Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Capn Bloggs
I think this is such an incredibly pertinent point. If loss of control caused this incident I hope the industry leaders respond to what is obviously becoming a critical issue in aviation safety. In such a technologically advanced human-machine-environment interface these failures should not be considered acceptable. Airbus and Boeing could join together and demand high minimum standards to operate their equipment, and perhaps review and admit interface flaws. Some soul searching is needed.
Oh come on. Say that to the thousands of relatives of those killed recently. AF447 and virtually every other recent prang has been caused by Loss of Control. If you're quite happy for this to continue, good for you. I suspect that most of the travelling public wouldn't be but they accept it because of total ignorance. Chuck a extra couple of dollars onto every ticket to pay for more Sim training. Nobody could care less about the increased cost. Will air travel be decimated? Of course not.
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"Is may be reasonable at this point to assert that the aircraft entered the sea intact based on the following logic: the tail structure that was recovered, had it fallen from altitude, would have oriented itself with the relatively heavy vertical stabilizer on the bottom and the draggy fuselage wreckage on top. The vertical fin would have hit the water first and show damage at the top of the fin. It does not."
It would have just tumbled randomly
It would have just tumbled randomly
Last edited by Msunduzi; 11th Jan 2015 at 07:28. Reason: missed out quote
quite a wrinkle is this...
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https://irishweatheronline.wordpress...ical-analysis/I have updated my analysis of the conditions durinig the last moments.
I think a real possibility is icing at FL320, climb to higher followed by engine(s) shutting down from ice crystal-ingestion and subsequent loss of control. Pure educated speculation, of course.
I think a real possibility is icing at FL320, climb to higher followed by engine(s) shutting down from ice crystal-ingestion and subsequent loss of control. Pure educated speculation, of course.
Re condition of airframe on impact. AF447 fin sheared on impact and floated free. Here, if there is substantial fuselage structure attached, this implies to me a more energetic event. Also, the location of the engines relative to each other will be a good indication of that part of the airframe at impact as the engines will not be subject to much drift during fall through the water. Just need to find them....
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Originally Posted by Msunduzi
It would have just tumbled randomly
Yes agree...
Please stop pretending some of you have any idea about fluid
mechanics or flight crash dynamics...
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That last picture is a door from a bar trolley. Assuming they were stowed in the galley (presumably rear galley) due to turbulence, the picture suggests a big impact from below, if it was the right way up of course.
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Selective Quoting Distortion
Quote:
But it was not 'the industry' that paid those extended recovery costs. 'The industry' was getting a free ride on the taxpayers of the location of the crash. In the same way that MH370 searches are being largely funded by Australian taxpayers. endquote:
And you would be wrong on both counts.
While governments initially fund searches, in many cases (such as MH370) extended operating costs will be charged back to the airlines, which in turn pay the charges from their insurance policy.
In the case of MH370, Malaysia Airlines has a $2.25 billion per crash liability policy with no caps for Search and Rescue. The Australian government has already reached out to Malaysia to seek reimbursement from this insurance fund.
In the case of AF447, Air France and Airbus directly funded the search for the blackboxes.
More relevant to this case (in Indonesia), Adam Air directly paid for the search and recovery the Adam Air 574 black boxes.
No doubt similarly AirAsia (and their insurer) must absorb / reimburse a large portion of the SAR costs.
For more "routine" recovery operations, governments typically do not charge back the airlines, but that's because the airlines and flying public already pay billions in taxes each and every year for routine government services (which include SAR).
But it was not 'the industry' that paid those extended recovery costs. 'The industry' was getting a free ride on the taxpayers of the location of the crash. In the same way that MH370 searches are being largely funded by Australian taxpayers. endquote:
And you would be wrong on both counts.
While governments initially fund searches, in many cases (such as MH370) extended operating costs will be charged back to the airlines, which in turn pay the charges from their insurance policy.
In the case of MH370, Malaysia Airlines has a $2.25 billion per crash liability policy with no caps for Search and Rescue. The Australian government has already reached out to Malaysia to seek reimbursement from this insurance fund.
In the case of AF447, Air France and Airbus directly funded the search for the blackboxes.
More relevant to this case (in Indonesia), Adam Air directly paid for the search and recovery the Adam Air 574 black boxes.
No doubt similarly AirAsia (and their insurer) must absorb / reimburse a large portion of the SAR costs.
For more "routine" recovery operations, governments typically do not charge back the airlines, but that's because the airlines and flying public already pay billions in taxes each and every year for routine government services (which include SAR).
Your source states:
"By tradition, governments do not seek reimbursement from an airline for search-and-rescue costs. As a result, the airlines do not typically need to ask their insurers to cover these costs; the insurers cover only so-called commercial costs, though their contracts do allow governments to seek reimbursement."
Which I believe was largely what the first poster was trying to say, albeit he has turned out to be wrong in 2 specific cases.
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I would suggest that the ULBs requirements are:
Detection Range At least 25 nautical miles in open ocean
Battery Life At least 6 months, possibly by reducing number of pulses and using smart transponder that does not go into regular short location signals until it receives a search request sonar signal
Encoded Location Signals The signals from the ULBs should be encoded with airframe ID, their position (last GPS position of the aircraft) and their depth in the water.
These requirements appear to be asking too much and all that is being offered is a slightly longer life battery.
Well then you will need a unit that's about 4 times as large to give more power output and longivity. But 25NM range: dream on unless you're talking of equipment capable of transmitting to submarines which is massive i.e Rugby.
Detection Range At least 25 nautical miles in open ocean
Battery Life At least 6 months, possibly by reducing number of pulses and using smart transponder that does not go into regular short location signals until it receives a search request sonar signal
Encoded Location Signals The signals from the ULBs should be encoded with airframe ID, their position (last GPS position of the aircraft) and their depth in the water.
These requirements appear to be asking too much and all that is being offered is a slightly longer life battery.
Well then you will need a unit that's about 4 times as large to give more power output and longivity. But 25NM range: dream on unless you're talking of equipment capable of transmitting to submarines which is massive i.e Rugby.
Change the frequency - Remember this is not radio this is sonar a lower frequency in water has a lot more range.
Change the pulse recurrence frequency so that there is one pulse every minute or even every 3 minutes by charging a capacitor bank then discharge that for a greater power output
Encode the signal with the last position from the DFDR/GPS and the aircraft ID
None of these would necessarily require anything 'special' just a little bit of engineering thought. As I said in a previous post I am not alone in asking for this
BEA also put forward a request for this type of improvement (from the BEA report on search operations for AFR 447 http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....11.2012.en.pdf ):
B.3.1 Enhanced battery life
The use of ULB beacons with 90 days(14) autonomy would have made it possible to
extend the search for the ULB beacons in this vast area. The BEA recommended that
EASA and ICAO extend the regulatory transmission time of ULBs (from 30 to 90 days)
B.3.2 Additional ULB
Using beacons capable of transmitting on lower frequencies (for example between
8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) would have facilitated the detection of the wreckage. Indeed,
military resources, typically deployed in the early days to take part in SAR operations,
are equipped with sonar suited to the detection of low frequency signals, and
in addition the use of lower frequencies increases the detection distance. The
BEA has recommended that EASA and ICAO make it mandatory for aeroplanes
performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with a lowfrequency
beacon.
The use of ULB beacons with 90 days(14) autonomy would have made it possible to
extend the search for the ULB beacons in this vast area. The BEA recommended that
EASA and ICAO extend the regulatory transmission time of ULBs (from 30 to 90 days)
B.3.2 Additional ULB
Using beacons capable of transmitting on lower frequencies (for example between
8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) would have facilitated the detection of the wreckage. Indeed,
military resources, typically deployed in the early days to take part in SAR operations,
are equipped with sonar suited to the detection of low frequency signals, and
in addition the use of lower frequencies increases the detection distance. The
BEA has recommended that EASA and ICAO make it mandatory for aeroplanes
performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with a lowfrequency
beacon.
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Bud leon
Agree totally! Especially about AF447 - always thought it was a strange concept in design to have no synchronous control stick feedback between pilots! Technology and flight envelope has been progressing at a staggering rate over the last century, but the interface to technology will never be a panacea on the assumption that the aircraft is operated within a flight envelope that it was not capable of. My point being - flight into an active tropical TC (or extreme weather) would hardly be considered 'safe' in terms of historic accident statistical analysis. Simply put, an executive decision to turn back based on refused clearance to alter FL would have been all that was needed to avert mass loss of life given the current synopsis.
Agree totally! Especially about AF447 - always thought it was a strange concept in design to have no synchronous control stick feedback between pilots! Technology and flight envelope has been progressing at a staggering rate over the last century, but the interface to technology will never be a panacea on the assumption that the aircraft is operated within a flight envelope that it was not capable of. My point being - flight into an active tropical TC (or extreme weather) would hardly be considered 'safe' in terms of historic accident statistical analysis. Simply put, an executive decision to turn back based on refused clearance to alter FL would have been all that was needed to avert mass loss of life given the current synopsis.
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Blackbox in the wrong direction?
Blackbox in the wrong direction?
Steve Herman
@W7VOA
5 minutes ago
MT @ChiefofNavy: #QZ8501: Black Box localised 0.5nm E of tail. Confirmed by the 3 searching vessels. Divers are verifying finding.
https://twitter.com/W7VOA/status/554225160148901888
Steve Herman
@W7VOA
5 minutes ago
MT @ChiefofNavy: #QZ8501: Black Box localised 0.5nm E of tail. Confirmed by the 3 searching vessels. Divers are verifying finding.
https://twitter.com/W7VOA/status/554225160148901888
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Qatar pushes for live aircraft data streaming | Avionics content from ATWOnline
...and more to come most likely...
...and more to come most likely...
From the article:
Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker said the carrier is trialing the use of constant data uploads from flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, aka black boxes, of its aircraft.
Speaking at the recent customer launch of the first Airbus A350, Al Baker said, “We want to … introduce full-time black box data uploads across all our aircraft,” he said, adding that the airline’s management was convinced it should be a mandatory technology across all IATA-compliant carriers.
Speaking at the recent customer launch of the first Airbus A350, Al Baker said, “We want to … introduce full-time black box data uploads across all our aircraft,” he said, adding that the airline’s management was convinced it should be a mandatory technology across all IATA-compliant carriers.
This could be an embarrassment to the aviation industry bureaucrats who no doubt had whole sets of technical interchange meetings in a 'roadmap' running to 2030 to discuss 'feasibility', 'nascent standards' and 'rule making' - and an airline is actually doing it already!
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davionics
Well we have to wait for the incident investigation to get to the point at which a reasonable understanding of causes is achieved. But there seem to be practices in the aviation industry which would not currently be considered acceptable in other industries. In most industries contemporary safety management supports decisions to stop operations when risks might possibly be entering into uncontrollable territory. The rights of individuals to declare an unsafe situation are sacrosanct. The safety of everyone is the first priority. Training and competencies are top priorities. Technology providers actively seek to eliminate interface deficiencies (as a safety progressional I see obvious interface errors in aspects of glass cockpits and it's time pilots stopped defending their favourite aircraft's flaws).
In any other industry the public would challenge an operator's public licence to operate. The aviation industry does not seem to be exposed to that level of stakeholder pressure. The aviation industry seems to be falling behind the current safety state of the art.
All of the Sopwith Camel ace pilot dialogue is old fashioned and should not enter the debate. The (mainly laughable) perceptions of Asian cultural elements should not dominate the debate.
if this incident turns out to be obviously avoidable, the airline industry should embrace this incident as an opportunity to be leaders in safety again.
Agree totally! Especially about AF447 - always thought it was a strange concept in design to have no synchronous control stick feedback between pilots! Technology and flight envelope has been progressing at a staggering rate over the last century, but the interface to technology will never be a panacea on the assumption that the aircraft is operated within a flight envelope that it was not capable of. My point being - flight into an active tropical TC (or extreme weather) would hardly be considered 'safe' in terms of historic accident statistical analysis. Simply put, an executive decision to turn back based on refused clearance to alter FL would have been all that was needed to avert mass loss of life given the current synopsis.
In any other industry the public would challenge an operator's public licence to operate. The aviation industry does not seem to be exposed to that level of stakeholder pressure. The aviation industry seems to be falling behind the current safety state of the art.
All of the Sopwith Camel ace pilot dialogue is old fashioned and should not enter the debate. The (mainly laughable) perceptions of Asian cultural elements should not dominate the debate.
if this incident turns out to be obviously avoidable, the airline industry should embrace this incident as an opportunity to be leaders in safety again.
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Technology and flight envelope has been progressing at a staggering rate over the last century, but the interface to technology will never be a panacea on the assumption that the aircraft is operated within a flight envelope that it was not capable of. My point being - flight into an active tropical TC (or extreme weather) would hardly be considered 'safe' in terms of historic accident statistical analysis. Simply put, an executive decision to turn back based on refused clearance to alter FL would have been all that was needed to avert mass loss of life given the current synopsis.
Yet all those flights were picking their way through the ITCZ and it was likely to be necessary for flight crews to dodge and dart their way round CBs. This was not a zone where crews could stick dutifully to assigned flight levels.
Wouldn't it therefore be sensible for ATC to space the flights out, to give crews adequate room to get out of trouble quickly without worrying too much about asking permission? Shouldn't that be a sensible precaution when crossing the ITCZ in any part of the world?
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I don't think that Qatar's idea of recording cockpit voices then saving in a company controlled data centre is really going to do much other than get more pilots fired. Not hard in today's world of big data to scan everything flight conversation.
It's the beginning of the end IMHO.
It's the beginning of the end IMHO.
Anyway - welcome to the world of continuous open mike recording with remote supervisor watchers and listeners and instant replay that ATC has had for decades. So controllers never know when all their actions and talk are being watched/listened to by their supervisors.
Sorry, but the world doesn't work that way. Safety is always a tradeoff against cost.
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The Straits Times reports:
PANGKALAN BUN/JAKARTA (Reuters) - Indonesian search teams believe they have found the fuselage of an AirAsia airliner that crashed in the Java Sea two weeks ago, and divers hope calmer waters on Monday will allow them to retrieve the black box flight recorders.
Searchers have also been hearing pings, believed to be from the aircraft's two black boxes near where the tail of the Airbus A320-200 aircraft tail was raised on Saturday.
Supriyadi, operations coordinator for the National Search and Rescue Agency, said on Sunday a sonar scan had revealed an object measuring 10 meters by four meters by 2.5 meters on the sea floor.
"They suspect it is the body of the plane. There is a big possibility that the black box is near the body of the plane," Supriyadi told Reuters in the town of Pangkalan Bun, the base for the search effort on Borneo.
"If it is the body of the plane then we will first evacuate the victims. Secondly we will search for the black box.” Strong winds, currents and high waves have been hampering efforts to reach other large pieces of suspected wreckage detected by sonar on the sea floor. Three vessels involved in the search have detected pings about 4 km (two miles) from where the plane's tail was raised on Saturday, in water about 30 meters (yards) deep.
"Three ships have (recorded) the pings so we can confirm the coordinates of the location of the black box," Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee investigator Santoso Sayogo told Reuters.
If weather conditions are conducive, "hopefully they will recover the black box tomorrow morning," Santoso said. "The coordinates show the bottom of the sea (in that location) is sand so the divers should easily be able to see it."
If and when the recorders are found and taken to the capital, Jakarta, for analysis, it could take up to two weeks to download data, investigators said, although the information could be accessed in as little as two days if the devices are not badly damaged.
Searchers have also been hearing pings, believed to be from the aircraft's two black boxes near where the tail of the Airbus A320-200 aircraft tail was raised on Saturday.
Supriyadi, operations coordinator for the National Search and Rescue Agency, said on Sunday a sonar scan had revealed an object measuring 10 meters by four meters by 2.5 meters on the sea floor.
"They suspect it is the body of the plane. There is a big possibility that the black box is near the body of the plane," Supriyadi told Reuters in the town of Pangkalan Bun, the base for the search effort on Borneo.
"If it is the body of the plane then we will first evacuate the victims. Secondly we will search for the black box.” Strong winds, currents and high waves have been hampering efforts to reach other large pieces of suspected wreckage detected by sonar on the sea floor. Three vessels involved in the search have detected pings about 4 km (two miles) from where the plane's tail was raised on Saturday, in water about 30 meters (yards) deep.
"Three ships have (recorded) the pings so we can confirm the coordinates of the location of the black box," Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee investigator Santoso Sayogo told Reuters.
If weather conditions are conducive, "hopefully they will recover the black box tomorrow morning," Santoso said. "The coordinates show the bottom of the sea (in that location) is sand so the divers should easily be able to see it."
If and when the recorders are found and taken to the capital, Jakarta, for analysis, it could take up to two weeks to download data, investigators said, although the information could be accessed in as little as two days if the devices are not badly damaged.
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This triggers a question in my mind. The airways over the Java Sea were very busy that day, as presumably is the case most days. QZ8501 was at FL320 because there was so much other traffic, both behind and crossing, at higher altitudes. The flight in front and the one following were both closer than the required separation distance at the same altitude.
Yet all those flights were picking their way through the ITCZ and it was likely to be necessary for flight crews to dodge and dart their way round CBs. This was not a zone where crews could stick dutifully to assigned flight levels.
Wouldn't it therefore be sensible for ATC to space the flights out, to give crews adequate room to get out of trouble quickly without worrying too much about asking permission? Shouldn't that be a sensible precaution when crossing the ITCZ in any part of the world?
Yet all those flights were picking their way through the ITCZ and it was likely to be necessary for flight crews to dodge and dart their way round CBs. This was not a zone where crews could stick dutifully to assigned flight levels.
Wouldn't it therefore be sensible for ATC to space the flights out, to give crews adequate room to get out of trouble quickly without worrying too much about asking permission? Shouldn't that be a sensible precaution when crossing the ITCZ in any part of the world?
In areas subject to large numbers of convective storms (called by some controllers 'popcorn thundershowers') Flow management may put significant limits on the number of aircraft allowed through the airspace. In areas where aircraft are confined to fixed air routes the flow managers will normally put on an extended 'Miles In Trail' limit to reduce the numbers of aircraft. Controllers in sectors that start becoming difficult to work will give the surrounding sectors a maximum number of aircraft they can accept in a time period - to reduce workload and make working the aircraft in their sector safer.
It will vary by control unit, but it is not uncommon to have the pilot and controller working together with their different weather sensors to negotiate a safe track for the aircraft. This takes time and at sector boundaries the controller has to liaise continually with the neighboring sector(s) at every change in level or track. Inevitably this has a knock-on effect and flow restrictions are imposed on aircraft outside those sectors or centers, often leading to extended ground holds.
There are systems in place such as 'Collaborative Trajectory Options' where airlines can put in a prioritized list of potential tracks and profiles (trajectories) for their flight, and the flow managers clear the flight onto the trajectory that will get the least delay. Future Concepts of Operations will allow even more flexibility to avoid weather. However, on short flights such as this AirAsia flight there are not really a lot of options and the ITCZ goes all around the equator, you have to cross it somewhere.