Luckily the dead engine wasn't dead after all.
Join Date: Nov 2011
Location: Moon
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This incident is very poor example of flying. The Capt had 12000 hrs on type. Thirty knots before V1 they had bird hit on the right engine. The rookie copilot suggested reject which the Capt decided to investigate in the air. The engine was vibrating badly. The No2 engine vibration monitor was showing excessive reading of N1,which the copilot read as NO1 engine. And the Capt of total 20000hrs didn't bother to check and shut down No.1. During restart at 2000ft thanks to Airbus they got alpha floor in Boeing they would be dead. Managed to restart asked for immediate Landing without much preparation. When vectored made a meal of it had to goround and landed safely if you can call that second time around. Some guardian angel who's duty time was not over must have taken mercy.
Dig into this matter.
There are a lot that they have not covered and has been hidden.
This is not all the truth.
Company management are good at hide the truth but keep asking and you will be surprise.
You said: Some guardian angel who's duty time was not over must have taken mercy.
Yes it was, In the flight it was called EXPAT. Yes An Expat was traveling on this flight as a passenger and he is the one that Saved the day.
Flight G8-338, VT-GOS with 164 passenger and Multi Million dollars Aircraft(Airbus 320) with bunch of ancient people between building on the ground should of crashed , if it was not because of what this expat did.
Go back and dig and ask question from the other pilots and personal that they have been working at the time and they are still there and they will tell you that this is truth.
Yes it was, In the flight it was called EXPAT. Yes An Expat was traveling on this flight as a passenger and he is the one that Saved the day.
Flight G8-338, VT-GOS with 164 passenger and Multi Million dollars Aircraft(Airbus 320) with bunch of ancient people between building on the ground should of crashed , if it was not because of what this expat did.
Go back and dig and ask question from the other pilots and personal that they have been working at the time and they are still there and they will tell you that this is truth.
ROFL Thanks for the highlight of an otherwise forgettable day.
Thanks 'but57.
As long as there have been more than one noise maker, drivers have been shutting down the wrong one. Personally have had guy grab the wrong lever in a 2 engine, and on a 4 engine, the latter, grabbing the #4 shutdown handle and saying confirm "confirm #1...". Stuff happens. This crew got the righteous engine up and running again in short order, recovering from their faux pas. Shades of a B767 over the water west of LAX.
Want to reduce such failures, improve the HMI interface, get rid of extraneous warm fuzzy stuff that has no benefit to the decision process in the cockpit. Improve the training for failures, we are effectively trained to be trigger happy just to complete the matrix in 4 hour sessions, rather than to review the decision making before flicking switches.
A comment was made earlier about confirmation in a shutdown; there is a widespread problem in the inflight restart as well where the confirmation is frequently missed after the selection of fuel to run, where the actioning pilot removes his hand from the fuel control during the process, and in the event of an aborted start fuel chops the engine without confirmation. A perennial problem from a bad checklist and bad training, not limited to any particular airline or aircraft. Usually not a problem with corporate or military jets, where the fuel cutoff is a gated position on the thrust level except with a start in a descent where both throttles may be close to idle.
Thanks 'but57.
As long as there have been more than one noise maker, drivers have been shutting down the wrong one. Personally have had guy grab the wrong lever in a 2 engine, and on a 4 engine, the latter, grabbing the #4 shutdown handle and saying confirm "confirm #1...". Stuff happens. This crew got the righteous engine up and running again in short order, recovering from their faux pas. Shades of a B767 over the water west of LAX.
Want to reduce such failures, improve the HMI interface, get rid of extraneous warm fuzzy stuff that has no benefit to the decision process in the cockpit. Improve the training for failures, we are effectively trained to be trigger happy just to complete the matrix in 4 hour sessions, rather than to review the decision making before flicking switches.
A comment was made earlier about confirmation in a shutdown; there is a widespread problem in the inflight restart as well where the confirmation is frequently missed after the selection of fuel to run, where the actioning pilot removes his hand from the fuel control during the process, and in the event of an aborted start fuel chops the engine without confirmation. A perennial problem from a bad checklist and bad training, not limited to any particular airline or aircraft. Usually not a problem with corporate or military jets, where the fuel cutoff is a gated position on the thrust level except with a start in a descent where both throttles may be close to idle.
So you say, with 12 post (5 of which are:"look for the expat"). How about you just tell us what happened?
