TWA-800 ANNIVERSARY

[HotDog]

John, for any of the cargo doors to open in flight electrically, you would have to suffer a series of multiple malfunctions. The cargo handling bus-2 relay R992 has to be energized to supply power to the cargo doors which comes from External Power receptacle No.2 or APU Generator No.2. Once airborne, there is obviously no External power and even if the APU had been left on for T/O, the Aux Power solenoid of R992 would be de-energized as it gets it's earth through the Ground Safety relay R910, which is open when airborne. I believe a centre tank explosion to be a very feasible cause of the TWA 800 disaster and definitely don't believe in the chemtrail or any other conspiracy.

[Kato747]

Causes and conspiracies aside guys....How about a 'nickel on the grass' for the crew and pax plus the families who're still wondering how the finest aerial vehicle ever built could become such a torch.

If it's an anniversary....let's remember....and try like hell to not let it happen again. One was enough..........


Vigilance, my son, vigilance

[GotTheTshirt]

JBS,

The Missile Theory is just that theory - just like the centre tank and cargo door - ALL theories.
First the reason that the B747 nose separates is that it is without doubt the weakest part of the fuselage structure with hi diff loads and contour change. Hence the station 41 FAA AD.

Second, like yourself, the eywitness flying the coast guard helo was n air force major with 48 vietnam missions and on the program was quite forceful that from his experience
the first 2 explosions were definitely HE.

Finally after all the debate the military did several test firings of stingers mainly to check the visiblity effects. the film showed the firings and related them to the eye witness reports. Many were identical !

** Still an open mind !!***

[JohnBarrySmith]

Dear PPRuNe,

For those of you who tell me it can't happen, read below about how it did... and did. These two uncommanded openings happened on the ground and thus are not eligible for the center tank explosion or bomb or missile explanation.

Please note, still not refuted, still disagreed by saying it was a bomb or missile or center tank and just a theory and just can't happen because of relay this and switch that.

You guys are in denial denial denial. And still you will not check out the straightforward easily understandable mechanical explanation with precedent and documentation.

I speak to you as pilot to pilot, check out this alert, electrical problems are causing Boeing 747 cargo doors to open when they shouldn't. It's happened before in 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1996 and now 2000. Some on the ground and some in the air. I say to you as navigator to pilot, we may be supposed to be over there, but we are over here, defer to reality, tell your safety people to check out www.corazon.com and contact me for further clarification.

Trust in your instruments when the seat of your pants says otherwise. The instruments that say explosive decompression are the CVR and the FDR, the seat of your pants says hey, the NTSB and AAIB and TSB can't be wrong, now can they?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
[phone] phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924 www.corazon.com
[email protected]

The below SDR reveals that the flaw of electrically opened forward cargo door still exists. This supports the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for four Boeing 747 accidents as detailed at www.corazon.com

Difficulty Date : 10/11/00
Operator Type : Air Carrier
ATA Code : 5210
Part Name : CONTROLLER
Aircraft Manufacturer : BOEING
Aircraft Group : 747
Aircraft Model : 747422
Engine Manufacturer : PWA
Engine Group : 4056
Engine Model : PW4056
Part/Defect Location : CARGO DOOR
Part Condition : MALFUNCTIONED
Submitter Code : Carrier
Operator Desig. : UALA
Precautionary Procedure : NONE
Nature : OTHER
Stage of Flight : INSP/MAINT
District Office Region : Western/Pacific US office #29
A/C N Number : 199UA
Aircraft Serial No. : 28717

Discrepancy/Corrective Action:FWD CARGO DOOR OPENED BY ITSELF WHEN CB PUSHED IN. ON ARRIVAL, CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE PUSHED IN, WHEN PRESSURE RELIEF DOOR HANDLE WAS OPENED THE DOOR LATCHES OPENED AND THEN THE DOOR OPENED ON ITS OWN. COULD NOT DUPLICATE PROBLEM AFTER INITIAL OPENING.

Below from NTSB AAR 92/02 for United Airlines Flight 811
1.17.6 Uncommanded Cargo Door Opening--UAL B-747, JFK Airport
On June 13, 1991, UAL maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at JFK Airport, Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.
The airplane was being prepared for flight at the UAL maintenance hangar when an inspection of the circuit breaker panel revealed that the C-288 (aft cargo door) circuit breaker had popped. The circuit breaker, located in the electrical equipment bay just forward of the forward cargo compartment, was reset, and it popped again a few seconds later. A decision was made to defer further
work until the airplane was repositioned at the gate for the flight. The airplane was then taxied to the gate, and work on the door resumed.
The aft cargo door was cranked open manually, the C-288 circuit breaker was reset, and it stayed in place. The door was then closed electrically and cycled a couple of times without incident. With the door closed, one of the two "cannon plug" (multiple pin) connectors was removed from the J-4 junction box located on the upper portion of the interior of the door. The wiring bundle from the junction box to the fuselage was then manipulated while readings were taken on the cannon plug pins using a volt/ohmmeter. Fluctuations in electrical resistance were noted. When the plug was reattached to the J-4 junction box, the door began to open with no activation of the electrical door open switches. The C-288 circuit breaker was pulled, and the door operation ceased. When the circuit breaker was reset, the door continued to the full open position, and the lift actuator motor continued to run for several seconds until the circuit breaker was again pulled. At this time, a flexible conduit, which covered a portion of the wiring bundle, was slid along the bundle toward the J-4 junction box, revealing several wires with insulation breaches and damage.
UAL personnel notified the Safety Board of the occurrence, and the airplane was examined at JFK by representatives of the Safety Board, United Airlines, and Boeing. After the wires in the damaged area were electrically isolated, electrical operation of the door was normal when the door was unlocked. When the door was locked (master latch lock handle closed), activation of the door control switches had no effect on the door. This indicated that the S2 master latch lock switch was operating as expected (removing power from the door when it was locked). After the on-site examinations, the wiring bundle was cut from the airplane and taken to the Safety Board's materials laboratory for further examination.

[SKYDRIFTER]

There should be no doubt that a door opening CAN occur.

However, the witness reports, PETN traces, the abrupt loss of power, the autopsies, the aircraft remains, the obvious cover-up, the flight recorders, etc. point to the impossibility of TWA-800 being a cargo door opening.

The shattered cockpit alone says that it wasn't as simple as a cargo door event. Again, contrast the damage between PA-103 and TWA-800.

[GotTheTshirt]

JBS

FYI
The door opening senario cannot happen on
aircraft designed and constructed to BCAR's
as doors in the presure hull should be plug doors.
US manufactured aircraft are certificated in the UK under Special Condition.
The Brits dont always get it wrong !

[JohnBarrySmith]

“The door opening scenario cannot happen on
aircraft designed and constructed to BCAR's
as doors in the pressure hull should be plug doors. “

They certainly should, but are they?

‘The Brits don't always get it wrong ! ‘

Hey, I was born in the UK, ‘don’t say nuttin’ bad ‘bout my baby, oh, no.’

“US manufactured aircraft are certificated in the UK under Special Condition.’

My questions are, “Is the Airbus 380 going to have non plug cargo doors and do the other Airbuses have all plug type doors already?”

All pictures I have seen of all Boeing airliners and Airbus have all had outward opening non plug doors and I am most interested to know if Airbus has plug type on present or future models.

Thanks for comments about doors, I assume BCAR means British Certification Aircraft Regulations.

Want to read something sad but enervating? The below is from family of a victim of open cargo door in flight. Wisdom and insight can come from civilians, usually one personally involved such as the Campbells or myself. They have my highest respect for their perseverance and have given me inspiration.

Note comments about Air India Flight 182.

Can you refer your safety organization to me? This is a clear and present danger that must be checked out. It is their job to do this.

Can you do something?
Cheers,
Barry
Dear Barry , Steve emailed on your reply , Thank you for your kind comments
about our work. As you know we live in NZ but we own an apt here in Waikiki
and usually spend from may till end sept here .This year we were late
arriving as our first grandchild was due early may , He did not arrive until
the 19th and we stayed to help out our daughter until the 1st june . Our son
in law gave us a computer so they could email pictures of the new baby . I
have resisted getting a computer as I cant type but seem to be managing OK .
Anyway as soon as I got on line the first search I did was 811 and got your
site , it all sounded very familiar to me and I could tell you had obviously
done your homework . Steve had visited us in NZ in Feb just as we moved into
our new apt there after selling our family home so I asked Steve if he had
been in contact with you and what spurred your interest in cargo doors { I
should have explored your site a bit more and I would have found the reason
myself but I was just starting searching the web and only hit the one page ]
Steve did not know what your motives were so I thought I would contact you
myself , however I had bought a lot of my documents over with me this trip as
I had to fly on to Seattle to do an interview with the BBC Panorama progam
for a documentry on aircraft wiring problems following the release to the
media of the Swissair wreckage , the doco is cofunded by the Discovery
Channel and may show [ Or a USA version of it ] on TLC depending on wether
they want to upset Boeing or not . The request to do this doco followed a
very good doco done by Channel 9 Sydney on their Sunday program titled "Fire
in the Sky" also about Kapton wire in Feb of this year .I had lent BBC some
of my documents including my submission to the NTSB on the cause of 811 and
also a document I had written in 1989 I called "Countdown to Disaster"
detailing the sequence of events leading up to and beyond the 811 disaster .
I still have not had them returned but Steve can email them to you if you
have never seen them.
As you are probably aware we did an investigation on 811 and have appeared in
the media many times . We had many stories about our efforts in NZ newspapers
,magazines and TVNZ followed us on one visit to the USA and did a Documentry
on our investigation { the email from the guy in NZ that you sent Steve was
from one of the team that was to do a computer simulation of my theory
compared to the NTSB theory as soon as they tried to program the NTSB theory
they could see it did not compute and it was then they realised I had to be
correct and were behind me 100%. the same people did the Americas Cup
simulations] The WALL STREET JOURNAL did a front page article on our efforts
on 24th feb 1990 and I have done several articles with Byron Acihido of the
Seattle Times among others .
In all we took 7 trips to the USA investigating 811and they started with a
look at the aircraft at Hickam AFB were we took many pictures of the damage
and I was able to rule out corosion as the cause . We attended the NTSB
hearing at Seattle and managed to steal all of the documents from the NTSB
metalurgists seat after the hearing ended . Initially they would only give us
the list of witness`s but after complaining to the media at the first recess
they gave us a press set and said we could have anything off the press table
when the hearing ended two days later . At the end of proceedings we gave an
interview to The Honolulu Advertiser and when it finished we went back in to
get the stuff off the press table, as I was looking at it my wife Susan
walked up to the top table and yelled out there was a good set of stuff here
, we grabbed a box loaded it in and took off just as the NTSB guys were
coming back in with a trolley to load it up . We hailed a taxi and were off .
It took months to look at it and absorb it all but the result was " Countdown
to Disaster"
We have stayed with both Dave Cronin and Al Slader many times .On one visit
to the NTSB we got copies of all the passenger safety statements and wrote to
everyone that had replyd to the Questionair . Mainly they were First and
Business class passengers with a few coach as well . We visited everyone who
replyed to us , Flying in to Seattle and driving to Denver New York Florida
San Diego San Francisco Lake Tahoe and back up to Seattle . Boeing would
never talk to us directly only through their legal people [Perkins Coie] and
initially United would not talk to us either but a year after the accident
when United had gone from the most popular to the carrier of last resort for
NZ passengers we got an invitation to visit the United maintenance base in
San Francisco . they were just going to do a PR job on us but it did not work
out that way and we got stuck into each of the VP`s and told them were they
had failed , when one broke down we knew we had them and it ended up with the
Senior VP United Joe O Gorman giving us a personal escort around the base
and getting answers to everything we wanted to know . We stood in the cargo
bay of a 747 while they operated the door and I pointed to the Conduit at the
top of the door and said that that was were I thought the Arc had originated
from. as we walked back across the tarmac I spotted a newly painted 747with a
number I did not recognise , when we got back to the motel I checked my
records and there was no N4724U . so asked the next day if it was N4713U
renumbered and they had to admit it was .
We were in Hawaii for the search for the cargo door and I tried every avenue
to be on that sub or even the recovery boat without sucess. I was phoned
within an hour of the recovery of the door and told that they had a
contingency plan , if the door revealed the NTSB were correct the door was to
be released to the media in Hawaii ,if the door showed that the Campbells
were correct the door was going straight to Boeing . He said that the door is
going straight to Boeing . We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see
the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the
office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes,about 3 hours later we held
a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were
correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to
hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch
with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think
that Air India was a bomb ?"
The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the
video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.
I wrote to both Air India and the Canadian Safety Board with my findings on
811 but did not even have the courtesy of a reply .
I was very upset to read your theory on TWA 800 as I thought we had the
problem beat but it had never occured to me that if the pull in hooks opened
that the door could break in half , this is of course exactly what 811`s did
but I had put it down to the fact that it struck the side of the fuselage as
it opened and levered out the hinge and the section above it .
Fate intervened on 811 and the door opened on the 747 at JFK and they could
no longer withhold the revised report on 811 . The new report however still
does not admit that 811 got the signal to open right there at 23000 ft
insisting it happened before takeoff . This is a much less scary scenario for
Boeing and the NTSB as they still believe that other safeguards preclude it
from getting a signal after shutdown of the APU and the ground switch which I
believe is a load of baloney .Are you aware that the original door design for
the 747 called for a warning light that would have advised the cockpit of a
S2 switch failure and the fact that power was still available to the door
latch actuators? I had the document that showed this system deleted by
whiteout and no one would ever answer my question wether the aircraft was
certified with this system or not as it never made it into production . I
lobbied very hard for this system to be reinstated but it wasnt ,I guess that
would have opened up liability problems for Boeing I lent the document to a
journalist and have never got it back either . You probably have plenty of
questions for me but I will run through the ones you asked Stuart Mc Clure
and answer any that I can .
Dave Cronin PO Box 4263 Incline Village NV 89451-8320 Tel [phone] Fax
702 831 3615 . Dave was flying the plane manually getting the last bit of
pleasure before he retired , as it blew he just let it go and it went up and
sideways about 50 ft { I have the engine readouts and you can see that
airflow was cut over the engine intakes ] Dave and I both believe that had it
been on autopilot it would have broken the nose off at the 41 section joint
which is a known weak point { This is what happened to Pan Am 103 and TWA
800] all of the beams in the business section were broken and I actually
stood in the cargo hold of N4713U at Hickam and lifted the floor off the
temporary struts with one hand , the floor was only held up by the cargo
containers after the door went . Actually the only bit of solid floor left in
business class was were our son sat in 12H But the shock wave went from the
back past Lee moving the toilets beside him { forward of the hole ] forward
12" it the bounced off the front of the plane came back and broke his seat
off its legs or mountings , it also blew the eardrums of most of the first
class passengers and in some cases blew up their teeth if they had air
cavities in them Dave is a very experienced glider pilot and called on all
his skills to get the plane back but it was dropping at 1000 ft p/m it was at
22000 ft 22 minutes out and at METO speed it crashed to a perfect landing at
Honolulu International Airport it could never have gone around for another
attempt { I have the CVR printout and it makes chilling reading } What was
heard ? The CVR has a thump followed 1.8 seconds later by a loud explosion {
I failed in my bid to listen to the actual tape ,I only wanted to actually
hear the sound myself but was denied }Talking to the passengers some off them
heard a hiss followed by an explosion described as being like "A thousand
handclaps " no one saw the passengers go . One passenger in first class {with
a Ph D in physics } nearest to the door said he heard something start up
immediately prior to the thump . the NTSB never interviewed him and dismissed
this as being the elevator to the galley but the steward was already in the
galley at the time of the explosion and I dont think the elevator was moving
. So the sequence was a whir a thump a hiss and then 1.8 seconds later the
explosion . Dave had time to say " what the # was that " and Al replied "I
don't know "between the thump and the explosion The CVR's power was then off
for 21.4 seconds
I have the all the NTSB photos and my own of the door frame area,the side
frames and the sills are in perfect condition ,the 8 bottom pins are all
goughed but otherwise OK the forward mid span pin is also goughed and the
mtg bracket had moved outward on its bolts , the rear mid span pin was
goughed and the bracket was held by one bolt the other 3 had broken . It
takes 1.5 seconds for the 8 C Locks on the bottom of the door to open
followed by the opening of the pull in hooks , with the 1.8 second time gap
when the hiss was heard I take that to be the time that the door had blown
off the 8 C Locks and it was held by the pull in hooks until they also opened
sufficiently for the door to blow off them as well . Something had to be
different to PAN AM 10 out of London where the door was closed by the
slipstream and they got back safely.
At least one passenger was ingested by engine no 3 . I have the Coroners
report on what they found and I have seen what they removed from the engine
apart from the body bits . It was not our son as we had to give a DNA sample
and the result was negative Steve recently spoke to someone who inspected
the engine the day it happened and thought the red on the turbine was seat
material until he touched it and realised what it was They told us that they
gave the aircraft parts a Hawaiian burial at sea but I doubt it , they
certainly did not give us the seat parts that we could have used in an action
against the seat manufacturer [ Weber Aircraft Co ]
We have photos of damage to the wings , the top of the aircraft and to the
vertical stabiliser , we hope that one of these killed our son as we know he
could have survived the fall to the sea 22000 ft and over 4 minutes below .
parts were still falling out of the sky after 811 was back on the ground in
Honolulu. We have the reports from all the services that attended the
accident . We found they knew Lee was missing by about 4 AM local time but it
was not till about 12 Hrs later that they phoned us from Chicago and said he
was missing presumed dead .The damage to No3 engine was caused by a body or
bodies , luggage and aircraft parts . Damage to No 4 was mainly by luggage .
N4713U did not have the lock sectors strengthed by aluminium {the first
fix]but I would think that PAN AM 103 would have as PAN AM did not wait for
Boeing to supply the steel kits but made their own and fitted them to their
fleet after the London incident , as they realised the implications of not
doing so . As detailed in "Countdown " Boeing devised a one time test to
check the integrity of the cargo door locking system , they told the airlines
to hit the door open switch to see what happened , a day later they stopped
the test as operators were calling to say it was damaging the planes ,
obviously lots of aircraft had failed S2 switches and the actuators were live
just waiting for a stray arc to doom the plane and the passengers and the
FAA still gave up to 2 years to replace the lock sectors with steel ones .

[SKYDRIFTER]

The 811 type incidents are quite real and frightening enough, but nothing in the TWA-800 remains suggests a cargo door opening.

Clearly, the TWA-800 cockpit was shattered from within. That's not a cargo door opening.

I'm not the least bit surprised to see the liberal corrective time on the 'fix.' It's criminal of Boeing not to attend to the repair in a manner legally fitting of the automotive industry.

Given that U.S. pilots civil rights are not in any way equal to those of a bus driver, it shouldn't be too surprising; however illogical.

Big U.S. money - once again.

[GlueBall]

JBS:
Keep in mind that just because a door opens OUTWARD doesn't automatically make it a non plug type. The B74 pax CABIN doors are all plugs.

[ 27 July 2001: Message edited by: GlueBall ]

[JohnBarrySmith]

From Skydrifter: “The 811 type incidents are quite real and frightening enough, but nothing in the TWA-800 remains suggests a cargo door opening.”

Nothing? How about these matches of real evidence that ‘suggests’ a cargo door opening:

UAL 811 matches TWA 800

aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
and shortly after takeoff
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
foreign object damage to starboard engines #3
fire in number three engine
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
post side smooth forward of the wing.
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
bare wire found in cargo door area.
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.
forward cargo door frayed
hoop stress found in cargo door area
door skin shattered outward.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight considered
initially thought to be a bomb
but later ruled out.

From Glueball:
‘Keep in mind that just because a door opens OUTWARD doesn't automatically make it a non plug type. The B74 pax CABIN doors are all plugs’

Righto, and that’s why I try to always say, “outward opening nonplug doors.”

The answer is to make all the doors like the passenger doors, outward opening/sliding/ plug type. The philosophy about why the passenger doors are plug type and slide and cargo doors are non plug about open up and outward is interesting. My take is look at the stagecoach, the train, the bus, and the car for precedent. Even vans and SUV have that back hatch that opens up and outward. And of course none of the above has an internal pressure differential of 8.9 PSI.

Space and money and trust and fear enter into door design. Space for cargo is a premium and any infringement is to be avoided. Crazy passengers might try to open door in flight so make passenger doors impossible to open when pressurized, a situation controlled by pilot. Cargo doors are like the trunk/boot of a car they open up and outward so make the plane the same to assuage fear of passenger. The insanity of having a huge nine foot by eight foot non plug door in the side of a highly pressurized hull with known weakness at section 41 and held by only one midspan latch for each eight foot slice of fuselage and then not have locking sectors on the two midspan latches while having them for the bottom eight is only explained as...as...as...

The Comet was forgotten, the DC 10 was forgotten, the DC 9 was forgotten, all explosive decompression around windows/doors that resulted in fatalities.

NTSB remembered and said in NTSB AAR 92/02 about United Airlines Flight 811:

The next opportunity for the FAA and Boeing to have reexamined the original assumptions and conclusions about the B-747 cargo door design and certification was after the findings of the Turkish Airline DC-10 accident in 1974 near Paris, France. The concerns for the DC-10 cargo door latch/lock mechanisms and the human and mechanical failures, singularly and in combination, that led to that accident, should have prompted a review of the B-747 cargo door's continuing airworthiness. In the Turkish Airlines case, a single failure by a ramp service agent, who closed the door, in combination with a poorly designed latch/lock system, led to a catastrophic accident. The revisions to the DC-10 cargo door mechanisms mandated after that accident apparently were not examined and carried over to the design of the B-747 cargo doors.
Specifically, the mechanical retrofit of more positive locking mechanisms on the DC-10 cargo door to preclude an erroneous locked indication to the flightcrew, and the incorporation of redundant sensors to show the position of the latches/locks, were not required to be retrofitted at that time for the B-747. Of similar concern is the fact that the cargo doors for the L-1011 required redundant latch/lock indication sensors at initial certification, during the approximate same time frame the DC-10 and B-747 were certificated.
More recently, when Boeing and the FAA learned about the circumstances of the Pan Am cargo door opening incident in March 1987, more timely and positive corrective actions should have been taken. The Safety Board believes that the findings of that incident investigation should have called into question the assumptions and conclusions about the original design and certification of the B-747 cargo door, especially the alternative method for verifying that the door was latched and locked that was sought by Boeing and was granted by the FAA. Since a B-747 cargo door opening in flight was considered to be an "unacceptable event", once a door did come open in flight, the FAA and Boeing should have acted much quicker to prevent another failure.

So, what’s the point?

From Skydrifter: “There should be no doubt that a door opening CAN occur. “

The implication is that the event is in the future and not accepting it has happened, by official count, to a DC 9 in flight, to two DC 10 in flight and one on ground, to Boeing 747 to Pan Am 125 in March 1987, to United Airlines Flight 811 in Feb 1989, and UAL preflight in 1991 and UAL in 2000.

The point is cargo doors have opened in flight with catastrophic consequences in the past, have happened recently and will happen again. And all the band-aid latches and switches and cutout relays and circuit breakers pulled out or pushed in, and warning lights, and pressure relief doors and viewing ports, and manual locking handles and warning placards in English or otherwise will not keep the inexorable physical law of nature from finding a weakness and equalizing the pressure differential. Nature abhors a vacuum. That’s the point.

Nature abhors a vacuum.

Submarines do not have hatches that the deeper they go, the more pressure to implode. Yet, planes have doors that have incredible pressure to blow out, all the time, in all sorts of weather, maintained by all sorts of people under all sorts of stress of noise and time and darkness.

Then add wiring that is exposed and gets chafed and cracks and arcs and is used to turn on door unlatch motors and there you have it: New incident report or new AAR. And that’s after the blame has failed to stick to incompetent baggage handler who improperly latches the door, or mad terrorist bomber or mad terrorist missile launcher or angry God with static electricity in fuel tank, or what the heck, the plane just had an inflight breakup and we don’t know what caused it but it sure as heck was not the manufacturer’s fault of design or installation, or the airline, or the crew, or the government oversight.

And how to do the flightcrews react when presented with the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation? Well of course, deny the problem, disagree by stating alternative explanations that have mystery terrorists or unknown ignition sources.

You see, I have been following the wiring/cargo door event cause for 12 years. I was on it long before Trans World Airlines Flight 800. I suspected exactly what happened to 800 as soon as they said ‘bomb’ and confirmed when the CVR had that signature sudden loud sound followed by the abrupt power cut to the recorders. You'll know as soon as I do about the next one when the above listing matches to United Airlines Flight 811 are revealed as the CVR is found and the wreckage is examined.

And I’m preparing myself to go through the emotions again. Almost happened to the UAL plane but the crew violated FAA guidelines and kept those door power circuit breakers pulled and saved at least nine of their passengers lives. What do you do about those circuit breakers?

Do something other than saying I’m wrong because the authorities say it was missile, bomb, or mystery center tank explosion. Do something. Get your safety people to check it out, that is their job. Or tell your fellow crew at risk to check it out for their opinion. Do not become frozen in panic of fear of it being correct.

What is your duty to respond to a safety alert that has documentation, precedent, and you know could happen again and is presented by a fellow pilot, navigator, mechanic, crewmember, and owner? And yes, survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash who has come back from the fire and is telling you, don't let that happen again. The event is preventable but takes action. Take the action. Do something.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
[phone] phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924 www.corazon.com
[email protected]

[SKYDRIFTER]

There should be no doubt that a problem exists with the 747 cargo doors. Good luck, as the FAA facilitates profits and only selectively enforces safety.

Bush has had plenty of time to get Jane Garvey into gear, but hasn't, so I doubt that he or Cheney care a damn about air safety.

While, again, I agree to the problem, the cargo door issue seems terribly inappropriate for this topic / thread.

[RogerTangoFoxtrotIndigo]

JBS

found this picture of TWA 800, and believe me these pictures are becoming harder to find, all the 'evidence' is probably heading for a land fill if its not there already. i fear we will never get an objective investigation just like we didnt with PA 103, however, is the red outline the cargo door? if so i seems that the event began elsewhere

sorry cant get the picture to post will try again later.

the hulk is to be used as a training tool for air acident investigators? and they say americans dont possess a sense of irony


[ 28 July 2001: Message edited by: RogerTangoFoxtrotIndigo ]

[ 29 July 2001: Message edited by: RogerTangoFoxtrotIndigo ]

[GlueBall]

RTFI
The TW800 salvaged and reconstructed center section will not go to the junk yard. It's been designated as a training tool for NTSB accident investigator trainees.

[Jackonicko]

JBS,

I'm happy that you've proved that a cargo door opening in flight could have caused (or indeed is a likely cause) of TWA800's demise, but don't believe that you've demonstrated a conclusive level of proof.

While I tend towards the centre tank blowing up (as a result of wiring spark) explanation, I don't think anyone has refuted Skydrifter's allegations of 'damage to the cockpit inconsistent with....', nor of the alleged 'combat damage' to the forward fuselage. Not that he, or any of the other conspiracy theorists, have provided much evidence to support these contentions. Nor have you answered the accusations about the NTSB ignoring this or that witness, or attributing statements to people who've since denied them.

I don't believe it was a missile, or a bomb, and I do believe it was a design fault (which would give plenty of parties ample reason to want to 'blur' the conclusions of any investigation). But at the moment we only have alternative explanations, and not a definite cause.

With regard to the Pan Am crash, I think that to deny that there was a bomb is specious - they found big lumps of it, ferchrissake, and even prosecuted one of the perpetrators!

[mysteryman]

RIGHT
I'M SICK OF THIS
TWA800 WAS SHOT DOWN
CHECK OUT THE SITE www.TWA800.com
NEXT
IF THE AAIB WAS AS CORRUPT AND EASILY
LED AS THE US VERSION NTSB THEY WOULD BE HANGING FROM A TREE BY NOW
REMEMBER THE UK MEDIA WE AREN'T CONTROLLED BY THE GOV OVER HERE
QUESTION
I KNOW THE U.S. POPULATION AREN'T THE SMARTEST STICK IN THE BUNDLE
BUT
WHY CAN'T
A THEY SEE THE TRUTH
B DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT

LAND OF THE FREE ?
HOME OF THE IDIOT

mm
BUT FOR CHRIST SAKE

[JohnBarrySmith]

Dear Jackonicko,

“I'm happy that you've proved that a cargo door opening in flight could have caused (or indeed is a likely cause) of TWA800's demise, but don't believe that you've demonstrated a conclusive level of proof.”

Righto, Jacko, it’s why they call it a ‘probable cause’ and not ‘a conclusive cause’ in all the official AARs. For sure the forward cargo door blew out in Trans World Airlines Flight 800 and I say the cause was probably wiring. An honest bomb guy or missile guy or center tank guy would say the forward cargo door blew out and their reason caused it. But they never say that because they know that United Airlines Flight 811 makes electrical the most likely cause.

All I need to do is to offer a reasonable, plausible, mechanical explanation with precedent to justify you pilots and crew to talk to your safety analysts to further investigate the possibility that the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup is probable for four Boeing 747s, Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800 and could do so again to another Boeing 747.

I have done that here with my factual posts matching the four to the incontrovertible wiring cargo door event of United Airlines Flight 811 and I have done it at www.corazon.com.

This Forum chat room will read like the last words on the transcript of a CVR before fatal accident just before the wiring shorts on the door unlatch motor causing the inadverntent opening of the forward cargo door in flight or on the ground, as it has done before most recently in Oct 2000 in a 747-400.

The conversation about whether Boeing 747s are at risk of another shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup becomes mute and moot.

“While I tend towards the centre tank blowing up (as a result of wiring spark) explanation, I don't think anyone has refuted Skydrifter's allegations of 'damage to the cockpit inconsistent with....', nor of the alleged 'combat damage' to the forward fuselage.”

The refutation is the absence of corroborative evidence to support the premise of bomb or missile and even center tank as initial event. The wiring/cargo door explanation has that corroborative evidence in photos, charts, and precedent.

“ Not that he, or any of the other conspiracy theorists, have provided much evidence to support these contentions.”

Conspiracy guys never need evidence, they need ‘gut feelings’.

“ Nor have you answered the accusations about the NTSB ignoring this or that witness, or attributing statements to people who've since denied them.”

Conspiracy talk, let the NTSB answer the allegations against them. I answer factual questions about the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation....and I don’t see any here.

“I don't believe it was a missile, or a bomb, and I do believe it was a design fault (which would give plenty of parties ample reason to want to 'blur' the conclusions of any investigation). But at the moment we only have alternative explanations, and not a definite cause.”

Then do something about the alternative explanations you have. Don’t sit there hoping there is fuel in the tank because there is supposed to be fuel in the tank, they told you threre was fuel in the tank, the guage says there is fuel in the tank, you will be in big trouble if there is no fuel in the tank, and yet, and yet, there is a real possiblity given to you by someone who knows about fuel in the tank, that there is very little fuel in the tank and soon no fuel in the tank.

“With regard to the Pan Am crash, I think that to deny that there was a bomb is specious - they found big lumps of it, ferchrissake, and even prosecuted one of the perpetrators!”

Yeah, I always have to face the 103 thing. They did not find ‘big lumps of it.’ I do not pick the flight numbers, the evidence does.

Want to see it?

811 to 103 Evidence matches:

aged
non Section 41 retrofit
high flight time
early model-100
poly x wired
Boeing 747
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area
shape of hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side is rectangle with specific rectangular shape.
fodded number three engine
on fire number three engine.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at midspan latch,
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

So, again, never refuted, on disagreed with. If someone says the Titanic was an iceberg and another a UBoat torpedo, neither refutes the other, only disagrees.

I can refute the missile, the bomb, and the center tank as intial event. And I will if you offer some sort of refutation against the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation or refer your safety people of your airline to me and the website.

Or you can sit and wait and hope that the circuit breaker that causes the forward cargo door to ‘open on its own’ does not get pushed in, or pulled out, or pulled out and pushed in or whatever....in flght. Because this is what happens:

Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800
Hot humid air in the forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff on hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Or water entered into the forward cargo bay from the rain shower during cargo loading. The Poly-X insulation type wire bundle in the cargo door area which held the cargo door cam latch motor became chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against a clamp, too tight turn radius of the wire, or many door openings and closings on it. The sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against the metal fuselage charring wires and powering on door actuator which attempted to rotate all ten cam sectors to unlocked positions around their latching pins. The eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlatching around pins because of the strengthened eight locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors to prevent the inadvertent rotation. The powered on door actuator, an aging out of rig cargo door, the slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn latch pins allowed the midspan latches to rotate just past center permitting the 38115 pounds of internal pressure on the 99 inch by 110 inch door to rupture outward.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish door burst open at the midspan latches sending the latches, door material, and large pieces of fuselage skin spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as a red-orange streak to ground observers. The aft door frame at aft midspan latch position bulged outward. The forward door frame at forward midspan latch was bulged outward with outward peeled skin. The fuselage skin forward of the wing was torn vertically. The forward cargo door fractured and shattered into a few large pieces and many small pieces. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on the bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of the red topped cargo door opened outward and upward smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. Or the fuselage skin in the cargo door area was stretched as the explosive decompression blew out door and windows above it. When the skin stretched it peeled away the top white paint exposing red paint below. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away by contact with upper skin showing the white base coat paint underneath The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The now lose red painted trim piece and red top of cargo door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge appears to be function and likely has overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.

The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing as well as in the cargo bay belly. Parts of the cargo bay structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft along with midspan latches, manual locking handle, and torque tubes. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose. The sudden rushing otward air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.

At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal and other foreign objects from baggage compartment and caused engine to catch fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate towards uncontainment and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer. The number three engine has internal soot from the fire, missing blades from the uncontainment, and soft body impacts from the foreign object damage.

The floor beams above the cargo hold were sucked downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone or compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the large hole and weakened other skin and frames peeling skin further outward. The 300 knots of indicated airspeed pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole to the right. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.

The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over a twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at midspan latches from rupture. Midspan latches were blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.

The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The 300 knots of wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast direction, leaving a wide debris field. The aft cargo door pieces were found in the aft fuselage debris field.

Pieces of the nose and center tank which fell in the early debris field were unsooted. Pieces of fuselage and center tank which fell into the later debris field were sooted.

Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of a bomb in forward cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out due to lack of corroborating evidence. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. A streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust. Singe marks, burns, and witness marks inside center fuel tank led to suspicion of spontaneous center fuel tank explosion. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.

Fuselage rupture at midspan latches of forward cargo door inflight was initially rejected because bottom eight latches were found latched around eight locking pins while two midspan latches were not recovered, examined, or evaluated.

Questions about center tank explosion as initial event which evidence raises.

1. Sudden loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder is described as start of aircraft breakup but not sound of explosion. Sound on CVR does not match other staged Boeing 747 center tank explosion. How can an explosion in the center tank be powerful enough to start the aircraft breakup and blow off nose of Boeing 747 and not be heard on CVR?

Sudden loud sound is sound of explosive decompression which gives a sudden loud sound when forward cargo door ruptures/opens in flight. The TWA 800 sudden loud sound was linked to PA 103 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to AI 182 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to confirmed DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression on CVR. UAL 811 had a cargo door rupture/open in flight and recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR. The sound is the sudden rushing of air molecules which were compressed now moving fast outward to equalize with the lower pressure outside air.

2. Center tank explosion would be spherical, not directed, and would either give no damage forward of the wing or about equal damage on both sides of the fuselage of TWA 800. The wreckage reconstruction shows smooth skin with little damage forward of the wing on the port/left side yet severe, shattered, torn, and frayed damage on the starboard/right side of the fuselage in the cargo door area. How can a center tank explosion cause unilateral damage only on starboard side?

Explosive decompression and rupture of forward cargo door area when aft midspan latch ruptures would give shattered, torn and frayed, damage to starboard cargo door area while leaving port/left/opposite side smooth and light damage. Cargo door rupture would give the unilateral damage on starboard side as shown by TWA 800 wreckage, not center tank explosion.

3. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers. Water impact damage would be inward, not outward. How could water impact damage produce outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers?

Explosive decompression in nose of TWA 800 would give outward peeled skin in nose, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers as internal high pressure rushes outward to equalize with the low outside pressure. Center tank explosion would not.

4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows red paints smears only above the forward cargo door area and nowhere else on both side of the Boeing 747 fuselage. This indicates that the red painted door below ruptured/opened outward, slammed upward, and smashed into the white painted area above and transferred red paint from door onto white paint between windows. Or it indicates an outward stretching of the fuselage skin. How did red paint smears get where they are?

After the rupture at aft midspan latch the door fractured and upper piece of the red painted door was pushed outward, rotated on its hinge, slammed upward and smashed into the white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to the white painted area between the passengers windows, as shown by the TWA 800 reconstruction. UAL 811 also had paint transfer from door to fuselage when its door opened in flight. Or the explosive decompression bulged fuselage skin outward so that white paint was removed revealing red below.

5. A center tank explosion would be far enough away from power cables to allow the Flight Data Recorder to record longer than the abrupt power cut it suffered. How can a center tank explosion which is not loud enough to be heard on the CVR and some distance away be strong enough to abruptly cease power to the FDR?

The explosive decompression in the cargo compartment would severely disrupt the cargo hold floor and the adjacent main equipment compartment in which the FDR and power cables are located. The severe disruption would abruptly cease power to the FDR. UAL 811 also had abrupt power cut when its cargo door opened in flight. Center tank explosion would not abruptly cut power to FDR and CVR.

6. How could forward cargo door rupture/open when bottom eight latches are latched and locked in TWA reconstruction?

The forward cargo door of Boeing 747s is about nine feet by eight feet square. It has a hinge on the top and eight cam latches on the bottom. On each nine foot side is one midspan latch. The bottom eight cam latches go around eight latching pins. Over each cam latch is a locking sector. The two midspan latches have no locking sectors. The forward cargo door could rupture at the midspan latches and the hinge and bottom eight latches could still be attached to fuselage skin. The top of the door with hinge attached would tear off with the fuselage skin and spin away. The bottom eight latches could stay attached to bottom sill and continue down to the sea with the nose. The middle of the large door can still be ruptured/opened while the lower part stays attached to airframe. Doors can open/rupture with most or all latches latched. TWA 800 reconstruction shows aft midspan latches missing which implies they became unlatched. The door frame sills are smooth and not attached to door which implies door ruptured in those areas.

7. How could forward cargo door rupture cause center tank explosion?

When cargo door ruptures in flight a huge hole is created in nose which the 300 knot slipstream tears off. The falling, noseless, structurally compromised aircraft disintegrated into debris of rupturing fuel tanks, fuselage pieces including center tank, and spinning hot on fire jet engine number 3. When falling debris reached about 7500 feet, the fodded on fire engine number three ignited the fuel cloud and center fuel tank into a fireball. Center tank fire/explosion occurred but later and lower than forward cargo door rupture initial event.

Event, consequence, significance, source for destruction sequence:

1. Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff on hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996 or water from rain entered cargo bay.

NTSB exhibits gave takeoff time and temperatures plus the airconditioning system in Boeing 747s. Rain shower passed over TWA 800 prior to takeoff.

2. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin.

Water was available to ground any bare wires to fuselage skin. Observation made of water cascading out of forward cargo hold of Boeing airliner by John Barry Smith standing in concourse at San Francisco Airport on December 6, 1997.

3. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door cam motor power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire.

Bare wires can be shorted to ground causing power to go to door motor. NTSB exhibits list two forward cargo hold charred wiring fires. NTSB hearing on aging aircraft detailed problems with Poly-X/Kapton/aromatic polyimide type wiring chafing from vibration with more severe affects in the presence of moisture. NTSB AAR 92/02 detailed problems with chafing wires causing door motor to turn on. TWA 800 had Poly-X wiring and rain on aircraft.

4. Condensed water or rain water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position.

Event explains how door motor got power to turn on. NTSB exhibits list two previous cargo hold charred wire fires. NTSB AAR 92/02 lists two uncommanded cargo door opening on Boeing 747s caused by electrical problems, UAL preflight and UAL 811.

5. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors.

The eight bottom latches held tight to locking pins because of AD 88-12-04 which strengthened all the eight locking sectors. NTSB AAR 92/02 describes the AD, door, and all latches.

6. The out of rig door, slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the midspan latches to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the midspan latches.

UAL 811 had small rupture at aft midspan latch as shown in photograph in NTSB AAR 92/02. NTSB exhibit lists 3.5 PSI pressure differential for TWA 800. TWA 800 was extremely old aircraft with over 93000 flight hours.

7. The nine foot by eight foot squarish door burst open at midspan latches sending the latches and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers as moving all which ways.

Press reports reveal eyewitnesses say different colored streaks going every which way from all directions. Time of 8:31 PM and angle of low sun to aircraft in east and observers to the west permitted the angles to be perfectly aligned for spinning falling shiny piece of metal to reflect as streak to observers.

8. The aft and forward door frames were clean of attachment to door and bulged outward.

Midspan latches blown away at rupture time and caused outward bulge. NTSB reconstruction photograph shows bulges and missing latches in forward cargo door.

9. Fuselage skin was torn vertically.

Explosive decompression bursts outward but limited by stringers and bulkheads which are vertical and match the other cargo door accident, UAL 811. NTSB photograph shows the vertical tears of TWA 800.

10. The forward cargo door fractured and shattered.

NTSB photograph shows the damage. 38115 pounds of force were suddenly released onto now weakened door and it burst apart. 99 inches times 110 inches times 3.5 PSI equals 38115 pounds of force on the ten latches and hinge.

11. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away.

The bottom of large door held tight while middle of door ruptured in a troublesome section of a high time Boeing 747, Section 41 and Section 42. TWA 800 had not yet had the Section 41 retrofit. NTSB exhibit states bottom eight latches latched while omitting midspan latch status.

12. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath. The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away.

The lose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it.

The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above.

The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.

Sequence of door opening out and up and transferring paint above is described in text and drawing in NTSB AAR 92/02. Inward movement of top of door is described in AAR 92/02. Normal working hinge attached to top of door is described in AAR 92/02. Overtravel impression damage is described in text and picture in AAR 92/02.

13. The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing.

NTSB photograph shows decompression rectangle zone on right side of nose.

14. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft.

The first parts of plane to depart indicate trouble started there. NTSB exhibits show first parts to leave were from cargo structure. NTSB wreckage database shows most of first objects to leave TWA 800 were from forward cargo bay.

15. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise.

NTSB AAR 92/02 states crew of UAL 811 heard a 'tremendous explosion,' when door opened in flight.

16. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose.

Outward peeling indicates force from within, not without. UAL 811 had same outward peeling of fuselage skin in cargo door area.

17. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound.

Sound matches other Boeing 747 sudden loud sound of explosive decompression and a DC-10 cargo door decompression sound according to NTSB chart.

18. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.

Cables for power and signal run through the forward cargo hold to the adjacent MEC. The cargo floor is severely disrupted when explosive decompression occurs in cargo hold according to AAIB 2/90 report and will cut off power abruptly.

19. At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments.

Where did those bodies go? What happened to them to reduce them to bone fragments requiring DNA analysis to identify? At least nine bodies always disappear when explosive decompression occurs in high time Boeing 747s according to AAIB, NTSB, TSB and Indian reports. The missing passengers may have been ingested into engine number three.

20. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.

NTSB AAR 92/02 describes the sequence of FOD into number three and also number four and the subsequent vibration and fire.

21. The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised.

AAR 92/02, AAIB 2/90, and NTSB TWA 800 exhibits describe the downward movement of the floor beams above cargo compartment.

22. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward.

AAR 92/02 describes the actions of the aircraft after door opened in flight.

23. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole.

AAIB and TSB/Indian reports describe how nose came off after explosion in forward cargo hold at 300 KCAS of two Boeing 747s. 300 knots of wind faster than any wind on earth.

24. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.

AAIB 2/90, TSB/Indian Court, and NTSB TWA 800 exhibits describe the dense nose debris field present when nose comes off in flight of three Boeing 747s.

25. The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.

AAIB 2/90, TSB/Indian, and NTSB photographs describe the lesser damage port side nose compared to the more severely damaged starboard side as well as the outward peeled skin on nose of three Boeing 747s.

27. The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure.

Passenger injuries are described in NTSB exhibits, TSB/Indian report, AAIB 2/90, and NTSB exhibits.

28. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The 300 knots of wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast direction, leaving a wide debris field. The aft cargo door pieces were found in the aft fuselage debris field.

NTSB exhibits describe the breakup sequence and NTSB video shows fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower than initial event. Engine number three was on fire for AAIB 2/90 and number three and four were on fire for NTSB AAR 92/02 after cargo hold ruptures.

29. Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out.

Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose.

Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.

Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event.

Press reports, FBI reports, and NTSB reports describe the bomb, missile and center tank explanations.

30. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.

NTSB public hearing reveals the gaps in the center tank as initial event explanation.

31. Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
[phone] phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924 www.corazon.com
[email protected]

[GlueBall]

JBS
Major flaws with your forward belly door theory on TW800 include:
1. UA811 was at much higher altitude, 23,000?
when door got ripped off. Much higher differential pressure than TW800. Therefore much more violent decompression. True?
2. UA811 airplane did NOT break up.
3. UA811 center tank did NOT explode.
4. UA811, at 300 kts with big hole in forward starboard side, with large section of fuselage panel peeled off, molecules rushing out faster than those molecules of TW800, but its nose DIDN'T come off.
5. TW800 pax experiencing "baro-trauma?"
H-E-L-L-O. At 13000 feet, with cabin altitude maybe at 2000 feet, it would be a rather mild decompression as opposed to the much higher altitude UA811 decompression.
6.The red paint marks from the door blowing off on TW800; it's conceivable that it happened AFTER the center tank exploded and severed the "keel beam" of the jet, causing the forward fuselage to break off and severing a lot of electrical wires, including the wire from the cockpit area microphone to the CVR in the tail....

Did any of the UA811 pax have "baro-trauma?"

[JohnBarrySmith]

Dear Glueball,

Thank you for comments and questions:

‘Major flaws with your forward belly door theory on TW800 include:
1. UA811 was at much higher altitude, 23,000?
when door got ripped off. Much higher differential pressure than TW800. Therefore much more violent decompression. True?’

Yes, except for 1.5 second delay when pull in hooks held for 811. Partially depressurized as shown by same shape of door and skin torn off but smaller.

From AAR of 811: The CVR revealed normal communication before the decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. The CVR returned to normal operation at 0209:29 HST, and cockpit conversation continued to be recorded in a normal manner.

‘2. UA811 airplane did NOT break up.’

So, the victim did not die and only because of that 1.5 second delay. The answer is pilot said he came off autopilot and did not fight it.

‘3. UA811 center tank did NOT explode.’

Because no inflight breakup and no disintegrating fuel tanks to be ignited by fiery fodded engines.

‘4. UA811, at 300 kts with big hole in forward starboard side, with large section of fuselage panel peeled off, molecules rushing out faster than those molecules of TW800, but its nose DIDN'T come off.’

Good question and one I wrestled with for several years. Answer, hole smaller, check out pictures of starboard side of the four 747s. PDF with pix available upon request.

‘5. TW800 pax experiencing "baro-trauma?"

All four 747 had explosive decomprssion and bara trauma when hull disintegrates suddenly at altitude. The cause of the hull rupture and where and why are the questions.

‘H-E-L-L-O. ‘

Duh, actually, dude, you should, like, you know, drag out the “hello’ like this, hellooooooooooooooo to be really really hip. Please to show respect, you will get it in return. Please note that all conspiracy guys use capitals for some reason as they rant, as shown by ‘mysteryman,’ and are thus unworthy of response.

‘At 13000 feet, with cabin altitude maybe at 2000 feet, it would be a rather mild decompression as opposed to the much higher altitude UA811 decompression.’

Oh yeah, mild? Please to do the math, for Trans World Airlines Flight 800 3.5 PSI on door 99 inches by 110 inches, look at pictures of ruptured shattered forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 and entire area just frayed and in pieces. Port side opposite smooth as baby’s butt of course.

For 811: 2.2 Loss of the Cargo Door
The calculated pressure differential at the time of the loss was about 6.5 psi, which would have exerted a load on a properly closed and locked door that was substantial, but well within design limits.

For Pan Am Flight 103 and for Air India Flight 182 it was 8.9 PSI

‘6.The red paint marks from the door blowing off on TW800; it's conceivable that it happened AFTER the center tank exploded and severed the "keel beam" of the jet, causing the forward fuselage to break off and severing a lot of electrical wires, including the wire from the cockpit area microphone to the CVR in the tail....’

Well. OK, maybe. Exactly right. The red paint smears and outward ruptures in door area could have been caused by center tank exploding as initial event, just like bomb or missile could too. Need corroborative evidence of center tank as initial event and it’s not there and contrary evidence is such as all nose forward of split has no soot while all fuselage aft of split is burnt and sooted, as shown by sooting exhibit in public docket for Trans World Airlines Flight 800. For NTSB to say center tank exploded with unknown ignition source is to admit they do not know the cause of the accident.

‘Did any of the UA811 pax have "baro-trauma?"’

Good question and answer below from NTSB AAR 92 02: Also evident on passengers on Air India Flight 182 and as all passengers who suffer hull rupture at altitude. This just shows the plane had sudden explosive decompression but not the source. By the way, none of the 800 plus passengers from the four 747 events had any explosive residue, burns, or shrapnel, or any other sign of explosive consequence.

APPENDIX D
INJURY INFORMATION
Flight Crewmember.--The second officer sustained minor superficial brush burns to both elbows and forearms, during the evacuation.
Cabin Crewmembers.--The cabin crewmembers sustained the following injuries during the evacuation:
Flight attendant No. 1 sustained a strained left shoulder;
Flight attendant No. 2 sustained acute thoracic and lumbosacral strain;
Flight attendant No. 3 sustained a mild right bicep strain;
Flight attendant No. 4 sustained a left elbow contusion, left shoulder dislocation, and mild lumbosacral strain;
Flight attendant No. 5 sustained a left calf contusion;
Flight attendant No. 6 sustained a mild left elbow bruise;
Flight attendant No. 7 sustained mild left arm and lower back strain;
Flight attendant No. 8 sustained a soft tissue injury to the back;
Flight attendant No. 9 sustained abrasions to both palms and the left knee;
Flight attendant No. 10 sustained a fracture of the left tenth rib;
Flight attendant No. 11 sustained a minimal injury to the right middle finger PIP joint and left first MP joint;
Flight attendant No. 12 sustained a pulled muscle on the left side of the neck;
Flight attendant No. 13 sustained a comminuted fracture of the right ulna and radius;
Flight attendant No. 14 sustained a mild thoracic back strain;
Flight attendant No. 15 sustained a non-displaced fracture of C-6, a cerebral concussion, a fracture of the proximal right humerus, and multiple lacerations;
A flight attendant, flying as a passenger, sustained mild lumbosacral strain, a laceration of the right little finger, and a left elbow abrasion.
Passengers.--Nine Passengers who were seated in seats 8H, 9FGH, 10GH, 11GH, and 12H, were ejected from the fuselage and were not found; and thus, are assumed to have been fatally injured in the accident.
Passengers seated in the indicated seats sustained the following injuries:
Seat
7C - Barotrauma to both ears
9C - Half-inch laceration to the upper left arm, superficial abrasions to left arm and hand, barotrauma to both ears
9E - Superficial abrasions and contusions to the left hand, mild barotrauma to both ears
10B - Superficial abrasions to the left elbow and left middle finger
10E - Superficial abrasions to the torso and left forearm, bruising of the left hand and fingers
11E - Laceration on the right ankle tendon, multiple bruises
11F - Slight contusion of the right shoulder
13D - Barotrauma to both ears
13E - Bleeding in both ears
13H - Contusion to the left periorbital area
14A - Laceration in the parietal occipital area, barotrauma to both ears
15J - Comminuted fracture of the lateral epicondyle of the left distal humerus (about 5mm separation)
16B - Superficial abrasions to the right arm
16J - Barotrauma to both ears
16K - Right temporal abrasions
26A - Barotrauma to both ears
26B - barotrauma to both ears
26H - Barotitis to both ears, low back pain, irritation to the right eye due to foreign bodies
27A - Barotrauma to the right ear
28J - Superficial abrasions and a contusion to the left hand, mild barotrauma to both ears
1The flap track canoe fairings are numbered 1 through 8, from left outboard to right outboard.
2For ease in reference, the following numbering was used to relate forward cargo door frames to fuselage body stations (BS): frame 1--BS 567.10, frame 2--BS 580.95, frame 3--BS 596.75, frame 4--BS 608.15, frame 5--BS 623.96, frame 6--BS 636.02, frame 7--BS 651.50, frame 8--BS 662.90.
3 The "used" switch is the switch through which electricity passes; the "unused" switch does not have electricity pass through it.
4NFPA 414 - Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Vehicles, National Fire Protection Association, 1984, Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269.
5Airport Fire and Rescue Vehicle Specification Guide, AC 150/5220-14, March 15, 1979, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20591.
6 Air Carrier Overwater Emergency Equipment and Procedures" (NTSB/SS-85/02)

Sincerely,
Barry

[JohnBarrySmith]

Dear PPRuNe

Below will give chills to any pilot who has had emergency which everybody. This crew deserves awards from a lot of agencies. Note telling tower it looked like a bomb and internal first suspicion as a door opening. This transcript is incredible for a lot of reasons. The crew is fantastic. Captain Dave Cronin was 59 and was rewarded by forced retirement later. Checkpoint 'doors' is one of those incredible coincidences. (It's like "Bombay" is where the wreckage of Air India Flight 182 is stored.)

Sincerely,
Barry
John Barry Smith
[phone] phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924 www.corazon.com
[email protected]


UNITED 811 Transcript
TIME FROM
UTTERANCE

117 E FOURTEEN * ONE SIXTY TWENTY EIGHT TWENTY FOUR.

129 E OH IF I DIDN'T TELL YA YOUR AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST IS COMPLETE

132 C ALL RIGHT

407 F DO YOU FEEL LIKE ADDIN' SOME NUMBERS?

412 E I CAN ADD NUMBERS.

415 F THANKS.

436 F THERE'S A FEW OF THEM OUT THERE AREN'T THERE?

446 C ALL RIGHT.

448 C IT'S COLD OUTSIDE HERE.

449 F YEAH IT IS.

515 C TELL 'EM WE CAN HANDLE THIRTY THREE IF IT'S AVAILABLE.

519 F OKAY.

522 X ***

523 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY CENTER.

526 F AH UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY GO AHEAD.

527 R YES SIR SAY YOUR HEADING DIRECT DOORS.

533 F ONE NINETY AH SIX.

538 F OKAY IT LOOKS LIKE ONE NINETY SIX AH PUT US DIRECT DOORS.

541 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER.

633 F ARE YOU GUNNA WANT TO GO A LITTLE TO THE RIGHT OR WHAT?

634 C A LITTLE BIT NOT MUCH.

638 F YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO TOP IT.

640 C YEAH.

641 C YEAH WE'LL BE ABLE TO TOP THAT.

650 E TELL THEM WE CAN TAKE THREE THREE RIGHT NOW IF THEY GOT IT.

707 F WELL MAYBE WE CAN'T.

709 E OH YEAH WE'RE IN GOOD SHAPE - BEAUTIFUL.

713 F AND HONOLULU UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH WE CAN HANDLE THREE THREE ZERO NOW IF WE COULD GET IT.

719 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY UNABLE THREE THREE ZERO OAKLAND HAS TRAFFIC.

724 F OKAY.

726 C I WOULD YOU PUT IT ON FILE FOR US.

730 F AND COULD YOU PUT US AH PUT IT ON FILE FOR US AH WE'D LIKE THREE THREE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

735 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN ROGER.

741 E I DON'T THINK WE'RE GUNNA TOP THAT SON OF A GUN DO YOU

745 C OH (LET'S SEE HERE)

759 F ONLY WHAT AH THIRTY - ABOUT THIRTY FIVE MILES IN FRONT OF US.

815 C OKAY TELL HIM WE'RE GUNNA DETOUR OVER TO THE LEFT.

819 F AND CENTER EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH WE'RE GUNNA BE DETOURIN'

822 F SOME WEATHER HERE AT AH

824 F IT'S GONNA BE TO THE LEFT OF COURSE.

826 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN DEVIATION AS NECESSARY APPROVED.

827 F ROGER.

837 F LOOKS LIKE IT ENDS OUT THERE TO THE RIGHT DOESN'T IT?

840 C *

844 F I SAY IT LOOKS LIKE IT'S THE END OF IT RIGHT THERE TO THE RIGHT.

847 C YEAH.

850 F YOU'RE GETTIN' A HOLE RIGHT HERE ON THE RADAR.

852 C YUP.

853 E YOU GUYS (PICK/TAKE) THE QUICKEST WAY AROUND IT.

907 C WHAT THE # WAS THAT?

908 F I DON'T KNOW.

929 X THE ENGIN

931 F OKAY AH IT LOOKS LIKE WE'VE LOST NUMBER THREE ENGINE

934 F AND AH WE'RE DESCENDING RAPIDLY COMING BACK

938 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER KEEP CENTER ADVISED.

941 C CALL THE (A/AFT) FLIGHT ATTENDANT.

944 X *

946 C GOIN' DOWN.

947 E WE'VE LOST NUMBER THREE.

948 R CONTINENTAL TEN HEAVY TURN THIRTY DEGREES LEFT VECTOR FOR INBOUND TRAFFIC.

948 C OKAY.

953 C EMERGENCY DESCENT.

955 O WHAT'S THAT -

956 F UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY WE'RE DOIN' AN EMERGENCY DESCENT.

959 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER.

1000 F PUT YOUR MASK ON DAVE

1001 C YEAH.

1003 O HONOLULU CENTER CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY DID YOU WANT US TO TURN LEFT DID YOU SAY.

1006 R CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY AFFIRMATIVE.

1010 O TURNING NOW.

1016 C I CAN'T GET ANY OXYGEN-

1018 F (DID WE AH)

1019 X *

1021 E (WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO NOW)

1034 F YOU OKAY?

1035 C YEAH.

1036 F ARE YOU GETTIN' OXYGEN?

1037 F WE'RE NOT GETTIN' ANY OXYGEN

1038 E NO I'M NOT GETTIN' OXYGEN EITHER.

1040 C I'M OKAY.

1043 E THE CABIN'S FIFTEEN AND I GOT THE * SET.

1059 F WHAT'S THE CABIN DOIN' MARK?

1107 F WHAT'S THE AH INSTRUMENT SAYIN'

1109 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY SAY YOUR ALTITUDE NOW

1111 C LEAVIN' FIFTEEN.

1113 F AH UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY WE'RE OUT OF FIFTEEN POINT FIVE.

1116 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER.

1118 E THE CABIN'S WRONG

1119 E WE'RE AT SIXTEEN THOUSAND COMIN' DOWN

1120 E WE'RE GETTIN' WHAT WE GOT.

1121 C OKAY.

1123 F GO THROUGH THE PROCEDURE FOR NUMBER ONE AH NUMBER THREE.

1127 X *

1129 F I THINK WE BLEW A DOOR (* THINK WE BLEW A) - OR SOMETHIN'.

1135 C TELL THE PA- THE AH FLIGHT ATTENDANT TO GET AH PREPARED FOR AN EVACUATION.

1153 C WE DON'T HAVE ANY FIRE INDICATIONS.

1156 E I DON'T HAVE NO I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING.

1159 C OKAY WE LOST NUMBER AH THREE.

1202 F (LOOKIT) EGT - MAYBE WE DIDN'T - THERE'S NO N1.

1206 R CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY LEAVING ONE FIVE THOUSAND RESUME OWN NAVIGATION DIRECT DOORS.

1207 C LET'S AH SHUT IT DOWN

1209 C THERE'S NO N1.

1211 O CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY.

1212 F YEAH OKAY.

1214 F READY FOR NUMBER THREE.

1216 F SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST.

1216 R CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY HAVE AH TRAFFIC YOUR TWO OCLOCK AND TWO ZERO MILES OPPOSITE DIRECTION AH HEAVY SEVEN FORTY SEVEN EMERGENCY AIRCRAFT INBOUND TO HONOLULU AND WE MIGHT NEED YOU TO ASSIST HIM AH INBOUND.

1217 E (NUMBER) THREE.

1224 E BEFORE AH YOU SHUT DOWN * NUMBER THREE THE GENERATOR WENT OFF

1227 E LOOKS OKAY TO GIVE IT A TRY

1230 O CONTINENTAL ONE HEAVY

1239 F THAT STOPPED THE VIBRATION ANYWAY.

1243 F AH CENTER UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN YOU WANT TO HAVE THE EQUIPMENT STANDING BY COMPANY NOTIFIED PLEASE.

1243 E LOTS OF FUEL

1245 E SHOULD WE DUMP?

1248 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER.

1252 E WANT ME TO START DUMPIN'?

1317 F AND HONOLULU UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY WE'RE GUNNA LEVEL AT NINE THOUSAND HERE WHILE WE ASSESS OUR PROBLEM

1323 F AND AH--AH WE'RE COMIN' BACK DIRECT HONOLULU.

1327 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER KEEP THE CENTER ADVISED.

1330 F OKAY.

1333 F I THINK WE LOST THE AH - WE LOST THE AH IT'S LIKE THE LEADING EDGE ON NUMBER AH--

1337 C WE MIGHT HAVE SOME DAMAGE OUT THERE -

1340 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY YOU'RE CLEARED AH PILOTS DISCRETION TO SIX THOUSAND HONOLULU ALTIMETER THREE ZERO ONE TWO.

1344 F OKAY PD TO SIX UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY.

1353 F OKAY AH FOURTEEN -

1412 C WE GOT

1412 E WE GOT AH HUNDRED-

1413 E -AND EIGHTY THOUSAND POUNDS.

1414 C WE GOT A CONTROL PROBLEM HERE.

1415 F DO WE

1418 A EVERYONE TAKE YOUR SEATS - TAKE - EVERYONE TAKE YOUR SEATS.

1419 F START DUMPIN' THE FUEL.

1420 E I AM DUMPIN/

1421 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY WHEN ABLE FORWARD THE SOULS ON BOARD AND FUEL AT LANDING.

1425 F OKAY AH STAND-BY WE'LL GIVE IT TO YA AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

1428 R ROGER.

1429 C WHAT ARE YA DUMPIN' DOWN TO?

1430 E YEAH.

1433 C WE'VE GOT A # OF A CONTROL PROBLEM HERE--I'VE GOT ALMOST FULL RUDDER ON THIS THING.

1440 F OKAY WE GOT -

1441 F YOU DUMPIN' AS QUICK AS YOU CAN?

1443 E I'M I'M DUMPIN' EVERYTHING.

1445 C AH WE GOT A PROBLEM WITH NUMBER FOUR ENGINE.

1447 E YEAH NUMBER FOUR LOOKS LIKE IT WAS AH OUT TOO.

1450 F WELL WE GOT EGT WE GOT N1.

1454 C OKAY WE GOT A PROBLEM WITH NUMBER FOUR ENGINE TOO.

1458 E OKAY SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIVE EGT

1500 E THE N1 LOOKS - LOW

1503 E YOU DON'T HAVE ALL OF IT.

1506 C OKAY WHAT'S AH MAX AH EPR FOR NUMBER TWO ONE AND TWO.

1513 F CAN YOU MAINTAIN TWO FORTY?

1515 C YEAH JUST BARELY.

1518 F YEAH BUT WE'RE LOSIN' ALTITUDE.

1519 C I KNOW IT.

1521 E WE'RE DOWN TO AH SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THOUSAND NOW

1522 E WE'RE DUMPIN' FIVE THOUSAND POUNDS A MINUTE.

1522 F AH CENTER UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH DO YOU HAVE A FIX ON US?

1523 C OKAY.

1527 R AFFIRMATIVE SIR I HAVE YOU ON RADAR.

1530 F OKAY IT APPEARS THAT WE'VE AH WE HAVE LOST NUMBER THREE ENGINE

1534 F AND AH WE'VE LOST AH WE'RE NOT GETTIN' FULL POWER OUT OF NUMBER FOUR.

1538 F WE'RE AH - NOT ABLE TO HOLD AN ALTITUDE RIGHT NOW.

1542 F AH - WE'RE DUMPIN' FUEL

1544 F SO AH AH I THINK WE'RE GONNA BE ABLE T

1548 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER I SHOW YOU SIX ZERO MILES SOUND OF HONOLULU AT THIS TIME.

1552 F AH ROGER.

1555 F OKAY WHERE ARE WE WE GOT YOU'RE DUMPIN'-

1557 E YEAH.

1559 F WE GOT TO SHUT DOWN NUMBER THREE-

1601 E I'M GOING AH * --

1602 F WE DON'T HAVE FULL POWER ON NUMBER FOUR.

1604 E I HAVEN'T TALKED TO ANYBODY YET I COULDN'T GET TO 'EM.

1608 E AH YOU WANT ME TO GO DOWN STAIRS AND CHECK -

1610 C YEAH LET'S SEE WHAT'S HAPPENING DOWN THERE

1611 E I THINK I WE LOST A COMPRESSOR BUT AH -

1615 C I CAN'T HOLD AH I CAN'T HOLD ALTITUDE.

1617 F YEAH I TOLD HIM THAT WE'RE GUNNA -AH

1621 C AH WHAT'S THE MAX ON THERE-

1624 F *

1625 C I GOT TAKEOFF POWER ON THIS THING.

1626 F WE COULD--WHATEVER YOU NEED CAPTAIN.

1629 C WELL I KNOW IT I GOT-

1632 F YOU GOT TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY KNOTS NOW

1633 F THAT'S GOOD

1634 F SEVEN THOUSAND THAT'S---

1637 C YEAH WHY DON'T YOU -

1638 C WE'RE GETTIN' MORE RUMBLE

1640 E SIX SIXTY FIVE -

1641 C NO FUEL FLOW NOW FUEL FLOW ON NUMBER AH FOUR ENGINE

1644 F HOW CAN WE HAVE NO FUEL FLOW IF WE GOT N1 AND EGT

1648 C WE MUST BE AH LOSIN' FUEL LIKE MAD OUTTA THAT -

1650 F *

1652 C NUMBER FOUR ENGINE YOU GOT THE THING BALANCED ON THE FUEL.

1657 E AH YES FUEL'S BALANCED.

1659 C OKAY

1701 F OKAY WATCH YOUR HEADING WATCH YOUR HEADING YOU'RE GOIN DIRECT TO AH YOU WANT TO GO DIRECT HONOLULU.

1705 C YEAH

1706 E OKAY I'M GOING DOWNSTAIRS TO SEE WHAT THE # IS GOING ON

1707 F YEAH

1708 C GO AHEAD AND RUN DOWN AND SEE WHAT'S HAPPENING

1714 F I'M GUNNA COME BACK IN RADIO

1717 F DO YOU WANT TO BE BACK IN RADIO

1719 C YEAH

1720 F I'LL GIVE YOU DIRECT HONOLULU

1726 F WHAT A # OF A THING TO HAPPEN ON YOUR AH SECOND TO LAST MONTH

1729 C NO #

1732 F YOU GOT A FIRE OUT THERE

1734 C THERE'S A FIRE OUT THERE?

1735 F YEAH LOOKS LIKE IT'S ENGINE NUMBER FOUR

1736 C WHICH ONE

1737 F LOOKS LIKE NUMBER - NUMBER FOUR HOLD ON A SECOND -

1739 C YEAH WE GOT A FIRE IN NUMBER FOUR

1741 C GO THROUGH THE PROCEDURE SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE

1744 F WE'RE NOT GUNNA BE ABLE TO HOLD THIS ALTITUDE ON TWO

1746 C WELL

1749 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH PILOTS DISCRETION DESCEND TO FOUR THOUSAND

1753 C OKAY FOUR THOUSAND WE GOT A FIRE ON THE RIGHT SIDE

1755 C WE GOT A FIRE ON THE FIGHT SIDE

1357 C AH WE'RE ON TWO ENGINES NOW.

1753 E THE WHOLE RIGHT SIDE...

1759 E THE RIGHT SIDE IS GONE FROM ABOUT THE AH ONE RIGHT BACK IT'S JUST OPEN YOU'RE JUST LOOKIN' OUTSIDE

1759 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER

1807 C WADDAYA MEAN PIECES-

1808 E LOOKS LIKE A BOMB

1809 F FUSELAGE-

1810 E YES FUSELAGE IT'S JUST OPEN

1812 C OKAY IT LOOKS LIKE WE GOT A BOMB AH THAT WENT OFF ON THE RIGHT SIDE

1815 C AH THE WHOLE RIGHT SIDE IS GONE

1817 E FROM ABOUT ONE RIGHT BACK TO AH-

1820 F ANYBODY-

1822 E SOME PEOPLE ARE PROBABLY GONE - I DON'T KNOW

1824 C WE GOT A REAL PROBLEM HERE

1828 F WHY DON'T YOU SEE IF YOU CAN GET BACK TOWARDS ZERO THREE ZERO THAT'S DIRECT HONOLULU

1830 F AH CENTER UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY NOW AH YOU'VE GOT TO GIVE US A VECTOR AH DIRECT HONOLULU WE'RE LOSIN' THE VOR

1832 E ZERO THREE ZERO CAN YOU MAKE CAN YOU MAINTAIN HEADING NOW AND ALTITUDE

1834 C AH NOT REALLY

1836 C WE SHUT DOWN NUMBER FOUR

1838 C WE'RE ON TWO ENGINES.

1840 F CENTER DO YOU READ UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

1841 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY DO YOU HAVE THE AIRPORT IN SIGHT

1845 F THEY DON'T HEAR US WE'RE LOSING *

1847 C OKAY

1848 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY CENTER

1851 F OKAY WE NEED A VECTOR NOW WE'RE LOSING THE VOR

1855 F AH WE'RE DOWN TO SIXTY FIVE HUNDRED AND WE LOOK LIKE WE CAN HOLD THIS ALTITUDE

1859 F AH DID YOU GET OUR LAST TRANSMISSION?

1903 F WE EVIDENTLY HAD A BOMB OR SOMETHING AH A BIG SECTION OF THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT IS MISSING.

1906 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER DO YOU HAVE THE AIRPORT IN SIGHT CLEARED FOR A VISUAL APPROACH

1912 C WHAT'S THE WHAT'S THE WIND

1912 F AH WE'RE SHO-WE'RE STILL FORTY FIVE DME SO AH YOU WATCH US AH

1917 C WE GOTTA GET DOWN IN WEIGHT HERE

1917 C WHAT'S THE--

1918 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN ROGER I HAVE YOU ON RADAR

1921 E WELL I I SAY WE LAND OVER WEIGHT SO WE'RE SIX FIFTY TWO RIGHT NOW

1922 E DOWN TO --

1924 F WE GOT FORTY FIVE MILES TO GO

1927 E SIX FIFTY YEAH I WOULD SAY-

1929 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN AH YOU'RE MISSING THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE CABIN OR THE RIGHT WING SIR.

1930 E * * GEAR

1934 F IF THAT WOULD HELP LEAVE IT DOWN

1935 C WHAT

1936 F THE GEAR'S UP

1937 E THE GEAR'S UP OKAY

1937 F I'M SORRY EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY SAY AGAIN

1939 R YES SIR YOU SAY YOU'RE MISSING THE RIGHT SIDE IS THAT AH THE FUSELAGE OR THE WING

1943 C YEAH

1944 F THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE THE WE'RE MISSING A SECTION OF THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE

1948 F PART OF THE FUSELAGE IS MISSING

1950 F AND WE'VE GOT AH WE'VE LOST ENGINE NUMBER THREE

1952 F WE'VE GOT ENGINE NUMBER FOUR SHUT DOWN 'CAUSE IT APPEARED LIKE AS IF WE HAD A FIRE OUT THERE

1956 F WE WANT ALL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT WE CAN GET AND THE AH ALL THE EQUIPMENT WE CAN GET STANDING BY.

1955 F WE'D LIKE ALL THE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT WE CAN GET

2002 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER

2004 E I WOULDN'T GO ANY FASTER THAN YOU HAD TO BECAUSE THAT THAT HOLE

2009 E I WOULDN'T GET IT OVER TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY KNOTS - THAT'S A BIG-

2011 F WHAT'S THE MINIMUM MANEUVERING AH MINIMUM MANEUVERING FOR WHAT WE GOT HERE?

2015 F WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE #'S GUNNA HAPPEN WHEN WE START TO...

2018 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY SEARCH AND RESCUE HAS LAUNCHED A HELICOPTER INTERCEPT

2022 F AH SAY AGAIN

2024 C THEY LAUNCHED A HELICOPTER

2025 R SEARCH AND RESCUE HAS LAUNCHED A HELICOPTER TO INTERCEPT AND AID YOU IN AH RETURNING BACK TO HONOLULU

2030 F AH ROGER UNDERSTAND

2030 C OKAY WHAT'S WHAT'S OUR STALL SPEED

2034 F I WOULDN'T GO BELOW TWO FORTY

2036 E AH YEAH

2038 F TWO TWO FORTY'S CLEAN MANEUVERING - SINCE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WE HAVE OUT THERE

2040 X *

2054 F AH CENTER UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ARE YOU AH YOU ARE LOOKIN' AT US AREN'T YA

2058 C ARE YOU SQUAWKING SEVENTY SEVEN

2059 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AFFIRMATIVE STILL HAVE YOU ON RADAR

2105 C OKAY PUT YOUR AH HARNESSES ON AND * * *

2120 C AND PLAN EVACUATION TELL 'EM

2122 F OH YOU BET

2124 F AND HONOLULU UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN AH WE DO PLAN TO EVACUATE ON THE RUNWAY AH-

2132 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER AND AH LAND AT YOUR CHOICE OF RUNWAYS SIR

2132 E OKAY LET ME TRY TO TALK TO THE PA - TO THE FLIGHT ATTENDANT GETTIN'

2139 C OKAY WHAT'S THE AH *

2140 E I CAN'T TALK TO HER DOWN THERE

2142 F TRY TO HOLD YOUR SPEED

2143 C * WIND

2145 F AH SAY YOUR WIND

2147 C THAT'S ALRIGHT HE -

2148 F WE TOOK OFF ON EIGHT

2150 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY STANDBY WE'RE GETTIN' AH CURRENT WEATHER FROM HONOLULU

2154 F OKAY

2155 F AH WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WE'RE GUNNA GET WITH GEAR EITHER DO WE

2157 C NAW * *

2207 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY HONOLULU WIND AT THE AIRPORT AT ZERO SIX ZERO AT ONE ZERO ZERO SIX ZERO AT ONE ZERO

2215 F AH ROGER EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

2217 F IS THERE A CLOSER AIRPORT THAN THIS

2218 R AND EIGHT ELEVEN YOU UNDERSTAND YOUR CHOICE OF RUNWAY DIRECT TO THE HONOLULU AIRPORT AND YOUR CHOICE

2221 X WHICH ONE

2221 C WHAT'S THE LONGEST RUNWAY

2223 F EIGHT AH EIGHT RIGHT I BELIEVE IT IS

2224 C WHAT ASK HIM WHAT THE -

2227 F WATCH YOUR ALTITUDE

2228 C YEAH

2230 C WE'RE GOIN' DOWN TO FOUR THOUSAND RIGHT

2232 F WELL WE GUNNA GO WHATEVER WE CAN DO

2233 F HE CLEARED US TO SIX

1234 F BUT I TOLD HIM WE COULDN'T HOLD IT

2234 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH CONTACT HONOLULU APPROACH NOW ONE ONE EIGHT POINT ONE IF ABLE

2238 F EIGHTEEN ONE OKAY

2249 F HONOLULU APPROACH UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY IS WITH YA

2251 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN RUNWAY FOUR RIGHT YOU'RE CLEARED TO LAND

2254 C IS THAT THE LONGEST RUNWAY

2255 F OKAY WE NEED A LONG RUNWAY

2257 F AH EIGHT EIGHT IS AH LONGER ISN'T IT?

2258 E EIGHT RIGHT EIGHT'S--

2259 R YOU CAN HAVE EIGHT LEFT

2301 C EIGHT LEFT - OKAY

2308 C YOU WANT TO SET ME UP ON THAT

2310 F YEAH

2312 R YOU HAVE THE AIRPORT IN SIGHT AH UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN

2314 C NEGATIVE

2315 F AH NEGATIVE

2316 F WE'RE STILL TWENTY EIGHT MILES OUT ON THE DME ANYWAY ON HONOLULU DME

2318 F DO YOU HAVE US ON RADAR?

2320 R I GOT YOU ON RADAR

2321 R TURN TEN DEGREES LEFT VECTOR TO EIGHT LEFT.

2323 F OKAY TEN LEFT VECTOR TO I'LL GET IT -

2326 F TEN LEFT

2337 F OKAY TEN LEFT IS AH -

2339 F I'LL SET YOU UP

2341 F ONE OH NINE - ZERO SEVEN NINE

2343 F SET IN MINE

2345 F WATCH YOUR AIRSPEED

2348 C I GOT MAX ON HERE

2350 F ONE OH NINE FIVE - AND AH ZERO SEVEN NINE

2400 C I DON'T KNOW IF WE'RE GUNNA MAKE THIS

2403 C AH - I CAN'T AH I CAN'T HOLD ALTITUDE

2407 F OKAY DON'T OKAY AH WELL WE HAVE TWENTY FOUR MILES TO GO AND WE'RE DTIFTIN' DOWN SLOWLY SO -

2412 E YOU'RE GUNNA MAKE IT

2414 C HUH

2415 F WELL -

2415 E YOU'RE GUNNA MAKE IT

2416 F MAKE SURE WE DON'T HIT ANY # HILLS ON THE WAY

2419 E THERE AREN'T ANY HILLS IF WE COULD HAVE LANDED FOUR RIGHT

2321 E I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THAT RUNWAY IS

2323 E I COULD LOOK IT UP

2325 E DO YOU HAVE THAT OUT

2425 F FOUR RIGHT IS AH-

2427 E THAT'S STRAIGHT IN

2430 C I NEED A LONG FINAL

2432 C TELL HIM WE NEED A LONG FINAL

2435 F AND UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH WE'D LIKE AS LONG A FINAL AS YOU CAN GIVE US

2438 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN TURN AH FIFTEEN DEGREES LEFT

2442 F FIFTEEN LEFT NOW UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

2449 F OKAY I GOT LIGHTS OVER HERE

2502 C OKAY

2504 F OKAY YOU CAN SEE IN A MINUTE

2507 F OKAY WE'RE AT FOUR

2509 F WE'RE TWENTY ONE MILES OUT

2511 F WE'RE IN GOOD SHAPE, WE'RE IN GOOD SHAPE

2513 F OKAY NOW WHAT DO WE WANT TO DO ABOUT THE GEAR - ANYTHING

2515 C WE'RE GUNNA HOLD THAT UNTIL WE GET ON THE GLIDE SLOPE

2516 C YOU WANT TO GET ME SET UP WHEN AH EIGHTY SEVEN

2519 F ONE OH NINE FIVE ZERO SEVEN NINE - OKAY YOU'RE SET UP FOR THE ILS

2525 F EIGHT LEFT THAT'S THE LONGEST RUNWAY

2527 C YEAH

2529 F ONE OH NINE FIVE AND ZERO SEVEN NINE

2532 C THANKS

2533 C WHAT WE'RE GUNNA DO IS AH GO ON A TWO ENGINE APPROACH

2536 C YOU WANT TO READ ME A CHECKLIST

2538 E YEAH I GOT IT OUT WHEN YOU'RE READY

2540 C READY

2541 E OKAY IT'S AH - AUTO-BRAKE IF INSTALLED -

2542 C *

2546 E SET

2547 E IGNITION OPERATOR

2548 E WE'LL PUT THE IGNITION BACK ON

2551 F WE DON'T HAVE IT ON THOSE TWO RIGHT

2553 F ** YOU NEED TO TURN **

2554 E AIRSPEED BUGS - AH HERE'S -

2556 C YEAH YOU WANT TO GIVE ME SOME SPEEDS

2557 E ONE FIFTY IS GUNNA BE YOUR TWO ENGINE AH USE AH ONE SIXTY

2601 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN I NEED AH SOULS ON BOARD IF YOU HAVE IT

2604 F OKAY SOULS ON BOARD

2606 E ONE SIXTY IS THE MINIMUM IF IF WE CAN-

2608 F AH STANDBY UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

2610 E I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY'S ON BOARD

2611 E TWO HUNDRED AND AH

2611 F AH

2615 E I DON'T HAVE THE PAPER WORK IN FRONT OF ME RIGHT NOW

2615 F AH WE'RE TOO BUSY RIGHT NOW IT'S TWO HUNDRED AND SOMETHING

2617 R OKAY

2618 X **

2620 F OKAY WE'RE SEVENTEEN MILES OUT DAVE

2622 C YEAH

2623 E WE HAVE ALL OF OUR HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS

2625 C THAT'S A PLUS

2626 F THAT NOT - SOMETHIN' - SCREWY THERE

2627 C OKAY WHADDA WE GOT IN HYDRAULICS

2630 E WE GOT ALL OF OUR HYDRAULICS AH INDICATING NORMALLY

2632 E THE AIR PUMP ON NUMBER FOUR IS RUNNING

2634 E THE PUMPS ARE RUNNING

2635 C OKAY I'M NOT GUNNA -

2637 C WHAT WHAT'S THE MINIMUM AH SPEED RIGHT NOW

2639 C WHADDA WE GOT ON FUEL WEIGHT

2641 C SIX TEN

2642 C OH #

2643 E * SIX TEN AH ONE SIXTY

2644 E WE'RE STILL DUMPIN'

2645 F ONE SIXTY'S *

2647 F CLEAN MANEUVERING FOR SIX TWENTY IS TWO THIRTY SO -

2650 F NOW ARE WE GONNA TRY TO GET FLAPS?

2654 E DON'T GET ANY LOWER CAPTAIN

2656 C I KNOW

2657 E *(FEET/PEAKS)

2658 C I KNOW

2659 C LET'S TRY AH ONE DEGREE AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS

2702 F OKAY

2704 F WATCH YOUR HYDRAULICS

2708 E ALRIGHT

2721 F OKAY YOU GOT -

2723 F HOW DO THE CONTROLS FEEL

2724 C ALRIGHT SO FAR

2725 F OKAY *

2726 E DON'T GET IT MUCH LOWER

2729 C HUH

2730 C I DIDN'T HEAR YA

2732 E I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING - *

2733 C * HOW ABOUT *

2735 F DO WE HAVE THE GREEN LEADING EDGE LIGHTS- DO WE HAVE THE LEADING EDGE LIGHTS

2736 E YES YES

2737 C HOW ABOUT FIVE

2738 F TRY AT FIVE COMIN' TO FIVE - TELL ME IF THE CONTROLS CHANGE

2740 F TELL ME IF THE CONTROLS CHANGE

2750 F OKAY WE'RE GETTIN' A SPLIT FLAP ON THE OUTBOARDS

2753 C AH LET'S AH JUST YOU LAND WITH FIVE DEGREES GIVE ME A SPEED FOR FIVE DEGREES ALRIGHT

2755 C GIVE ME A SPEED FOR FIVE DEGREES ALRIGHT

2758 F FIVE'S A HUNDRED AND EIGHTY

2759 E IT'S ON IT'S ON THE BOARD ONE NINETY

2801 F WE'RE NOT GETTIN A FULL FIVE

2803 E * ONE SIXTY ONE NINETY AND

2806 F WE'RE NOT GETTIN' FULL FIVE DAVE WE'RE GETTIN' A SPLIT

2807 F WE'RE GETTIN' A SPLIT

2808 C THAT'S ALL RIGHT

2810 F ON THE OUT ON THE OUTBOARDS

2816 F WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET MORE ONCE THIS SPLIT - STOPS THE OUTBOARDS WE CAN GET THE INBOARDS

2823 C OKAY I GOT TO SLOW IT DOWN A LITTLE BIT

2824 F ALRIGHT

2825 *

2826 E DO NOT GO BELOW TWO TEN THOUGH

2828 E ARE YOU GUNNA TRY TO EVACUATE THE AIRPLANE * LANDING

2830 F AND UNITED AH -

2832 C YOU BET

2833 F EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY AH WE SHOULD HAVE THE AIRPORT BUT WE DON'T

2837 C WHERE'S THE AIRPORT

2838 R OKAY TURN ANOTHER FIFTEEN DEGREES LEFT UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN

2841 F FIFTEEN LEFT

2843 R THAT'S CORRECT THAT'LL PUT YOU ON ABOUT A TWELVE MILE FINAL

2845 C OKAY

2846 F OKAY WE'VE GOT THE ISLAND IN SIGHT AND WE SHOW WE'RE ONLY ELEVEN MILES FROM THE AIRPORT BUT AH WE DON'T HAVE THE AIRPORT

2852 F OKAY NOW WE'VE GOT FLAPS FIVE ON THE INBOARDS AND A SPLIT ON THE OUTBOARDS-

2853 R OKAY WE'LL TURN THE LIGHTS ON HIGH

2857 F -YOU WANT TO TRY FOR MORE WE CAN PROBABLY GET - SPLIT SHOULD STOP THE OUBOARDS

2858 F SPLIT SHOULD STOP THE OUTBOARDS

2900 C ALRIGHT TRY TEN THEN

2902 F ALRIGHT WE'LL TRY TEN

2906 F OKAY THE INBOARDS ARE COMING TO TEN

2913 F NOW SPEED'S IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE STALL WARNING INDICATOR'S ON THE INBOARDS

2917 F WO WE MAY - WE WON'T HAVE THE STALL WARNING INDICATOR

2920 C OKAY

2921 F SAY TEN FLAPS AH -

2923 C I SAY LAND WITH TEN DEGREES

2925 E CAN YOU MAKE THE TURN HERE - CAN YOU MAKE THIS TURN

2926 C YEAH

2927 E I'D START

2928 F WE'RE HIGHER THAN HELL

2929 E YEAH I'D START MAKIN' THE RIGHT HAND TURN

2931 C WELL AH WE'RE GUNNA AH GO OUT A LITTLE WAYS

2932 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN TURN RIGHT HEADING ZERO SEVEN ZERO

2936 E IT'S OVER HERE TO YOUR RIGHT CAPTAIN

2937 F YOU GOT THE AIRPORT?

2938 C NO

2938 E IT'S RIGHT OVER HERE TO YOUR RIGHT

2939 C OKAY

2940 F ZERO SEVEN ZERO UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN

2941 C LET'S TRY AH

2942 C WE'RE ABOVE GLIDE SLOPE AH *

2943 F ARE WE GOOD FOR TERRAIN OUT HERE?

2947 R SAY AGAIN

2948 F ARE WE GOOD FOR TERRAIN

2950 C YEAH WE'RE ALRIGHT

2951 R YES YOU ARE THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FEET

2953 F OKAY

2954 F OKAY WATCH YOUR

2955 F YOU WANT TO TRY THE GEAR?

2956 C YEAH LET'S TRY THE GEAR

2957 C WE'RE ABOVE

2957 C AH WELL, HOLD ON, LET'S GET ON THE GLIDE SLOPE HERE

3001 F WE'RE ALREADY ABOVE THE GLIDE SLOPE HERE

3003 E JEEZ YOU'RE ON THE GLIDE SLOPE RIGHT NOW

3005 C WELL LET'S HOLD OFF ON THE GEAR A LITTLE BIT HERE

3007 F RIGHT

3009 F ONE OH NINE FIVE ONE OH NINE FIVE I'M ON ZERO SEVEN NINE

3016 E OKAY YOU'VE GOT THE EVACUATION RIGHT HERE THE SIGNAL FOR THAT

3019 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN TURN RIGHT ZERO EIGHT ZERO

3020 C OKAY LET'S AH -

3021 F OKAY WE HAVE THE AIRPORT NOW UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

3023 R EIGHT ELEVEN IS CLEARED TO LAND EIGHT LEFT - EQUIPMENT STANDING BY

3025 R WIND ZERO FIVE ZERO ONE TWO

3030 F CLEARED TO LAND EIGHT LEFT UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

3032 C OKAY WELL LET'S TRY THE GEAR

3034 F OKAY TRYIN' THE GEAR

3035 F YOU READY?

3035 E OKAY

3035 F YOU'RE HIGH ON THE GLIDE SLOPE

3036 C YEAH

3036 F THAT'S FINE

3037 C YEAH I WANNA BE HIGH

3039 F TELL ME WHAT I CAN DO TO HELP

3041 E OKAY MINIMUM AIRSPEED-

3043 F YOU'RE OKAY YOU'RE AH YOU'VE GOT TEN FLAPS THAT SHOULD BE ONE SEVENTY BUT THE INBOARDS ARE UP AH THE OUTBOARDS ARE UP SO - TWO HUNDRED ONE NINETY'S PROBABLY GOOD SPEED -

3053 E TWO ENGINE APPROACH

3054 F TWO ENGINE APPROACH

3055 E I HEAR PEOPLE SCREAMIN' BACK THERE

3056 C I THINK * -

3058 F SHE'S YELLING FOR 'EM TO SIT DOWN

3102 C GIVE 'EM AH AH THREE MINUTE WARNING - TELL HER ON THE PA

3110 F ARE WE DEPRESSURIZED?

3111 E YES

3113 E HAVE ABOUT AH TWO MINUTES UNTIL WE TOUCH DOWN

3119 E WANT ME TO TELL 'EM TO PLAN FOR EVACUATION

3121 F * NEED YOUR HELP DAVE

3122 C YEAH WHEN WE EVACUATE

3124 E WE WILL BE EVACUATING WE WILL BE EVACUATING UPON TOUCH DOWN AND ONCE WE COME TO A STOP

3131 F OKAY YOU'RE A LITTLE FAST DAVE

3132 C YEAH I KNOW

3133 F OKAY

3139 F I'D SAY AIM FOR ABOUT ONE NINETY FOR TOUCHDOWN

3140 C YEAH

3142 E AH - I WOULDN'T GET ANY SLOWER THAN TWO HUNDRED

3145 C NAW I WOULDN'T EITHER

3147 F WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WE HAVE FOR BRAKES BUT WE GOT NORMAL PRESSURE OKAY SO

3152 C WELL HOW ARE WE DOIN' ON HYDRAULICS

3154 E HYDRAULICS ARE AH GOOD

3157 C WE GOT BRAKES?

3158 E NORMAL HYDRAULICS

3200 F SO WE GOT BRAKES

3202 F BUT YOU'RE ONLY GUNNA HAVE REVERSING ON ONE AND TWO

3205 C HOW YOU DOIN'

3207 E I'M FINE I'M TRYIN TO CATCH UP *

3209 F MAKE SURE YOU GET SPUN AROUND AND FACE FORWARD

3212 F OKAY YOU GOT TWO HUNDRED KNOTS

3213 F AND YOU'RE OUT OF A THOU - OR THIRTEEN HUNDRED

3215 F AND A LITTLE HIGH ON THE GLIDE SLOPE

3217 C YEAH I'M JUST RIGHT

3219 F WANT ME WANNA HAVE 'EM TURN THE RABBIT DOWN

3223 C CENTER THE AH TRIM WHEN WE WHEN I COME BACK ON THAT

3228 F UNITED AH EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY CAN YOU TURN DOWN THE STROBE A LITTLE BIT PLEASE

3231 R ALRIGHT

3236 E OKAY DESCENT CHECK

3238 E AH GEAR'S DOWN

3240 E FLAP - WE KNOW WHAT THEY ARE

3242 E THE SPEEDBRAKE AH

3244 C OKAY FINAL CHECK WE'RE DOING THAT

3246 F YES THE GEAR'S DOWN

3247 F SPEEDBRAKE

3248 F WE GOT TEN FLAPS

3250 F WE GOT A HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE

3252 F LOOKIN' GOOD

3253 F AH A DOT HIGH ON THE GLIDE SLOPE

3254 C YUP

3256 F LOOKIN' GOOD

3257 F ONE NINETY TWO

3258 F THOUSAND DOWN

3259 F DOT AND A HALF HIGH

3301 F ONE NINETY

3302 F ONE EIGHTY FIVE

3303 F A LITTLE SLOW

3304 F A LITTLE SLOW DAVE BELOW WHAT WE WANT

3306 F ONE NINETY

3308 F ONE NINE ONE NINETY TWO

3310 F COMIN' UP TO THE GLIDE SLOPE

3312 F YOU GOT THE GEAR DOWN WE'RE CLEARED TO LAND

3315 F EVERYTHING'S DONE AS FAR AS WE KNOW

3317 F TWO HUNDRED

3319 F ONE NINETY FIVE

3322 F HALF A DOT HIGH

3323 F LOOKIN' GOOD

3324 F ONE NINETY TWO

3325 F ONE NINETY FIVE

3326 C COMIN' OFF ON THE POWER

3328 E ONE HUNDRED FEET

3329 E FIFTY FEET

3330 C CENTER THE TRIM CENTER THE TRIM

3331 E THIRTY

3332 E TEN

3332 ((SOUND OF RADIO ALTIMETER TONE STOPS))

3335 ((SOUND OF TOUCHDOWN))

3335 E ZERO

3337 F WE'RE ON

3338 E GEAR'S HOLDING

3339 F NO SPOILERS

3340 C I'M GUNNA GO INTO REVERSE

3341 F ON NUMBER TWO ONLY 'CAUSE WE GOT ONE SEVENTY

3345 F ONE SIXTY

3348 F ONE FORTY

3351 F ONE THIRTY

3353 F ONE TWENTY

3355 E LOOKS GOOD

3356 F ONE TEN

3358 F LOOKS GOOD SO FAR

3359 F ONE HUNDRED

3400 F BRAKE PRESSURE'S AH HOLDING BRAKE -

3402 C LET'S GO THROUGH THE PROCEDURE

3404 F BRAKE PRESSURE

3405 C AS SOON AS I LOCK THE AH

3406 E SPOILERS ARE COMIN' IN

3407 F OKAY

3408 C I'M GUNNA LOCK THE BRAKES.

3409 F OKAY HOLD ON

3412 F AH SPEEDBRAKE PARKING BRAKE -

3416 E SHUTDOWN THE ENGINES

3418 F START LEVERS

3419 C SHUT 'EM DOWN

3420 C SPEEDBRAKES

3421 C WE'RE EVACUATING

3420 F OKAY WE'RE STOPPIN' HERE UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY

3421 F WE'RE EVACUATING THE AIRPLANE

3421 E I'M GIVIN' THE EVACUATION SIGNAL

3422 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN ROGER YOU GOT THE AIRPORT

3424 YOU MADE AN ANNOUN-

[GlueBall]

JBS:

Thanks for posting the dramatic UA811 CVR transcript. A worthwhile read.

AAR-00/03 evidence showed that the cargo door was in the closed position at the time of impact, "...all 8 of the latching cams along the bottom of the door (and some pieces of the door itself) remained attached to the pins....

"Deformation and fracture patterns on the door matched damage to the adjacent fuselage structure....

"Inflight breakup was not initiated by preexisting condition resulting in a structural failure and decompression....

JBS, I have read everything that you have said about your door failure theory, so no need to rehash it again. You raise good points, but their connection to the OVERALL evidence found in this crash is not the probable trigger of the breakup sequence.

AAR-00/03 "It was clear from the wreckage recovery locations that the FIRST pieces to depart the airplane were from the area in and around the airplane's wing center section (WCS), wich includes the CWT, and therefore that the breakup must have initiated in this area.

"...the red zone (the wreckage zone closest to JFK along the airplane's flightpath and, therefore, containing the earliest pieces to depart the airplane) consisted primarily of pieces from the WCS front spar and spanwise beam (SWB) 3, the manufacturing access door from SWB 2, the two forward air conditioning packs, large pieces of a ring of fuselage structure just in front of the wing front spar, and main cabin floor beams and flooring material from above the WCS and from the fuselage in front of the WCS....

JBS, you allege that: "...For NTSB to say center tank exploded with unknown ignition source is to admit they do not know the cause of the accident."

Sir, an ignition source is not required for spontaneous ignition. Proper fuel/air mixture (vapor) under enough pressure with enough heat will ignite, just as (in cruder terms), a diesel engine fires up. Evidence had pointed to an obvious overpressure in the CWT which had forced the center section lower skin and the forward end of the keel beam downward. The fuel/air vapor in the ullage of the center tank was flammable as determined from subsequent inflight testing
of a cargo 74-100. Who knows, perhaps the TW800 CWT vent was blocked, causing enough pressure buildup for spontaneous combustion, or perhaps there was an ignition source from frayed wiring of the center tank pump....

But the tank exploded! On its own. And so did several other Boeing CW tanks:
AV 727, 1989
PAL 737, 1990 (that airplane was brand new).
TG 737, 2001 (8 year old plane)
USAF KC135

I'm not trying to steer you away from researching inflight door failures, but in this case you are trying to make chickensalad out of chickensh+t.