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Ryanair pilot demoted after incident
Ryanair pilot was demoted following a serious incident on a flight carrying 128 passengers from Stansted to Cork last year, it has emerged.
Poor communications between the pilot and co-pilot led to the incident, where the Boeing 737-800 aircraft flew too low over Bishopstown, resulting in calls from "alarmed" residents. The Air Accident Investigation Unit of the Department of Transport (AAIU) today published its investigation into the incident on June 4th last year, with 134 people on board. The flight over Bishopstown was reported to the Cork Airport Authority by "at least 16 upset residents, whose independent and consistent complaints, submitted by phone and in writing, referred to noise and how low the aircraft was being flown", the AAIU report says. The captain was at the controls on the day, and the co-pilot, who was less experienced on the aircraft type than the captain, later recalled hearing the warning signals twice and said they were "silenced" by the captain. According to the report, the co-pilot, who had a better view of the ground to his right, "repeatedly" advised the captain of height loss on the turn over Bishopstown, which "alarmed" many residents. No safety recommendations are made in the report. It notes that the "experience gradient" between the two pilots in this case was "steep" but not unusual in day-to-day operations and "may have been a contributory factor in the [captain's] attitude to the co-pilot". The co-pilot had tried to comply with Ryanair's training manual but his "inputs had little effect". The AAIU said this did not excuse the "aberrant deviation" from the airline's standard operating procedures in its approach and landing that day, however. In a statement, Ryanair said it "co-operated fully with this AAIU investigation and agrees with its findings". "Following a disciplinary hearing, the pilot in question was demoted for deviating from Ryanair's standard operating procedures." Last month, the AAIU reported that a Ryanair flight with 138 passengers and six crew on board almost crashed near Knock when it "overshot" the runway and came way below the recommended flying level due to a series of errors. Final report: http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?...g=ENG&loc=1652 http://www.aaiu.ie/upload/general/8770-0.pdf |
Until one day, they run out of luck. Big expansion, less safety? Is that an echo of Valujet? Keep smiling you get there "cheaper".:E
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you get what u pay for...
"No safety recommendations are made in the report. It notes that the "experience gradient" between the two pilots in this case was "steep" but not unusual in day-to-day operations and "may have been a contributory factor in the [captain's] attitude to the co-pilot". As good as saying...yes we accept that what we have in many aircraft is a virtual single crew operation but we consider that to be an acceptable state of affairs... What's the matter CAA.... not enough blood spilt yet ? |
As usual, smart guys keep on shooting at other pilot's back. I saw experienced copilots or supposed so, giving negative inputs to young captains and contributing to serious incidents. So experience sometimes doesn't mean everything on its own. You need to add good CRM, A/C and OPs Manual knowledge. And that can be achieved by any pilot who is willing to do his homework.
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True SoftRide... experienced crews do have accidents but in this case there is, as the report states, a clear indication that the disparity in experience levels of the crew had a negative effect on CRM... Snotties parading around with three stripes on their arms a few months after bashing circuits as a FI are not going to have much influence on experienced capt's when the sh*t is close to the fan irrespective of how well they understand the FMS.... it's why we keep log books and why sensible employers ask for a minimum of relevent experience.
IMHO trying to keep the right hand seat warm with a frozen ATPL has always been a nonsense on anything but a small or medium sized a/c. It's strange that the European exams go to ridiculous lengths to ensure a minimum standard of academic qualifications compared to the relatively simple FAA system yet the larger companies in the US almost always take new recruites from the pool of experienced regional operators and thus end up with a far more practical candidate for the right hand seat. |
Originally Posted by sud747
(Post 3098260)
Until one day, they run out of luck. Big expansion, less safety? Is that an echo of Valujet? Keep smiling you get there "cheaper".:E
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Ryanair pilot demoted after incident
My Oh My!!! How times have changed. During the war years and for a considerable time thereafter. Britains aviators were generally a closed knit bunch of brothers often affectionately known as the Brylcreem Boys.
However, today when one reads PPrune it can safely be assumed the the aviators operating in the UK are more often than not a bunch of venomous, poison pen pushers, slating each other at every opportunity. Gone are the days where there was some form of comraderie amoungst each other. You should all be ashamed of yourselves |
Good post ZS340, but don't forget that it's very easy to be a "744 Cptn" on this site, when the truth is quite different.
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ZS340
The camerarderie bred during the war years was largely a result of "Flying Together and Dying Together" safety was a secondary issue to getting the job done.... hardly the case in todays flying environment at least outside of the military. Good CRM has to be based on mutual respect in the cockpit... respect comes with experience and as this report suggests the very correct protestations made by the inexperienced P2 were largely ignored by the Capt while under pressure.... Ryanair would appear to have a high turnover of flightcrew... it may be worth investigating the level of experience of their pilots compared to other companies and maybe even look again at the effects of multi-sector short haul operations over extended periods. One would expect that LCC's such as RyanAir would have more reportable incidents simply because of the many sectors that are flown each day..... we now have the least experienced crews flying the more demanding schedules. |
Eh ZS with your comradrie and tribalism, the individual involved held a german atpl.....he would'nt have been part of your brillcream club!!
Anyway the folk at Cork reckon they had to climb out of the valley to land such was it they were so low. Another lesson.....they did a right hand orbit with the Capt flying so he had'nt a clue where the rwy was on the right downwind, together with Cork being 502 AMSL and the terrain at 4 miles from the THR at say sea level, a real cocktail to get sucked into. We all can f@ck it up but to do it twice is not on. If it was me I would have climbed to circuit alt of 2500' got radar vectors from Banon did the ILS and groveled to the F/O about overcookingthe first approach. Ahh ....cant beat arm chair flying!! |
First we have Flybe now Ryanair with near-CFIT incidents. So Ryanair 'demoted' the Captain who carried out this cowboy approach - twice!! What would he need to do to get sacked I wonder?
How can the authority accept such a person as a pilot in that airline? How can the management accept it? Or maybe he was 'management'?? Pathetic! Doesnt matter how cheap it is, dont go there if you have any sense. |
"..... and groveled to the F/O about overcookingthe first approach."
And why would you need to grovel? Being upfront about having got it wrong is NO reason to grovel. Admit your mistake, calmly and professionally and go-around. That way the chap in the other seat LEARNS something. If you grovel about it the FO thinks that admission is something to be avoided. And thats when incidents like these happen. |
My apologies Capt Bernoulli....grovelled is humbling...your right should and meant to have used the word apologised and got on with it.....lets get back to the orig point as against splitting hairs......basically 2 f@ck ups are inexcuseable.:ok:
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So here we go again. Yet again, we've sailed ever so close to the wind and once again, by extraordinary luck, there wasn't a smoking hole. However, the regulator has "no safety recommendations" to make. Which begs the question, exactly how much broken metal has to there to be before a proper and thorough audit of ryanair is done?
The simplistic answer, which is of course rIAAanair and assorted fellow travellers such as Leo would have us believe is the correct one, is that the pilots once again screwed up and that the company is squeky clean. Were the IAA and ryanair not effectively the same organisation, someone might be asking the question as to why it is ryanair pilots that are regularly narrowly avoiding smearing aircraft across terra firma. Yes, ryanair is a big airline, with a lot of flights so statistically, things will happen. HOWEVER, there are many many other big airlines in Europe, of both the traditional and low-pay variety, who also have large numbers of daily flights but manage to avoid the regular monotonous procession of near-accidents. This following is almost certainly the main cause. It is the ryanair rush and pressure mentality. Every minute extra on the ground counts because the turn-around is so tight and people are scared of being away late. The pressure, both implicit (rumours of threats, knowledge of supposed expectations etc) and explicit (don't board while refueling: get demoted; totally inadequate check-in times etc etc), is on you to never be late, never compromise the schedule. The IAA claims to be unaware of this situation, which proves they are either monumentally incompetant or in league with ryanair. I suspect both. |
To my simple mind (and I hasten to add my qualifications as a mere Cherokee driver) this guy got himself into a situation that even I would have managed to avoid on a clear VFR day.
He appears to have strted with a too high approach, decided to try and save it by doing an orbit, made the mistake of making a RH orbit, from which he had trouble seeing where he was in respect of terrain avoidance and where his runway he was visually approaching was. He descended by 1,650 feet during his orbit (from 1,700 AAL to 50' AAL) became illegally low at less than 500' above a settlement and then had to climb hard towards rising ground (I guess that is why the residents complained about the noise) to establish a reasonable height to make a stable approach to land off. I would have thought (based on what I have read) that there was a strong case for suspending his license, a prosecution for reckless endangerment and a breach of rule 5, as a minimum requiring serious re-training and a psych eval into why he thought he could discard so many of his SOPs and ignore all his CRM training. It is difficult to say as much unemotionally. I also note (as was the case in the Knock incident) that the occurrence date and reporting date were almost a couple of weeks apart. Unfortunately (again) any CVR would have been long since overwritten when the investigators arrived. It all strikes me as rather unsatisfactory. |
I also note (as was the case in the Knock incident) that the occurrence date and reporting date were almost a couple of weeks apart. Makes one wonder what else hasn't been reported. Does anyone else find it truly disturbing that the "safety culture" perpetuated by ryanair seems to operate on the premise that even the most serious incidents are not reported until they can be covered up no longer? Even more shocking (but, based on the record so far, not exactly unbelievable) the IAA find this behaviour acceptable. |
One awaits for Leo to be wheeled out on this one to give us his bluster, verbose and bulls@t on this trival incident.
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Ryanair pilot demoted after incident
Folks I am not condoning poor operational procedures for one moment. I am also not comparing the operational standards of the various carriers. The Big names in the industry have had their fare share of c .....ups in the past. Hopefully we all learnt from those mistakes.
What gets my hair up is the cynical, bitchiness that one reads continually on this PPrune. C'mon you're suppossed to be commanders (OR POTENTIAL COMMANDERS) of commercial aircraft, not cheerleaders in a school netball team. Now Grow up! |
As someone with over 10000 hrs in command of transport jet aircraft I still manage to @#%& up the occasional approach. The key is to use your experience to recognize your mistakes early and not push a bad position.
I agree that we should not be so quick to criticise and try to be more supportive of our fellow aviators, however with media reporting the way it is and the internet reporting every rumor, we all end up paying the price for each others mistakes. As a community we are viewed as one by the travelling public. A mistake by one of us, tarnishes the reputation of all of us. |
As sombody whose experience is limited to SEPs and as you can see my age and realise I am hardly likely to end up commanding anything approaching a jet transport ... my point is that am in a group that probably makes more lousy appraches than most - and thus is probably more forgiving of genuine mistakes and misjudgements - but it seems to me that what happened at Cork would get a member of my flying club a chat with the CFI without biscuits. And possibly even have him phoning Flying Lawyer to defend himself against Rule 5 and the CAA.
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Dave,
I agree with you. One should have to answer for something like that. I guess what didn't come across clearly in my post is the fact that I truly believe that we as pilots should keep the pressure on each other to operate in a responsible manner. As I said, in the mind of the public we are all viewed as one. Accountability and peer pressure can be used as a valuable tool in enhancing safety. We just have to avoid the crass and personal attacks that one sometimes see on this site. |
Yet again the CVR is not available. Advances in technology make the production of a CVR that has say a 30-day memory straightforward compared to when the regulations for these were formulated. How many years before the blindingly obvious is mandated.
It doesn't have to be of the fully crashproof/fireproof type, the existing duration is probably fine for one of these in parallel, but just a normal recorder. I don't see in the accident report whether they were on schedule or behind time, and if so by how much. It would be useful to indicate that. |
Let's be careful over our use of the words accident and incident. There was no damage other than to professional pride, and nobody was hurt, nothing broken. Safety systems operated correctly. It was no more than an 'incident'.
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Originally Posted by Rainboe
(Post 3099855)
Let's be careful over our use of the words accident and incident.
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dunno what all the fuss is about, after all, O'leary reckons his outfit can withstand 2 hull losses. Great claim to fame :ugh: :ugh:
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Its a very clear cut case. The Captain did two things wrong (procedurely at least) and that was firstly he made a bad command decision by not GOING AROUND. Secondly he decided to orbit but not only that but orbit with LANDING FLAP.
That in itself is a clear breach of SOP. Nobody cares that he cocked up the approach - who hasnt. Its what he did once he realised it all was going horribly wrong that put him back in the right seat. Lesson - GO AROUND is always an option. |
With the greatest of respect, I note that the captain had 11,780 hours.
Nothing is said about the experience of the co pilot. At a later debrief neither pilot considered fatigue a factor in this event. The cause is quoted as: This serious incident was precipitated by the PF not adhering to the Operators explicit SOP’s in the two approaches to RWY 17 and also by not conforming to established CRM principles in relation to the PNF. |
Sunfish,
At the time, PNF had logged 850h on type and PF (almost) 8000h on type. |
If a highly experienced pilot were downgraded from left to right would this not in turn create the potential for some rather unsual CRM based on the fact he is likely to be far more experienced that the lefty ?
Based on the fact that CRM was poor previously when in command I can see that it could be magnified further when sitting on the other side. Just a thought. P.S I am sure the individual concerned is a great guy and I hope he gets the remedial training and opportunity to learn from this. |
Originally Posted by jet_noseover
(Post 3100144)
Sunfish,
At the time, PNF had logged 850h on type and PF (almost) 8000h on type. You're not answering Sunfish. What's your point? Do you mean having 8000 hrs gives a commander the right to ignore is (inexperienced) f/o AND his sop's??? :ugh: |
Dutchjock
I simply made a statement to Sunfish's post: With the greatest of respect, I note that the captain had 11,780 hours.Nothing is said about the experience of the co pilot. Do you mean having 8000 hrs gives a commander the right to ignore is (inexperienced) f/o AND his sop's??? So far I refrained from making any comments on the issue. Let me just say this: I agree with the airline decision. Too bad for the captain and the actions he chose. He's going to have to live with the consequence. I find F900EX observation quite an interesting one. With that many hours behind the belt he will not be happy on the right.... Lesson(s) learned, you think? :ouch: |
Sunfish - I think the real world is slightly different from the one you percieve in this case.
Regarding fatigue it reads to me you are looking/hoping they were fatigued so as to prove a point about FR roster/pattern etc. The answer to your question about fatigue is we as pilots self regulate ourselves everyday in our decision to go to work and the crew established they were not fatigued probably the same way you establish your not fatigued before a duty. Why doubt them. As for an 11000 hour plus Captain doing what he did. You make an assumption there is something special about having 11000hrs. Maybe he slipped through the net. Turned on the charm/CRM for a Line Check then went back to his old ways. Maybe he has been getting away with it for years and got found out. Who knows.... As an instructor I have very quickly learned that what hours is written on a piece of paper is not necessarily an indicator of performance/ability. In the past I have been guilty of showing too much respect based on hours on paper. Have stepped onto the plane and have been shocked by what has been demonstrated. This case is clear to me. Any Ops Manual serves two purposes. One it provides us with guidance and secondly if we follow its pages 'it' protects us from the company. Our friend in Ryanair deviated from it and and the minute he did that he lost his protection and found himself without a leg to stand on. |
It's not because Ryan Air are loco
Everyone makes mistakes, some admit to it and other's do not. As pilots we need a certain amount of humility, and when we are unable to exercise this then that is when the person in the other seat should start to worry.
As mentioned before, the greatest worry isn't that this incident occured, instead that once it had been recognised a valid crew member was in effect disregarded, company SOP's were ignored and the initial chain was allowed to build potentially leading to disaster. I don't believe it has to do with the fact that this airline is lo-cost. Easy Jet are lo-cost yet they have a very good safety culture. It stems from the corporate culture of this airline; how they view their workforce, have treated individuals in the past, have a relatively high turnover of pilots compared to other airline's of the same size, call in contract pilots when Ryan air pilots need time off because they have flown too many hours. The situation is not condusive to any from of stability, and unfortunately with all these variables, safety along with a few other aspects will suffer. It is interesting that Ryanair have had numerous incidents in the past, as i'm sure other airlines have had and will continue to do so. But to have 'quite a few' is either unlucky or a sign of a more serious underlying issue. What exactly is the IAA doing to correct this? |
Not withstanding the fact that demotion is over six months behind the times. But just a simple question... do you think if the captain followed the published missed approach, he would have been demoted? I mean that's why they have such procedures to keep airplanes above the ground outside the airports... out of contact with the chief pilot, pilots from losing their airmen certificates, and I gues the most imortant... survive another day to fly again. The number of hours an airman has should not be equated to his or her level of judgement.
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Missed Approach Or Go Around?
Why should the pilot making a visual approach follow the missed approach procedure which is designed to safely take the aircraft (in IMC) back to a position from which it can recommence an approach after not making visual contact with the ground at DH/A or the MAP?
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The purpose of any follow-up action after an occurrence (occurrence to me sounds less then an incident or accident, but what's in a name) should be aimed at correcting the cause of the occurrence. Punitive action is in my opinion acceptable, but only in case of gross negligence (continueation after becomming aware of negligence, e.g. neglecting a GPWS) or in willfull misconduct (e.g. making a low pass over your girlfriends house)
Any such punitive action should be taken in such a manner that integrety is preserved (e.g. union represetation in the investigating body) and consideration to the crew's cooperation in the investigation. If in this situation the pilot failed to follow his/her fellow pilots advice I think it touches gross negligence, also it indicates that the PNF needs some additional assertiveness training. (training is not a form of punitive action) Not following SOP's is a finding and not a conclusion, any good investigation must find out why the crew/pilot did not follow the SOP's. Finally any occurrence investigation should remain free of the blame culture and clear accepted guidelines must be set so that the punitive follow-up does not "interfear" with an objective investigation. I'd be interested to get some feedback on this from you fellow pilots! Nick |
Sorry, I'm a bit jet-lagged, but it seems to me that this incident is serious but not as serious as some RYR-haters might think.
1. I think it's a perfect decision to do a circling after a missed approach. In fact, an aborted approach is always a go around, even if you don't add full go-around thrust. I guess the altitude he had chosen was way too low. Otherwise, no problem at all. I know that there are lots of airports around where you have circling minimas 500 ft AGL. 2. I don't know RYR's SOPs, so I can't judge the fact that he left the flaps in landing configuration. Let me just state that other aircraft types - Airbus! - requires you to do the circling in landing configuration (flaps 3 or 4 and gear down), at least the official AI procedures. 3. What he *did* wrong in my opinion is that he didn't chose a normal circuit: abeam threshold, time check, 25-40 sec out, base turn, start descent, initiate configuration, set up for a good landing. This has to be a circling or a circuit, not a 360 orbit, then it's perfect. I'm surprised that the incident report isn't based on these general rules. Neighter a height of 500ft nor a decision to make a circling is basically something wrong. It was a poor executed one. Dani |
If you follow SOPs and the OPS manual then, the Chief Pilot CAN defend you! If you dont he cannot! It is wrong to say that if you follow SOPs that that will protect you from the company.
Ryanairs CP is THE fairest CP you could get and he always gives a pilot that has [I]helped[I]himself (ie by trying to do a good job) a second chance (if allowed by the IAA). This sometimes involves retraining, phsycological help (as with the Rome incident) or a chance in a different role within the airline. I have witnessed dozens of positive outcomes and supported cases, dozens. If you decide to cover up your incident, tell the CP one story, the AAIU another and they all disagree with the FDR, then $%ck you cos you deserve to be demoted! (Not the Cork case). I am sick of the politics of this airline interfering with the bloody good job us pilots do daily. Remove the word Ryanair from this thread and watch how all the bloody do gooders would change their tunes. And for all you plonkers that seem to think your airlines are bullet proof and incapable of screwing up this badly, dream on! PS You wouldnt believe the cover ups that go on in some of the so called best airlines out there. |
Hey guys,
I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying. We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only. Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind. We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped. All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme. I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified. |
Hey guys, I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying. We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only. Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind. We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped. All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme. I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified. |
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