Another reason not to fly Asiana
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Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd
he could have held over ANC to get down to landing weight if that was a problem, but one is never really very far from a "suitable " airport twixt LAX and ANC.
And the cargo fire suppression system is supposed to give up to 4 hours protection; however I personally will land ASAP with ANY fire or smoke warning...
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Any smoke or fire warning should be consider valid unless confirmed otherwise ....
How fast it can go ...
Read below:
UPS FLIGHT 6
ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS:
On September 3rd 2010, a Boeing 747-44AF departed Dubai International Airport [DXB] on a scheduled international cargo flight [SCAT-IC] to Cologne [CGN], Germany.
Twenty two minutes into the flight, at approximately 32,000 feet, the crew advised Bahrain Area East Air Traffic Control [BAE-C ] that there was an indication of an on- board fire on the Forward Main Deck and declared an emergency.
Bahrain Air Traffic Control advised that Doha International Airport [DOH] was 'at your ten o'clock and one hundred miles, is that close enough?', the Captain elected to return to DXB (approximately 180 NM), configured the aircraft for the return to Dubai and obtained clearance for the turn back and descent.
A cargo on the main cargo deck had ignited at some point after departure. Less than three minutes after the first warning to the crew, the fire resulted in severe damage to flight control systems and caused the upper deck and cockpit to fill with continuous smoke.
The crew then advised Bahrain East Area Control [BAE-C] that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke' and that they ‘could not see the radios', at around the same time the crew experienced pitch control anomalies during the turn back and descent to ten thousand feet.
The smoke did not abate during the emergency impairing the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft for the duration of the flight back to DXB.
On the descent to ten thousand feet the captains supplemental oxygen supply abruptly ceased to function without any audible or visual warning to the crew five minutes and thirty seconds after the first audible warning. This resulted in the Captain leaving his position. The Captain left his seat and did not return to his position for the duration of the flight due to incapacitation from toxic gases.
The First Officer[F.O], now the Pilot Flying [PF] could not view outside of the cockpit, the primary flight displays, or the audio control panel to retune to the UAE frequencies. Due to the consistent and contiguous smoke in the cockpit all communication between the destination [DXB] and the crew was routed through relay aircraft in VHF range of the emergency aircraft and BAE-C.
BAE-C then relayed the information to the Emirates Area Control Center (EACC) in the UAE via landline, who then contacted Dubai ATC via landline.
As the aircraft approached the aerodrome in Dubai, it stepped down in altitude, the aircraft approached DXB runway 12 left (RWY 12L), then overflew the northern perimeter of the airport at 4500 ft at around 340 kts . The PF could not view the Primary Flight Displays [PFD] or the view outside the cockpit.
The PF was advised Shajah International Airport [SHJ] was available at 10 nm. This required a left hand turn, the aircraft overflew DXB heading East, reduced speed, entering a shallow descending right-hand turn to the south of the airport before loss of control in flight and an uncontrolled descent into terrain, nine nautical miles south west of Dubai International Airport.
There were no survivors.
CAUSES:
1. A large fire developed in palletized cargo on the main deck at or near pallet positions 4 or 5, in Fire Zone 3, consisting of consignments of mixed cargo including a significant number of lithium type batteries and other combustible materials. The fire escalated rapidly into a catastrophic uncontained fire.
2. The large, uncontained cargo fire, that originated in the main cargo deck caused the cargo compartment liners to fail under combined thermal and mechanical loads. 3. Heat from the fire resulted in the system/component failure or malfunction of the truss assemblies and control cables, directly affecting the control cable tension and elevator function required for the safe operation of the aircraft when in manual control.
4. The uncontained cargo fire directly affected the independent critical systems necessary for crew survivability. Heat from the fire exposed the supplementary oxygen system to extreme thermal loading, sufficient to generate a failure. This resulted in the oxygen supply disruption leading to the abrupt failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply and the incapacitation of the captain.
5. The progressive failure of the cargo compartment liner increased the area available for the smoke and fire penetration into the fuselage crown area.
6. The rate and volume of the continuous toxic smoke, contiguous with the cockpit and supernumerary habitable area, resulted in inadequate visibility in the cockpit, obscuring the view of the primary flight displays, audio control panels and the view outside the cockpit which prevented all normal cockpit functioning.
7. The shutdown of PACK 1 for unknown reasons resulted in loss of conditioned airflow to the upper deck causing the Electronic Equipment Cooling [EEC] system to reconfigure to "closed loop mode". The absence of a positive pressure differential contributed to the hazardous quantities of smoke and fumes entering the cockpit and upper deck, simultaneously obscuring the crew’s view and creating a toxic environment.
8. The fire detection methodology of detecting smoke sampling as an indicator of a fire is inadequate as pallet smoke masking can delay the time it takes for a smoke detection system to detect a fire originating within a cargo container or a pallet with a rain cover.
How fast it can go ...
Read below:
UPS FLIGHT 6
ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS:
On September 3rd 2010, a Boeing 747-44AF departed Dubai International Airport [DXB] on a scheduled international cargo flight [SCAT-IC] to Cologne [CGN], Germany.
Twenty two minutes into the flight, at approximately 32,000 feet, the crew advised Bahrain Area East Air Traffic Control [BAE-C ] that there was an indication of an on- board fire on the Forward Main Deck and declared an emergency.
Bahrain Air Traffic Control advised that Doha International Airport [DOH] was 'at your ten o'clock and one hundred miles, is that close enough?', the Captain elected to return to DXB (approximately 180 NM), configured the aircraft for the return to Dubai and obtained clearance for the turn back and descent.
A cargo on the main cargo deck had ignited at some point after departure. Less than three minutes after the first warning to the crew, the fire resulted in severe damage to flight control systems and caused the upper deck and cockpit to fill with continuous smoke.
The crew then advised Bahrain East Area Control [BAE-C] that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke' and that they ‘could not see the radios', at around the same time the crew experienced pitch control anomalies during the turn back and descent to ten thousand feet.
The smoke did not abate during the emergency impairing the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft for the duration of the flight back to DXB.
On the descent to ten thousand feet the captains supplemental oxygen supply abruptly ceased to function without any audible or visual warning to the crew five minutes and thirty seconds after the first audible warning. This resulted in the Captain leaving his position. The Captain left his seat and did not return to his position for the duration of the flight due to incapacitation from toxic gases.
The First Officer[F.O], now the Pilot Flying [PF] could not view outside of the cockpit, the primary flight displays, or the audio control panel to retune to the UAE frequencies. Due to the consistent and contiguous smoke in the cockpit all communication between the destination [DXB] and the crew was routed through relay aircraft in VHF range of the emergency aircraft and BAE-C.
BAE-C then relayed the information to the Emirates Area Control Center (EACC) in the UAE via landline, who then contacted Dubai ATC via landline.
As the aircraft approached the aerodrome in Dubai, it stepped down in altitude, the aircraft approached DXB runway 12 left (RWY 12L), then overflew the northern perimeter of the airport at 4500 ft at around 340 kts . The PF could not view the Primary Flight Displays [PFD] or the view outside the cockpit.
The PF was advised Shajah International Airport [SHJ] was available at 10 nm. This required a left hand turn, the aircraft overflew DXB heading East, reduced speed, entering a shallow descending right-hand turn to the south of the airport before loss of control in flight and an uncontrolled descent into terrain, nine nautical miles south west of Dubai International Airport.
There were no survivors.
CAUSES:
1. A large fire developed in palletized cargo on the main deck at or near pallet positions 4 or 5, in Fire Zone 3, consisting of consignments of mixed cargo including a significant number of lithium type batteries and other combustible materials. The fire escalated rapidly into a catastrophic uncontained fire.
2. The large, uncontained cargo fire, that originated in the main cargo deck caused the cargo compartment liners to fail under combined thermal and mechanical loads. 3. Heat from the fire resulted in the system/component failure or malfunction of the truss assemblies and control cables, directly affecting the control cable tension and elevator function required for the safe operation of the aircraft when in manual control.
4. The uncontained cargo fire directly affected the independent critical systems necessary for crew survivability. Heat from the fire exposed the supplementary oxygen system to extreme thermal loading, sufficient to generate a failure. This resulted in the oxygen supply disruption leading to the abrupt failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply and the incapacitation of the captain.
5. The progressive failure of the cargo compartment liner increased the area available for the smoke and fire penetration into the fuselage crown area.
6. The rate and volume of the continuous toxic smoke, contiguous with the cockpit and supernumerary habitable area, resulted in inadequate visibility in the cockpit, obscuring the view of the primary flight displays, audio control panels and the view outside the cockpit which prevented all normal cockpit functioning.
7. The shutdown of PACK 1 for unknown reasons resulted in loss of conditioned airflow to the upper deck causing the Electronic Equipment Cooling [EEC] system to reconfigure to "closed loop mode". The absence of a positive pressure differential contributed to the hazardous quantities of smoke and fumes entering the cockpit and upper deck, simultaneously obscuring the crew’s view and creating a toxic environment.
8. The fire detection methodology of detecting smoke sampling as an indicator of a fire is inadequate as pallet smoke masking can delay the time it takes for a smoke detection system to detect a fire originating within a cargo container or a pallet with a rain cover.
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he could have held over ANC to get down to landing weight if that was a problem,
Don't know Airbus at all, but I'm sure the A380 will have a fuel dumping facility. In which case these guys had plenty of time en-route to the nearest airport to dump sufficient fuel to reach their MLW. Having said that, better to be on the ground overweight with a bent undercarriage than in a smoking hole.
It makes me wonder how some airlines are still permitted to operate to areas that take safety and the decisions made by the crew to that effect more seriously.
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exsp33db1rd
I had a similar experience in a 777
Departed Singapore for Ams...about 150 nm North of KL got a cargo fire warning,turned around and headed back to
KL ,landed about 40 tonnes over max landing weight..permitted to do that in an emergency..smoothest landing I ever did in a 777
We had a fire warning prior to departure and engineers reracked the card,I was pretty sure it was a false warning but I fired the bottles and was sure as hell not overflying a suitable airport.
Treat every warning as a real one,as far as I am concerned I would rather be on the ground asap.
I had a similar experience in a 777
Departed Singapore for Ams...about 150 nm North of KL got a cargo fire warning,turned around and headed back to
KL ,landed about 40 tonnes over max landing weight..permitted to do that in an emergency..smoothest landing I ever did in a 777
We had a fire warning prior to departure and engineers reracked the card,I was pretty sure it was a false warning but I fired the bottles and was sure as hell not overflying a suitable airport.
Treat every warning as a real one,as far as I am concerned I would rather be on the ground asap.
tdracer,
Is that all pax jets, or all newly certified pax jets? Our NB Airbii only have one bottle, with one shot, for two cargo compartments. I'm told that the probability of detecting smoke in both compartments on one flight is very low.
Is that all pax jets, or all newly certified pax jets? Our NB Airbii only have one bottle, with one shot, for two cargo compartments. I'm told that the probability of detecting smoke in both compartments on one flight is very low.
). But what I recall is that all passenger aircraft manufactured after a specific date had to comply, and the existing fleet would have to be upgraded by a later date. I'm reasonably sure the new-build date passed a few years back, I really don't recall what the retrofit date was. For all practical purposes it only affects the 747, A380, and A340. Note also that even twins don't need to comply if they're not used for ETOPS.If you're really interested, go research the FAA Part 25 "Appendix K" regulations.
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Thread was something like another reason not to fly Asiana... Lot's of talk about fires and lets go to the nearest pad ridiculing the captain's decision. I'm trying to find out exactly why? He has smoke not heat sensors in the cargo compartment. The average hull loss is 16 minutes into noticing there is a problem, with Swissair right in the middle of the graph. He is two hours from Anchorage or Vancouver and three and a half from LAX. There is no doubt if he would have had a fire, blows the bottles and it's still burning, he would have to ditch. I guess he didn't care to fly with a fire light on for 3.5 instead of 2 hours. He is supposed to be protected for 4 hours, meaning there is zero O2 in the cargo hold after he blows the bottles.
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efatnas,
Thread drift apologies but:
Very few sky gods consider continuing actual smoke / fire or warnings.
Even if heading for the nearest suitable (or perhaps unsuitable by normal standards) airfield, based on past cases, continued flight might be not possible or sufficient evidence that this situation could soon exist.
I only know one pilot who would do the necessary drills and be in a position to ditch or force land in a few minutes. Not something that one could really be ready for at FL350. Maybe 500 ft, already configured, while proceeding towards somewhere more comfortable and deciding if continuing is really an option.
Thread drift apologies but:
Very few sky gods consider continuing actual smoke / fire or warnings.
Even if heading for the nearest suitable (or perhaps unsuitable by normal standards) airfield, based on past cases, continued flight might be not possible or sufficient evidence that this situation could soon exist.
I only know one pilot who would do the necessary drills and be in a position to ditch or force land in a few minutes. Not something that one could really be ready for at FL350. Maybe 500 ft, already configured, while proceeding towards somewhere more comfortable and deciding if continuing is really an option.
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Here is a strictly devil's advocate scenario to garner opinions.
After seeing the examples of Swissair, Valuejet, Asiana 747, UPS, and several others where the smoke became obvious within minutes and the aircraft crashed not that many minutes later, what if you are over the ocean(or some other remote area) and get a fire warning, follow the procedure and divert. Then 90 minutes or so later as you approach your technically suitable but very remote airport, there has not been one hint of any unusual smell anywhere in the aircraft. Is there really any chance of a fire?
With your large amount of remaining fuel, you hold for a while at about 10 miles final in order to be ready for an immediate landing in case an unusual smell occures, but there is still no hint of fire except that warning light. Then after discussion with company, you decide that it is a false warning(as most are) and proceed to a more suitable(and operationally convenient) airport a few hours away.
After seeing the examples of Swissair, Valuejet, Asiana 747, UPS, and several others where the smoke became obvious within minutes and the aircraft crashed not that many minutes later, what if you are over the ocean(or some other remote area) and get a fire warning, follow the procedure and divert. Then 90 minutes or so later as you approach your technically suitable but very remote airport, there has not been one hint of any unusual smell anywhere in the aircraft. Is there really any chance of a fire?
With your large amount of remaining fuel, you hold for a while at about 10 miles final in order to be ready for an immediate landing in case an unusual smell occures, but there is still no hint of fire except that warning light. Then after discussion with company, you decide that it is a false warning(as most are) and proceed to a more suitable(and operationally convenient) airport a few hours away.
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Stop overthinking this. In the UPS Dubai crash from cargo fire, the flight controls where no longer effective just 2 minutes after the first fire warning.
2 minutes.
If you have a fire warning that you can not confirm, get the plane on the ground. Don't overthink it. Boeing doesn't want you to overthink it. They go as far as telling you to ditch or make an off-airport crash landing if it is bad enough.
2 minutes.
If you have a fire warning that you can not confirm, get the plane on the ground. Don't overthink it. Boeing doesn't want you to overthink it. They go as far as telling you to ditch or make an off-airport crash landing if it is bad enough.
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UPS Dubai crash happened 27 minutes after the initial warning. He decided for some reason to go back to Dubai instead of getting it on the ground in Doha or better Al Adid. If you on fire its almost always better to look for a military base; they have better fire crews and many times the latest equipment. In my airline, a smoke sensor in the cargo compartment was activated by somebody smoking a cigarette in the bathroom I'm told. It's hard to believe, but never the less word around the camp fire. What I do agree with on this thread is that the Asiana Captain probably did what dispatch told him to do. If based on the UPS scenario, he should have gone to PANC; difference to the UPS Captain, he knew he had a fire and decided to go 220 miles I seem to recall; furthermore his mask wasn't working. Go figure...
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Direct from my QRH
CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.
How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...
CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.
How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...
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Direct from my QRH
CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.
How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...
CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.
How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...
But playing the devils advocate again and looking at the remote oceanic scenario in a widebody jet, you divert to the nearest suitable airport which is a remote island that is perhaps 90 minutes away with the smoke/fire light remaining illuminated after all that time with not a hint of unusual smell and the reality that false warnings do happen and not infrequently on a variety of aircraft types.
Will you land immediately or consider heading further away to a more convenient airport perhaps after another hour of loitering around your nearby remote island with still no hint of anything unusual.
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what if you are over the ocean(or some other remote area) and get a fire warning, follow the procedure and divert. Then 90 minutes or so later as you approach your technically suitable but very remote airport, there has not been one hint of any unusual smell anywhere in the aircraft. Is there really any chance of a fire?
They diverted to Urumqi. Opened up the aft bulk cargo bay and there were scorch marks all over the ceiling. Battery fire started in a passenger's bag.
Also - there are legal ramifications for not taking the first suitable, in the US at least. I know a crew that was overhead airport A at FL250 when they lost an engine in a turboprop. They descended and landed at airport B about 20 miles away. They were violated for not landing at A.
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(a) Thanks for your input and story about the fire warning.
(b) I find the turboprop story difficult to believe. Here is what Boeing says in their FCTM...
"A suitable airport is defined by the operating authority for the operator based on guidance material but, in general, must have adequate facilities and meet certain minimum weather and field conditions. If required to divert to the nearest suitable airport, the guidance material typically specifies that the pilot should select the nearest suitable airport “in point of time” or “in terms of time.” In selecting the nearest suitable airport, the pilot-in-command should consider the suitability of nearby airports in terms of facilities and weather and their proximity to the airplane position. The pilot-in-command may determine, based on the nature of the situation and an examination of the relevant factors, that the safest course of action is to divert to a more distant airport than the nearest airport. For example, there is not necessarily a requirement to spiral down to the airport nearest the airplane's present position if, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it would require equal or less time to continue to another nearby airport.
(b) I find the turboprop story difficult to believe. Here is what Boeing says in their FCTM...
"A suitable airport is defined by the operating authority for the operator based on guidance material but, in general, must have adequate facilities and meet certain minimum weather and field conditions. If required to divert to the nearest suitable airport, the guidance material typically specifies that the pilot should select the nearest suitable airport “in point of time” or “in terms of time.” In selecting the nearest suitable airport, the pilot-in-command should consider the suitability of nearby airports in terms of facilities and weather and their proximity to the airplane position. The pilot-in-command may determine, based on the nature of the situation and an examination of the relevant factors, that the safest course of action is to divert to a more distant airport than the nearest airport. For example, there is not necessarily a requirement to spiral down to the airport nearest the airplane's present position if, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it would require equal or less time to continue to another nearby airport.
Trash du Blanc
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That's great, but it wasn't a Boeing, it was an Embraer Brasilia.
And it didn't help that airport B was the company's maintenance base......
The bottom line: there better be a safety-related reason to return to LAX over PANC.
And it didn't help that airport B was the company's maintenance base......
The bottom line: there better be a safety-related reason to return to LAX over PANC.
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I know a crew that was overhead airport A at FL250 when they lost an engine in a turboprop. They descended and landed at airport B about 20 miles away. They were violated for not landing at A.
Ah, the dreaded auto-rotation vertical deathly dive/spin in a fixed wing a/c, rather than a relaxed glide with time to plan and set up for a familiar airfield within glide range. An interesting debate in front of the aviation-wise judge.
Ah, the dreaded auto-rotation vertical deathly dive/spin in a fixed wing a/c, rather than a relaxed glide with time to plan and set up for a familiar airfield within glide range. An interesting debate in front of the aviation-wise judge.
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Once again, I have difficulty believing that someone going 25 miles to an airport from FL250 is not going to a nearest suitable airport in time. I suspect that there is more to the story. But, you never know what a regulating authority might do. They tried to ground Bob Hoover many years back.