Pax Jet in water at NAS Jacksonville, all OK
Join Date: May 2015
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In my humble opinion, you don't have to land in that tight spot. Especially in FL, more airports around you at anytime than Trump supporters...
Our company made sure that every recurrent we had a landing distance refresher, for good reasons. Try flying into 3 airports on 1 day in Central and S America, all 5000-9000 ft elevation and ra/ts+ etc, add rubber covered runways and unreliable ATC, unreliable or no actual weather reports etc etc, ooh and at max dispatch ldg mass calculated by the supercomputers of dispatch and of course verified during the preflight briefing...in a widebody freighter
Our company made sure that every recurrent we had a landing distance refresher, for good reasons. Try flying into 3 airports on 1 day in Central and S America, all 5000-9000 ft elevation and ra/ts+ etc, add rubber covered runways and unreliable ATC, unreliable or no actual weather reports etc etc, ooh and at max dispatch ldg mass calculated by the supercomputers of dispatch and of course verified during the preflight briefing...in a widebody freighter
Join Date: Jun 2001
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NTSB Accident Report Released:
Miami Air International flight 293, a Boeing 737 charter transporting U.S. Department of Defense personnel from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, ended up in shallow waters of the St. Johns River after it overran runway 10 at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida, while landing in a heavy rainstorm May 3, 2019. Although none of the 143 passengers and crew onboard were seriously injured, several animals carried in the cargo compartment died in the accident.
The accident report details how the flight crew did not follow procedures, including continuing an unstabilized approach, landing the airplane at an excessive approach speed, and delaying deployment of the speedbrakes. However, investigators determined that even if none of those errors occurred, the airplane still would not have stopped on the ungrooved runway because the rainfall rate and runway characteristics contributed to water depths that caused the aircraft to hydroplane.
(In this photo, taken May 4, 2019, Miami Air flight 293, a Boeing 737, is shown in the shallow water of the St. Johns River after departing runway 10 while landing in a rainstorm at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida. NTSB photo by Dan Bower.)
The investigation also found Miami Air International failed to provide its flight crews with adequate guidance for evaluating braking conditions for landing on wet or contaminated runways.
Miami Air International ceased operations May 8, 2020.
The NTSB’s 32-page accident report, Miami Air Boeing 737; Jacksonville, Florida; May 3, 2019, is available online at https://go.usa.gov/xFNPb.
The accident docket, which contains interviews, photos, studies and other factual material, was opened to the public April 21, 2021, and is available online at https://go.usa.gov/x6GGd. [this link leads to the report, not the docket - Airbubba]
Poor Braking Conditions Following Heavy Rain Led to 737 Runway Overrun
8/4/2021 Washington (August 4, 2021) — A jetliner overran a rain-soaked runway due to an “extreme loss of braking friction,” the National Transportation Safety Board said in a report released Wednesday.Miami Air International flight 293, a Boeing 737 charter transporting U.S. Department of Defense personnel from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, ended up in shallow waters of the St. Johns River after it overran runway 10 at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida, while landing in a heavy rainstorm May 3, 2019. Although none of the 143 passengers and crew onboard were seriously injured, several animals carried in the cargo compartment died in the accident.
The accident report details how the flight crew did not follow procedures, including continuing an unstabilized approach, landing the airplane at an excessive approach speed, and delaying deployment of the speedbrakes. However, investigators determined that even if none of those errors occurred, the airplane still would not have stopped on the ungrooved runway because the rainfall rate and runway characteristics contributed to water depths that caused the aircraft to hydroplane.
(In this photo, taken May 4, 2019, Miami Air flight 293, a Boeing 737, is shown in the shallow water of the St. Johns River after departing runway 10 while landing in a rainstorm at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida. NTSB photo by Dan Bower.)
The investigation also found Miami Air International failed to provide its flight crews with adequate guidance for evaluating braking conditions for landing on wet or contaminated runways.
Miami Air International ceased operations May 8, 2020.
The NTSB’s 32-page accident report, Miami Air Boeing 737; Jacksonville, Florida; May 3, 2019, is available online at https://go.usa.gov/xFNPb.
The accident docket, which contains interviews, photos, studies and other factual material, was opened to the public April 21, 2021, and is available online at https://go.usa.gov/x6GGd. [this link leads to the report, not the docket - Airbubba]
Probable Cause and Findings The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
An extreme loss of braking friction due to heavy rain and the water depth on the ungrooved runway, which resulted in viscous hydroplaning. Contributing to the accident was the operator’s inadequate guidance for evaluating runway braking conditions and conducting en route landing distance assessments.
Contributing to the continuation of an unstabilized approach were
1) the captain’s plan continuation bias and increased workload due to the weather and performing check airman duties and
2) the first officer’s lack of experience
An extreme loss of braking friction due to heavy rain and the water depth on the ungrooved runway, which resulted in viscous hydroplaning. Contributing to the accident was the operator’s inadequate guidance for evaluating runway braking conditions and conducting en route landing distance assessments.
Contributing to the continuation of an unstabilized approach were
1) the captain’s plan continuation bias and increased workload due to the weather and performing check airman duties and
2) the first officer’s lack of experience
I've spent a fair amount of time in Florida - and the rain can often come down in sheets ('heavy rain" being a huge understatement). It boggles the mind that a runway intended for jet aircraft would be "ungrooved".
The report refers to Actual Landing Distance; assuming this was as published in the Boeing QRH, then even with a 15% addition there was little or no margin for this landing. This also assumes that Boeing had data for a flooded runway, or that the crew knew of it, and understood the conditions at the airport.
The international TALPA meetings proposed new methods of assessing runway braking condition, which together with more realistic landing distances, Operational Landing Distance (OLD), particularly for contaminated runways, and the use of a minimum of 12% margin (FOLD), should reduce this type of accident - providing the crew think about the contributing factors and apply greater margins than the minimum.
EASA have mandated procedures associated with the TALPA changes; the FAA has not, relying on advice only.
Many manufacturers have published new landing data - FOLD, but as yet Boeing appears not to have done so for US / FAA operations. The FAA advice in this area is in AC 25-32, where para 11 considers existing aircraft; also see SAFO 19001 and 19003
Does Boeing publish any data according to the new OLD / FOLD requirements; are there any US operators using the new landing data, data supplied either by Boeing or other data suppliers; if so are the assumptions in calculation, for crew actions, and for safety margins explained?
The international TALPA meetings proposed new methods of assessing runway braking condition, which together with more realistic landing distances, Operational Landing Distance (OLD), particularly for contaminated runways, and the use of a minimum of 12% margin (FOLD), should reduce this type of accident - providing the crew think about the contributing factors and apply greater margins than the minimum.
EASA have mandated procedures associated with the TALPA changes; the FAA has not, relying on advice only.
Many manufacturers have published new landing data - FOLD, but as yet Boeing appears not to have done so for US / FAA operations. The FAA advice in this area is in AC 25-32, where para 11 considers existing aircraft; also see SAFO 19001 and 19003
Does Boeing publish any data according to the new OLD / FOLD requirements; are there any US operators using the new landing data, data supplied either by Boeing or other data suppliers; if so are the assumptions in calculation, for crew actions, and for safety margins explained?
