BA's flight continuation policy remains unchanged! The policy is manufacturer-approved. Issi Noho - assumptions are a dangerous thing in aviation - you 'assume' the decision was crew-led. You talk about a senior BA captain wanting to make up his own annex to the Flying Manual (FM). I can assure you he would have been facing an interview without coffee had he done so. The truth is, the policy is contained in a section of the FM and the decision will have been taken by the crew in conjunction with the best possible advice from the company, in real time. BA's procedures are approved by the CAA. The discussion should now take place between CAA & FAA.

True, but they wouldnt have continued if the alternates weren't cast iron, it was summer and the weather was pretty benign, plus the LAX-LHR great circle is mostly over land, alternates are not as far away as you'd think, once past Winnepeg/Edmonton theres Churchill, Iqaluit, Goose, Sondestrom, Keflavik, indeed the longest stretch of water is probably Iceland - Scotland. We're not talking about a mid atlantic crossing here, in fact i would be surprised if it went out of maybe 90 mins for the whole flight.

The flight continuation policy is common to most JAA airlines, I would imagine there's a continued flight on 3 at least once a month by a European airline if not more often. BA's backup from Base is excellent, they are the most experienced 744 operator in the world.

Pretty much agreed, that's a sensible word indeed.

However, it is not just a matter of regulators, it is also a matter of passengers deciding, whether they feel comfortable with the procedure and feel comfortable with the airline, when the airline does not provide them with the safety margin passengers have paid for.

As such, it could become a financial matter to the airline, if they are perceived as taking unnecessary chances in the public.

Simon

Didn't the flight in question take place on February 19th 2005?

No argument here, that there are plenty of airports around. But for example, I wouldn't fancy to go into Sondrestrom with two engines out ...

Simon

Is this clown for real? Sonderstrom must be in his flight sim.

OK, time has come, once again, to issue a warning to our self appointed 'experts' who in fact have never, ever, flown a B744 and quite probably, never, ever, flown a commercial airliner, never mind a jet. One particular poster in particular seems hell bent on trying to teach those us who do fly heavy jets and the B744 in particular, how to suck eggs.

If you want to appear knowledgeable on these forums then do not try to tell us how to operate, fly and handle abnormal situations. Austrian Simon in particular seems fixated on trying to teach us how to handle a B744 in a cross-wind with two engines out on the same side. :rolleyes: Well, let me tell you AS, unless you are an experienced B744 pilot and I'm willing to wager that you aren't, please wind your neck in a notch or two as you are irritating the majority of us who do fly the B744.

Whilst there are differing opinions on what any of us who fly the B744 would have done under the same circumstances, I don't think any of us would deny that the B744 having a non-catastrophic engine failure at any stage after V1 is not quite the same as having the same problem in a twin engined aircraft. I have again looked through my QRH for the B744 and nowhere does it say land at the nearest suitable airport for an engine failure. Have you any idea of the redundancy available in a B744?

So, please stop wittering on about losing a second engine or climb gradients on two engines. As long as the aircraft still has three engines running it is certified for continued flight. Whether you would want to is another matter and as you will probably only ever be a passenger in one, you will have to rely on the professionalism of the crew and the back up they receive from their operations department, which in BA, is probably one of the best.

Experience of Microsoft Flight Simulator or even having been given a joyride once or twice in a real simulator does not confer on you any 'expertise' worthy of posting irritating pontifications on here. When you've at least qualified to fly a twin engined jet and have a bit of experience behind you, then you will be given the respect you deserve when you post your opinions about how to handle the situation on here. Qualify to fly the aircraft in question, the B744, then you will be listened to and your arguments will have the necessary weight of experience behind them. Until then, please refrain from posting your opinions based on a joyride in a sim.

Blueprint
 

I would like to point out to M. Mouse that I flew 747s for 18yrs. Having overflown Iceland on 3eng a further failure shortly after that point with about 900nm to Man would have led to a serious fuel shortage if that misfortune had occured. We know the a/c landed as it was with fuel low pressure lights illuminated in a critically low fuel state. The crew knowingly flew the a/c into such a situation, that is what the authorities are worried about.

Nice one Danny. About time someone wound his scrawny little neck in!!!!:)

Blueprint they had low fuel pressure on 2 pumps due to a slightly mismanaged crossfeed and at that stage in the approach declared a PAN, they actually landed with about 8t if my memory serves which is not critically low by any means. As for overflying iceland, well you turn back if its before the BIKF/EGCC crit point, you should know that. Anyway Glasgow and Prestwick are well before EGCC

Quite obviously that depends which aviation authority you look at. It certainly looks like, that not all aviation authorities agree with that sentence, and even issue penalties for continuing this flight in question.

What will CAA say, should one flight, which continued past the next suitable airport on three engines, suffer another failure and - Lord beware - crash? Will they then say, that this was just fate and the scenario not foreseeable?

Simon

Why do you think if they had a second failure "shortly after Iceland" they would not have gone back to Keflavik, as a twin would do, or go into Prestwick ?

Well said Danny. As a 400 Captain with 26000 hours and 8000+ on the 400 operating according to my companies SOP, under the circumstances experienced my the BA crew my action would have been same to continue to LHR.

Very interesting thread (again ;) ), although I do have one question.

Austrian Simon, do you actually fly 747s?

What do make out of the minimum climb rates listed on the approach charts, for example LLZ/DME+MKR Runway 10, for the go-around, flying on just two engines?

Simon

Austrian Simon

OK, tell us what the procedures for flying a B747-400 2 engine out approach are.

Do you know? What is the commital height, what does that actually mean? What is the landing configuration, when do you configure? What sort of power settings would you use? If you had to, what is the go-around procedure and how does it differ from a 3 or 4 engines approach?

Demostrate (as Danny says) that you know and have carried out 2-engine approaches in a B744, and then you can question the decisions of a professional crew, until then by al means debate the cultural differences between the FAA and the CAA, but otherwise keep your own council.

I stand by my original posting, pages ago.....as Danny has pointed out, [I]nowhere[I] in the '400 manual, that I recall, is land as soon as possible for 1-eng out.

I also am convinced that with with fewer and fewer 4-eng experienced pilots in th USA, especially in the FAA (mostly ex-mil, particularly Army choppers, in my experience of them), they are brainwashed into 2-eng op. mode. Indeed, the first thing USAF pilots get drilled into them in UPT is a parrot-fashion recital for 'stand-ups' on how to handle an emergency:
1 mantain aircraft control
2 analyse the situation
3 land as soon as conditions permit
Here, I think is the crux of the situation - the FAA inspectors are stuck on phrase three.

Somebody posted earlier ' we're not in a war here'...true, and sound advice indeed. But, we are in a commercial business with slim economic margins; BA has given it's crews a magnificent tool that deserves to be operated to the significant advantages it confers over cheaper twins. We're not crossing at 45North in this example, and the abnormal is not time-critical. I'm pretty sure I'd carry on too. In fact, I have, once.....:cool:

Austrian Simon....oh deary me....it's like trying to lecture Spok about the finer points of comedy....'that's illogical, Captain'
1. Suggest you try flying your -400 sim with enough rudder applied to not need to use aileron - a simple glance down at the top of the yoke would tell you on the graded scale there if you have enough size-11 (oh-wait...the joystick you use has missiles and rear view up there...woops)
2. This will shock you...the -400 will go-around prior to flaps 20 for a 2-eng approach, indeed it will still go around from after that. It can, if you're very brave and know the difference between rudders and the flappy things out at the ends of the wings (they're locked-out at high speed BTW), in fact, climb out from gear retraction at heavy weight after t/o on 2. Hate to try it for real - you have to go to flaps 5 and fly right in the hockey stick, as I recall - sh1t scary out of HKG, but a great scan exercise....
3. I don't know of any Authority out there brave enough to overrule the manufacturer's manual and ban 3-engine continued flight...
4. Please don't let me ever land with you in a podded jet in a strong crosswind if aileron and roll-rates are primary in your mind...I've been scared-a-plenty with agricultural wing-warping at low altitude...the crosswind limit for 2-eng is a combination of available rudder deflection and level wings (a small amount of wing down is available, but I believe no credit on certification). The ailerons come into play primarily on roll-out. If you mash the yoke around, the 400 just shudders, as will the Captain.;)

Photon torpedo running....

Austrian Simon,

What Topbunk is trying to tell you is that commit to landing with the B747 on 2 engines is GEAR DOWN.

That makes min climb rates for a go around rather irrelevant.

PS. I think that armchair quaterbacks should leave the professionals to do their job. I have no doubt that these guys proceeded after considering ALL the options and that they still had options open to them when they made the decision to go to Manchester.

Minimum climb gradients are for "normal" operations.In a G/A,you will level out at 800/1000 agl,cleanup and,if feasable,comply with an emergency escape procedure published by the company(advising ATC)using the departure emergency policy published by each concerned airline for that specific runway(some on the airport analysis,some on special procedure manuals).All airports where heavy birds operate,there are these procedures,due to non-minimum climb gradients obtained and it takes you to MSA and dumping area combined for;
holding x resolving x crm'ing x preparing X deciding x returning.

3 engines on a 4 bird,2 engines on a 3 bird are considered an ABNORMAL situation.Decision to go/nogo lies entierly on crew/sop.

2 engines ferry flights on a Tri bird and 3 engines ferry on a quad bird are common.No PAX,special crew and clearance necessary.Saves the compan a bundle to bring it back to base for overhaul(eng change abroad at ramp)
witch would require hauling spare eng,crew and service(a million bucks).
These crews are certified by the company/manufacter/FAA/JAA/CAA and,special training is required for these operations.Not to mention a special procedure on the AFM,with at least 25/30 pages of maintanance requirements(yes,strapping the fan is part of it too...).
Been there,done that..Transatlantic and Inter Europe.
Regards

Ricky, not quite correct. The QRH has a note stating 'do not attempt a missed approach after landing gear is extended'. However, if you've trained on the B744, you will probably have tried the two engined go-around utilising the kinetic energy still available after gear extension. The QRH suggests gear down at glideslope intercept, which quite often is at around 2000'-3000'.

So, aside from Austrian Simons parallel universe, we could retract the gear and clean up to at least flap 1 whilst accelerating DOWN the glideslope to initiate a climb before reaching minimums. You have to be careful about how much thrust you apply so that it is commensurate with directional control. Ooh er! I bet they don't teach you that in MS Flight Sim! :rolleyes:

Based on Austrian Simons logic, I should never fly because if I lose one engine then I might lose another. I'd rather face that in a B744 than a twin, three hours from the nearest suitable airport.

Austrian Simon, please do us all a favour and refrain from your comments on here because they serve no purpose other than to irritate with no substance to provide any mitigation. The only issue here is whether the FAA are right or wrong to fine BA for continuing the flight instead of landing at the nearest suitable airport. In my book, as a B744 pilot, albeit, with nowhere nearly enough experience to make such a command decision, the BA captain did nothing illegal. Whilst I may not have reached the same conclusion and may have decided to continue as far east as was practical whilst my ops department set up a reroute to JFK or EWR, so that we could arrange onward transfers for our pax, I have no doubt that the BA crew involved weighed up all their options and continued on the basis that it was feasible. What happened later to cause the fuel problem is irrelevant to this case as it could have had the same effect if they'd not lost an engine and been kept below optimum levels and the winds were not as favourable as forecast.

"Whilst I may not have reached the same conclusion and may have decided to continue as far east as was practical whilst my ops department set up a reroute to JFK or EWR, so that we could arrange onward transfers for our pax...."

In my humble view (and I don't claim to have flown a 744 - and most definitely not a Microsoft Flight Sim!), that would have been the most prudent option - although probably not the cheapest for the airline.

Just because 'you can' doesn't mean 'you should'.

With respect Beagle, 'most prudent' does not always equate to 'correct'.

I would take the decision to continue as being the correct decision IF having considered all the factors, including of course enroute contingency planning of fuel and alternates it met my/company criteria. This may vary from day to day.

I would have to have a 'check mark' or 'tick' in all the boxes to continue, and the default would be that if that were that not the case, to proceed to a suitable enroute alternate. Remember time is not a factor here, as it takes about 5 hours from LAX to leaving mainland Canada. At all stages using the DODAR concept, there is the R=Review option or 'howgoesit', and decisions can be changed - that is exercising good CRM/command/decision making skills.

Diverting somewhere enroute is sometimes the 'easy' option, not the'correct' option. Making such decisions to continue are sometimes more difficult than that to divert and shows calm, rational thought and certainly not a reckless commitment to continue.

I applaud my colleagues:ok:

Mike - were the FAA invited to send a representative to that meeting, as they're the ones squawking the loudest? Has a copy been info'ed to them?
Just curious...

Top Bunk, absolutely correct. Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Montreal, etc must have all been fairly close abeam, ORD,BOS,JFK a little further. It's not press-on-itis, it's teamwork and confidence in a plan. By the time Montreal was passed, the plan must have looked solid. BA are not idiots.

And I can just imagine the tree-hugger headlines in California if BA had stayed off-shore and dumped fuel over their cute little sea-otters: "Nasty Colonials attempt to destroy precious marine habitat during jet near-disaster".
:hmm:

The FAA has more pressing problems here at home with the dismal state of service in the US carriers and lack of infrastructure investment...:mad:

TopBunk and Danny,

ACH (asymmetric committal height): the height, from which a safe go-around is assured (or as the regulation says, below which the pilot SHOULD not attempt another approach), taking into account the time needed to accelerate the engine, retract gear and reduce flaps, the airplane type, gross weight, elevation of the airport, temperature, winds, obstacle clearance and qualification of pilot.

In reviewing the manuals I found the notice, that on a two engine approach landing is committed upon lowering the gear (and then found comments along the same line in messages here - thanks!).

That raises an interesting question however: What do you do, if the landing target is not assured for one or the other reason, when you get down to say 300 feet AGL?

Where did I say or imply that? My kernel argument is, that loosing an engine reduces safety margin and increases risk, which should be kept as short and as minimal as possible.

BTW, as you have mentioned that too: I did not say anywhere, that this crew did anything illegal. I have not mentioned the legal side at all in my postings so far. I argue from the point of risk management and safety margins and the paying customers' (those, who in the end pay the wages of pilots and all other employees of airlines) perceiption of safety issues.

The discussion so far has shown, that an approach on two engines leaves no safety margin whatsoever, if between lowering the gear and arriving on the runway a safe landing is prevented.

And that's exactly, what I said in all my postings today. A Go-Around is not an option in this scenario, neither performancewise because of the insufficient achievable climb gradient (as I said throughout the discussion) nor legally as I now learned from reviewing the manuals, so the go-around out of a two engine approach is not an option on any airport. That is actually worse than I believed earlier today.

My mistakes in this discussion, as it has unfolded, has been the language, which is not in line with regular pilot talk (of course! See below), the oversight of the legal ban of a go-around on the two engine approach, once the gear has been lowered, and too late a review of manuals.

So far the discussion could not change my view. If you will, despite being an European, I am with FAA on this one.

Now, I am software developer, developing mathematic models of air flow and aerodynamics of airplanes - as such I have flown a significant number of hours in full flight sims of various airplane types and have flown them all into their extremes to cross check predictions out of the modelling (so my "joyrides" were "workrides" in reality). Clearly, I do not know all the details of procedures, certainly not the legal side of them and certainly not by heart.

Me, too, no doubt about that. I just need to mention the Atlantic Glider ...

Simon

Danny, I know that I will never take control of a 747 :ugh:
But I have to say, to continue to the point that you issue a mayday(yes they did) call on final, thinking that you did not have enough fuel to perform a go-around. In that situation you have no options, you have to land
I just think it may have been prudent to put it down before it got to that stage.
I know you guys get paid to make these decisions but I have to agree with B-Eagle on this one.:8
E.F.

Just how many times does it have to be posted?

They had enough fuel.

They missunderstood the information presented to them.

They were not about to run out of fuel.

They had 8 tons on landing.

8 tons is close to an hours flying time.

They were NOT about to run out of fuel.

Egerton. I'm glad you and BEagle agree. Neither of you have flown the aircraft concerned. Blueprint (whose posting was erroneous and misleading) had flown Classics, I guess, and BEagle, I believe, the mighty '10. (BEagle: like it or not, if it happened again tomorrow, we'd probably do it again)

The 747 is designed to do it, the manufacturer approves it, the CAA certifies it, the operator trains it (and approved it in this case), the crew were happy with it on the day and the FAA have their collective heads up their @rses.

Now PLEASE can we save some bandwidth for the BA pension thread ;) ??

PS: Austrian Simon: if English is not your first language then congratulations on the standard of your postings. Most professional pilots are not software developers (NoD excepted :) ) and we would not dream of offering advice on a software developers forum. I can understand your interest in the subject, but with respect, your experience (as described by you) does not enable you to contribute anything meaningful to the B744 qualified pilots on here in this discussion. Welcome to PPRuNe!

I know I am wasting my breath but...

Before commencing the approach you make sure you have an assured landing. You are cleared to land before commencing the approach. In other words the runway is sterile. It is yours.

A go around from AFTER gear down is practiced in the simulator, and perfectly flyable. Indeed it is in the current BA check.

The B747-400 is certified to do it. Boeing have approved the procedure. It is part of the aircraft certification. How on earth is that illegal??

l337

Yes they had enough fuel but it was mostly in Nbr 2 tank.
I know I am a mere engineer, but I find the B744 fuel system complicated.
If you fly a B777 or A320 or B737, go look at the B744 fuel system. 8 tanks and 16 pumps and override pumps and transfer valves and point sensors etc. It would be complicated for an F/E let alone a pilot. However in NORMAL operations it works just fine. The pilots set it up at engine start and then leave it alone. During the cruise they get an EICAS message and turn off some switches. And the rest is automatic. However, with an engine out, you have to do things differently. You have to keep the aircraft balanced, and use up all the fuel in Nbr 2 tank before TOD. This may sound easy , but its not. They had fuel left in Nbr 2 tank, and the book says tank to engine on descent. So they landed with LHR fuel, but unusable. I hope the BA B744 manual explains how to do this better now.

By the way I have taken off in a Tristar on a 2 engine ferry flight and thought the lack of V1 was not very funny, especially as the F/E told me as we were taxying out for T/O!

Blueloo wrote:

The reason we have those enhanced standards is precisely because they are inherently less safe than 3/4 eng a/c. And for your info.- the BA 767 engines are directly compatible with the 744 and vice-versa. Same motors, just that you've only got two to start with.





AS wrote:

That's why you make sure that rwy is yours & yours alone for the approach.:rolleyes:

You are applying twin-engine logic to a 4-eng a/c. :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

You're still not listening. 2-eng is perfectly safe including G/A. Depending on weight, OAT etc a G/A from about 500' is achievable. It's been a while since I flew the a/c, but we used to practice just that - G/A after the commit point. If some moron decides to drive his van across a 'sterile' rwy with Mayday traffic at 1nm Final on 2 engines then he deserves to have his genes removed from the gene-pool.

Double engine failure and a rwy incursion at 300'. You're stretching the bounds of reality now AS.

Hogwash.

No it is not. No more difficult than a single-engine apch on a twin.

AS, I don't mean to be sarcastic, but there is so much more you said earlier that is complete nonsense to those of us who earn a living flying these things. I just can't be bothered to respond to the rest.

A period of silence from you would now be most welcome.

Idol (12yrs 100/200 & 400). And unlike you, I'm no expert.

Someone mentioned specially trained 3 engine ferry crews, in BA only one person on a ferry flight has any exceptional training and that is normally a training captain. An ordinary line FO, with no extra training, occupies the other seat.

That is BA's CAA approved procedure for a 3 engine ferry.

Danny,

Yep, I am aware of the note, but was trying to keep it simple for our Simon. I have practised said procedure.

Cheers,

Ricky :ok:

idol detent - you are forgetting so many other factors which are required for ETOPS certification. It is not just about the engines. It is about many systems. THe engines play a large part in the equation, and an engine failure from an ETOPS fleet aircraft can affect the ETOPS certification.



What this comes down to was, was this the safest course of action. The answer to that will be debated. Continue with and engine failed and have to declare a fuel emergency..... or dump fuel and land at MLW.

For my mind, Safety before schedule will remain my priority.

Quite. I was merely poining out that the BA767 and -400 engines are the same. They are not ETOPS 'special editions' as was implied in your post. ;)


Likewise.

Having used all the resources available to them and considered the many factors that needed to be considered, the crew elected to continue on 3 engs. Nothing illegal and not un-safe to my mind. I would quite possibly have done the same. Why the FAA are up in arms is beyond me.

Rgds

Idol

The safest option was not to leave the ground in the first place. Flying is not risk free. The only question is was a flight on 3 engines at an acceptable level of risk.

Nearly every 744 pilot on this forum seems to believe that the risk was at an acceptable level, why do the non 744 pilots find this so difficult to comprehend?

I am only wanabee, but the arguments put forward by the 744 pilots along with my respect for BA leaves me in no doubt that their decision was sound.

Requirements and considerations for three engine ferry don't apply in this case. Special training and crewing for the ferry scenario is necessary due to the abnormal takeoff procedures and handling characteristics encountered when initially setting off with only three out of four. In a nutshell, the difficult bit of getting airborne on three is tracking the runway as thrust is applied and correctly responding to the loss of a second engine. Quite tricky actually, with some of it going against the grain but all completely irrelevant in the case of an engine failing after a normal takeoff.

There's a set margin of safety, and this flight certainly cut into it, although whether the cut was deep enough to compromise that safety is obviously open to debate. When operating on three prepare for operating on two, and plan accordingly with a knowledge of the limitations and risk that the situation is going to impose. Suffice to say that it would seem as though commercial considerations entered into this particular go/no-go decision. Continuing wasn't actually unsafe because nothing went additionally wrong, but under the given the circumstances landing and calling it a day would undoubtedly have been safer. The FAA has a point - why roll the dice?

So many replies to this thread, and only Strepsils has come close to getting it right. Again, the relevent part of FAR 121.565:

Did the aircraft have the fuel to make the airport (Healthrow) that the PIC selected? No it did not, since an emergency was declared and a fuel diversion to Manchester was required, short of Heathrow.

Therefore was proceeding to the selected airport (Heathrow) as safe as landing at the nearest airport? No it was not, because the aircraft didn't have the fuel to make the selected airport (Heathrow).

One of the linked articles speculates that the crew might have had the fuel if they had not spent so much time over the Pacific near LAX. Maybe so, but this does not change the requirement that most of the flight has to be planned all over again (as required by FAR 121.565) before continuing the flight.

Was the crew in violation of FAR 121.565 when they turned the pointy end East towards Healthrow? Yes they were, because they did not meet the requirement of part (b)(2) of this regulation.

It really is that simple.

According to what I have read on this thread, they did meet the requirement of 121.565. People keep saying they had LHR fuel(and I assune alternate fuel). But from what swedish steve said, here on page 4, if I read it correctly, they mismanaged their fuel. Or perhaps there was a fuel pump malfunction, or something similar. Can anyone confirm.

Just to reapeat what I said on the original thread. The FAA's original complaint was filed by an inexperienced FAA duty officer who has since been sat upon. The decision to continue the flight was made in accordance with the Company Ops manual which had been filed with and approved by the FAA so that they ,the FAA, could issue a Foriegn Carrier Certificate.

END OF STORY (again)

Cheers Beerdrinker.

As suspected - look like the Septics are trying to back out in a face saving manner.

I agree with Mike J. Improving their 3rd world airports would be a good start - although I have to say that I love the simplicity of their departures.

Utter rubbish.

The QRH on the day covered the senario they arrived at.

That is "All pumps on, all cross-feeds open"

Simple.