It's not many years (mid 1990s) since pilots were out there changing the gear downlock inspection lights on Airtours' MD83s. Pre-9/11 most of us carried a Leatherman or similar, so it wasn't difficult. The lights were a no-go item, so if one failed in the middle of a night Heraklion you had to fix it. In my current airline, getting any bulb changed on a 30 minute turnround at base is no problem at all.

The rules are of course a little stricter now. In those days we wouldn't think twice about opening up a RB211 downroute, adding oil and and buttoning it up again. If the cowling had closed when it shouldn't have done, the pilot would have been chopped in half. And if it had opened when it shouldn't..........

AAIB could come to no other conclusion. There are some things that the commander of an aircraft, whether it be a Cub or 747, has to take the blame for. Striking a stationary aircraft with your own is one of them I'm afraid.

Yes, but.........
 

Nowhere is it written how far from a stopbar or preceeding a/c should the commander of an a/c stop.

Remember in this incident the baby crew elected to hold behind a quadrapuff but so far back they infringed the taxiway strip of both Twy Victor and the crossing link.

And had the perfect right so to do. At other times one can see 3 or 4 a/c occupy the same space that then only 2 did.

A year apart wing tips clashed at LHR at the 27L hold, both incidents involved a/c commanders deciding where to stop and infringing adjacent taxiway strips.

Anybody agree with me that to stop this happening again we could agree a common standard or recommended practice of an acceptable stopping distance from a RTHP or preceeding a/c?

Discuss.

CAA take note

BALPA copy

ICAO in your own time.

Sir George Cayley

I would like to know much more about why the Capt of the 76 feinted. Was he that unwell prior to push? If so this is seriously unprofessional. If not was it the shock of the incident and what lessons can we learn from that?

Thank god that the 76 did not need to perform an emergency evac.. non company cabin crew and an unconcious Capt....great stuff!!!!!!

Pure stress.... adrenalin rush.....did it.... AnywayI always found things went better if I fainted and was not involved when something went wrong....legal faint...well rested.

FLybeeeee I think you haven't expressed yourself very well, the AIB report doesn't BLAME anyone for the accident it merely points out that the primary responsibility for avoiding the collision lies with the Captain of the 767. The AIB quite rightly points out that even when following anATC clearance collision avoidance is still the crews ultimate responsibility, this doesn't only apply on the ground but is also applicable in the air.

I think it is a common international convention that AIB's do not apportion blame, they report facts. If their is any institution that apportions blame then it would be a court of law.

The AIB made three recomendations, non of them blamed the capt or crew of the 767.

Spottyemm,
There is nothing unprofessional about this 767 skipper. He was not feeling unwell and his medical was in tact.The rest is between him and his doctor. He is a highly experienced Longhaul pilot who had a bad night.

The cabin crew were excel crew trained in the sop for that aircraft, all approved by the CAA so where do you get the non company crew idea from. The guys flying had been on the contract for a considerable time and probably had (and still have) a better working relationshp than 80 % of the supersilious sounding colleagues of yours. Spotty M or spotty arse you lot are just charter oiks like the rest of us and thank god it wasnt you that made a mistake waiting to happen.