Boeing at X-Roads?
TD Racer
You obviously as a Boeing insider have a much more detailed understanding of Boeing than I do, but I am interested in your take with respect to the 777X and the changed product rule. My understanding from reading open source material is that one of the major factors in the 777X project certification program was that the FAA is now much stricter applying the changed product rule to anything to do with the 777X. This has resulted in extensive unforeseen delays.
In any case help me out here. My understanding is the changed product rule applies to when a manufacturer makes changes to an existing certified design, so it would seem to me that Boeing is treating the certification process of the 777X as a derivative of the 777, not a clean sheet design. The fact that almost nothing is left of the original 777 does seems to me that they are in simplistic terms trying to smoke through what is basically a whole new airplane on the basis of an existing design.
With respect to my pension plan comment 700 senior engineers took early retirement in 2022 because if they stayed their pension payout would be permanently reduced. Boeing was already short of engineers lost due to COVID induced layoffs, and then saw the mass exodus of a tranche of their most experienced personnel. How was this not both totally avoidable and poor management of critical Boeing resources ?
Finally the choice to apply for an exemption from the 737 MAX inlet heating issue days after the door plug “quality escape” seems to me a pretty big sign that nothing has changed at Boeing. Boeing can’t seem to be able to design an automatic inlet heat control for the MAX in 2 years ? This is the Boeing that is going to get the 777X certified and in production, Really ?
You obviously as a Boeing insider have a much more detailed understanding of Boeing than I do, but I am interested in your take with respect to the 777X and the changed product rule. My understanding from reading open source material is that one of the major factors in the 777X project certification program was that the FAA is now much stricter applying the changed product rule to anything to do with the 777X. This has resulted in extensive unforeseen delays.
In any case help me out here. My understanding is the changed product rule applies to when a manufacturer makes changes to an existing certified design, so it would seem to me that Boeing is treating the certification process of the 777X as a derivative of the 777, not a clean sheet design. The fact that almost nothing is left of the original 777 does seems to me that they are in simplistic terms trying to smoke through what is basically a whole new airplane on the basis of an existing design.
With respect to my pension plan comment 700 senior engineers took early retirement in 2022 because if they stayed their pension payout would be permanently reduced. Boeing was already short of engineers lost due to COVID induced layoffs, and then saw the mass exodus of a tranche of their most experienced personnel. How was this not both totally avoidable and poor management of critical Boeing resources ?
Finally the choice to apply for an exemption from the 737 MAX inlet heating issue days after the door plug “quality escape” seems to me a pretty big sign that nothing has changed at Boeing. Boeing can’t seem to be able to design an automatic inlet heat control for the MAX in 2 years ? This is the Boeing that is going to get the 777X certified and in production, Really ?
Last edited by Big Pistons Forever; 28th Feb 2024 at 00:41.
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Big Pistons Forever
Far be it for me to lurch ahead of tdracer (or even think about doing that). So this will be a brief comment/question only.
Giving significance to the changed product rule as such is elevating form over substance, isn't it? If there is a potentially fatal flaw in the T7-X design or prototypes (or failure to meet the letter of the substantive cert regs), that's one thing. But if the C.P. rule can be stretched far enough to cover the "old T-7" morphed into the new "T-7X" and there is nothing wrong or below standards other than this would be taking advantage of some flex in the rule as written and as applied, then .... is it actually in a doom loop?
Maybe I'm still high-on-Sevens from a trip Chicago-O'Hare...Tokyo-Narita.....NYC-JFK return on stunning JAL T7-300ERs. It's a great aircraft (well, to ol' SLF anyhow). But then, it was back in 2105, Feb. 2015, so . . . .
Far be it for me to lurch ahead of tdracer (or even think about doing that). So this will be a brief comment/question only.
Giving significance to the changed product rule as such is elevating form over substance, isn't it? If there is a potentially fatal flaw in the T7-X design or prototypes (or failure to meet the letter of the substantive cert regs), that's one thing. But if the C.P. rule can be stretched far enough to cover the "old T-7" morphed into the new "T-7X" and there is nothing wrong or below standards other than this would be taking advantage of some flex in the rule as written and as applied, then .... is it actually in a doom loop?
Maybe I'm still high-on-Sevens from a trip Chicago-O'Hare...Tokyo-Narita.....NYC-JFK return on stunning JAL T7-300ERs. It's a great aircraft (well, to ol' SLF anyhow). But then, it was back in 2105, Feb. 2015, so . . . .
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 28th Feb 2024 at 09:58.
TD Racer
You obviously as a Boeing insider have a much more detailed understanding of Boeing than I do, but I am interested in your take with respect to the 777X and the changed product rule. My understanding from reading open source material is that one of the major factors in the 777X project certification program was that the FAA is now much stricter applying the changed product rule to anything to do with the 777X. This has resulted in extensive unforeseen delays.
In any case help me out here. My understanding is the changed product rule applies to when a manufacturer makes changes to an existing certified design, so it would seem to me that Boeing is treating the certification process of the 777X as a derivative of the 777, not a clean sheet design. The fact that almost nothing is left of the original 777 does seems to me that they are in simplistic terms trying to smoke through what is basically a whole new airplane on the basis of an existing design.
You obviously as a Boeing insider have a much more detailed understanding of Boeing than I do, but I am interested in your take with respect to the 777X and the changed product rule. My understanding from reading open source material is that one of the major factors in the 777X project certification program was that the FAA is now much stricter applying the changed product rule to anything to do with the 777X. This has resulted in extensive unforeseen delays.
In any case help me out here. My understanding is the changed product rule applies to when a manufacturer makes changes to an existing certified design, so it would seem to me that Boeing is treating the certification process of the 777X as a derivative of the 777, not a clean sheet design. The fact that almost nothing is left of the original 777 does seems to me that they are in simplistic terms trying to smoke through what is basically a whole new airplane on the basis of an existing design.
While I'm sure enhanced FAA oversight has contributed to some of the 777X delays, I seriously doubt those have much to do with CPR or the overall cert basis, with one proviso - the agreed cert basis is only good for 5 years after the original type cert application - after that the FAA can require that you step up for any changes to the FARs that occurred since the original type cert application. I no longer pay attention to all the FAR amendments so I don't know if there are any that would cause huge problems. I know that when that happened on the 747-8, it was a huge paperwork pain, but the actual changes needed due to the cert basis change were almost non-existent.
With respect to my pension plan comment 700 senior engineers took early retirement in 2022 because if they stayed their pension payout would be permanently reduced. Boeing was already short of engineers lost due to COVID induced layoffs, and then saw the mass exodus of a tranche of their most experienced personnel. How was this not both totally avoidable and poor management of critical Boeing resources ?
BTW, 'Early' retirement is a relative term - under the Boeing pension plan you could retire with full benefits anytime after age 60, and you can retire once you reach 55 (but with a reduction in benefits for each year prior to age 60). With the huge influx of engineers in the late '70's and early '80's, there were vast numbers of engineers who were 60 or older...
There was an interesting picture, tweeted after an EU meeting with Airbus. On it, an ac in A321 class with high aspect wings, foldable for gust relief and wing mounted open fan engines was enpictured. Wing with odd shape to hold these engines. Lookup mentour pilot or mentour now on youtube, he just recently commented this with some speculation. I don't want to contradict you, but you might be interested.
Your background make your posts an super interesting read. Although I turned into an anti-Boeing guy the recent years, your opinion is very much valued.
Your background make your posts an super interesting read. Although I turned into an anti-Boeing guy the recent years, your opinion is very much valued.
After a few decades of reluctantly preferring A over B as a pilot, the 320XLR definitely evened out the NB score for me. Yeah, cockpit comfort is still vastly better. Being restricted to the lowlow 30s for 95% of the flights, not cool.
Lady Speedbird, well, I’m going to own up, I haven’t a clue what you’re talking about.
You talk about a UAL 757 incident and then almost in the same breath “the” Air France incident, closely followed by a SriLankan A330 grounding incident!
In your post you say “You are wasting your time.They don't want facts” . . . Who is “you”, and who are “they”?
I know, I must keep up.
You talk about a UAL 757 incident and then almost in the same breath “the” Air France incident, closely followed by a SriLankan A330 grounding incident!
In your post you say “You are wasting your time.They don't want facts” . . . Who is “you”, and who are “they”?
I know, I must keep up.
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I'm only weighing in - lightly - on lecturing pro pilots about ANYTHING on this forum: Bad form.
As to overheated press reports about what in reality are routine and minor occurrences, it's nothing new, not even remotely, and it has been noted even in this thread.
As to overheated press reports about what in reality are routine and minor occurrences, it's nothing new, not even remotely, and it has been noted even in this thread.
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 28th Feb 2024 at 15:45. Reason: Original post edited
Ah, thanks, understand now.
Got to agree with you about the press reporting of pretty much all things aviation, complete joke (but not funny). I wish I could remember some of the nonsense that Sky and even the BBC spout; they just can’t be bothered to run the story past a real aviator to check it is accurate and makes sense!
Got to agree with you about the press reporting of pretty much all things aviation, complete joke (but not funny). I wish I could remember some of the nonsense that Sky and even the BBC spout; they just can’t be bothered to run the story past a real aviator to check it is accurate and makes sense!
Sure almost all posters in this thread are able to differ a wing falling off of your beloved little 777, from a bird strike, and the MAX, TBC issues. No need to piecc on us that way, isn't it.
The FAA report on Boeing quality issues is not specific to any aircraft type or manufacturing site: the issues are generic, and linked to embedded corporate culture, behaviours and systems. Bear in mind QA/QC is the last line of defence: the real skill is to get it right first time. Boeing strategy for dealing with the issues they have seems to rely on catching mistakes rather than eliminating errors from the design and production process. Wrong emphasis.
The kind of problems they have aren’t fixed in 90 days. To change a culture takes years.
Both the 737 Max and 787 have been grounded for design and quality issues, and it seems military programmes are not immune either,
The FAA doesn’t come out of this covered in glory.
So, however good it might look on paper, on what basis is the 777X (already several years late and with at least one design flaw covered up by Boeing) likely to be different?
the criticism that Airbus doesn’t have anything novel in the works is valid, but given the state of the competition, they don’t need anything. Their biggest issue is the A220 competing with the A320. And they are outspending Boeing significantly on R&D. So they won’t move until they have to.
The kind of problems they have aren’t fixed in 90 days. To change a culture takes years.
Both the 737 Max and 787 have been grounded for design and quality issues, and it seems military programmes are not immune either,
The FAA doesn’t come out of this covered in glory.
So, however good it might look on paper, on what basis is the 777X (already several years late and with at least one design flaw covered up by Boeing) likely to be different?
the criticism that Airbus doesn’t have anything novel in the works is valid, but given the state of the competition, they don’t need anything. Their biggest issue is the A220 competing with the A320. And they are outspending Boeing significantly on R&D. So they won’t move until they have to.
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The FAA report on Boeing quality issues is not specific to any aircraft type or manufacturing site: the issues are generic, and linked to embedded corporate culture, behaviours and systems. Bear in mind QA/QC is the last line of defence: the real skill is to get it right first time. Boeing strategy for dealing with the issues they have seems to rely on catching mistakes rather than eliminating errors from the design and production process. Wrong emphasis.
The kind of problems they have aren’t fixed in 90 days. To change a culture takes years.
Both the 737 Max and 787 have been grounded for design and quality issues, and it seems military programmes are not immune either,
The FAA doesn’t come out of this covered in glory.
So, however good it might look on paper, on what basis is the 777X (already several years late and with at least one design flaw covered up by Boeing) likely to be different?
The kind of problems they have aren’t fixed in 90 days. To change a culture takes years.
Both the 737 Max and 787 have been grounded for design and quality issues, and it seems military programmes are not immune either,
The FAA doesn’t come out of this covered in glory.
So, however good it might look on paper, on what basis is the 777X (already several years late and with at least one design flaw covered up by Boeing) likely to be different?
To write Boeing off as so many do on this forum, one must believe (at least, I believe it is a necessary premise for the defeatism) that no aspiring middle managers want to restore the company. That no rising manufacturing floor leaders who want to restore the company are asserting their presence. Sure, freeze-frame missing bolts in the door plug assembly, and it's pretty simple to cast doubt, even aspersions, on the pending 777X process. Simplistic too.
Because - to repeat an earlier post - what flaw or lurking defect is there in any of the pending T7 variants? There's been so much "content" here about the financial manipulations of the senior management and Board, so, if it's an investment view that's preferred, so be it: past screw-ups do not necessarily guarantee more of the same.
Of course Boeing's agenda is long and will be difficult. Down around the Slab Caster in the BOF Shop, we often said, "first thing you do when you find yourself in a hole, is to stop digging." (Well, it was a little more colorful, being Steelmaking and all that.) Boeing has done that - yes the door plug at higher altitudes could have been Fade to Black, Roll the Credits, but now, here we are.
Oh one more ray of sunshine into the cynicism of defeatism: much ink was spilled and energy spent keeping a man without aviation safety experience out of the top FAA job. Just a point of view of an SLF/attorney but I believe the FAA Boss in office now has every reason to build a legacy worthy of the reputation he justifiably holds for focus AND effectiveness in matters of aviation safety.
I would also add that Boeing Renton (narrow body aircraft - 737 exclusively for the last 20 years) and Boeing Everett (widebody aircraft) are very different, almost as if they were different companies. Yes, there is intermix and crossover, but the environments are very different. After spending most of my career working Everett aircraft, I was moved to the 757-737 for a few years and was quite frankly astounded at the differences.
A rapid production rate in Everett is 8.3 aircraft per month (777 for a few years) - Renton is around 2 aircraft per day. I don't want to say production is relaxed in Everett (it's not), but it's nothing like what goes on in Renton.
Yes, the MAX has been something of a cluster
, only a fool would assume the 777X will experience similar issues.
A rapid production rate in Everett is 8.3 aircraft per month (777 for a few years) - Renton is around 2 aircraft per day. I don't want to say production is relaxed in Everett (it's not), but it's nothing like what goes on in Renton.
Yes, the MAX has been something of a cluster
, only a fool would assume the 777X will experience similar issues.
Boeing was the world leader in the civil airliner market. The 707 was the first truly viable jet airliner, the 747 established the wide body market and the 757, 767, 777 established the twin engine long range wide body as the dominant configuration.
As has been widely reported the company started to lose its way with the disastrous merger with MD and now here we are, deeply in debt due to the problems with the 787 and MAX, under the regulatory microscope, and with only one product under development that is years late and massively over budget.
I take no joy in writing Boeings obituary but I just can’t see a way forward for this company, but I would be happy if anyone can articulate a realistic and achievable path back to long term viability.
As has been widely reported the company started to lose its way with the disastrous merger with MD and now here we are, deeply in debt due to the problems with the 787 and MAX, under the regulatory microscope, and with only one product under development that is years late and massively over budget.
I take no joy in writing Boeings obituary but I just can’t see a way forward for this company, but I would be happy if anyone can articulate a realistic and achievable path back to long term viability.
The idea has been put forth in the past. But it's difficult for the government to force a reorganization on a private business. But recently, the local news has carried a story about the DoJ revisiting criminal charges for the MCAS fiasco. Based on evidence that Boeing never did clean up its act, demonstrated by (among other things) missing door plug bolts.
Normally, Boeing would resist such a breakup kicking and screaming. But with a potential criminal charge looming and the resulting prohibition on bidding DoD and other government work, those divisions might welcome cutting commercial loose. To save their own business.
Next step would be to push the newly spawned commercial division into a well managed private equity group. One that will run it without quarterly profits at the forefront and not strip it of assets. Warren Buffett, where are you?
There's a big flaw in the underlying reasoning here - it proceeds from an assumption of static statuses of Board oversight and control, management incentive, regulatory leadership, presence and involvement, and Congressional attention and focus. On that last item, I'd note that although the Hill as a whole may be writhing in dysfunction, with so many individuals braying like you-know-whats, just try selling cynicism about Boeing, defeatism about Boeing, to a key aviation-minded United States Senator from Illinois, one who served this country with sacrifice, valor, and honor. By itself her commitment doesn't cause change but the progress represented by the legislation which authorized the report, and the report itself, is a significant start.
To write Boeing off as so many do on this forum, one must believe (at least, I believe it is a necessary premise for the defeatism) that no aspiring middle managers want to restore the company. That no rising manufacturing floor leaders who want to restore the company are asserting their presence. Sure, freeze-frame missing bolts in the door plug assembly, and it's pretty simple to cast doubt, even aspersions, on the pending 777X process. Simplistic too.
Because - to repeat an earlier post - what flaw or lurking defect is there in any of the pending T7 variants? There's been so much "content" here about the financial manipulations of the senior management and Board, so, if it's an investment view that's preferred, so be it: past screw-ups do not necessarily guarantee more of the same.
Of course Boeing's agenda is long and will be difficult. Down around the Slab Caster in the BOF Shop, we often said, "first thing you do when you find yourself in a hole, is to stop digging." (Well, it was a little more colorful, being Steelmaking and all that.) Boeing has done that - yes the door plug at higher altitudes could have been Fade to Black, Roll the Credits, but now, here we are.
Oh one more ray of sunshine into the cynicism of defeatism: much ink was spilled and energy spent keeping a man without aviation safety experience out of the top FAA job. Just a point of view of an SLF/attorney but I believe the FAA Boss in office now has every reason to build a legacy worthy of the reputation he justifiably holds for focus AND effectiveness in matters of aviation safety.
To write Boeing off as so many do on this forum, one must believe (at least, I believe it is a necessary premise for the defeatism) that no aspiring middle managers want to restore the company. That no rising manufacturing floor leaders who want to restore the company are asserting their presence. Sure, freeze-frame missing bolts in the door plug assembly, and it's pretty simple to cast doubt, even aspersions, on the pending 777X process. Simplistic too.
Because - to repeat an earlier post - what flaw or lurking defect is there in any of the pending T7 variants? There's been so much "content" here about the financial manipulations of the senior management and Board, so, if it's an investment view that's preferred, so be it: past screw-ups do not necessarily guarantee more of the same.
Of course Boeing's agenda is long and will be difficult. Down around the Slab Caster in the BOF Shop, we often said, "first thing you do when you find yourself in a hole, is to stop digging." (Well, it was a little more colorful, being Steelmaking and all that.) Boeing has done that - yes the door plug at higher altitudes could have been Fade to Black, Roll the Credits, but now, here we are.
Oh one more ray of sunshine into the cynicism of defeatism: much ink was spilled and energy spent keeping a man without aviation safety experience out of the top FAA job. Just a point of view of an SLF/attorney but I believe the FAA Boss in office now has every reason to build a legacy worthy of the reputation he justifiably holds for focus AND effectiveness in matters of aviation safety.
It took many decades for Boeing to create the corporate character it once had, only a few years to destroy it, but it would now take many decades to rebuild it, and that only if the right people were leading the way. So I’m not as optimistic as I’d want to be.
FAA Gives Boeing 90 Days To Establish A Quality-Action Plan
Boeing now has 90 days to present a comprehensive action plan to resolve what the Federal Aviation Administration cites as “systemic quality-control issues.” Today (Feb. 28), FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker cut in half yesterday’s National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) six-month mandate for developing an action plan to achieve “substantive upgrades” in Boeing’s quality and safety systems. The NTSB recommendation was part of its preliminary report on an Alaska Airlines incident, where four bolts in a fuselage door plug of a Boeing 737 MAX 9 were never reinstalled after preproduction fuselage repair work by Boeing employees, resulting in the door plug departing the aircraft in flight.
Administrator Whitaker’s statement added that Boeing’s efforts at improving quality control must consider information to be gleaned by an ongoing production-line audit by the agency, as well as the findings from an expert panel review commissioned by the FAA and released yesterday. Also, the FAA mandates action on completing the Safety Management System initiative Boeing formally launched in 2019. Of note, the FAA announced Boeing would be responsible for ensuring the SMS be integrated with its Quality Management System and that efforts must mandate “the same level of rigor and oversight” among its suppliers, such as Spirit AeroSystems, which manufactures the 737 MAX fuselages. The long-term objective, according to the FAA, is creating “a measurable, systemic shift in manufacturing quality control.”
At an all-day meeting with Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun and members of his senior safety staff yesterday, Whitaker advised the Boeing team of his action. After the meeting, as reported in the Seattle Times, Whitaker said, “Boeing must commit to real and profound improvements. Making foundational change will require a sustained effort from Boeing’s leadership, and we are going to hold them accountable every step of the way, with mutually understood milestones and expectations.”
In a statement today, Boeing’s Calhoun said, “Boeing will develop the comprehensive action plan with measurable criteria that demonstrates the profound change that Administrator Whitaker and the FAA demand.”
Administrator Whitaker’s statement added that Boeing’s efforts at improving quality control must consider information to be gleaned by an ongoing production-line audit by the agency, as well as the findings from an expert panel review commissioned by the FAA and released yesterday. Also, the FAA mandates action on completing the Safety Management System initiative Boeing formally launched in 2019. Of note, the FAA announced Boeing would be responsible for ensuring the SMS be integrated with its Quality Management System and that efforts must mandate “the same level of rigor and oversight” among its suppliers, such as Spirit AeroSystems, which manufactures the 737 MAX fuselages. The long-term objective, according to the FAA, is creating “a measurable, systemic shift in manufacturing quality control.”
At an all-day meeting with Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun and members of his senior safety staff yesterday, Whitaker advised the Boeing team of his action. After the meeting, as reported in the Seattle Times, Whitaker said, “Boeing must commit to real and profound improvements. Making foundational change will require a sustained effort from Boeing’s leadership, and we are going to hold them accountable every step of the way, with mutually understood milestones and expectations.”
In a statement today, Boeing’s Calhoun said, “Boeing will develop the comprehensive action plan with measurable criteria that demonstrates the profound change that Administrator Whitaker and the FAA demand.”
" never reinstalled after preproduction fuselage repair work by Boeing employees"
The repair work was not done by Boeing employees.
The repair work was not done by Boeing employees.
Was there a Boeing QC system in place to ensure that bolts critical for the security of the door plug was properly installed. YesNo
Was Boeing responsible for the airworthiness of this aircraft when it was delivered to Alaska. Yes/No