F-16 and Cessna Midair in South Carolina, USA
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Under Class C
Posts: 106
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dunno why anyone considers it necessary to start a wiki...
So very sad when that pleasure is being derived from the tragic death of two people.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Hadlow
Age: 60
Posts: 597
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry, but you guys are missing the point, which is that if an error is made known, it is correctable. IMHO, none of those involved should be named, as they are not individually notable enough to sustain a Wikipedia article (AFAIK). I will be raising this point over at Wikipedia with the intention of getting them removed.
I created the article, not to glory in the death of those involved, but to form a record of the accident for future generations. It goes without saying that I wish there was no article to write, but since there is, at least it should be as accurate as possible.
It is a possibility that there will be a major change in the way the American military operate, as there was in the UK following the 1974 mid-air over Norfolk. Time will tell.
I created the article, not to glory in the death of those involved, but to form a record of the accident for future generations. It goes without saying that I wish there was no article to write, but since there is, at least it should be as accurate as possible.
It is a possibility that there will be a major change in the way the American military operate, as there was in the UK following the 1974 mid-air over Norfolk. Time will tell.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Not far from a big Lake
Age: 81
Posts: 1,454
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is a possibility that there will be a major change in the way the American military operate, as there was in the UK following the 1974 mid-air over Norfolk.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hughes_Airwest_Flight_706
That is why the F-16 was almost certainly operating inside the ATC system when the accident occurred.
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Seattle
Posts: 3,196
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A "record of the accident for future generations" will be available at the NTSB and the USAF Safety Center. They will be created when the relevant facts are discovered and analyzed.
IMO, wikipedia is NOT the proper repository of such records, because of the high probability of errors in the reporting.
IMO, wikipedia is NOT the proper repository of such records, because of the high probability of errors in the reporting.
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Santa Rosa, CA, USA
Age: 71
Posts: 169
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The high probability of errors in the reporting
I may not live long enough to read the official reports on this accident, so I appreciate all of you who have contributed info from news reports, local knowledge, similar incidents, and Wikipedia, despite the high probability of errors in the reporting. I factor that in. As has been pointed out, Wikipedia has the advantage that errors can be easily corrected. That doesn't happen with news reports or PPruNe posts. And an interesting thing, those official reports sometimes seem a bit politically skewed. For example, the hair-raising F-16 vs Cessna 172 N73829 near Tampa that OK465 cited. Read it and see if you agree that the poor Cessna pilot was in any way responsible, or even ATC. And I'm a USAF veteran. Ignoring the high probability of errors, Kathryn's Report has a good article on this incident and mentions that “Both aircraft had operable transponders". Please continue to contribute any info on this accident you find, that's why I read PPRuNe.
Last edited by PrivtPilotRadarTech; 11th Jul 2015 at 08:11. Reason: The yellow plane is not the C-152.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Denver, CO
Posts: 265
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Intruder
IMO, wikipedia is NOT the proper repository of such records, because of the high probability of errors in the reporting.
IMO, wikipedia is NOT the proper repository of such records, because of the high probability of errors in the reporting.
If you have grief with the accuracy, log in and fix it.
Frankly, if that's your only contribution to this thread, go to bed.
----
Sorry, but you guys are missing the point, which is that if an error is made known, it is correctable.
Last edited by rottenray; 11th Jul 2015 at 05:27. Reason: added quote
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Carmel,NY
Age: 82
Posts: 35
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Let's get back to the issue
Was the F16 in contact with approach? Was the traffic called? Was the Cessna in contact with approach. We all know see and avoid can be difficult, esp. with fast airplanes. Some problems are unavoidable and the fickle finger of fate intervenes.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Mercer Island WA
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This Collision may be as important as the PSA Midair
This recent F-16 and C150 collision could turn out to be as important as the PSA B727 midair, or the Allegheny DC9 Cherokee collision at KIND, ...to finally lead to long needed evolution of our obsolete airspace system, and improvement of our separation processes. The collision again points out the significant risk still inherent in our present antiquated Air Traffic Separation processes, still depending on a mixture of "see and be seen" and hand carrying 1:1 radar vectors, or even procedural separation, which is now becoming increasingly impractical with small UAVs operating in global airspace and the continued mix of VFR VMC traffic with IFR VMC traffic. Instead, now with the ability to electronically exchange trajectories (e.g., RNP based via data links) at very low cost and high reliability, it may be time to start to move to electronic flight rules (EFR) and phase out VFR, VMC, IFR, and IMC as such, so as to be able to safely assure economic airspace access for any users, but with vastly improved separation assurance. Bottom line is that not only may starting a Wikipedia entry for this tragic event now be appropriate, but with the FAA hearings pending this fall considering the split up of FAA, and the formulation of a long needed separate ANSP that is more accountable to the airspace users, this could become a watershed historic event regardless of the ultimate assignment of responsibility or contributing factors.
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Seattle
Posts: 3,196
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The "evolution of our obsolete airspace system" to a semblance of "electronic flight rules" is already underway, with the upcoming mandate of ADSB-out. However, due to cost, standards, and performance issues, there is still a LOT of pushback in General Aviation.
The FAA itself is as much to blame, with the continuing failure of their contractors to perform on the contracts to update the ATC software so it is capable of handling the ADSB load. The US is FAR behind much of the world in implementing ADS-C and CPDLC over the contiguous 48 states. It's been working in Alaska for years, and even Canada has it working over most of the country now. The new radar system for the enroute centers went on line a month or 2 ago, so I guess there's finally SOME real progress...
The FAA itself is as much to blame, with the continuing failure of their contractors to perform on the contracts to update the ATC software so it is capable of handling the ADSB load. The US is FAR behind much of the world in implementing ADS-C and CPDLC over the contiguous 48 states. It's been working in Alaska for years, and even Canada has it working over most of the country now. The new radar system for the enroute centers went on line a month or 2 ago, so I guess there's finally SOME real progress...
Ahh, the old privatization of ATC argument again... 
Yeah, I know that certain airlines, political lobbies and unions favor the idea. They have their reasons.
But there is no good reason to believe this accident would have been any less likely to occur under a private corporation run ATC system than a government run one. In fact, it's the regulations that determine regulatory airspace structure and operating rules. Which entity provides ATC services does not appear to be relevant to this instance. The previous airline vs GA accidents were addressed by airspace and equipments rule changes and appear to have prevented recurrences. Getting speared by military aircraft is a separate issue requiring military regulation changes.
This collision appears to have happened outside of airspace requiring contact with ATC and outside the airspace requiring mode C altitude reporting. It would have been somewhat less likely to have happened with an airliner or bizjet due to the requirement that most such aircraft be equipped with TCAS. US fighter jets and most light aircraft are not required to be so equipped. However most certificated Cessnas of that vintage are equipped with Mode C altitude reporting even though it is not necessarily required if they remain outside airspace requiring it. The area where the collision occurred appears to be one of those areas.
If the Cessna was squawking mode C, the crew of a TCAS equipped aircraft would have received an RA. Without TCAS, an F-16 would rely upon ATC separation, the Mark I eyeball and whichever model of target tracking RADAR they are equipped with. (If switched ON) Older models of F-16 not upgraded with newer RADAR units would have a more difficult time spotting targets below them in the clutter than those equipped with the upgraded units.
My point is that there are holes in the rules that leave the mid-air collision threat wide open in certain situations. To a very high degree, "big sky" theory and the Mark I eyeball remain the last line of defense in those situations. And in some airspace and equipage scenarios, that's all there is folks. In these instances, only extreme vigilance, practiced scanning and some good fortune act to protect one from the collision threat. Venture outside positive control airspace and the rules allow non-participating aircraft that ATC is not required by rule to separate you from. See and avoid is the law of the land and the primary protection in these instances. Until such time as ALL airspace is declared positive control, it will remain so.
The better news is that the ADS-B mandate will close some of the holes. The not so good news is that the emerging UAS industry pressure applied to congress may have the effect of exempting allot of UAVs from those same rules!
Stay sharp.
westhawk
Yeah, I know that certain airlines, political lobbies and unions favor the idea. They have their reasons.But there is no good reason to believe this accident would have been any less likely to occur under a private corporation run ATC system than a government run one. In fact, it's the regulations that determine regulatory airspace structure and operating rules. Which entity provides ATC services does not appear to be relevant to this instance. The previous airline vs GA accidents were addressed by airspace and equipments rule changes and appear to have prevented recurrences. Getting speared by military aircraft is a separate issue requiring military regulation changes.
This collision appears to have happened outside of airspace requiring contact with ATC and outside the airspace requiring mode C altitude reporting. It would have been somewhat less likely to have happened with an airliner or bizjet due to the requirement that most such aircraft be equipped with TCAS. US fighter jets and most light aircraft are not required to be so equipped. However most certificated Cessnas of that vintage are equipped with Mode C altitude reporting even though it is not necessarily required if they remain outside airspace requiring it. The area where the collision occurred appears to be one of those areas.
If the Cessna was squawking mode C, the crew of a TCAS equipped aircraft would have received an RA. Without TCAS, an F-16 would rely upon ATC separation, the Mark I eyeball and whichever model of target tracking RADAR they are equipped with. (If switched ON) Older models of F-16 not upgraded with newer RADAR units would have a more difficult time spotting targets below them in the clutter than those equipped with the upgraded units.
My point is that there are holes in the rules that leave the mid-air collision threat wide open in certain situations. To a very high degree, "big sky" theory and the Mark I eyeball remain the last line of defense in those situations. And in some airspace and equipage scenarios, that's all there is folks. In these instances, only extreme vigilance, practiced scanning and some good fortune act to protect one from the collision threat. Venture outside positive control airspace and the rules allow non-participating aircraft that ATC is not required by rule to separate you from. See and avoid is the law of the land and the primary protection in these instances. Until such time as ALL airspace is declared positive control, it will remain so.
The better news is that the ADS-B mandate will close some of the holes. The not so good news is that the emerging UAS industry pressure applied to congress may have the effect of exempting allot of UAVs from those same rules!
Stay sharp.
westhawk
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Mercer Island WA
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Obsolete ATS system/rules likely the prime factor if not cause
While it is true that conceptually there is no theoretical difference between the ability of a governmental run ATS system, a Quasi-Governmental run ATS system, or a privatized ATS system to provide safe efficient and economical separation service to all air vehicles, ...the fact of the matter is that the second order effects and biases of the present seriously deficient FAA led system have been disastrous, in both failing to accommodate user ATS needs at an affordable cost, discouraging safety improvements, while blocking capability increases and cost reductions in ATS service provision, that are all now possible with modern technology. We now have the means to reduce user and ANSP costs by likely an order of magnitude. But with ATS buried in FAA, with no substantial airspace user input and oversight, NextGen is spinning out of control (e.g., completely inappropriate criteria and a 2020 deadline, that will not work now, or ever) and hence is heading toward a $40B failure. Hopefully the recent F-16 vs. C150 event, as tragic as it was, will now at least serve as a catalyst, to spur the needed dialogue for ATS massive change in the US and globally, just as the Grand Canyon event did back in '56, or Allegheny 853 on Sept 9 1969. Long live the memory of AL853's Capt. Jim Elrod, who in his and his crew and passenger's death, essentially found himself in the exact same place as that F-16 pilot, but with no ejection seat. Let's learn from this recent F-16/C150 event, and have the courage to move forward with the massive re-design of a failing and poorly formulated Nextgen. We can do much better, at far lower cost, with much higher safety, for both our F-16s and our C150s, let alone our RJs, B777s and A350s.
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: USA
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Was the F16 in contact with approach? Was the traffic called? Was the Cessna in contact with approach. We all know see and avoid can be difficult, esp. with fast airplanes. Some problems are unavoidable and the fickle finger of fate intervenes."
The F16 was shooting approaches into Charleston on a IFR plan, so he was "heads down" and talking to ATC. The 150 was departing a satellite airport just outside of the Class C shelf and was legally not talking to anyone, nor was he required to. The 150 was probably in a left hand climbing turn.
My guess is that it happened too quickly for ATC to see the C150 pop up on radar.
The F16 was shooting approaches into Charleston on a IFR plan, so he was "heads down" and talking to ATC. The 150 was departing a satellite airport just outside of the Class C shelf and was legally not talking to anyone, nor was he required to. The 150 was probably in a left hand climbing turn.
My guess is that it happened too quickly for ATC to see the C150 pop up on radar.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Mercer Island WA
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Too quickly for ATC to see the pop-up on radar?
That is exactly the point!!! Trying to have a human air traffic separation specialist still hand carry "radar vector" airplanes 1:1, with duplex voice, based on outdated or missing data that can never be real time at any feasible fully allocated cost, with a backup of "see and be seen" with a high speed jet flying into into a hazy day sunset, trying to see a C150, or LSA, or glider, or now 3 ft wingspan UAV,... is just nuts!
Current US ATS is pure and simple obsolete for any modern requirements and safety expectations from LSAs, to parachutists, to gliders, to A380s and F22s. The cost per unit separation service is at least one order of magnitude if not more orders of magnitude higher than modern technology with RNP, data links, and automated conflict probe and resolution now readily permits (IF WE HAVE THE PROPER CRITERIA and benefits allocation PUT IN PLACE).
Further, the airport runway capacity per unit time, per acre, per dollar is abysmally low, even at our busiest facilities like KORD and KATL, especially in convective WX. We can do much better, safer, and at lower cost, with many of the CNS tools already at hand (like 3D and 4D RNP, data links, RTA, and automated trajectory separation with conflict probe and resolution), if they're just combined and used the proper way (but NOT as in NextGen).
Now with the advent of UAVs, it is critical that ATS be rethought from first principles, ...just as the phone companies re-designed the phone system in the '50s, and as cellular technology displaced land lines.
Not only is the obsolete ATS configuration that facilitated this sad F-16/C150 event obsolete, but even NextGen's present exceedingly poor design is nothing but a warmed over 1950's version of ADS-B fueled "Pseudo radar", still essentially using hand carried radar vectors. It will be nothing but the modern day equivalent of having a carbon-boron composite nuclear/solar powered automated buggy whip.
Current US ATS is pure and simple obsolete for any modern requirements and safety expectations from LSAs, to parachutists, to gliders, to A380s and F22s. The cost per unit separation service is at least one order of magnitude if not more orders of magnitude higher than modern technology with RNP, data links, and automated conflict probe and resolution now readily permits (IF WE HAVE THE PROPER CRITERIA and benefits allocation PUT IN PLACE).
Further, the airport runway capacity per unit time, per acre, per dollar is abysmally low, even at our busiest facilities like KORD and KATL, especially in convective WX. We can do much better, safer, and at lower cost, with many of the CNS tools already at hand (like 3D and 4D RNP, data links, RTA, and automated trajectory separation with conflict probe and resolution), if they're just combined and used the proper way (but NOT as in NextGen).
Now with the advent of UAVs, it is critical that ATS be rethought from first principles, ...just as the phone companies re-designed the phone system in the '50s, and as cellular technology displaced land lines.
Not only is the obsolete ATS configuration that facilitated this sad F-16/C150 event obsolete, but even NextGen's present exceedingly poor design is nothing but a warmed over 1950's version of ADS-B fueled "Pseudo radar", still essentially using hand carried radar vectors. It will be nothing but the modern day equivalent of having a carbon-boron composite nuclear/solar powered automated buggy whip.
Couple of comments about 'head down' instrument work in single-seaters while VMC and also comments about infallible airspace....
This single fighter 'instrument approach practice' scenario struck me as somewhat unusual in that in cases of truly flying instrument practice in the single-seaters, we normally provided for a safety chase. If the type had a two-seater, this was the preferred instrument trainer in the fighters I'm familiar with, the safety pilot being in the front seat. However, even in the single-seater, you do not necessarily have to be 'head down' as such to fly instruments.
With respect to the P/D radar, even the early F-16A radar did not have a problem with ground clutter and was always utilized to provide traffic situation awareness when 'cruising' about if serviceable. There are certain isolated situations where a return may temporarily not be displayed however.
The mil has spent a lot of money on Auto-GCAS to prevent CFIT, but evidently don't feel the same urgency with respect to TCAS.
ADS-B 'out' will be an improvement, but still provides overall situation awareness to the controllers only. In a perfect world everyone would also have ADS-B 'in'. Don't hold your breath.
And I personally think 'VFR non-participation' should always be available to GA, it's the American way, but you takes your chances....and potentially someone else's.
This single fighter 'instrument approach practice' scenario struck me as somewhat unusual in that in cases of truly flying instrument practice in the single-seaters, we normally provided for a safety chase. If the type had a two-seater, this was the preferred instrument trainer in the fighters I'm familiar with, the safety pilot being in the front seat. However, even in the single-seater, you do not necessarily have to be 'head down' as such to fly instruments.
With respect to the P/D radar, even the early F-16A radar did not have a problem with ground clutter and was always utilized to provide traffic situation awareness when 'cruising' about if serviceable. There are certain isolated situations where a return may temporarily not be displayed however.
The mil has spent a lot of money on Auto-GCAS to prevent CFIT, but evidently don't feel the same urgency with respect to TCAS.
ADS-B 'out' will be an improvement, but still provides overall situation awareness to the controllers only. In a perfect world everyone would also have ADS-B 'in'. Don't hold your breath.
And I personally think 'VFR non-participation' should always be available to GA, it's the American way, but you takes your chances....and potentially someone else's.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Mercer Island WA
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A better cheaper solution assuring airspace access is possible
Yes the F-16 radar could theoretically have spotted the C150 if the pilot had the time to share the complexity of single-seat jet high speed flying duties with added radar operation too, as well as at the same time still assuring "see and be seen", to the extent possible, ... all when he thought ATS was comprehensively providing separation service.
But the long term backup separation CAS solution is ADS-B related automated and nearly instantaneous 3D or 4D RNP based trajectory exchange among vehicles, WITHOUT ANY NEED for any ATS intervention (and NOT the severely flawed poorly designed FAA 91.227 version of ADS-B, which is still both fatally flawed as well as overdesigned, in many respects). Also noteworthy, is the fact that TCAS as presently designed, while it is an excellent tool as a start, particularly for expensive high speed aircraft, is presently far too expensive, too heavy, and is even too limited in capability, and spectrum inefficient, for either the needs of F16s, LSAs, UAVs, or even B777s, and A350s for the long term.
So the type of ADS-B needed for that C150, and everybody else in low end GA too, was a small, light, low cost unit (maybe even portable) of under $500, and NOT needing FAA's absurd overspecified, excessively costly, inappropriate 91.227 driven NIC and NAC, that can be placed on every vehicle in mixed airspace. That way any vehicle from LSAs to parachutists, to UAVs,... could have been visible to higher speed traffic. With a simple device like that on every manned air vehicle, it would have allowed for simple display of cooperative traffic and trajectory assessment on the F16, WITHOUT ANY need for ADS-R (hence the needed move to EFR, and no longer dependence on either VFR or IFR). Fire control radars typically have a difficult time spotting and reliably tracking some very small low speed GA aircraft and distinguishing them from birds, let alone seeing very tiny UAVs. So only then, with a better low cost ADS-B solution, and cooperative automated conflict probe and resolution by ATS (based on RNP trajectories or RNP volumes for certain kinds of airspace operations) and data links for their exchange, with use in most mixed airspace, will there be any reasonable probability that we can economically keep F-16s from running down C150s or gliders, or B777s or A350s from fatally ingesting errant "link lost" tiny wingspan UAVs into their GE90-115Bs or Trent 7000s, such as while flying into a sunset landing on 25L at KLAX, or popping out of a puffy cumulus or cloud deck, as fatally happened to AL853 descending into KIND in September of 1969.
But the long term backup separation CAS solution is ADS-B related automated and nearly instantaneous 3D or 4D RNP based trajectory exchange among vehicles, WITHOUT ANY NEED for any ATS intervention (and NOT the severely flawed poorly designed FAA 91.227 version of ADS-B, which is still both fatally flawed as well as overdesigned, in many respects). Also noteworthy, is the fact that TCAS as presently designed, while it is an excellent tool as a start, particularly for expensive high speed aircraft, is presently far too expensive, too heavy, and is even too limited in capability, and spectrum inefficient, for either the needs of F16s, LSAs, UAVs, or even B777s, and A350s for the long term.
So the type of ADS-B needed for that C150, and everybody else in low end GA too, was a small, light, low cost unit (maybe even portable) of under $500, and NOT needing FAA's absurd overspecified, excessively costly, inappropriate 91.227 driven NIC and NAC, that can be placed on every vehicle in mixed airspace. That way any vehicle from LSAs to parachutists, to UAVs,... could have been visible to higher speed traffic. With a simple device like that on every manned air vehicle, it would have allowed for simple display of cooperative traffic and trajectory assessment on the F16, WITHOUT ANY need for ADS-R (hence the needed move to EFR, and no longer dependence on either VFR or IFR). Fire control radars typically have a difficult time spotting and reliably tracking some very small low speed GA aircraft and distinguishing them from birds, let alone seeing very tiny UAVs. So only then, with a better low cost ADS-B solution, and cooperative automated conflict probe and resolution by ATS (based on RNP trajectories or RNP volumes for certain kinds of airspace operations) and data links for their exchange, with use in most mixed airspace, will there be any reasonable probability that we can economically keep F-16s from running down C150s or gliders, or B777s or A350s from fatally ingesting errant "link lost" tiny wingspan UAVs into their GE90-115Bs or Trent 7000s, such as while flying into a sunset landing on 25L at KLAX, or popping out of a puffy cumulus or cloud deck, as fatally happened to AL853 descending into KIND in September of 1969.
Yes the F-16 radar could theoretically have spotted the C150 if the pilot had the time to share the complexity of single-seat jet high speed flying duties with added radar operation too, as well as at the same time still assuring "see and be seen",
This was not:
all when he thought ATS was comprehensively providing separation service
So the type of ADS-B needed for that C150, and everybody else in low end GA too, was a small, light, low cost unit (maybe even portable) of under $500
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 74
Posts: 3,692
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From what I read here it looks like both aircraft were where they were supposed to be and in contact with their respective ATS units . ( the F16 with APP and the C150 with the Departure TWR)
To get a collision one of the 2 apparently was where it was not supposed to be, or does the airspace around those 2 airports is in pure class G ?
Can someone in the know clarify, or put a map of the area up ?
As to ADS-B, it is not the solution to everything. I have it on my ( small GA) aircraft, to use it as an anti collision tool you need to put the detection range between 4 and 8 NM , it does not work well with F16s coming at you at 250 Kts when you are doing yourself 70 Kts on the climb. Plus it only warns you of the aircraft having a transponder, and set on ALT.
So in VFR country , using eye balls is still the most effective effective way to avoid each other.
To get a collision one of the 2 apparently was where it was not supposed to be, or does the airspace around those 2 airports is in pure class G ?
Can someone in the know clarify, or put a map of the area up ?
As to ADS-B, it is not the solution to everything. I have it on my ( small GA) aircraft, to use it as an anti collision tool you need to put the detection range between 4 and 8 NM , it does not work well with F16s coming at you at 250 Kts when you are doing yourself 70 Kts on the climb. Plus it only warns you of the aircraft having a transponder, and set on ALT.
So in VFR country , using eye balls is still the most effective effective way to avoid each other.
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 14th Jul 2015 at 06:26. Reason: adding ADS-B para
The Cessna had taken off from Berkeley County (MKS) and the F16 was planning an approach to Charleston (CHS). The crash site is about 3 nm southeast of MKS (west of the NS river), well outside of the CHS Class C.
