Boeing at X-Roads?
What a difference from the Boeing of thirty years ago, when the 777 was nearing entry into service and the 737NG program was going strong. Today, Boeing can't even get type certification of the most recent 777 derivative, admittedly a major development, from an understandably mistrustful FAA.
"How does a company go from being a respected standard setter to being a bit of a tragic joke?"
People believed the initial ET-302 news reports based on claims by the operator about how the flight was managed. That's the pivot point. This was then fired up by resentment that while Boeing stock holders had been enriched by buy-backs, the Boeing workers had not, and with the news coverage those workers who held stock saw their retirements significantly set back right after the giddy run-up. Add in the long term resentment of changes due to the ownership change at Boeing puts the company under attack from inside and outside.
People believed the initial ET-302 news reports based on claims by the operator about how the flight was managed. That's the pivot point. This was then fired up by resentment that while Boeing stock holders had been enriched by buy-backs, the Boeing workers had not, and with the news coverage those workers who held stock saw their retirements significantly set back right after the giddy run-up. Add in the long term resentment of changes due to the ownership change at Boeing puts the company under attack from inside and outside.
Psychophysiological entity
. . . from an understandably mistrustful FAA.
I'd say it's more a case of the FAA losing manpower and having difficulty leveraging the digital age. There have been complaints that Boeing hid the changes to MCAS from the FAA, but those changes should have been managed by a software release system that controlled the source code, the compilation, distribution, and the sign-offs from all related people such as the programmers, QA reps, and various upper management members. Such release systems can generate messages to participants about each stage of the release, starting with the withdrawal/check-out and the upload/check-in of the source code. It would have been trivial to have the FAA be in the group of notifications recipients.
For MCAS it would have made no difference as it was lack of imagination rather than insurmountable engineering issue that was the problem, and the FAA has never impressed me as having any imagination at all.
So, they delegate rather than adapt.
<long unrelated rant about FAA and the funding and marching orders from Congress.>
For MCAS it would have made no difference as it was lack of imagination rather than insurmountable engineering issue that was the problem, and the FAA has never impressed me as having any imagination at all.
So, they delegate rather than adapt.
<long unrelated rant about FAA and the funding and marching orders from Congress.>
I'd say it's more a case of the FAA losing manpower and having difficulty leveraging the digital age. There have been complaints that Boeing hid the changes to MCAS from the FAA, but those changes should have been managed by a software release system that controlled the source code, the compilation, distribution, and the sign-offs from all related people such as the programmers, QA reps, and various upper management members. Such release systems can generate messages to participants about each stage of the release, starting with the withdrawal/check-out and the upload/check-in of the source code. It would have been trivial to have the FAA be in the group of notifications recipients.
For MCAS it would have made no difference as it was lack of imagination rather than insurmountable engineering issue that was the problem, and the FAA has never impressed me as having any imagination at all.
So, they delegate rather than adapt.
<long unrelated rant about FAA and the funding and marching orders from Congress.>
For MCAS it would have made no difference as it was lack of imagination rather than insurmountable engineering issue that was the problem, and the FAA has never impressed me as having any imagination at all.
So, they delegate rather than adapt.
<long unrelated rant about FAA and the funding and marching orders from Congress.>
As Global points out, the FAA has used delegation of one form or another for many decades (e.g. DER's and DAR's) - I was first appointed a DER in 1986. Delegation can work just fine, providing the FAA chose the right people as DERs (integrity being a must)
ODA isn't fundamentally bad, but it puts a barrier between the FAA and the those doing the actual work and compliance findings that can exaggerate any flaws or shortcomings in the process (and makes it far harder for the FAA to judge the judgement and integrity of the delegates making the decisions and compliance findings).
However, the problems with the FAA are more fundamental than delegation or ODA. I call it 'The forest for the trees' focusing on minor details while missing the big picture of ensuring a safe aircraft. While the FAA specialists are divided into different disciplines (e.g. Structures, Propulsion, Avionics, etc.), within those disciplines, the specialists need to be something of a jack-of-all-trades. For example, within Propulsion, Boeing had sub-groups such as Engine Controls, Installations, Performance, Aerodynamics, etc. where the engineers could hone their specialty - while the FAA Propulsion types needed to understand all those areas, 30 years ago, the people at the FAA where mainly aviation types that knew and lived airplanes (many were disgruntled ex-Boeing) and had many years of experience in aviation - and so knew how to look at the big picture.
That started to change around the turn of the century (coincidentally, about the same time Boeing started to move towards becoming an ODA, which was truly unfortunate timing). Many of the long-time FAA types were retiring, and their replacements were young and inexperienced (often straight out of college) who lacked aviation background. Overwhelmed by having to know and understand an entire area such as Propulsion, they tended to focus on something they did understand - nit-picking the heck out of it - while ignoring the big picture of "is the resultant system safe" - instead studying a small slice in excruciating detail (sort of like a general focusing on what one or two privates are doing, rather than managing the entire battle).
Worse, lacking overall system knowledge, they focused on 'box checking' - making sure every little bit of paperwork was submitted and correct (I once had an 8110 form rejected because - under the affected models - I had "747-SP" rather than the TCDS listed "747SP"), rather than making sure that paperwork resulted in safe aircraft. A couple of the new Propulsion specialists were so bad that we turned their names into a sort of obscenity - as in "You poor sucker, you just got 'Smith'ed' when Smith was assigned to your cert plan (Smith not being a real example BTW).
ODA isn't fundamentally bad, but it puts a barrier between the FAA and the those doing the actual work and compliance findings that can exaggerate any flaws or shortcomings in the process (and makes it far harder for the FAA to judge the judgement and integrity of the delegates making the decisions and compliance findings).
However, the problems with the FAA are more fundamental than delegation or ODA. I call it 'The forest for the trees' focusing on minor details while missing the big picture of ensuring a safe aircraft. While the FAA specialists are divided into different disciplines (e.g. Structures, Propulsion, Avionics, etc.), within those disciplines, the specialists need to be something of a jack-of-all-trades. For example, within Propulsion, Boeing had sub-groups such as Engine Controls, Installations, Performance, Aerodynamics, etc. where the engineers could hone their specialty - while the FAA Propulsion types needed to understand all those areas, 30 years ago, the people at the FAA where mainly aviation types that knew and lived airplanes (many were disgruntled ex-Boeing) and had many years of experience in aviation - and so knew how to look at the big picture.
That started to change around the turn of the century (coincidentally, about the same time Boeing started to move towards becoming an ODA, which was truly unfortunate timing). Many of the long-time FAA types were retiring, and their replacements were young and inexperienced (often straight out of college) who lacked aviation background. Overwhelmed by having to know and understand an entire area such as Propulsion, they tended to focus on something they did understand - nit-picking the heck out of it - while ignoring the big picture of "is the resultant system safe" - instead studying a small slice in excruciating detail (sort of like a general focusing on what one or two privates are doing, rather than managing the entire battle).
Worse, lacking overall system knowledge, they focused on 'box checking' - making sure every little bit of paperwork was submitted and correct (I once had an 8110 form rejected because - under the affected models - I had "747-SP" rather than the TCDS listed "747SP"), rather than making sure that paperwork resulted in safe aircraft. A couple of the new Propulsion specialists were so bad that we turned their names into a sort of obscenity - as in "You poor sucker, you just got 'Smith'ed' when Smith was assigned to your cert plan (Smith not being a real example BTW).
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Not to nit-pick, but the 737NG didn't certify until 1997 - and it had a fair share of issues getting certified (there was a huge problem getting JAA buy-in to the emergency exit configuration - IIRC Boeing had to completely redesign the overwing exits and spent a boatload retrofitting dozens of already completed 737s before they could be delivered to European operators).
Psychophysiological entity
tdracer said,
I can no longer argue assertively on points such as this, though it's only a few years since my memory was very, very sharp. Since the MAX posts I've started to lose that edge, though it may be life's stresses being the main culprit. So how did I come to the conclusion about the Feds? Well of course it was entirely based on those many months of intense postings. I claim to have read, and for the most part understood, every post. I am as sure as one possibly can be* that I read that statement purporting to be from a FAA bod, presumably quite senior. So in quite literal terms "That FAA never existed outside your imagination." is not correct unless my memory is playing outlandish tricks on me.
*Professor Elizabeth Loftus is a world authority on False Memory issues. She's very pleasant to communicate with, while being unnerving to anyone that is convinced they remember minutia from their childhood. I imagine any honest judge must be deeply concerned that justice might be based on re-constructed, re-re-re-constructions to give utterly false recall.
Anyway, my lasting impression has been that the FAA would have been burdened beyond all reason to re-evaluate the millions of records needed to certify a modern airliner. It made sense to have self-certification, but it was based on long held and seemingly out-dated beliefs.
If I'd known I'd spend the fat part of two years with a deep interest in such a subject, I'd have started a filing system with highly relevent 'facts' like that easily researched. But I didn't and fear I'd have little chance of finding it.
That FAA never existed outside your imagination.
There has been plenty wrong with the FAA, but that was never part of it (remember, I had firsthand dealings with them for 30 years).
There has been plenty wrong with the FAA, but that was never part of it (remember, I had firsthand dealings with them for 30 years).
*Professor Elizabeth Loftus is a world authority on False Memory issues. She's very pleasant to communicate with, while being unnerving to anyone that is convinced they remember minutia from their childhood. I imagine any honest judge must be deeply concerned that justice might be based on re-constructed, re-re-re-constructions to give utterly false recall.
Anyway, my lasting impression has been that the FAA would have been burdened beyond all reason to re-evaluate the millions of records needed to certify a modern airliner. It made sense to have self-certification, but it was based on long held and seemingly out-dated beliefs.
If I'd known I'd spend the fat part of two years with a deep interest in such a subject, I'd have started a filing system with highly relevent 'facts' like that easily researched. But I didn't and fear I'd have little chance of finding it.
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"dramatic overhaul at the top"; board has been "insidious and negligent"
In the February 12-25, 2024 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology, the very eminent Anthony L. Velocci, Jr. has written this edition's Up Front column, entitled "Crisis of Confidence" - subtitle, "Are institutional shareholders Boeing's best hope?"
Through the many travails of Boeing, great volumes of ink (liquid as well as electronic) have been spilled. Among the areas of overlap in the views of interested parties and observers, the idea that "it's all been said before" probably would be one such view. Regardless, to this SLF/attorney, it hasn't been said as well as Mr. Velocci's AW&ST column, nor as authoritatively. Find it, get it and read it.
Through the many travails of Boeing, great volumes of ink (liquid as well as electronic) have been spilled. Among the areas of overlap in the views of interested parties and observers, the idea that "it's all been said before" probably would be one such view. Regardless, to this SLF/attorney, it hasn't been said as well as Mr. Velocci's AW&ST column, nor as authoritatively. Find it, get it and read it.
What Boeing is missing, as much of corporate America is missing today, is product 101.
Figure out what your market needs... Figure out the cost to do it well... Work closely with industry management to determine optimal pricing... And work closely together across the entire industry to increase value for the end user.
This is a common sense growth model that has worked over and over and over but it's too easy to get pulled into any of the secondary arguments that get most of the attention.
Figure out what your market needs... Figure out the cost to do it well... Work closely with industry management to determine optimal pricing... And work closely together across the entire industry to increase value for the end user.
This is a common sense growth model that has worked over and over and over but it's too easy to get pulled into any of the secondary arguments that get most of the attention.
For 25 years now, Boeing has been stuck on "best next quarter" and as a result is optimizing what you can do in 3 months in aviation, which is absolutely nothing good.
I continue with my assertion that Boeing management actually has the goal of shutting Boeing down as profitably as possible.
😅
But doesn't this drive down the share values? I mean, Wall Street could bet on losses, but bonus shares for Boeing Management can't.
And what about the immense face loss for them decision makers when terminating a company?
Oh, sounds like the latest excessive capitalist strategy.
😅
But doesn't this drive down the share values? I mean, Wall Street could bet on losses, but bonus shares for Boeing Management can't.
And what about the immense face loss for them decision makers when terminating a company?
😅
But doesn't this drive down the share values? I mean, Wall Street could bet on losses, but bonus shares for Boeing Management can't.
And what about the immense face loss for them decision makers when terminating a company?
Ride that horse till it falls over then sell it for glue.
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Evidently, the concept of fiduciary duties of management and directors, and proxy contests and/or litigation recourse for breach, has been repealed. That is, as an assumption for the view that management, with board acquiescence and/or particpation, is deliberately tanking the company and rewarding themselves to the max, in the process.
Just seen this - ahem - related news announcment:
'Boeing announced Wednesday that the head of the company's 737 Max program is leaving the company in a management shake-up in the wake of a January mishap that has damaged the aircraft manufacturer's reputation and cost it billions of dollars in value.
Boeing Executive Vice President and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Stanley A. Deal announced several leadership changes in an email to employees Wednesday, including that Ed Clark, the head of the company's Boeing’s 737 Max program, has been replaced.
“Ed departs with my, and our, deepest gratitude for his many significant contributions over nearly 18 years of dedicated service to Boeing,” Deal said.
On January 5, a Boeing-manufactured Alaska Airlines plane door panel blew out midair over Portland, forcing an emergency landing.'
'Boeing announced Wednesday that the head of the company's 737 Max program is leaving the company in a management shake-up in the wake of a January mishap that has damaged the aircraft manufacturer's reputation and cost it billions of dollars in value.
Boeing Executive Vice President and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Stanley A. Deal announced several leadership changes in an email to employees Wednesday, including that Ed Clark, the head of the company's Boeing’s 737 Max program, has been replaced.
“Ed departs with my, and our, deepest gratitude for his many significant contributions over nearly 18 years of dedicated service to Boeing,” Deal said.
On January 5, a Boeing-manufactured Alaska Airlines plane door panel blew out midair over Portland, forcing an emergency landing.'
Just seen this - ahem - related news announcment:
'Boeing announced Wednesday that the head of the company's 737 Max program is leaving the company in a management shake-up in the wake of a January mishap that has damaged the aircraft manufacturer's reputation and cost it billions of dollars in value.
Boeing Executive Vice President and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Stanley A. Deal announced several leadership changes in an email to employees Wednesday, including that Ed Clark, the head of the company's Boeing’s 737 Max program, has been replaced.
“Ed departs with my, and our, deepest gratitude for his many significant contributions over nearly 18 years of dedicated service to Boeing,” Deal said.
On January 5, a Boeing-manufactured Alaska Airlines plane door panel blew out midair over Portland, forcing an emergency landing.'
'Boeing announced Wednesday that the head of the company's 737 Max program is leaving the company in a management shake-up in the wake of a January mishap that has damaged the aircraft manufacturer's reputation and cost it billions of dollars in value.
Boeing Executive Vice President and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Stanley A. Deal announced several leadership changes in an email to employees Wednesday, including that Ed Clark, the head of the company's Boeing’s 737 Max program, has been replaced.
“Ed departs with my, and our, deepest gratitude for his many significant contributions over nearly 18 years of dedicated service to Boeing,” Deal said.
On January 5, a Boeing-manufactured Alaska Airlines plane door panel blew out midair over Portland, forcing an emergency landing.'
Evidently, the concept of fiduciary duties of management and directors, and proxy contests and/or litigation recourse for breach, has been repealed. That is, as an assumption for the view that management, with board acquiescence and/or particpation, is deliberately tanking the company and rewarding themselves to the max, in the process.
* End all new airframe development and associated expense (begun in the 90s, goal achieved in 2003 with 787 announcement)
* Develop derivative products using minimal resources and expenditure, using information control, and outright deception if necessary, to avoid regulatory friction
* Sell obsolescing products into markets with inelastic demand
* Seek a buyer, or divestiture, for defense business, where failed contract management and recurrent quality issues are causing problems greater than in civilian business
* End expenditures on costly quality and safety processes that negatively affect production rate
* Use mechanisms independent of product design and quality to increase shareholder "value," in particular stock buyback
* Issue golden parachutes to executive management as needed during wind-down "messaging strategy"
Or in other words
Phase 1: Collect underpants.
Phase 2: ?
Phase 3: Profit!
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If Ed Clark had told his BCA superiors, "Sorry, but we can't produce that many MAXes, that fast, while delivering the aircraft our customers and their passengers expect," when would his departure have been announced?