Yes we do fly safe- you will not find a safer airline or one with better training, believe me....and certainly not one in the world with more experience of worldwide longhaul heavy jet flying than BA. We actually know how to do it pretty well because nobody has done more since 1945.
If it was LHR-LAX when an engine failed, it would most probably have returned to LHR before PNR as that would be easiest for repair. After losing an engine over Caraffa, I returned to LHR- it is actually easier to do that and transfer a to another aeroplane than dump them at Rome or Athens at 2 am to hoe to get a flight on later that evening! But this is hypothetical- we are talking about LAX-LHR.

Lets be quite clear that the crew were not instructed to go anywhere. BA do not instruct crews on where to go when an aircraft has a technical problem. They will inform crew what the best options are in terms of ground handling, technical support and alternative arrangements for passengers, but the decision on the ultimate destination for the aircraft rests solely with the flight crew. This is not some third world airline where the pilots are monkeys flying the plane who will unthinkingly do what the management tell them for fear of losing their jobs.

There was no 'HOMITIS' here. The crew spent the night assessing every en-route airfield for its availabilty and calculating and recalculating three engine fuel burn as well as two engine drift down altitude and cruise performance. At any stage of the process they could have diverted to an en-route alternate. At every stage of the process across the Atlantic the criteria for continuing were met.

Once (yet!) again, the 747 is approved by Boeing, the FAA and the CAA for flight on three engines. The CAA have no problems with the conduct of the flight. The mayday was a seperate issue which the entire UK 747 flight crew community have learned from. The plan was sound from the outset and the CAA agree with that. As the CAA, not the FAA, regulate UK flight operations the continuation policy will remain. The only thing that might change is that we'll have to avoid US airspace in order to avoid the FAA scoring cheap points trying to promote their own industry.

Winston Churchill once wrote of a Japanese Admiral (Kurita, after Leyte):
"...only those who have endured similar may judge him...". I think it applies to this particular flight....:hmm:

Back to the original article - the FAA fine for operating an aircraft in an unsafe manner becomes even more inexplicable when one considers
a. The aircraft had sufficient fuel for the flight as intended (even after departing the LAX area on 3)
b. Adequate terrain clearance could be maintained throughout
c. Suitable en-route alternates were available
d. The FAA originally certified the aircraft for just such a policy.:confused:

It leads me to a suspicion: I have heard through the grapevine that there has been concern expressed in Gov. circles here that there exists an in-balance of trade between US carriers and their foreign counterparts on bi-lateral routes, both in terms of pax numbers (390-ish on a -400 / 220-ish ETOPS twin) and in terms of yield (a function of pathetic service on US carriers and what you can charge for a premium passenger ie: if you have $5K to spend on a 1st class ticket and choice - who do you think that pax is going to chose? It ain't grumpy grannies...). The FAA certainly seem to have their knickers in a twist here.:E

It's one engine more than a Triple on both!

....and the wheel goes around about the 20th time saying the same things over and over again to people who refuse to understand the whole point about safe and efficient longhaul 4 engine operations! Sometimes I think the best way is just to not say anything and let the storm subside before it reaches this never ending rotation of the same arguments from people who really don't know or understand the capabilities built in to the aircraft so this can be achieved safely! The voices of those who feel anything not absolutely perfect with the aeroplane is enough reason to 'land at nearest suitable airfield!' The whole point of our argument is that as long as you remain in a safe operation, the best thing is to get where repairs can be most expeditiously carried out and the pax most expeditiously carried to their destinations. That is why the 747 has all that redundancy and why it has 4 beautiful Rollers. Instead of examining the real operation causing concern ('excessive' ETOPS), they are throwing all their criticism in the wrong place.

You watch the discussions that come again- all the old stuff recycled!

Take first the mote from thine own eye....

We'd moved on from the 'land asap' comments to a discussion concerning levels of risk which, though more restrictive than pure Perf A considerations, would perhaps be more appropriate to continued operation of a 4-engined non-specific airliner with fare-paying passengers on board following the loss of a single power unit.

I consider that 60 min flight time at 2-e speed/alt from en-route alternates (obviously with Wx better than 2-e minima applicable to type) should be the limit.

Thanks, by the way, for all the PMs in agreement with my comments.

I don't know the ins and outs of the FAA - Euro politics, but I'm confused by the constant reference to the FAA looking after their own industry. It was a Boeing involved after all. Are they hoping that BA will change the 744 fleet for 777's or something?:confused:

BEagle, stop being a pompous a*****e!

ETOPS are highly relevant in this discussion because they involve operating aircraft with many passengers all over the world under rules and regulations formulated by the same bodies and institutions as any other flight.

The questions to be answered are..........

Was the flight legal?

Was the flight safe?

Was the flight conducted in accordance with the manufacturers and operators SOP's?

What's your bloody problem??

To follow your 'logic', then why shouldn't twin engined flights be planned at the 60 minutes/1-e speed/alt. ie traditional twin (non ETOPS) planning?

Your 'logic' if fundamentally flawed.:bored:

Sorry to jump into the thread with a stupid question… but is the 4th engine really needed on the 747 ?

If 3 engine operation is deemed “safe enough” for regular passenger service by manufacturer, operator and CAA , if a 3 engine LAX-LHR flight is to be seen as a non event, then isn’t the 747 an inefficient design ?! :)

Ok, more seriously, as a regular BA customer (and tiny shareholder) I would rather see might flight diverted / cancelled than flying such a long route with one engine u/s, regardless of SOP. Exceeding minimal regulatory requirements is what I would expect from BA when speaking of safety matters.

When the original 747 was designed back in the '60s, if it hadn't had four engines it wouldn't have got off the ground. As time has gone on, engine technology has improved so if it were designed from scratch today, it would probably look like a 777-300. ;)

Good point :)

atakacs
 

Well as a fellow shareholder (isn't it time this whole topic died..)

Returning to LAX would mean dumping perhaps 50 tonnes of very expensive aviation fuel, overnighting 300 plus pax in LAX hotels, rearranging onward connections, and either having to have the aircraft repaired at LAX (at what cost?) or three engine ferrying it back to the UK.....all of the above not good for the bottom line or your shares.

On the other hand (here we go again) having got airborne, and contained the problem the crew could reconsider their options: take advice from the Company ( Operations who know where the spare bits and crews are, engineering who can access telemetry from the aircraft), consider the en-route alternates, weather and terrain..and on the basis of all the above make a considered decision as to if and how to continue.

As someone who is both a shareholder and current on the 744, working on the basis of what I have heard of this incident, I would have continued towards the UK..the operation certainly "was safe enough" and the FAA are getting their proverbials in a twist here.

Finally the main threat to your precious shares doesn't come from the crews or the engineers - it's the other decision makers in the Company you need to worry about!

Nobody is buying 747-400s. Very few orders so far for the 747-800/900. Lots of orders for the 777. Lots of orders for A340s and A380s. See whats going on here? The FAA would like to eliminate any commercial advantage to operating a quad over a twin by extending ETOPS times and imposing onerous restrictions on quads. This skews the aircraft market in favour of Boeing. The FAA has a mandate to promote the airline industry.

BA B747- 400 three engine promenade put in context by a non American nor Brit.


Civil aviation versus military:

Military aircraft are used to be deliberately exposed to dangerous situations and then try to get out of it unharmed. Civil aviation is about the transport of passengers and the very essence of its operation is to stay out of trouble at all times. This is the essential reason why they are designed with so much redundancy.

The probability law:

Many decisions are made based on probability calculations. ETOPS, AWO, autopilot architecture etcetera. All this to assure that in case of failures there remains enough redundancy to bring the ship safe on the ground. These redundacies are not there for commercial reasons but for Safety only.

Airliners are built for efficiency when all goes normal only.

Civil aviation is a commercial activity and has inherent commercial risks. Out of the thousands of flights every day, some flights are lost due to technical reasons.

This is something we have to accept. The build in redundancy is not to be used to cover commercial risk and that’s exactly how British Airways has used it.

Therefore, in its very essence this incident is not to be put in the context of twin versus four engine powered aircraft, this has nothing to do with it. A failed weather radar shortly after take off over Africa with the ITCZ ahead of you is the same kind of problem. The potential of serious trouble ahead is a fact.

Those that claim this is not so are missing the real meaning of what happened.

The MEL covers all that is needed to cover minor technical failures and that’s the bottom line as far as it’s commercial benefit is concerned, for whitch the MEL was not even designed.

Many lessons have been learned from errors and lost lives in the past. Are we are now throwing all that away for non relevant reasons?

Aircraft design has evolved in a way that they are easier to operate and reduced crew error has resulted from it, however this is no argument to reduce crew training or training culture.


It’s not because routine tasks have been delegated to hard and software that crews should no longer be required to handle their malfunctions since this is the prerequisite to proper monitoring the function of these systems in the first place. The way we used to fly the old stuff gives the exact mindset needed to do this.

We all know that if the flying skills that were needed to fly the old generation non glass Airliners are combined with today’s technology, the new kind of automation related errors that are emerging would not be allowed to develop beyond an acceptable level. We all know that what happened to the Virgin A 340 fuel problem would have been picked up by a crew that had the experience of flying the old B 747 or DC 10 with flight engineers.Situation awareness was more a fact in those times, today it's hidden in the bits and bytes of computers and crews that blindly trust those systems are waking up to reality when it's too late.

It does not matter if the FAA wins or not, its BA that was wrong and as such the UK CAA is no different than the Egyptian CAA.

Neither British Airways nor any other airline can be compared to the RAF and that’s why the FAA is right but they probably have chosen the wrong battlefield, basically because they do not think with a military strategy and that’s why they are right.

What we need is common sense and not heroes.

Remember Concord.

So what's your point?

I've seen DISTRACTING posts before, but I believe this takes first place.
I fail to see how MEL enters the picture; nor how BA failed to maintain a generous degree of redundancy right up to their parking the bird at MAN.

Do we really? Well from what I know of the fuel problem speaking to Virgin A340 skippers it would appear that you are actually talking out of your behind. Pray tell, how would B747 Classic or DC10 experience, or indeed a flight engineer, have helped deduce that the indications on the ECAM fuel page were actually erroneous due to a second unannounced failure of a fuel management computer? Perhaps the flight engineer might have spent the flight interrogating the maintenance computer to determine the servicability of the fuel computers every hour?

AIMS by IBM, it is a lost cause mentioning Flight Engineers here. All it will accomplish is to bring the usual insecurities to the surface. As seen.

Before you get excited about "Aims by IBM" take a look at his profile.

'AIMS by IBM'

What a ridiculous and semi literate rant, 'Airliners are built for efficiency when all goes normal only'

Indeed, the levels of redundancy built into modern transports, particularly the 747 allow for continued flight in the event of a loss of significant systems, up to and including powerplants. (That is why they have four!)

'Built in redundancy not to be used to cover commercial risk' It is there to cover any risk that failures require.

'Loosing' as you call it your weather radar over Africa with the ITCZ in front of you is not even remotely close to the same situation this crew had.

ETOPS is extremely relevant, as has been said, the FAA in their wisdom have no problem allowing a twin engine aircraft to fly on one for over three hours.
But protest when a four engine aircraft continues on three despite being certified to do so by them.

Or perhaps I am confused remembering 'Concord'

stilton wrote:

Indeed, the levels of redundancy built into modern transports, particularly the 747 allow for continued flight in the event of a loss of significant systems, up to and including powerplants. (That is why they have four!)

They have four because at the time they needed four to get them in the air since more powerfull engines were not available.

Optimum cruise is with four engines. That's a commercial argument and thats the reason of the design. They could easily have build it with less redundancy so it would be even more intersting commercially speaking (lesser weight) but they didn't do that for safety reasons.

That is why the redundancy is build in for safety and not commercial reasons. It's obvious but hard to acept if you do not want to see it that way.

Once one engine is out the remaining redundancy must be used to get the plane on the ground safely and not to continue for commercial arguments only this is the key argument against the continuance of the flight.

That and only that is the main reasoning when one has to answer the question of What is the safest course of action.

Actually, the customer required four because with the reliability level of 1960's engines, it was deemed unsafe to cross the pond on fewer. Bigger engines could have been built at that time (or shortly after) but no passenger wanted to trust fewer than four donks.

In fact there was something of a tempest over McD-D & Lockheed proposing trijets for overwater flights. Pan Am and BA were especially reluctant - the early sales of trijets were for transcontinental carriers. ETOPS? Don't make me laugh!

What has happened in the three-plus decades since then?

Performance trend monitoring and other on-wing diagnostics can detect an incipient failure well before the donk coughs. Engine time on wing has gone from a thousand hours to ten thousand or more. The statistics are in a new universe. A second unrelated engine failure in one flight happens at a rate measured in decades. In fact the "typical" flight crewperson will probably never experience a true engine failure in a career of professional flying.

To reiterate: an engine failure (sans fire warning) is not an emergency. When it happens, you survey the situation and make a decision. Then you follow through.

Baritone

You raise a point I've wondered about, trend monitoring. Running the remaining 3 at MCT for XX hrs, does this mess up the the benefits, in maintenance terms, which you gained from a trend program?

And can you answer one more thing, at what point in the flight was it apparent that LHR was not an option?

Thanks

I agree that this is the issue and that decision has been placed in the captains hands. To me it is not black and white whether the decision making process was right or wrong. As has been mentioned before there is demonstrated historical risk to divert or turnback, while there is only implied risk to continued with some loss of redundancy.

I don't see that any lessons learned from a safety standpoint can be gleened from second guessing another choice. I'm quite satisfied that the captain did not make his decision hastily and did consult with others. To me the long and short of it, is that it's the captainjs decision and it should remain that way. There is no need to go to a rule book to sort this out.

From a design engineer's standpoint, the critical airfoils in an engine come up to temperature very quickly. The 5 minute (sometimes 10 minute) TO rating is an artificial one from the metallurgist's view. The limit is really the erosion that takes place over many hundreds or thousands of hours. So, running at MCT for 10 hours won't make the accountants happy, because it might shorten the on-wing time from 10000 hours to 9990 - but it's NOT a safety issue as long as the EGT/ITT/TIT limits are observed.

Probably when they got an estimate of destination holding time from ATC. :ok:

Before someone from the "old school" jumps on me, let me point out that while the technology has played a great part in improving safety, there is a well-documented side effect, namely:

It's possible to Murphy-proof the daylights out a system, to the point that a minimally-trained operator (pilot???) can make it work pretty well 99.9% of the time. But if this becomes a way of life, then safety starts sliding downhill again - we see this in the third world.

Put in other terms, we start raising a new-and-improved generation of "Murphies". :eek:

(My corollary proposition: One pilot should always be over age 60!) :cool:

Well 'AIMS', those are just your personal opinions and have no basis in the rules under which the aircraft was certified.

These same rules state that continued flight is an option as long as it is considered 'as safe'

I contend that it certainly was, all performance parameters were met, and, as stated earlier the remaining redundancy was superior to the majority of modern jet transports (certified by the same FAA)

It seems quite the Irony that this only has become an issue in the US. If the flight had originated elsewhere the continuation would not have been an issue.

Indeed the same aircraft had an engine problem with a consequent shutdown a short time later on a SIN-LHR flight and continued, landing on three with no objection by any of the relevant civil aviation authorities.

We didn't always live in the world of twins and ETOPS, the redundancy enjoyed by 3 and 4 engine transports has been used in such a manner ever since they started service, and continued flight with one shutdown was never questioned, (unless there was good reason) there was not in this case.

Certainly, when the 747 first flew it needed 4 engines, and they were at the limits of their capability.

That is what makes the 744 such a superb and capable design, in that it combines the tremendous redundancy of Boeings conservative design with modern powerplants that provide a quantum leap in performance.

A Solution!
 

Barit 1, you've got the answer.

In fact, the over-60 doesn't even need to fly, he'll be far too decrepid for that.

He (or she, sorry Ma'am) just needs to be tied to the jump seat to mutter "Don't forget Murphy" every 15 minutes between start-up and shut down.

This is only temporary. In around 2020 he'll be replaced by the dog put on the flight deck to bite the systems monitor (ex-Pilot, perhaps? Reborn Flight Engineer?) if he/she tries to take control from the automatics.

When Murphy once stopped my Prentice engine in cloud over the Italian mountains (Naples - Brindisi) because both mags got damp, in his haste to leave with the only umbrella he dropped a card that said "Sooner or later someone will think that it's possible to Murphy-proof a system. That's the moment, Murph' ole boy, to go for it".

Congratulations on the point you were really making...exactly right!

I can only repeat what I have stated before.

The available redundancy should not be used for commercial reasons.

The simple fact that these failures are very rare, means that it’s commercial impact is very low anyway and reinforces the argument.

I am sure that if you ask any CAA if the redundancy is there for commercial reasons they would say no, they would have no other choice.


There is no reason to start a technical discussion since the aforementioned principle makes it obsolete.

The FAA did what they had to do and as far as other CAA is concerned, they are controlled by politics so their opinion does not matter.

I could go flying half pissed but if nothing happens then I did nothing wrong seems to be the reasoning by those who get away with it. This is not good enough.

So how would they defend the flight continuation policy which they approved? How would they justify their recent comments that they were satisfied with BAs conduct of the flight in question? I'm afraid you are wrong again. Give it up.

Politics as always

And what sort of expert are you to make the statements you have as fact? And pray tell us how much experience you have in the industry? In other words- what do you know about it, and if you are an expert, why is your profile so bare?

Aims I was once on a B747 operated by a well known U.S. carrier which, over Greenland, en route to the West Coast had an engine failure. Interestingly, we did not divert to the nearest available airfield. Nor did we continue to the destination. Nope, we went ORD, which happens to be just what the captain told us - a "suitable" maintenance base for the operator in question. (I trust you will concede that this was quite a distance and that many suitable airfields were passed en route).

I did not then, nor do I now consider that the captain or operator did anything strange or unreasonable. However, it seems to me that this falls neatly into the area that you criticise thus: It seems to me that - apart from the utterly circular nature of the dialogue of the deaf which this particular topic seems to generate - that there is a fundamental and fatal logical flaw at work in this type of argument. This is the one that people try to bring out when they start to talk about ETOPs and loss of an engine on a two engined aircraft - in order to make key points about redundancy and levels of safety.

While redundancy and reliability statistics suggest that flights of some time and distance can be achieved within acceptable safety levels on one engine, it is agreed that getting on the ground ASAP is essential. However, were you to add multiple levels of statistical and practical safety and redundancy as in the B747 some people, such as yourself, seem to think that the additional safety margins in the B747 should be ignored in any decision-making. Some even seem keen to consider the B747 on 3 engines to be equivalent - for decision-making purposes - to being on one engine in a twin-engined aircraft. A typical argument is that both are in a state of greater risk (which is a truism, but tells us nothing about comparative risk).

As many B747 pilots have repeatedly pointed out, those who make such arguments rarely show any grasp of either the decision-making process which this crew followed or the level of redundancy in the B747. To repeat, on three engines the B747 has greater redundancy than a twin jet. Dreaming up complex scenarios in which a second engine is lost, etc. is the next response ... which I will not go into, because it has been done to death already.

hi

I liked AIM by IBM's idea about NOT using the redundency for commercial purposes.

Have any of you flown a 4 engine jet on 3 engines? I did a "3 engine ferry" of a BAE146 about 17 years ago. My first 3 weeks on the plane.

Taxied out for takeoff with 4 engines, set takeoff power, really odd sound, taxied back to gate, took passengers off, figured out which engine was "bad"...ferried from KSJC to KSAN ( can you guess the airline?).

So, there you go, everyone can be happy. The passengers can get off the plane and wait for a good one. The bean counters can be happy to get the plane to a major MX facility. The pilots can be happy...well maybe not everyone is happy.

I think the best way to fly anywhere is with all engines running "right". If they aren't running right go to some place safe darn soon. Take care of the passengers and then all you brave guys can do a "3 engine ferry" if you like.


While regulations would let you continue to destination...those regs were thought of in one sense...but GOOD sense would say, in this case, LAND AT THE SECOND BIGGEST CITY IN THE USA at a damn good airport and then worry about it, instead of flying for a dozen hours and STILL NOT GETTING to the destination.


all the best

jon

Hi jon

Problem is, the 'regs' say we can do it, so we do. End of chat.

But it looks like you were not a brave guy. In fact it looks like you are saying that you did something that you thought then, and now, was unsafe. Which raises questions about other issues. Do you think that 3 engine ferry flights are unacceptable and that they should be banned?

When you say you may like the notion, but this is just words. If you operate an aircraft with an "allowable" defect, you are trading redundancy for commercial purposes (the "risk" is deemed acceptable). There are criteria for judging the risk to be acceptable, just as there are criteria for judging some risks to be unacceptable.

The attractive phrase "NOT using the redundancy for commercial purposes" applies to all such examples, but it brings no clarity whatsoever to the different safety issues and the different levels of risk that apply. Which was my point in my earlier post above.

the concept of the forum lacks the punch of face to face conversation.

when I refer to "brave" I meant those who have never flown a 4 engine plane on 3 engines AND still make posts as if they had.

Was the 3 engine ferry I did unsafe? it was not one bit unsafe for the passengers we left at the gate.

And a lightly loaded BAe146 with just 2 pilots and proper fuel for a flight from KSJC to KSAN flys with complete lack of oomph for just about anything. I think we barely made FL180 and that seemed to take forever.

Read the manual someday and enjoy the special things you have to do.


AS to REGS aforementioned (up a couple of posts)...the regs even say I can loop the Golden Gate Bridge, if it is the only way I can save the plane(ultimate authority of the pilot in command)...( a heck of a lot of explaining if that were the case)



But you might remain correct on one concept...you can't regulate good sense!


end of chat

jon

Jon - my only question is - current practice is to have a ferry crew with current simulator trng for the 3-engine ferry. Sounds to me like that your experience was as a line crew. Isn't there a special AFM chapter for this?
(Special preflight inspections, restrictions, etc.)

(Mind you - I'm well aware that ferrying has NOTHING to do with this thread!)

barit1:

you raise an excellent point...at that time ( mind you it was 17 years ago) pretty much everyone had been sim trained in 3 engine ferry on this type of plane...the ALF engine was not the most robust. (ALF= avco lycoming fan?)

Lots of special things to do, even drawing with a pencil certain power settings ON THE THROTTLE quadrant.

I recall the sim training and really flying it on 3 wasn't all that bad...losing another one especially on takeoff would have required considerable skill I think.

if you put the passengers safety and comfort first you probably won't do too badly.

all the best

jon

Safer than sailing across!
 

Leaving the pax behind for a 3 engine ferry means zero risk to the pax from that operation.
Flying over populated areas on 3 rather than 4 increases the risk to people on the ground. The risk is miniscule, but it exists.
The ferry is done to get the aeroplane fixed more cheaply than if everything had to be taken to the aircraft for it to be fixed on site. The risk is accepted for a commercial reason.
Risk is balanced against cost, and this happens every day, on every flight. It would be safer for all pax if they were given high energy 'space' food in little bags, rather than have the danger of trolleys, bottles, cutlery etc loose in turbulence. It would be far safer if all seats (OK, except flight crew!) faced backwards, but pax don't like it, so commercial pressure reduces safety. How about replacing the weight of on-board entertainment systems with airbags? I could go on.
Aviation is probably the most risk-assessed and regulated human activity, and if all this assessment and regulation means that it is deemed to be permissible for a particular 4 engined aircraft to proceed on 3 with an acceptable degree of safety, and if the bloke at the sharp end agrees with that, then what is the problem?
The flight is obviously not as 'safe' on 3 as on 4, but it is a minor and acceptable risk.

IMHO, the interesting topic to discuss is not the safety of this flight, it is why the FAA reacted the way it did.