AAIB special bulletin ~ Loganair
AP Should Disconnect When Trim Is Activated
1. I continue to be puzzled as to why they were still in autopilot at that time. Nothing concentrates the mind on keeping situation awareness than manual flying. That's what they should have been doing, not playing "video games" by driving around pushing buttons.
2. Even more puzzling is why the AP doesn't disconnect when the trim switches/buttons are activated. If you need to manually trim the AP isn't doing its job properly and should be dumped. At the end of the report, I fully expected a recommendation that the AP be automatically disconnected when trim was activated or control forces above a certain level were experienced but was disappointed.
3. The first thing they should have done when the plane did not fly right was to push the autopilot disconnect switch(es).
2. Even more puzzling is why the AP doesn't disconnect when the trim switches/buttons are activated. If you need to manually trim the AP isn't doing its job properly and should be dumped. At the end of the report, I fully expected a recommendation that the AP be automatically disconnected when trim was activated or control forces above a certain level were experienced but was disappointed.
3. The first thing they should have done when the plane did not fly right was to push the autopilot disconnect switch(es).
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Western Pacific
Posts: 721
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I do have to wonder why the system was designed to allow pitch trim with the AP engaged.
None but a blockhead
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: London, UK
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Daily Record has a pretty breathless 'hero pilot wrestles with the controls' report now, which is basically a rehash of the AAIB narrative.
The AAIB report doesn't say that the cavalry charge annunciator sounded - was that info from other sources? Also, I've always thought that a lightning strike on an aircraft isn't that serious a technical event. Was there another reason for the mayday? (You don't need a very active imagination to see that getting hit at night, at 2000' over the North Sea just as you've broken off an approach, in a small aircraft and a big winter storm, may dispose one to expedite being somewhere else.)
I've done a fair bit of paxing into Scottish islands and know how exhilarating the weather can be - doesn't Saxa Vord still hold the wind speed record, achieved just before the anemometer blew away? I would not have liked to have been up front that night, that's for sure.
The AAIB report doesn't say that the cavalry charge annunciator sounded - was that info from other sources? Also, I've always thought that a lightning strike on an aircraft isn't that serious a technical event. Was there another reason for the mayday? (You don't need a very active imagination to see that getting hit at night, at 2000' over the North Sea just as you've broken off an approach, in a small aircraft and a big winter storm, may dispose one to expedite being somewhere else.)
I've done a fair bit of paxing into Scottish islands and know how exhilarating the weather can be - doesn't Saxa Vord still hold the wind speed record, achieved just before the anemometer blew away? I would not have liked to have been up front that night, that's for sure.
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Cambridge, England, EU
Posts: 3,443
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
One of the most frequent recording heard was " what's it doing now?".
...
...
... hmm, yes, tricky, init - perhaps your choice of:
(1) cut all the automatics, so that the pilots are just flying an aeroplane and there is no longer any scope for confusion
(2) disable all manual controls and fly the aircraft completely automatically, because the pilots have obviously lost the plot and can't be trusted to mess with it (maybe enable the controls again once the pilots have explained to the computer's satisfaction that they really are back in the loop).
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There has been much chat & comment during various different threads on here that all lead to the same conclusion: why did the crew not disconnect the automatics, stabilise the a/c and then determine the true status of the a/c? The thought is often that they were scared to do so, or were uncertain how to control the a/c manually. It could also be they did not detect an automatics malfunction in the first place. (see the thread about Unreliable airspeed) Thinking back to my years of recurrent training sessions, where there is a 3 year cycle so all systems are covered, there was very little manual flying of a broken a/c. (I do not consider a few moments of unusual attitude upset recovery to be manual flight training). I do not remember any LOFT or Reccurency training sessions which involved automatic runaways or subtle misbehaviours. Yet this is what we see in the real world as leading to many major incidents & accidents. We train and experience many failures that are quite rare and not too difficult to handle, but the really dangerous and difficult to handle scenarios are not included.
Food for thought? When writing recurrency exercises I often included scenarios of recent accidents that had been reported. The crews knew of their background and some of the why's and wherefore's. They learnt a lot from the experiences. That was back in there day when the chief pilot & chief instructor had more flexibility. Those scenarios ticked some of the mandatory systems boxes for recurrent training, but there was more meat on the bones. That's what I find missing these days; no meat on the bones.
Food for thought? When writing recurrency exercises I often included scenarios of recent accidents that had been reported. The crews knew of their background and some of the why's and wherefore's. They learnt a lot from the experiences. That was back in there day when the chief pilot & chief instructor had more flexibility. Those scenarios ticked some of the mandatory systems boxes for recurrent training, but there was more meat on the bones. That's what I find missing these days; no meat on the bones.
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: France
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aircraft Accident Report AAR 2/2016 published today.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...016_G-LGNO.pdf
"Five Safety Recommendations are made relating to the design of the autopilot system and the certification requirements for autopilot systems."
https://assets.publishing.service.go...016_G-LGNO.pdf
"Five Safety Recommendations are made relating to the design of the autopilot system and the certification requirements for autopilot systems."
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: United States
Posts: 1,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not a great advert for CRM or training within Loganair. ......Although is it the same everywhere ? Emirates looks like botched GA multiple EZY flaps selected instead of gear or vis versa . Asiana can't fly visual approach Turkish 3 pilots can't monitor speed .
Air Asia land at Melbourne instead of KL.
Are we now seeing the " children of the magenta line" coming home to roost ? What will it be like in another few years when the last of the old school are gone ?
Air Asia land at Melbourne instead of KL.
Are we now seeing the " children of the magenta line" coming home to roost ? What will it be like in another few years when the last of the old school are gone ?
Join Date: Jun 2015
Location: Soon to be out of the EU.
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Oh dear god. If I have a dollar for every time "children of the magenta line" mentioned here I would be minted.
The problem is two fold. You now have airlines who 'encourage' pilots to hand fly but also encourage the highest appropriate level of automation during an approach. If you stuff up the airline is not going to congratulate you for fine tuning your hand flying skills. It is going to come after you. Some even get twitchy about a visual side step and will put in the ILS and fly said ILS if offered the side step.
You've also got the social media generation. For them the job is just an excuse to stick themselves on Twitter or Instagram. Take one of our yung'uns: literally every time you see him he's taking a selfie. People are doing the job for the social status and bragging rights and have no interest or passion for the job. These go on to be young captains and can be prima donnas and think they're gods gift where in fact they're more donner kebab when it comes to their command skills.
Unfortunately there's very little than you can do about those with poor CRM skills. As long as they pass their sims they will continue.
The problem is two fold. You now have airlines who 'encourage' pilots to hand fly but also encourage the highest appropriate level of automation during an approach. If you stuff up the airline is not going to congratulate you for fine tuning your hand flying skills. It is going to come after you. Some even get twitchy about a visual side step and will put in the ILS and fly said ILS if offered the side step.
You've also got the social media generation. For them the job is just an excuse to stick themselves on Twitter or Instagram. Take one of our yung'uns: literally every time you see him he's taking a selfie. People are doing the job for the social status and bragging rights and have no interest or passion for the job. These go on to be young captains and can be prima donnas and think they're gods gift where in fact they're more donner kebab when it comes to their command skills.
Unfortunately there's very little than you can do about those with poor CRM skills. As long as they pass their sims they will continue.
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: United States
Posts: 1,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not sure what your argument is there Hearty , are you saying that the concept of "children of the magenta line" is not relevant to the above noted incidents ?
You may have a better definition of the phenomenon but it seems to me the clearest and easiest way to describe automation dependency .
have another dollar !
You may have a better definition of the phenomenon but it seems to me the clearest and easiest way to describe automation dependency .
have another dollar !
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Hotel Sheets, Downtown Plunketville
Age: 76
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Extract from AAIB report below:
"After reaching 4,000 ft amsl, the aircraft pitched
nose-down to a minimum of 19° and the applicable maximum operating speed (VMO) was
exceeded by 80 KIAS with a peak descent rate of 9,500 ft/min."
The bit about minimum 19 degree nose down is somewhat puzzling. I would have thought it is max that matters.
We all do of course express concerns about failure to disengage the A/P. Here are some clues.
Low time on type, yes, but what type(s) before.
Trigger lightning. This is a particularly nasty phenomenon, ask any North Sea chopper pilot. A trigger lightning strike forced down a chopper to ditch in the North Sea in January
1995 and was a causal factor in another fatal accident that occurred in July 2002. It has been suggested that it is the aircraft that triggers it off. There is no prior warning of it n`or of its presence. More info on this at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trigg...r-kevin-forbes
I can well imagine the effect this sort of event may have had on the crew.
"After reaching 4,000 ft amsl, the aircraft pitched
nose-down to a minimum of 19° and the applicable maximum operating speed (VMO) was
exceeded by 80 KIAS with a peak descent rate of 9,500 ft/min."
The bit about minimum 19 degree nose down is somewhat puzzling. I would have thought it is max that matters.
We all do of course express concerns about failure to disengage the A/P. Here are some clues.
Low time on type, yes, but what type(s) before.
Trigger lightning. This is a particularly nasty phenomenon, ask any North Sea chopper pilot. A trigger lightning strike forced down a chopper to ditch in the North Sea in January
1995 and was a causal factor in another fatal accident that occurred in July 2002. It has been suggested that it is the aircraft that triggers it off. There is no prior warning of it n`or of its presence. More info on this at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trigg...r-kevin-forbes
I can well imagine the effect this sort of event may have had on the crew.
Nose down is expressed as a negative number, so for example the minimum of -19 and -18 is -19.
Anyway, helicopter pilot here, highly automated type. It is easy to ridicule the pilots for not noticing that the AP was still engaged but that is the sort of mistake that should cause you a bit of confusion, not the sort of mistake that should nearly result in the aircraft spearing into the ocean at 9500'/min rate of descent well over max speed having held the control column right back for the duration. In other words, whilst the pilots have some culpability, most of the culpability rests with the system designers and certifiers. Which I think is what the AAIB are trying to say.
Join Date: May 2010
Location: UK
Age: 79
Posts: 1,086
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The main point in the report is that when the pilot is clearly trying to fly manually by moving the control column or the trim switches the autopilot should get out of the way and let the pilot fly the aircraft. The Saab 2000 is the only aircraft which does not do this and pilots are conditioned by their experience on any other aircraft to expect this to happen.
This is a basic design flaw which creates a nasty trap for the unwary. When the going gets tough we all rely on our experience which in this case is dangerous.
This is a basic design flaw which creates a nasty trap for the unwary. When the going gets tough we all rely on our experience which in this case is dangerous.
The report also mentioned that there are two commonly used a/p response to manual input - control column *or* trim switch - and that is for the a/p to disconnect. This type doesn't do that.
The captain said he was trying to trim as well as pitch up. In all the other types he flown, including the Captain's recent previous, the a/p would have disconnected with those same inputs. Doesn't matter which input - column or trim - because the pilot was doing both.
The captain said he was trying to trim as well as pitch up. In all the other types he flown, including the Captain's recent previous, the a/p would have disconnected with those same inputs. Doesn't matter which input - column or trim - because the pilot was doing both.
