days?

C212-100
Not sure if "alarming" is the word to use in flight safety or investigation work, but "interesting" might do...:)

All 3 were on wet runways and the first two had difficulties with spoilers, reverse and braking. The TACA 320 appears to be in forward thrust and except for #5 on the starboard wing, the spoilers appear to be retracted.

Manufacturers resolve the problem of spoiler/reverse deployement in the air in different ways - for the DC8 it was the nose oleo compression that deployed spoilers, (reverse was always available). Not sure what it is for the Boeings.

The Lufthansa A320 accident at Warsaw was brought up in the Congonhas thread with regard to the availability of spoilers, reverse and braking. After the Warsaw accident, Airbus changed the software "on-ground" logic such that partial spoilers would be available with an initial compression of one main-gear oleo. Previously, until both oleos were "on-ground", the spoilers would not deploy and system logic prevented auotmatic-braking and reverse, (manual braking was always available). Config 3 landings were Airbus-"recommended" under these circumstances after the accident. In the data we examine however, we see very few Config 3 landings.

If I recall correctly, the Quito accident appears to have been caused by damage to the oleo position sensors which prevented the ground spoilers from deploying which in turn prevented the availability of reverse.

The DFDR will tell the investigators the usual things about touchdown speed, g-loads, oleo compression, spoiler/reverse positions, thrust-lever position, brake-pedal deflection, brake pressures, anti-skid operation etc etc. The initial interest will likely be around such systems and their performance.

PJ2

Just a minor correction.

According to early Accident Information Telex by Airbus, the A340-600 in Quito did get spoiler deployment, but did not get autobrake or reverse thrust.

The sequence was as follows:

- Very hard touchdown (~1100ft/min)

- On-ground-Condition initially fulfilled -> Spoiler deployment. With the thrust levers in idle or reverse, spoilers remain deployed, even if WoW-signal is subsequently lost, e. g. during a bounce.)

- A wiring loom at both main landing gear bogies failed, severing the wires that transmit WoW signals

- Abrupt bogie derotation caused all four main gear front tyres to burst

- loss of WoW signals prevented reverse thrust activation.

- I'm not 100% certain what caused the autobrake failure. Autobrake is initially triggered by the same signal that is used for spoiler deployment, but, unlike spoilers, autobrake operation may depend on a continuous WoW signal. It may also turn off if tyre pressure is too low, although this is not mentioned as an arming condition in the FCOM.


Bernd

An English translation of the exchange audible on liveatc (two recordings there) is now available at:

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0016

Servus, Simon

I believe Airmalta have similar approach into LICR reggio Calabria Italy

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cjc1p...eature=related

Quito - look at the braking available after you have blown the front tyres, and the implied deceleration thereafter.

Congonhas - note the procedure changes introduced by Airbus via EASA into the FCOMs with regards to spoiler deployment or not after landing. Not seen the new knowledge requirements yet for groundschool training.

TGU - first impression (is that the right word when looking at the crumpled fuselage?) makes me think that the aircraft did not fall off the runway at particularly high speed. The spoilers may retract below a certain speed on the ground during landing roll out.

The AA touchdown "early" - please remember why the threshold is displaced and what for. The arrows are there to displace the threshold for obstacle clearance purposes associated with those hills a bit further up the approach. The use of arrows and not X and the runway's PCN number indicate that it is ok to touchdown prior to threshold, if you really want to. There may be other reasons why it is not a good idea. Oh, yes, I remember, a busy European airport had a 737 lined up and they gave another 737 landing clearance so it did over the top of the one on the runway. The investigation report's main conclusion was that displace thresholds were a good idea as they gave more vertical clearance in this situation.... another great investigation there then :ugh:

I have more to add, but that is all I am allowed to say for the moment.

Discount.

No such thing.


Thanks for the translation Simon.
From what I can see, there is nothing like a ''direct'' approach in Tegucigalpa, except maybe in case of severe visual conditions
At 1527 the crew elected to discontinue (early in the procedure) the circling approach for Rwy 20 due to low clouds, decided to climb back to 8000ft to start again an approach with the idea to later circle for Rwy 02 this time.
Nevertheless, the crew looks concerned by tailwind component:
''We request approach to runway zero two and if possible, winds is five knots''
Could it be the 5kt tailwind a TACA operational limitation in TGU ?

Bernd, thanks for the correction and input.

1100fpm...wow - was there any 'g' reading available from any preliminary report?

It's a wonder such a long fuselage didn't break over the wingbox/gear station...

The point is well taken regarding the stopping effectiveness of four flat tires. It's certainly a point of consideration in any high-speed reject.

This is a video of one TACA Airbus 320 landing at Toncontin.
(Please note THIS IS NOT actual flight 390 that crashed).
http://www.revistero.com.mx/videos/video/NSRdOBEvlA8

Do you see how flat and low he actually gets over the runway edge?
Do you see some dust cloud raised on the edge of the runway when he overflies the edge?
Do you see how long he lands maybe almost in front of the terminal?
Do you see tire smoke that signals actual tire contact?
Do you see the spoilers being deployed and since no sound is available how about reverse timing?

After all these questions, then another question comes to my mind for TACA flights arriving at Toncontin:
Could this be normal procedure on the Toncontin runway when dry, and even the same thing when it is wet?

Let's pray your not a trainer, no disrespect intended.

try with LESO, LEPP, LECO and GCLA