Boeing at X-Roads?
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@ MechEngr
I didn't spend the time it would have required to scan through various threads and count instances where posts you had written about Ethiopian's MAX accident prompted, or even provoked, disagreement by this SLF/attorney. (Even after 800 posts on this forum, my non-pilot, non-engineer limited knowledge has to be noted - I wouldn't be posting at all if I didn't want to keep learning.)
The sequence of cause-and-effect links (causal links, not "karma") as you have detailed in the post make much sense. A lawyer who won't admit a prior lack of understanding or admit prior error doesn't need to be disbarred (or deplatformed from the forum) but isn't much good, not even pretty much good, to anybody. Anybody serious or holding responsibility, that is.
But where I have to disagree is the way in which your views appear - at least appear - to exonerate many other failings others have pointed out, including in official reports by what I think are objective groups. The Dept of Transp. IG reports (iirc there were more than one), the extensively detailed House Committee report, and others (apologies for not knowing the catalogue as a memory item).
Okay, the workings of MCAS wasn't a strategy error. Yet the commitment to bean-counting management, bonus-driven non-engineering senior leadership, the litany of strategy decisions following the merger . . . quite plausibly your views don't dispute these were each giant steps in the direction of "the crossroads" although your views downplay them for the simple reason that the cascade of the MAX crisis obscures everything else. The crisis at Boeing isn't just the result of the over-reaction to the second MAX crash. That over-reaction didn't lead to the battery fires early in the Dreamliner's service. It didn't lead to the evident decline in manufacturing quality controls. I'm not trying to squeeze into one post the quantity of details about manufacturing problems as recited - i.e., alleged, in the Spirit class action lawsuit or even in the late Barnett Dep't of Labor whistleblower suit. There is more to the crisis and arrival at the crossroads than the serious adverse impact of the over-reaction.
And I think many here with knowledge far beyond what I can muster up would agree that the incorporation of MCAS into the 737 was itself the result of mismanagement by the bean-counter mentality which led to one variant too many for the type. And then in turn, to the improper interactions with FAA during certification, lack of sufficient information in the FCOM, and so on. I mean, that an Emergency AD was even necessary after a fatal crash isn't the stuff that the Boeing of Engineering Preeminence was made from. That conclusion does not deny the logic and facts as you relate them about the Ethiopian crash provoking a vast, nearly conspiratorial over-reaction, but it does recognize that Boeing nevertheless has been mismanaged to the point of crisis, at a X-roads. A crisis intensified and made deeper by the over-reaction - I agree with this, despite earlier obtuseness on my part.
I'm not touching AF447 and claims MCAS would have made the difference, and not because it is a bald counter-factual; see "SLF/attorney only." Still, thanks quite a lot, Mech, for your post(s) and stating your views.
I didn't spend the time it would have required to scan through various threads and count instances where posts you had written about Ethiopian's MAX accident prompted, or even provoked, disagreement by this SLF/attorney. (Even after 800 posts on this forum, my non-pilot, non-engineer limited knowledge has to be noted - I wouldn't be posting at all if I didn't want to keep learning.)
The sequence of cause-and-effect links (causal links, not "karma") as you have detailed in the post make much sense. A lawyer who won't admit a prior lack of understanding or admit prior error doesn't need to be disbarred (or deplatformed from the forum) but isn't much good, not even pretty much good, to anybody. Anybody serious or holding responsibility, that is.
But where I have to disagree is the way in which your views appear - at least appear - to exonerate many other failings others have pointed out, including in official reports by what I think are objective groups. The Dept of Transp. IG reports (iirc there were more than one), the extensively detailed House Committee report, and others (apologies for not knowing the catalogue as a memory item).
Okay, the workings of MCAS wasn't a strategy error. Yet the commitment to bean-counting management, bonus-driven non-engineering senior leadership, the litany of strategy decisions following the merger . . . quite plausibly your views don't dispute these were each giant steps in the direction of "the crossroads" although your views downplay them for the simple reason that the cascade of the MAX crisis obscures everything else. The crisis at Boeing isn't just the result of the over-reaction to the second MAX crash. That over-reaction didn't lead to the battery fires early in the Dreamliner's service. It didn't lead to the evident decline in manufacturing quality controls. I'm not trying to squeeze into one post the quantity of details about manufacturing problems as recited - i.e., alleged, in the Spirit class action lawsuit or even in the late Barnett Dep't of Labor whistleblower suit. There is more to the crisis and arrival at the crossroads than the serious adverse impact of the over-reaction.
And I think many here with knowledge far beyond what I can muster up would agree that the incorporation of MCAS into the 737 was itself the result of mismanagement by the bean-counter mentality which led to one variant too many for the type. And then in turn, to the improper interactions with FAA during certification, lack of sufficient information in the FCOM, and so on. I mean, that an Emergency AD was even necessary after a fatal crash isn't the stuff that the Boeing of Engineering Preeminence was made from. That conclusion does not deny the logic and facts as you relate them about the Ethiopian crash provoking a vast, nearly conspiratorial over-reaction, but it does recognize that Boeing nevertheless has been mismanaged to the point of crisis, at a X-roads. A crisis intensified and made deeper by the over-reaction - I agree with this, despite earlier obtuseness on my part.
I'm not touching AF447 and claims MCAS would have made the difference, and not because it is a bald counter-factual; see "SLF/attorney only." Still, thanks quite a lot, Mech, for your post(s) and stating your views.
Paxing All Over The World
Thank You MechEng for that clarification. I suggest, following that first CEO admission, that there has been a lot of obfuscation from Boeing. In the wider passenger arena, their reputation is mud. I recognise that the media have had a field day and contributed heavily to that result - but Boeing did not seem capable of getting back in charge.
WillowRun 6-3
That is how it looks to the passenger. The fact that Southwest would not accept more detailed flight crew training (=$$$) was another part of the problem and Boeing gave in to that.
I sit to be corrected.
WillowRun 6-3
And I think many here with knowledge far beyond what I can muster up would agree that the incorporation of MCAS into the 737 was itself the result of mismanagement by the bean-counter mentality which led to one variant too many for the type. And then in turn, to the improper interactions with FAA during certification, lack of sufficient information in the FCOM, and so on. I mean, that an Emergency AD was even necessary after a fatal crash isn't the stuff that the Boeing of Engineering Preeminence was made from. That conclusion does not deny the logic and facts as you relate them about the Ethiopian crash provoking a vast, nearly conspiratorial over-reaction, but it does recognize that Boeing nevertheless has been mismanaged to the point of crisis, at a X-roads. A crisis intensified and made deeper by the over-reaction - I agree with this, despite earlier obtuseness on my part.
I sit to be corrected.
Whoa there! These discussions, with their divergent views -- and loyalties -- generally make for good reading, even when there are significant disagreements around the facts, or purported facts. Obviously we should try to have an open mind when we see an opinion that differs from our own (even if it's stated as a fact...). But... your statement about AF447 is a bridge too far. Way too far. Why? Even if we accept your hypothesis that MCAS would have / could have saved the day (which I for one do not accept), that accident, as with many accidents, was the result of a myriad of factors; some complex, some simple, some procedural, some technological, some cultural. I don't think you've helped your case at all with that incredible, simplistic -- and biased -- statement.
Regardless of cause, the symptom in AF447 was a stalled aircraft and the solution was to put the nose down. The origin of that symptom is complex, but the solution was not.
And here was I thinking that MCAS was implemented to meet certification stick force gradient requirements. You comment with great authority on aircraft design and aircraft design failures. I'm curious to know if you ever been involved with specification, development, or certification of aircraft systems? I don't see that experience in your profile.
My engineering experience included a stint with McD fighter advanced aerodynamics group and F-15 performance support group, but they used my degree to make graphs. They never put into production the canard version of the F-15 I was to take stripped paper printouts and something they called WTDS terminals to make those graphs. I later did core design work on the mechanicals for two radar systems for the US Air Force, one of them for special ops, at a different company.
There are a lot of differing opinions on the wisdom of the Airbus no-feedback design - which would require its own thread.
The unwanted software response of MCAS was entirely due to a failure to create an accurate systems architecture model by the systems engineering group. Had an accurate model been included in the original spec to the software developers this discussion would never have happened. The "dual input" discussions were about ensuring MCAS operated when it should, not about preventing operation when it shouldn't. It was a case no one identified. More money, more time, more review, were not likely to turn up this accepted performance by the SMYD as a problem source.
In particular the failure to adequately test and validate mission critical software is chilling.
the symptom in AF447 was a stalled aircraft and the solution was to put the nose down. The origin of that symptom is complex, but the solution was not
This accident prompted Airbus to develop a fail-safe modification for its flight control software by preventing the airplane's built-in protection against stall from being activated by a high rate of change for the angle of attack
Notable today in the media are the chiefs of both Ryanair (O'Leary) and Etihad (Neves) going on about delayed aircraft deliveries, citing the impact this has on their projected business.
But of course this is just what leads to pressure down from the boardroom to the production managers to "get the planes out, don't hold up the line", which we have heard so much about. Sure, Boeing seem to have taken orders for more than they can deliver. But pushing for maximum output by the line seems to be how we got here in the first place.
But of course this is just what leads to pressure down from the boardroom to the production managers to "get the planes out, don't hold up the line", which we have heard so much about. Sure, Boeing seem to have taken orders for more than they can deliver. But pushing for maximum output by the line seems to be how we got here in the first place.
Whoa there! These discussions, with their divergent views -- and loyalties -- generally make for good reading, even when there are significant disagreements around the facts, or purported facts. Obviously we should try to have an open mind when we see an opinion that differs from our own (even if it's stated as a fact...). But... your statement about AF447 is a bridge too far. Way too far. Why? Even if we accept your hypothesis that MCAS would have / could have saved the day (which I for one do not accept), that accident, as with many accidents, was the result of a myriad of factors; some complex, some simple, some procedural, some technological, some cultural. I don't think you've helped your case at all with that incredible, simplistic -- and biased -- statement.
I agree. The A330 in “normal law” would not have stalled, the EFCS prevents it whatever the pilots do. But AF447 encountered icing conditions causing pitot tube icing that resulted in autopilot disconnect and the flight mode switching to “alternate law 2”. In this law high angle of attack protection is lost. That is my understanding.
None of the above having happened I suspect we have reached, and perhaps exceeded, the permitted limits of thread drift.
The title of this thread is “Boeing at the crossroads”
I think how Boeing got here can be debated around the edges but the broad outline is pretty clear. So the real question is what now ?
Is Boeing too broken to fix ? Personally I think so but. Would love to be proven wrong.
I think how Boeing got here can be debated around the edges but the broad outline is pretty clear. So the real question is what now ?
Is Boeing too broken to fix ? Personally I think so but. Would love to be proven wrong.
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When a new aircraft type is certified, it includes a Maintenance Planning Document (MPD), which spells out what maintenance tasks should be performed and at what intervals (hours and/or cycles) to maintain a safe, airworthy aircraft. That MPD is blessed by the certifying authority - in Boeing's case the FAA Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (aka SACO).
Part of an operator being granted authorization to operate that aircraft type is getting their maintenance plan approved by the local authority (important point here - that it's done 'locally' - nothing goes back to certification office such as SACO). To start with, that plan is usually based on the manufactures MPD - often verbatim. At entry into service, the MPD is typically pretty conservative - with relatively short maintenance intervals because the manufacturer simply doesn't now how some things are going to react in daily use in the field. So there are provisions to 'escalate' (extend) those intervals once the operator gets sufficient experience with the aircraft to see what really needs to done and how often to maintain the aircraft. To get a task 'extended', the operator puts together something showing that their experience shows the maintenance task doesn't need to be done as often as specified in the MPD - the local authority reviews that data and grants or denies the extension - again nothing goes back to the original certification office (even if the operator is based in the same local as the original cert office, it's a different 'branch' of the FAA and they don't really communicate). I believe in some cases, a task escalation can be approved by a designee (think DER), not part of the regular regulatory authority. The only exception is CMRs (Certification Maintenance Requirements) - CMRs cannot be escalated except by the original certification authority. Operators hate CMRs - best case they are a lot of paperwork, worst case an operation event such as a diversion can leave an aircraft AOG, requiring remote maintenance or a special, non-revenue positioning flight to get it back to where the task can be performed (expensive and a big paperwork hassle).
In the case of the Alaska jackscrew, the jackscrew maintenance interval had been legally escalated from something like 1,000 hours to something like 5,000 hours (which of course turned out to be excessive).
And yes, I do think the process is flawed - as a minimum the certificating authority should be informed of task escalations in excess of a certain percentage of the MPD numbers - with the authority and ability to reject escalations that appear excessive - especially for flight critical systems.
Part of an operator being granted authorization to operate that aircraft type is getting their maintenance plan approved by the local authority (important point here - that it's done 'locally' - nothing goes back to certification office such as SACO). To start with, that plan is usually based on the manufactures MPD - often verbatim. At entry into service, the MPD is typically pretty conservative - with relatively short maintenance intervals because the manufacturer simply doesn't now how some things are going to react in daily use in the field. So there are provisions to 'escalate' (extend) those intervals once the operator gets sufficient experience with the aircraft to see what really needs to done and how often to maintain the aircraft. To get a task 'extended', the operator puts together something showing that their experience shows the maintenance task doesn't need to be done as often as specified in the MPD - the local authority reviews that data and grants or denies the extension - again nothing goes back to the original certification office (even if the operator is based in the same local as the original cert office, it's a different 'branch' of the FAA and they don't really communicate). I believe in some cases, a task escalation can be approved by a designee (think DER), not part of the regular regulatory authority. The only exception is CMRs (Certification Maintenance Requirements) - CMRs cannot be escalated except by the original certification authority. Operators hate CMRs - best case they are a lot of paperwork, worst case an operation event such as a diversion can leave an aircraft AOG, requiring remote maintenance or a special, non-revenue positioning flight to get it back to where the task can be performed (expensive and a big paperwork hassle).
In the case of the Alaska jackscrew, the jackscrew maintenance interval had been legally escalated from something like 1,000 hours to something like 5,000 hours (which of course turned out to be excessive).
And yes, I do think the process is flawed - as a minimum the certificating authority should be informed of task escalations in excess of a certain percentage of the MPD numbers - with the authority and ability to reject escalations that appear excessive - especially for flight critical systems.
while I usually learn a lot from your posts (thanks for all your inputs!), I feel I need to jump in here. ;-)
The last time I had to deal with an MPD, I found it is not approved by any authority; it´s rather an OEM "compendium" / guideline (It´s a good starting point to build an AMP, and it provides an industry-wide "language" when it comes to contracting a (base) maintenance event to an MRO outside of your own company). I guess you meant the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR), which indeed is approved by an authority.
The other issue: I wouldn´t say that operators "hate" CMRs. Only now and then, an OEM lets operators look behind the rather solid 21J-curtain at the SSAs. So, we rather have deep respect for any maintenance task that bears those magic three letters. They also usually don´t generate more paperwork than other tasks in my point of view. Finally - if a CMR causes an AOG due to a diversion, I´d say the planning department of the operator has been a bit too agressive on interval utilisation; because of the consequences you rightly point out, you´d always avoid planning a CMR on the last day/cycle/hour.
Thanks again for your valuable inputs!
J.V.
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Airline customers want to meet with the Board
Excerpt from start of Wall Street Journal article (March 22):
"Boeing ’s biggest U.S. customers are taking their frustrations directly to its board of directors.
A group of airline chiefs recently requested a meeting with Boeing’s board to express concern over the Alaska Airlines accident and production problems that have upended the industry’s plans, people familiar with the matter said.
The airline bosses want Boeing directors to address the mounting fallout from the Jan. 5 panel blowout on a 737 MAX and to spell out their plan for fixing the aircraft maker’s quality problems.
Boeing has responded by offering to send Chairman Larry Kellner, a former chief executive of Continental Airlines, and other board members to meet the leaders of its key U.S. customers as soon as next week, the people said. Boeing directors also are expected to meet in coming weeks with CEOs of international airlines that rely on its jets."
Can't tell with any certainty if the airline chiefs wanted to meet with the entire Board in the setting of a Board meeting, though that would appear quite an unlikely scenario (despite the way the article descibes it). But perhaps further reporting will provide more clarity.
This development (or at least, it's a news item) prompts another observation. In situations where a company is insolvent or nearing insolvency, forms of receivership may be activated. (Not practicing in the field of creditors' rights or restructurings so I hope I've got this correct). Boeing already is subject to unusual and possibly unprecedented restrictions or limits on production rates, as well as other regulatory oversight steps, imposed by the FAA. And . . .
And at the same time, the DOJ investigation into the door plug Rapid Unplanned Disassembly event is taking flak from the NTSB and various industry worthies as interfering with "just culture". But DOJ has to deal with the pendency of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, even if at this time cooler heads prevailing might have argued against any criminal proceeding against Boeing in the first place. The imperatives of the DPA also would appear to have been intensified by the federal appellate court ruling which held that the crash victims' families have to be given their (proverbial) "day in court" pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act. I hasten to point out that even if the DPA should never have been entered because the criminal case shouldn't even have begun, and correlatively even if (therefore) the crash victims' families should not really be identified as "crime victims", the DPA is a legal fact of life.
But is that the end? Could it be possible to construct a new form?? I'd called it, "federal regulatory receivership." (1) The DPA provides some statutory authority, not enough, but it's something to start with. (2) Convene a higher-order form of something called the PBFA, Policy Board for Federal Aviation. It's an interagency group which (as I understand it, which may not be very much) deals with policy issues where various federal agencies, offices and departments all have one or more pieces of an overall issue and nobody owns the entire decision process. Modify it, bring in the necessary heavyweights from FAA and NTSB. Let key senior staffers from the Congressional Committees (and subcommittees) with significant jurisdiction participate as observers (not any Reps or Senators, thank you). (3) In exchange for the United States Federal Government agreeing in principle not to extend the duration of the DPA, subject to a satisfactory proceeding before the Mega-PBFA, Boeing will ..... here's the hard part, of course. Boeing will straighten-up and fly right.
Give the crash victims' families their day in court, when this ad hoc regulatory convening is presented and (presumably) approced. I believe their tesitmonies would have powerful impact. I have sensed some complacency in Boeing's approach - not in the specifics, which have been endlessly written up. Instead, a kind of "well, planes crash every now and then, let's be grown-ups about it." At least, let the families have their say, for whatever it may be worth and whatever impact it might have.
I mean, if the Airline Boss community wants to talk to "the Board", as an old Second Affirmative Speaker in Today's Debate and presenting the Affirmative Plan, I'm just trying to say, give them a Board to talk to, one that could actually get Boeing back onto a proper and forward-looking track.
"Boeing ’s biggest U.S. customers are taking their frustrations directly to its board of directors.
A group of airline chiefs recently requested a meeting with Boeing’s board to express concern over the Alaska Airlines accident and production problems that have upended the industry’s plans, people familiar with the matter said.
The airline bosses want Boeing directors to address the mounting fallout from the Jan. 5 panel blowout on a 737 MAX and to spell out their plan for fixing the aircraft maker’s quality problems.
Boeing has responded by offering to send Chairman Larry Kellner, a former chief executive of Continental Airlines, and other board members to meet the leaders of its key U.S. customers as soon as next week, the people said. Boeing directors also are expected to meet in coming weeks with CEOs of international airlines that rely on its jets."
Can't tell with any certainty if the airline chiefs wanted to meet with the entire Board in the setting of a Board meeting, though that would appear quite an unlikely scenario (despite the way the article descibes it). But perhaps further reporting will provide more clarity.
This development (or at least, it's a news item) prompts another observation. In situations where a company is insolvent or nearing insolvency, forms of receivership may be activated. (Not practicing in the field of creditors' rights or restructurings so I hope I've got this correct). Boeing already is subject to unusual and possibly unprecedented restrictions or limits on production rates, as well as other regulatory oversight steps, imposed by the FAA. And . . .
And at the same time, the DOJ investigation into the door plug Rapid Unplanned Disassembly event is taking flak from the NTSB and various industry worthies as interfering with "just culture". But DOJ has to deal with the pendency of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, even if at this time cooler heads prevailing might have argued against any criminal proceeding against Boeing in the first place. The imperatives of the DPA also would appear to have been intensified by the federal appellate court ruling which held that the crash victims' families have to be given their (proverbial) "day in court" pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act. I hasten to point out that even if the DPA should never have been entered because the criminal case shouldn't even have begun, and correlatively even if (therefore) the crash victims' families should not really be identified as "crime victims", the DPA is a legal fact of life.
But is that the end? Could it be possible to construct a new form?? I'd called it, "federal regulatory receivership." (1) The DPA provides some statutory authority, not enough, but it's something to start with. (2) Convene a higher-order form of something called the PBFA, Policy Board for Federal Aviation. It's an interagency group which (as I understand it, which may not be very much) deals with policy issues where various federal agencies, offices and departments all have one or more pieces of an overall issue and nobody owns the entire decision process. Modify it, bring in the necessary heavyweights from FAA and NTSB. Let key senior staffers from the Congressional Committees (and subcommittees) with significant jurisdiction participate as observers (not any Reps or Senators, thank you). (3) In exchange for the United States Federal Government agreeing in principle not to extend the duration of the DPA, subject to a satisfactory proceeding before the Mega-PBFA, Boeing will ..... here's the hard part, of course. Boeing will straighten-up and fly right.
Give the crash victims' families their day in court, when this ad hoc regulatory convening is presented and (presumably) approced. I believe their tesitmonies would have powerful impact. I have sensed some complacency in Boeing's approach - not in the specifics, which have been endlessly written up. Instead, a kind of "well, planes crash every now and then, let's be grown-ups about it." At least, let the families have their say, for whatever it may be worth and whatever impact it might have.
I mean, if the Airline Boss community wants to talk to "the Board", as an old Second Affirmative Speaker in Today's Debate and presenting the Affirmative Plan, I'm just trying to say, give them a Board to talk to, one that could actually get Boeing back onto a proper and forward-looking track.
Boeing coup ?
I read the WSJ article. I was thinking Boeing needs a coup. The customers and largest shareholder getting together to replace the board and the senior management. Almost seems like this is a reaction to prevent them getting together.
In a fantasy world my recommendations would be:
Calhoun is dead man walking - time to get rid of him and any acolytes of Harry S for that matter
Replace the entire board in the next year - and don't let the current board or management put forward any names.
Identify new names for the senior management - try to pull up internal candidates.
Instruct the new management to develop the bench and cut out outside management consultants.
Commit to offering a new plane with 24 months.
Move the headquarters back to Seattle
No dividends or buybacks till the new plane is funded.
Get to the bottom of the MCAS debacle - not to hang anyone - but to understand what went wrong.
Buy back Spirit and fix the relations with other suppliers
Oh well - back to reality.
In a fantasy world my recommendations would be:
Calhoun is dead man walking - time to get rid of him and any acolytes of Harry S for that matter
Replace the entire board in the next year - and don't let the current board or management put forward any names.
Identify new names for the senior management - try to pull up internal candidates.
Instruct the new management to develop the bench and cut out outside management consultants.
Commit to offering a new plane with 24 months.
Move the headquarters back to Seattle
No dividends or buybacks till the new plane is funded.
Get to the bottom of the MCAS debacle - not to hang anyone - but to understand what went wrong.
Buy back Spirit and fix the relations with other suppliers
Oh well - back to reality.
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From what I read it is United, American, Southwest and Alaska. Delta is missing, but then they are mostly moving to Airbus anyway, except for ordering about 100 Max 10's (which I would not be surprised to see them cancelling).
Hi Tdracer,
while I usually learn a lot from your posts (thanks for all your inputs!), I feel I need to jump in here. ;-)
The last time I had to deal with an MPD, I found it is not approved by any authority; it´s rather an OEM "compendium" / guideline (It´s a good starting point to build an AMP, and it provides an industry-wide "language" when it comes to contracting a (base) maintenance event to an MRO outside of your own company). I guess you meant the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR), which indeed is approved by an authority.
The other issue: I wouldn´t say that operators "hate" CMRs. Only now and then, an OEM lets operators look behind the rather solid 21J-curtain at the SSAs. So, we rather have deep respect for any maintenance task that bears those magic three letters. They also usually don´t generate more paperwork than other tasks in my point of view. Finally - if a CMR causes an AOG due to a diversion, I´d say the planning department of the operator has been a bit too agressive on interval utilisation; because of the consequences you rightly point out, you´d always avoid planning a CMR on the last day/cycle/hour.
Thanks again for your valuable inputs!
J.V.
while I usually learn a lot from your posts (thanks for all your inputs!), I feel I need to jump in here. ;-)
The last time I had to deal with an MPD, I found it is not approved by any authority; it´s rather an OEM "compendium" / guideline (It´s a good starting point to build an AMP, and it provides an industry-wide "language" when it comes to contracting a (base) maintenance event to an MRO outside of your own company). I guess you meant the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR), which indeed is approved by an authority.
The other issue: I wouldn´t say that operators "hate" CMRs. Only now and then, an OEM lets operators look behind the rather solid 21J-curtain at the SSAs. So, we rather have deep respect for any maintenance task that bears those magic three letters. They also usually don´t generate more paperwork than other tasks in my point of view. Finally - if a CMR causes an AOG due to a diversion, I´d say the planning department of the operator has been a bit too agressive on interval utilisation; because of the consequences you rightly point out, you´d always avoid planning a CMR on the last day/cycle/hour.
Thanks again for your valuable inputs!
J.V.
My CMR comment is based on direct feedback from operators that they wanted us to eliminate CMRs whenever practical. During the 777 development, as part of the 'Working Together" concept, we'd invited airline reps into our maintenance planning meetings. During one such meeting, I recall a rep (memory says they were from United) say - in pretty much so many words - 'CMRs are an excuse for bad engineering'.
Last edited by tdracer; 22nd Mar 2024 at 17:53.
I read the WSJ article. I was thinking Boeing needs a coup. The customers and largest shareholder getting together to replace the board and the senior management. Almost seems like this is a reaction to prevent them getting together.
In a fantasy world my recommendations would be:
Commit to offering a new plane with 24 months.
In a fantasy world my recommendations would be:
Commit to offering a new plane with 24 months.
But more importantly, Boeing has plenty it needs to do before it commits to a new aircraft program:
Get the MAX and 787 production problems ironed out.
Get the MAX-8 and MAX-10 certified and in service.
Get the 777X certified and into service (and don't forget - after they get the 777-9X handled, they still have commitments for the -8X and a freighter version).
Solve the ongoing issues with the KC-46 tanker.
Boeing already has plenty on its plate and desperately needs to get the existing programs working. They need to devote their available resources to handled what they already have.
Diverting some of those resources to a new aircraft program before they have the existing issues solved would be an invitation to further problems and perhaps even disasters.