Boeing at X-Roads?
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He said that the airline had discovered “silly, small things” during inspections of recent aircraft deliveries. He said they would lift floorboards and find a rag or a spanner under them. “It’s indicative of a poor approach to quality control on the line in Wichita or Seattle and Boeing need to fix it.”
If you're not finding (or even looking for?) things that shouldn't be there, before aircraft are sent for delivery, then there is a gaping hole in your QC processes. Which means the reverse is also true, you won't find things that are supposed to be there but aren't. And that kind of corporate culture virtually guarantees that, at some point, one or more of those "silly, small things" will be "not-so-silly" small things. Things that affect the integrity, operability or safety of the aircraft.
But, instead of addressing that root issue of safety culture, Boeing is akin to a sad old drunkard unable to change: reminiscing about the past, confused about who and where they are now, and delusional about the future. All whilst staggering, head down, toward the final curtain.
But, instead of addressing that root issue of safety culture, Boeing is akin to a sad old drunkard unable to change: reminiscing about the past, confused about who and where they are now, and delusional about the future. All whilst staggering, head down, toward the final curtain.
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FAA Report issued today
Review Panel’s Final Report on Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for the Design and Production of Airplanes
Monday, February 26, 2024 (link to report is on the FAA.gov website)The FAA appreciates the hard work and dedication of the expert panel members who completed this extensive review in preparing this report, which meets a requirement of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. We will immediately begin a thorough review of the report and determine next steps regarding the recommendations as appropriate. We will continue to hold Boeing to the highest standard of safety and will work to ensure the company comprehensively addresses these recommendations.
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Quote from a Boeing exec at a public conference in Nov 2023: "Our SMS journey started about 5 years ago..."
First MAX accident: Oct 2018. (About 5 years ago...)
ICAO SMS requirement: 2006.
First MAX accident: Oct 2018. (About 5 years ago...)
ICAO SMS requirement: 2006.
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary (copied exactly - footnotes indicated in [brackets])
This report conveys the findings and recommendations of the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Expert Review Panel (herein referred to as the “Expert Panel” or “Panel”) formed under Section 103 of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA), Pub. L. 116-260, Div. V, § 1031[1] (herein referred to as the “the Act”). The Act identifies the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Congressional committees of jurisdiction as recipients of this report.
The Act requires the Expert Panel to review the safety management processes and their effectiveness for each holder of an ODA for the design and production of transport airplanes.[2] The Act also requires the Expert Panel to make recommendations to the Administrator regarding suggested actions to address any deficiencies found after review of the matters listed in Section 103(a)(2) of the Act. The Expert Panel concluded that recommendations for The Boeing Company [3] (herein referred to as “Boeing”) and the FAA are consistent with the requirements of the Act and with the public interest in aviation safety. The Expert Panel expects that the FAA Administrator will review the recommendations and reinforce them as appropriate.
Section 103(a)(3) of the Act defines the required composition of the Expert Panel. Appendix A of this report identifies the Expert Panel membership.
The Expert Panel focused its review on safety culture, safety management systems (SMS), and ODA, while also evaluating other topics of concern for the safety of the flying public.
Following its review, the Expert Panel identified 27 findings and 53 associated recommendations. The findings and recommendations are based upon the Panel’s expertise and review of more than 4,000 pages of Boeing documents, seven surveys, over 250 interviews, and meetings with Boeing employees across six company locations.
A summary of the Expert Panel’s work is as follows:
• The Expert Panel observed a disconnect between Boeing’s senior management and other members of the organization on safety culture. Interviewees, including ODA Unit Members (UM), also questioned whether Boeing’s safety reporting systems would function in a way that ensures open communication and non-retaliation. The Expert Panel also observed inadequate and confusing implementation of the five components of a positive safety culture (Reporting Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture).
• The Expert Panel found Boeing’s SMS procedures reflect the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA SMS frameworks. However, the Boeing SMS procedures are not structured in a way that ensures all employees understand their role in the company’s SMS. The procedures and training are complex and in a constant state of change, creating employee confusion especially among different work sites and employee groups. The Expert Panel also found a lack of awareness of safety-related metrics at all levels of the organization; employees had difficulty distinguishing the differences among various measuring methods, their purpose, and outcomes.
• Boeing’s restructuring of the management of the ODA unit decreased opportunities for interference and retaliation against UMs, and provides effective organizational messaging regarding independence of UMs. However, the restructuring, while better, still allows opportunities for retaliation to occur,
particularly with regards to salary and furlough ranking. This influences the ability of UMs to execute their delegated functions effectively.
• The Expert Panel also found additional issues at Boeing that affect aviation safety, which include inadequate human factors consideration commensurate to its importance to aviation safety and lack of pilot input in aircraft design and operation.
The Act did not direct the Expert Panel to investigate specific airplane incidents or accidents, or to make recommendations toward a specific airplane incident or accident, which either occurred prior to or during the Expert Panel’s work. However, on several occasions during the Expert Panel’s activities, serious quality issues with Boeing products became public. These quality issues amplified the Expert Panel’s concerns that the safety-related messages or behaviors are not being implemented across the entire Boeing population.
Within six months of the issuance of this report, Boeing should review the recommendations contained in this report and develop an action plan that includes a milestone-based approach that comprehensively addresses each recommendation. Boeing should then share that action plan, including implementation dates with the FAA.
Successful adoption of the recommendations is expected to improve the level of safety provided by Boeing to its workforce, operators, and the public. While the Expert Panel focused on Boeing as an ODA holder, the enclosed findings and recommendations may assist other companies with similar authorizations to implement successful safety culture, SMS, or ODA programs.
The professional opinions expressed in this report solely belong to the Expert Panel and is not representative of any employer, organization, or other group or individual.
[Footnotes in Exec. Summary]
1 Section 103, Expert Review of Organization Designation Authorizations for Transport Airplanes, Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA), 2020.
2 Section 137(6), Definitions, of ACSAA 2020, defines transport airplanes as a transport category airplane designed for operation by an air carrier or foreign air carrier type-certificated with a passenger seating capacity of 30 or more or an all-cargo or combi derivative of such an airplane. This definition limited the scope of the panel review to Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA), a business unit of The Boeing Company.
3 As stated in The Boeing Company’s 2023 4Q Form 10-K, The Boeing Company, together with its subsidiaries is one of the world’s major aerospace firms. Boeing is organized based on the products and services offered through three reportable segments: Commercial Airplanes (BCA); Defense, Space & Security (BDS); and Global Services (BGS). https://investors.boeing.com/investo...s/default.aspx
This report conveys the findings and recommendations of the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Expert Review Panel (herein referred to as the “Expert Panel” or “Panel”) formed under Section 103 of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA), Pub. L. 116-260, Div. V, § 1031[1] (herein referred to as the “the Act”). The Act identifies the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Congressional committees of jurisdiction as recipients of this report.
The Act requires the Expert Panel to review the safety management processes and their effectiveness for each holder of an ODA for the design and production of transport airplanes.[2] The Act also requires the Expert Panel to make recommendations to the Administrator regarding suggested actions to address any deficiencies found after review of the matters listed in Section 103(a)(2) of the Act. The Expert Panel concluded that recommendations for The Boeing Company [3] (herein referred to as “Boeing”) and the FAA are consistent with the requirements of the Act and with the public interest in aviation safety. The Expert Panel expects that the FAA Administrator will review the recommendations and reinforce them as appropriate.
Section 103(a)(3) of the Act defines the required composition of the Expert Panel. Appendix A of this report identifies the Expert Panel membership.
The Expert Panel focused its review on safety culture, safety management systems (SMS), and ODA, while also evaluating other topics of concern for the safety of the flying public.
Following its review, the Expert Panel identified 27 findings and 53 associated recommendations. The findings and recommendations are based upon the Panel’s expertise and review of more than 4,000 pages of Boeing documents, seven surveys, over 250 interviews, and meetings with Boeing employees across six company locations.
A summary of the Expert Panel’s work is as follows:
• The Expert Panel observed a disconnect between Boeing’s senior management and other members of the organization on safety culture. Interviewees, including ODA Unit Members (UM), also questioned whether Boeing’s safety reporting systems would function in a way that ensures open communication and non-retaliation. The Expert Panel also observed inadequate and confusing implementation of the five components of a positive safety culture (Reporting Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture).
• The Expert Panel found Boeing’s SMS procedures reflect the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA SMS frameworks. However, the Boeing SMS procedures are not structured in a way that ensures all employees understand their role in the company’s SMS. The procedures and training are complex and in a constant state of change, creating employee confusion especially among different work sites and employee groups. The Expert Panel also found a lack of awareness of safety-related metrics at all levels of the organization; employees had difficulty distinguishing the differences among various measuring methods, their purpose, and outcomes.
• Boeing’s restructuring of the management of the ODA unit decreased opportunities for interference and retaliation against UMs, and provides effective organizational messaging regarding independence of UMs. However, the restructuring, while better, still allows opportunities for retaliation to occur,
particularly with regards to salary and furlough ranking. This influences the ability of UMs to execute their delegated functions effectively.
• The Expert Panel also found additional issues at Boeing that affect aviation safety, which include inadequate human factors consideration commensurate to its importance to aviation safety and lack of pilot input in aircraft design and operation.
The Act did not direct the Expert Panel to investigate specific airplane incidents or accidents, or to make recommendations toward a specific airplane incident or accident, which either occurred prior to or during the Expert Panel’s work. However, on several occasions during the Expert Panel’s activities, serious quality issues with Boeing products became public. These quality issues amplified the Expert Panel’s concerns that the safety-related messages or behaviors are not being implemented across the entire Boeing population.
Within six months of the issuance of this report, Boeing should review the recommendations contained in this report and develop an action plan that includes a milestone-based approach that comprehensively addresses each recommendation. Boeing should then share that action plan, including implementation dates with the FAA.
Successful adoption of the recommendations is expected to improve the level of safety provided by Boeing to its workforce, operators, and the public. While the Expert Panel focused on Boeing as an ODA holder, the enclosed findings and recommendations may assist other companies with similar authorizations to implement successful safety culture, SMS, or ODA programs.
The professional opinions expressed in this report solely belong to the Expert Panel and is not representative of any employer, organization, or other group or individual.
[Footnotes in Exec. Summary]
1 Section 103, Expert Review of Organization Designation Authorizations for Transport Airplanes, Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA), 2020.
2 Section 137(6), Definitions, of ACSAA 2020, defines transport airplanes as a transport category airplane designed for operation by an air carrier or foreign air carrier type-certificated with a passenger seating capacity of 30 or more or an all-cargo or combi derivative of such an airplane. This definition limited the scope of the panel review to Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA), a business unit of The Boeing Company.
3 As stated in The Boeing Company’s 2023 4Q Form 10-K, The Boeing Company, together with its subsidiaries is one of the world’s major aerospace firms. Boeing is organized based on the products and services offered through three reportable segments: Commercial Airplanes (BCA); Defense, Space & Security (BDS); and Global Services (BGS). https://investors.boeing.com/investo...s/default.aspx
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On the chance that the cynics on this forum - in light of the apparent thoroughness of the Expert Panel's efforts and Report - might be hungrier than usual for input to uphold cynical views, here's a bit from the Report (Sec. 2.6, Expert Panel Timeframe and Methodology, at page 14):
"Each interview with Boeing employees started with an opening statement that the Expert Panel was '...very interested in hearing your perspective on each topic.' However, it appeared to some Expert Panel members that Boeing employees viewed the Expert Panel’s work as an audit; not an opportunity to collaborate. Interviewees asked minimal questions of the experts. Some interviewees mentioned a briefing was provided by Boeing legal prior to the interviews." (italics as in original).
Makes you want to say, "hmmmmm."
"Each interview with Boeing employees started with an opening statement that the Expert Panel was '...very interested in hearing your perspective on each topic.' However, it appeared to some Expert Panel members that Boeing employees viewed the Expert Panel’s work as an audit; not an opportunity to collaborate. Interviewees asked minimal questions of the experts. Some interviewees mentioned a briefing was provided by Boeing legal prior to the interviews." (italics as in original).
Makes you want to say, "hmmmmm."
The Essentials of Safety Culture
Copy to Boeing
'The Essentials of Safety Culture'
https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/defaul...lture_2017.pdf
"Changing the safety culture is a long-term project"
P.S.
and another doc in the same series:
'Leadership in Safety'
https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/defaul...afety_2023.pdf
P.P.S
The Use and Abuse of Culture
"The term safety culture is so confusing it should be abandoned."
A good point to start from, to think about and engage in discussion.
https://link.springer.com/content/pd...-95129-4_4.pdf
https://link.springer.com/book/10.10...-3-319-95129-4
'The Essentials of Safety Culture'
https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/defaul...lture_2017.pdf
"Changing the safety culture is a long-term project"
P.S.
and another doc in the same series:
'Leadership in Safety'
https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/defaul...afety_2023.pdf
P.P.S
The Use and Abuse of Culture
"The term safety culture is so confusing it should be abandoned."
A good point to start from, to think about and engage in discussion.
https://link.springer.com/content/pd...-95129-4_4.pdf
https://link.springer.com/book/10.10...-3-319-95129-4
Last edited by safetypee; 27th Feb 2024 at 08:09. Reason: PS PPS
The new head of quality assurance for Boeing is an engineer (both bachelor's and master's degree). Boeing will be fine. 109 years and counting.
Backlog of 737s nearly $900 billion (list prices, not discounted),not to mention the 787s (i see an average if 5-7 deliveries per week lately) and the 777-9 once it - finally - starts flying. The defense business, the services business etc.
Backlog of 737s nearly $900 billion (list prices, not discounted),not to mention the 787s (i see an average if 5-7 deliveries per week lately) and the 777-9 once it - finally - starts flying. The defense business, the services business etc.
5-7 787 deliveries per week is not a production rate, purely shifting long overdue stock that has cost Boeing large amounts of money.
Within six months of the issuance of this report, Boeing should review the recommendations contained in this report and develop an action plan that includes a milestone-based approach that comprehensively addresses each recommendation. Boeing should then share that action plan, including implementation dates with the FAA.
We cannot expect instant, comprehensive improvement. That said, Boeing continues to produce aircraft. How many will they deliver before the full action plan is both completed and implemented?
Review Panel’s Final Report on Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for the Design and Production of Airplanes
Monday, February 26, 2024 (link to report is on the FAA.gov website)The FAA appreciates the hard work and dedication of the expert panel members who completed this extensive review in preparing this report, which meets a requirement of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. We will immediately begin a thorough review of the report and determine next steps regarding the recommendations as appropriate. We will continue to hold Boeing to the highest standard of safety and will work to ensure the company comprehensively addresses these recommendations.
Last edited by GlobalNav; 27th Feb 2024 at 22:43.
I am looking forward to Boeing's action plan. In the meantime, would it be possible for some Boeing staff to distil the Panel's Report down to the most essential, urgent issues and formulate an immediate plan to address them? This would in no way diminish the six month plan.
We cannot expect instant, comprehensive improvement. That said, Boeing continues to produce aircraft. How many will they deliver before the full action plan is both completed and implemented?
We cannot expect instant, comprehensive improvement. That said, Boeing continues to produce aircraft. How many will they deliver before the full action plan is both completed and implemented?
I hope the study is truly illuminating. The ODA might be valid in some cases, for some OEMs, with improved technical oversight and the return of direct FAA supervision and accountability designated representatives. Boeing’s ODA should be terminated permanently. No amount of saying or promising the right things will suffice.
Not sure how it works in the US, but in Canada most certification documents can be suspended or canceled for failing to meet the conditions of issuance for the original certification.
Since a working QA system is an obvious condition of issuance, it would seem to me if the FAA really wanted to incentivize change then a credible threat to suspend their production authority would produce results. After the resulting stock tanking I would suggest that Boeing’s institutional share holders would force a C suite overhaul.
I don’t think there is the political will to use the nuclear option, but it would IMO force the changes Boeing needs, but is incapable of accomplishing with the current leadership.
In any case that supposes that Boeing can be saved. It is massively underwater with the Billions needed to fix the 787 and Max design and production debacles, has effectively no new in demand products in the works and are not at break even at current production rates, with a production increase freeze in place.
Personally I think Boeing is already past its PNR.
Since a working QA system is an obvious condition of issuance, it would seem to me if the FAA really wanted to incentivize change then a credible threat to suspend their production authority would produce results. After the resulting stock tanking I would suggest that Boeing’s institutional share holders would force a C suite overhaul.
I don’t think there is the political will to use the nuclear option, but it would IMO force the changes Boeing needs, but is incapable of accomplishing with the current leadership.
In any case that supposes that Boeing can be saved. It is massively underwater with the Billions needed to fix the 787 and Max design and production debacles, has effectively no new in demand products in the works and are not at break even at current production rates, with a production increase freeze in place.
Personally I think Boeing is already past its PNR.
The 787 was turning into a major cash cow before the production rate got derailed - there is no reason why (with the issues sorted) it can't return to cash cow status (the demand for the 787 remains high among airlines).
BTW, the rate freeze only applies to the 737 MAX.
Boeing still has a talented engineering base - they can do some pretty impressive stuff if the bean counters and upper management just get out of the way.
After all, what all new products does Airbus have in the works?
The FAA are taking an electron microscope to everything that has anything to do with the 777X. Stuff that could be smoked through in the old days, won’t happen anymore. In any case Boeing’s strategy to try to grandfather a basically new airplane onto the 777 certificate is doomed.
The fact that Boeing covered up a 777X uncommanded pitch down in flight which an FAA audit uncovered 7 months later, also pretty much killed any remaining good will with the FAA.
An additional nail in the coffin was making a large tranche of senior engineers retire all at once because the genius in charge didn’t want to fund the pension plan. Talk about an own goal.
Bottom line, it is far from a sure thing the 777X will ever get certified and in production.
In any case it should not be forgotten that the only reason the door plug fiasco wasn’t an extinction level event for Boeing is because it happened at 16,000 feet not FL 360. If the plug had departed at cruise altitude there would have been fatalities in the cabin at best and there was a significant possibility that the aircraft would have broken up in flight killing everyone. Another accident due to a clear design or manufacturing “escape” and it has to be game over.
The fact that Boeing covered up a 777X uncommanded pitch down in flight which an FAA audit uncovered 7 months later, also pretty much killed any remaining good will with the FAA.
An additional nail in the coffin was making a large tranche of senior engineers retire all at once because the genius in charge didn’t want to fund the pension plan. Talk about an own goal.
Bottom line, it is far from a sure thing the 777X will ever get certified and in production.
In any case it should not be forgotten that the only reason the door plug fiasco wasn’t an extinction level event for Boeing is because it happened at 16,000 feet not FL 360. If the plug had departed at cruise altitude there would have been fatalities in the cabin at best and there was a significant possibility that the aircraft would have broken up in flight killing everyone. Another accident due to a clear design or manufacturing “escape” and it has to be game over.
The FAA are taking an electron microscope to everything that has anything to do with the 777X. Stuff that could be smoked through in the old days, won’t happen anymore. In any case Boeing’s strategy to try to grandfather a basically new airplane onto the 777 certificate is doomed.
are you talking about? The engineer contract was changed from a defined benefit to a defined contribution almost 10 years ago (i.e. well before I retired). Pension benefits earned before the change remained unchanged, after the swap the company dramatically increased their contribution to the employee's 401k. While there was a large retirement of long-time engineers, it had little to do with the pension change - it had much more to do with the fact that Boeing went on a huge hiring spree in the late 1970s (to man up for the 757/767 programs), and (like me) all those engineers were all hitting retirement age. Nearly every company in the US has moved away from defined benefit pension plans because not only is it an open-ended obligation - if the pension fund is adequately funded, it makes the company a huge takeoff target (the new owners rob pension fund and use the funds to finance the purchase, leaving the pension effectively worthless as there is nothing to back it up). Join Date: Jul 2013
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The FAA are taking an electron microscope to everything that has anything to do with the 777X. Stuff that could be smoked through in the old days, won’t happen anymore. In any case Boeing’s strategy to try to grandfather a basically new airplane onto the 777 certificate is doomed.
The fact that Boeing covered up a 777X uncommanded pitch down in flight which an FAA audit uncovered 7 months later, also pretty much killed any remaining good will with the FAA.
An additional nail in the coffin was making a large tranche of senior engineers retire all at once because the genius in charge didn’t want to fund the pension plan. Talk about an own goal.
Bottom line, it is far from a sure thing the 777X will ever get certified and in production.
The fact that Boeing covered up a 777X uncommanded pitch down in flight which an FAA audit uncovered 7 months later, also pretty much killed any remaining good will with the FAA.
An additional nail in the coffin was making a large tranche of senior engineers retire all at once because the genius in charge didn’t want to fund the pension plan. Talk about an own goal.
Bottom line, it is far from a sure thing the 777X will ever get certified and in production.
In other words, why is certification "doomed"? Is it some specific systems or aeronautics issue, or a general sense that "Boeing is doomed" so therefore....., or what? I'm not asserting (ground-pounding, grunt of an SLF/attorney as I still am) that you're wrong - I just wanna hear your reasoning and facts it's based on. What problems lurk in 777X that - in your assesement - would have been "smoked through" before but now will not?