Said it once, I'll say it again:
I would strongly advice against an autoland on CAT I ground eqpt.


Has nothing to do with the aircraft capability, being fail passive or fail operational.
Has everything to do with the ground eqpt. and environment as outlined already in various replies.

New definitions for DH made an interesting read though...

Well, from your point of view you should also advice against an autoland on CAT II ILS when CAT II procedures are not in use.

ILS named "CAT II" on the charts is worth it's category ONLY when appropriate signal-securing procedures are in use (called LVP). If they are not, you have no guarantee that heavy steel truck is not parked 300m from threshold, imparing ILS significantly - but legally.

This is certainly an interesting debate, although I am conscious that we are getting some way away from the original thread. Maybe we should start another thread about autolanding....or maybe we have already done it to death.

As I have indicated in previous posts I am more of a CAT 1 autoland sceptic but am always keen to get a wider view. We have had a number of assertions along the lines 'you can always' or 'I would not advise it'.

U 2 would you mind backing up with some evidence your view, that aircraft autoland capability plays no role in disconnections. The Boeing training manual revision 5 section 5.19 suggests otherwise. I am also not clear what you mean by new definitions of decision height. I do not think anyone has seriously suggested it can be any lower than 200 feet.

Yes indeed Wojtus,

Allthough the CAT II and CAT III ground eqpt. is more reliable and tested for autoland,
I would advice against an autoland when the signal area is not protected.
The signal area is not protected when LVPs are not in force.

Hi Lederhosen, I am with you and your remarks all the time on your posts, think there is a small misunderstanding, regardless of aircraft capability, like 2 A/Ps on 737 or A320 family or 3 A/Ps on e.g.757/767 and fail safe/operational aspects and IRS track keeping after signal loss etc.
All this is besides the point because the only thing that matters in this scenario is the ground equipment.
Interesting new definition(s) of DH are found in sleepers posts, or I am misreading them, as may very well be the point.

I am talking advices, but very strong advices and agree with all you wrote.

cheers !

Yes it's true. If you move an aircraft, or a big truck like "fire and rescue" ones, crossing in front of an array of LOC antennas, the LOC "far field monitor" will be in "red condition " during some seconds, because all signal structure will be "moved". Same happens, of course, in front of GP antennas. I've seen it just one hour before more or less, believe me!.

On the contrary, I don't know what will happen in the modern on-board computers that manages the automatic flight, when receiving this distorted signal.

My experience about this systems it's now history, I mean, the autopilot systems in DC-9 and B-727 ( Oh My God, how old am I! ;)). In that cases, for example, I saw how the autopilot was "rejected" when trying to manage a distorsion in a GP beam on board a DC-9... just over MM.

But today, with this IRS "coverage" that "lederhosen" told us here, and even GPS and D-GPS in the very next future, I hope that safety will be increased in all conditions.

Nice flights! :ok:

Hi folks,
we received a note at TNT as we go there every morning and it's often foggy, I think i would be nice to share it with all of you :


Dear All,
We have received a report from Panair that one of their BAe 146 aircraft on
approach to KTW experienced a sudden and rapid 'high on GS' indication,
followed by rapidly fluctuating Glideslope indications above / below GS,
starting at 500 feet RA and continuing until touchdown. This occurred on
the same day that an accident occurred to another aircraft (B737) at KTW,
which impacted the approach lights on final. Panair has alerted the KTW
authorities of this occurrence.

All TAY crews operating into KTW are recommended to be alert for erroneous
GS indications. If an unstable approach arises, a Go Around would be the
only safe option in the circumstances.

We shouldn't - of course - jump to conclusions, but that sounds a very plausible scenario for AEA's mishap. If that is the case, good for them that someone else had problems. Is it noted if the 146 had probs before or after AEA? if before, and it was reported to tower, one would like to think that subsequent crew were notified, but I know how these things are sometimes categorised as "one-off" and the communication doesn't happen, unfortunate if that turns out to be the case.

According to the information we've received from Panair, their GS-event occured 3 days before AEA accident. And was reported on 5th November.

Which begs the question, why was the glideslope on the air?

Nobody was aware of Panair's event at the moment of AirEuropa landing. Check the dates. And many troublefree approaches were performed before and after the accident.

I've seen radar replay of the landing, I've seen the site and the plane. Some things are now more obvious for me then for you. But I'm impatiently waiting for the findouts from plane's FDR and preliminary report written by authorized ones.

It's possible to fix and test fly a GS in less than 3 days.
A notam would have been out in that time, and should be easy to track down.

I'm not saying it happened, but it's possible.

It's more probable though, that if no error was found on the GS monitor, the techs declared it serviceable on the spot. :uhoh:

On a more general note, intermittent failures in navaids/radar/com are a pain. You can change components, calibrate and monitor test transmissions all you want, only to have them fail on you one week after the test flights OK them. :(

Polish edition of Aviation Revue (in the November edition)
informed in a short notice about the accident.
It said that the 738 touched down first before the threshold,
then again two times on the runway, braked and taxied
to the apron.

Canadian view on Cat 1 autoland. See para 2.15
Also see COM Para 3.13.1 (e).

The Europa's 737 had it engines removed and driven away somewhere. Local rumour says they will be repairing it at Katowice, dismounting of wings included. It shall be flyable on february.

My point exactly PEI 3721,

And note : this Canadian view is on : a practice autoland.
naturally it is highly inadvicable to practice around autolands on cat I ground equipment in lovis weather.

Good read.

By the way, best oysters in the world are from PEI , me thinks !

Cheers !

Update
 

Some update for those of you interested:

1. Plane
Both engines of AirEuropa 738 (seriously damaged) were removed and took away some weeks ago. And the plane itself has been recently moved to a temporary hangar built especially for it. So they will do the work on place, I hope the goal is to restore airworthiness, not harvest the spares ;)
http://img152.imageshack.us/img152/5...europa1rz8.jpg
(photo published on EPKT-spotters forum)

2. Approach lighting
All damaged lights had to be completely removed, and new installation has been put in place, including new foundations. It's now ready and waiting for flight test which is to be done this week.

3. ILS
About two weeks after the incident, investigation board ordered extra flight testing of the ILS. The results were within limits. Some weeks later, regular biannual flight test was being done... and GS went off the limits. GS is now shut down and tech people try to eliminate the reason. However, GS fluctuations were observed only in area of about 5 NM final and they were not very excessive.

4. Investigation board
...still published nothing. They usually do after a year or so... :/

Thanks for the update.

:ok:

Boeing are to send a team to repair this in the New Year

Some more pics.

http://img299.imageshack.us/my.php?image=segm5.jpg

Plane is flying, new approach lights shining, investigation board working. I'll make an announcement here if the report is published.

What about the GP at EPKT?
Still u/s?
Hate those LOC APP w/o DME and w/o PAPI's on RWY27, especially at marginal weather!
Not to mention the TWC we have to face sometimes!
RWY 09 is only for circling!

Good read this thread - missed it previously.

I might take issue with U2 on just one small point in post #135, though.

In my view the oysters from Southern EI might well give those from PEI a run for the money :ok:

During the Safety Conference on April 9th the Chief of the Investigation Commission
Dr. Edmund Kilch reported (among others) about this accident.
It was not the final report, just the description of the work in progress...

I am quoting from my memory (his presentation was not published),
so excuse any errors...

1. they approached too high over the ILS glide slope,
2. to catch the glide slope they were descending
with double the prescribed vertical speed,
3. crossed the glide slope with high vertical speed below decision height in clouds,
4. FO was flying, CPT took over when they were already below glide slope,
pulled, but it was too late
5. they started cutting the approach lights with the gear and engine cowling
6. they hit the ground 900m before threshold, jumped and hit the runway
7. they taxied to the apron without reporting to the ATC about the event
8. they were told by ground crew about the damage, but left for the hotel
without filing any report.
9. they were interviewed by police and prosecutors office next day
10. ILS was checked after the event and was OK and operational

I leave it without comment, because (as I stated before) there may be some errors...

BUT what I remember VERY well, the Chief of the Commission was using very
strong and explicit words describing the accident itself and
the behaviour of the crew, especially after the accident...

Let's wait for the official report for the conclusions.
I have my private opinion on this one.

With my best regards to:

boeingir, bradford737 and others...

In the meantime I found out that the presentation m.a.
was published on the official page of the Polish Civil Aviation Office:
(see pages 8-12)

http://www.ulc.gov.pl/_download/bezp...mund_klich.pdf

So once again, this time translation from the original document.


- approved direct approach
- approach on autopilot
- meteorological conditions below minima class I
- app. 5.4 NM from threshold intecepted direction above 3 deg. glideslope
- high descent rate (1200-1800 fpm) 2 x higher than acc. to ILS
- crossing the glide slope below decision altitude
- approach not stabilized
- activation of EGPWS (sink rate, pull up)
- CPT takes over
- hitting 2 and then following rows of lamps of the CALVERT system
- touch down 850 m before threshold
- landing run on runway
- no reports about ILS malfunction
- substantial damage to the aircraft
- approach light system destroyed
- no report about accident

I would assume one notices contacting structural parts and ground contact 850m before threshold.
Running away from the scene straight to the hotel, not mentioning the incident, seems just a tad strange to me....

(then again I have only a limited number of posts on my account yet...)

On that subject I recall only the speech of Dr. Kilch mentioning it (using straight and explicit words).

In the published document it says in original:
"brak informacji o zdarzeniu",
which translates to:
"no report about event"

Is there a final report on this accident?

No report yet. Shame

Air Europa :ouch:

Two publisised incidents - EPKT and GCRR. 2 unstable approaches culminating in two landings. Both with EGPWS hard warnings of 'PULL UP.' One incident causing damage to the aircraft (crew advised and elected not to report); the other results in a runway excursion.

It's what isn't publisised that worries me. I'll give this lot a wide berth.

You don't need to worry about the one at GCRR. Investigation findings are published here:

http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyr...041_IN_ENG.pdf

A report has now been published.

Report: Europa B738 at Katowice on Oct 28th 2007, touched down 870m before runway threshold on ILS approach

Only took them 10 years. Smashing!

This accident is eerily similar to the Smolensk disaster of April 10, 2010. Had this report been published in timely fashion and properly studied, it might have prevented a national calamity and all that has followed since. The damage to the B738 is astonishing, but they were very lucky just to take out a bunch of lights instead of colliding with a solid tree as at Smolensk and losing much of one wing causing a barrel roll into the ground.

yikes the photos are astonishing - this one passed me by --- beggars belief they did nowt and popped to the hotel without saying a word

i see there was an ''instructor'' on the jump seat - how many landing accidents have there been now recently with this scenario?

Hmmm.

I suspect that most pilots already know, without having to read the Smolensk report, that colliding with solid objects is likely to ruin your entire day.

I've read the report, especially the flight data and crew actions section. Astonishing. 3 experienced pilots must have known they were outside legal limits attempting the approach. Were they hoping for a tiny RVR improvement outside the OM? Dodgy. They discussed fuel use for the approach, but no mention made if they discussed diversion options and fuel available. Surely the diversion plan should have been made and understood before TOD to destination; but even the approach set-up & brief was done late in the descent, and the captain's decision to shorten the approach, put them high from that time, but with plenty of distance to recover. In those Wx conditions I'd expect sharp pilots to be well ahead of the game, no rushing and be very certain everything would be set up to give the best chance of success. Proper descent profile planning with idle thrust does not use extra fuel. It doesn't matter what route they chose, there is no excuse for getting high on the glide. Noting the point when they lowered the gear and had F40 shows they knew they were rushed. The CVR text doesn't tell the whole story. I'm sure the LHS captain would have been prompting drag etc. considering it was his idea to shorten the approach route. An idle thrust descending orbit uses a breath of fuel, so why not do it?
The whole approach, from FL100, would have had my neck hairs tingling like a barbecued pig on a spit. Continuing as they did in such weather questions their self-survival instincts. Different on a good vis day flight with 1000' cloud base, but CAT 2 RVR at night to a man land. No way. And what was PIC doing? Not a lot it seems.
As they had gear down & F40 very early they might have made a 1:1 profile and captured the glide earlier. The chopping & changing of LVL CHG & V/S suggests a weak understanding of the a/c and systems. I can not understand how 3 professionals can hurtle towards a black concrete hole, having no sense of danger to their survival, in the hope, rather than expectation, of success. There was no startle factor in this.
It is always curious to read the investigations 'cause of the accident'. The prime reason is given as failure to make a go-around. That may be true; indeed they would not then have crashed, true, but the root causes goes much further back. Indeed there might even have been trends in the individuals' history, but it would be the bad luck coincidence of all bad lucks to have 3 weak performers on the same flight deck.
The report mentions CRM improvements at the operator. To me that is to be welcomed, but I find weak CRM is often trotted out as an excuse for what is loss of SA, lack of basic airmanship and lack of self-survival. Those were required characteristics of individual pilots long before CRM was ever thought of. CRM came about as a counter to the dictatorial dogmatic semi-deaf belligerent captains. CRM did not suddenly replace good airmanship. The PIC instructor should have had no qualm chirping up and telling the PM captain that the approach was not on and they should divert. Not doing that he should have still have chirped up and said the 1000' gate was missed by a mile and called a GA. That's exercising authority when as a relaxed observer, who is PIC, can see the manure is about to hit the ventilation and he's going to have all the paperwork to write.
Is the report really saying that an EU airline, in 2008, did not have a strong landing gate discipline in its approved OM? Air Europa is not a young airline. Extraordinary. The root cause of this crash started a long time before, perhaps contributed to even by the choice of fuel load at departure. They were not that flush after a medium length flight. I'm sure there was fuel left in the bowser.
I take the point about the delay in the publishing of the report. The FDR & CVR & Crew and a/c were all available PDQ after the event. From the data it seems a slam dunk for the investigators. Perhaps there should be a report about the delay, but perhaps that could also take 8 years. I can't remember the Smolensk event, but this event seems pure human self-inflicted, not mechanical/systems. How would the Smolensk event have been avoided?

Some years ago, our Spanish subcontractors would routinely land below RVR minimums.

One would hope standards have improved since then.

RAT 5

Well meaning post no doubt, but the above highlights all the aspects of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.. it would take about 30 minutes to address correctly the multiple wrong ends of sticks and reality of flight ops & investigation

Does anyone know what happened to the crew?