Airway UM688 Iraq: Fake GPS signals causing nav failure over Iraq
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Got a questiion: the ´bad guys´ are somewhere in the Iraq / Turkey / Iran / Russia area. Bad enough. What about all the activity in the West that´s Notam-public, like in the US or UK or Germany or or ... ??
What about it? Sometimes necessary for military training or other security issues. Not an issue if you read the NOTAM.
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Pegase Driver
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That is basically why there is still a human in the cockpit 
The idea of the NOTAM is that it is read before departure and mitigation is taken . i.e do not rely 100% on GPS in an area NOTAMed for GPS outages ,
The idea of the NOTAM is that it is read before departure and mitigation is taken . i.e do not rely 100% on GPS in an area NOTAMed for GPS outages ,
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OK, so I read that GPS= potentially out over xxx area.
My MEL says GPS=out = ADS-B = out.
What do I tell ATC ? Do they quickly install different surveillance or return to larger separation ?
I can read - my airplane / the airplane systems can´t.
My MEL says GPS=out = ADS-B = out.
What do I tell ATC ? Do they quickly install different surveillance or return to larger separation ?
I can read - my airplane / the airplane systems can´t.
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Over land , under SSR coverage just tell ATC you.'ve lost GPS, and request radar vectoring
North Atlantic , half of it is now radar covered . so ATC has a fall back, , outside of it is the issue , there is no real urgency as ATC know your last position the system can extrapolate, if it last long , then we have a problem and emergency separation ( 500ft ) might be applied. As I posted earlier both Canada and Australia , the main users of ADS-B alone ( not backed up by radar) have no published procedures for this .
ASECNA ( Africa) is currently installing it , and there I would be very , very careful ,as communications is also an issue .
Now that is is for unforeseen hostile jamming , back to NOTAMs, again , if there is a published outage, ADS-B , outside -radar coverage, ADS-B separation will not be offered by ATC during that period and you will enter that airspace procedurally separated as before.
From Avweb.
GPS Spoofing Signals Traced To Tehran
A University of Texas student has traced the source of alarming GPS spoofing signals in the Middle East to the eastern outskirts of Tehran, but it would seem there is little anyone can do to stop the navigation interference. Todd Humphreys, who heads up the Radionavigation Laboratory at UT, said the grad student, Zach Clements, was able to use gear on the International Space Station to scan for the bogus signals and approximate their source. He said analysis of the signals themselves suggests it’s a more sophisticated form of jamming, the cruder form of which is ubiquitous in the region. “They seemed to be aimed at denial of service rather than actual deception,” Humphreys told Vice. “My students and I came to realize that spoofing is the new jamming. In other words, it is being used for denial of service because it’s more effective for that purpose than blunt jamming.”
Since late September, the website Ops Group has been collecting reports from pilots flying in the Middle East reporting satellite-based navigation equipment giving them false position reports. In some cases, their panels have told them they’re as much as 120 miles from their actual location, prompting the FMS to react. Some crews have had to ask ATC for vectors to keep them on course. Humphreys said the alarming development is the spoofing affects both the GPS-dependent equipment and the Inertial Reference System (IRS). The two systems are supposed to operate independently and the IRS was thought to be immune to that kind of tampering. It affects the main system and their backups simultaneously. “The GPS and IRS, and their redundant backups, are the principal components of modern aircraft navigation systems,” Humphreys said. “When their readings are corrupted, the Flight Management System assumes an incorrect aircraft position, Synthetic Vision systems show the wrong context, etc.” He said crews eventually figure out something is wrong and use old-fashioned tools like VOR and DME, but those are not always available and they have to call up ATC.
A University of Texas student has traced the source of alarming GPS spoofing signals in the Middle East to the eastern outskirts of Tehran, but it would seem there is little anyone can do to stop the navigation interference. Todd Humphreys, who heads up the Radionavigation Laboratory at UT, said the grad student, Zach Clements, was able to use gear on the International Space Station to scan for the bogus signals and approximate their source. He said analysis of the signals themselves suggests it’s a more sophisticated form of jamming, the cruder form of which is ubiquitous in the region. “They seemed to be aimed at denial of service rather than actual deception,” Humphreys told Vice. “My students and I came to realize that spoofing is the new jamming. In other words, it is being used for denial of service because it’s more effective for that purpose than blunt jamming.”
Since late September, the website Ops Group has been collecting reports from pilots flying in the Middle East reporting satellite-based navigation equipment giving them false position reports. In some cases, their panels have told them they’re as much as 120 miles from their actual location, prompting the FMS to react. Some crews have had to ask ATC for vectors to keep them on course. Humphreys said the alarming development is the spoofing affects both the GPS-dependent equipment and the Inertial Reference System (IRS). The two systems are supposed to operate independently and the IRS was thought to be immune to that kind of tampering. It affects the main system and their backups simultaneously. “The GPS and IRS, and their redundant backups, are the principal components of modern aircraft navigation systems,” Humphreys said. “When their readings are corrupted, the Flight Management System assumes an incorrect aircraft position, Synthetic Vision systems show the wrong context, etc.” He said crews eventually figure out something is wrong and use old-fashioned tools like VOR and DME, but those are not always available and they have to call up ATC.
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An accurate fix requires signals from a number of satellites, that will be spread over a wide angle. Not just one or two directly above. So the GPS receiver needs a wide beamwidth.
To maintain continuous jamming over a defined area by satellite would be a difficult and expensive business. Why bother when jamming from a ground station, even a mobile one, is relatively easy.
To maintain continuous jamming over a defined area by satellite would be a difficult and expensive business. Why bother when jamming from a ground station, even a mobile one, is relatively easy.
But they wouldnt spoof over a large area anyway, it would have to be directed at a small area/single target to be effective, i.e.trick the check logic.
Spoofing would have to come from above where the Rx antenna is, and we can guess the players that have that hardware.
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I would think so, GPS frequencies are line of sight, and therefore with the Rx antenna on top of the a/c theres going to be a huge dead area under the aircrafts radio shadow where a ground station would be ineffective.
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Airbus doesn't prohibit you to deselect the GPS, it only says that you shouldn't do it, because when it was just a GPS jamming, the signal was supposed to come back shortly.
To my experience, deselecting the GPS and setting the clock to INT as soon as the ECAMs start to pop up and after checking that I really lost the GPS position has worked nicely. By the way, the NAV ACCURACY never dropped below HIGH.
To my experience, deselecting the GPS and setting the clock to INT as soon as the ECAMs start to pop up and after checking that I really lost the GPS position has worked nicely. By the way, the NAV ACCURACY never dropped below HIGH.
