Thomas cook b757 incident, what a total mess
Capt Bloggs:
Having just re-read the AAIB report for the third time, I note on Page 62 it states:
"A section of the OM concerning emergencies after V1 stated that the PF should be responsible for radio communication when the PM was carrying out QRH drills. This division of tasks was not explicitly associated with any other procedure."
Perhaps it should?
dash 6:
In your posting #43 you are basically asking how us TRI/TREs are feeling now?
Let me give you a history lesson. In the old days, it was called the Base Check and Instrument Rating. The CAA required that you hand-flew all of the exercises (V1 Cut, NDB Hold, Engine-out ILS to minima, G/A, NPA which was usually an NDB followed by a Circling Approach to Land).
The only time that the autopilot was available was while you conducted a briefing and for obvious exercises like Cat II or Cat III.
The whole plot was changed with the introduction of JARs whereupon the automatics were available for every exercise except for one hand flown ILS and G/A with an engine out.
As a TRI/TRE I found this quite restricting in my ability to examine.
I always thought that the old CAA Base Check/IR was a bit like the Seven Labours of Hercules but the new regime, in my opinion, was far too lax and seemed to me to be a recipe for concealing weaknesses that could have been put right with proper instruction and further training.
Quite frankly, I find this incident extremely worrying and I find it extremely hard to believe. The whole bloody scenario was self-inflicted and got close to a disaster.
Somewhere, somehow the regulatory authorities have to get a grip on the situation. I still find it impossible to understand how AF447 happened nor do I even begin to understand how you can stuff a perfectly serviceable B777 into the seawall at SFO in CAVOK conditions.
You must understand that the TRI/TREs are hog-bound by the CAA/JAR/EASA into what they are allowed to do in teaching/examining.
How many of you out there could honestly tell me that you could pass an old-fashioned CAA Base Check/IR?
By the way, I actually think that LOFT when properly used is invaluable.
Having just re-read the AAIB report for the third time, I note on Page 62 it states:
"A section of the OM concerning emergencies after V1 stated that the PF should be responsible for radio communication when the PM was carrying out QRH drills. This division of tasks was not explicitly associated with any other procedure."
Perhaps it should?
dash 6:
In your posting #43 you are basically asking how us TRI/TREs are feeling now?
Let me give you a history lesson. In the old days, it was called the Base Check and Instrument Rating. The CAA required that you hand-flew all of the exercises (V1 Cut, NDB Hold, Engine-out ILS to minima, G/A, NPA which was usually an NDB followed by a Circling Approach to Land).
The only time that the autopilot was available was while you conducted a briefing and for obvious exercises like Cat II or Cat III.
The whole plot was changed with the introduction of JARs whereupon the automatics were available for every exercise except for one hand flown ILS and G/A with an engine out.
As a TRI/TRE I found this quite restricting in my ability to examine.
I always thought that the old CAA Base Check/IR was a bit like the Seven Labours of Hercules but the new regime, in my opinion, was far too lax and seemed to me to be a recipe for concealing weaknesses that could have been put right with proper instruction and further training.
Quite frankly, I find this incident extremely worrying and I find it extremely hard to believe. The whole bloody scenario was self-inflicted and got close to a disaster.
Somewhere, somehow the regulatory authorities have to get a grip on the situation. I still find it impossible to understand how AF447 happened nor do I even begin to understand how you can stuff a perfectly serviceable B777 into the seawall at SFO in CAVOK conditions.
You must understand that the TRI/TREs are hog-bound by the CAA/JAR/EASA into what they are allowed to do in teaching/examining.
How many of you out there could honestly tell me that you could pass an old-fashioned CAA Base Check/IR?
By the way, I actually think that LOFT when properly used is invaluable.
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JW411,
I disagree.
The incident under discussion did not occur due to a lack of hand flying skills. If anything the mishandling of the missed approach was caused by a lack of familiarity of how to use the automatics. The captain could have hand flown every exercise in every sim check for his whole career but that would not have prevented this incident.
At my airline we are encouraged to use the automatics as much as possible in any non-normal situation to free up capacity to manage the event and make the important decisions.
As others have already mentioned, the problem here was attributable to a lack of training/practice in a basic procedure i.e. 2 engine go around. Added to a certain amount of home base complaincency / lack of rigour (and what pilot can hand on heart say they have not been guilty of that from time to time).
I disagree.
The incident under discussion did not occur due to a lack of hand flying skills. If anything the mishandling of the missed approach was caused by a lack of familiarity of how to use the automatics. The captain could have hand flown every exercise in every sim check for his whole career but that would not have prevented this incident.
At my airline we are encouraged to use the automatics as much as possible in any non-normal situation to free up capacity to manage the event and make the important decisions.
As others have already mentioned, the problem here was attributable to a lack of training/practice in a basic procedure i.e. 2 engine go around. Added to a certain amount of home base complaincency / lack of rigour (and what pilot can hand on heart say they have not been guilty of that from time to time).
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From an ATC point every time I've informed the following aircraft that the landing a/c may have hit a bird they have elected to put it down. At least give them the option. A mandatory go around seems a bit extreme.
there is an alt button on the A380 FCU
It is impossible to make sweeping statements about the fit of an Airbus autoflight system as there are now so many differences available to operators.The EXP feature is surpressed in many of the newer ones and the performance of the Push to Level Off feature of the Vertical Speed mode has led to problems in the past. My operator does not approve of its use.
Airbus now say on their Golden Rules card that if the automation is not behaving as expected do something about it, but working out what is wrong and then finding a correction can be difficult when tired.
It is quite easy to slip into former habits and behaviours in stressful situations and revert to inapproriate actions.
This was an early morning long duty. There is no mention in the report what time the pilots had awoken or how much sleep they had . I always find the first early morning difficult as your body does not want to go to bed early or be woken up when it really wants to be asleep. This,associated with the pressures the Captain had been experiencing due to the company restructure probably meant that he had less than a few hours of restful sleep. I have heard of pilots finding sleep very difficult in similar situations as they struggle to comprehend how they will deal with the sudden loss in pay and the inevitable changes in lifestyle for themselves and their families.As this sort of company reorganisation seems to be spreading across the industry in the UK I believe that there will be a lot of pilots who will empathise with this pilots predicament.
Airbus now say on their Golden Rules card that if the automation is not behaving as expected do something about it, but working out what is wrong and then finding a correction can be difficult when tired.
It is quite easy to slip into former habits and behaviours in stressful situations and revert to inapproriate actions.
This was an early morning long duty. There is no mention in the report what time the pilots had awoken or how much sleep they had . I always find the first early morning difficult as your body does not want to go to bed early or be woken up when it really wants to be asleep. This,associated with the pressures the Captain had been experiencing due to the company restructure probably meant that he had less than a few hours of restful sleep. I have heard of pilots finding sleep very difficult in similar situations as they struggle to comprehend how they will deal with the sudden loss in pay and the inevitable changes in lifestyle for themselves and their families.As this sort of company reorganisation seems to be spreading across the industry in the UK I believe that there will be a lot of pilots who will empathise with this pilots predicament.
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JW411. Thanks for the "history lesson" I was part of that history.I simply ask if any trainers think some of the simulator time could have been better utilised? And yes,"extra time" practice has been offered under assessment in one of my previous airlines,resulting in termination of training and early arrival at the bar.
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Two engine go around 101: Use one hand to Push and hold the thrust levers 3/4 of the way forward and use the other hand to pull and hold a pitch of 15 degrees.
Doesn't matter if it's a 747, A320, 737, 787, DHC8 or a 757 it works in all of them regardless of what modes/automation is engaged.
This didn't happen because of lack of training on aircraft type. This happened because of a lack of basic flying ability & airmanship
Doesn't matter if it's a 747, A320, 737, 787, DHC8 or a 757 it works in all of them regardless of what modes/automation is engaged.
This didn't happen because of lack of training on aircraft type. This happened because of a lack of basic flying ability & airmanship
...... had been experiencing due to the company restructure probably meant that he had less than a few hours of restful sleep. I have heard of pilots finding sleep very difficult in similar situations as they struggle to comprehend how they will deal with the sudden loss in pay and the inevitable changes in lifestyle for themselves and their families.
I'm not a pilot but have been through this restructure>change>relocation>poss job loss scenario several times. Even at an age and in a system where redundancy is a damn good deal I had plenty mornings of waking two or three hours early in a mental flat spin.
Being in same scenario at a time of life when mortgage and kid's education predominate AND early starts AND others lives depending on alertness puts my problem in perspective.
Last edited by Airbanda; 13th Oct 2014 at 06:46. Reason: syntax
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"This didn't happen because of lack of training on aircraft type. This happened because of a lack of basic flying ability & airmanship"
AAIB should add that to it's final report.
AAIB should add that to it's final report.
The incident under discussion did not occur due to a lack of hand flying skills.
This is where manual flying skills come into play rapidly. Instead there were several attempts to get the automatic pilot engaged. Automation dependence strikes again. Why the blinding haste to re-engage the automatics? The real reason was lack of confidence in his own manual flying ability caused by years of automation dependence. It doesn't matter how expert a pilot is in the understanding and use of the automatics, it still takes a finite time for the automatics and thus the aircraft to react.
Often in the simulator we see pilots pressing the TOGA button and getting flustered if for some reason the thrust levers do not go forward. So what happens - well they keep on feverishly hitting the TOGA switch hoping a miracle will happen and the throttles will go up. In the meantime the airspeed steadily reduces...
How many times do we see in the simulator an instructor who demonstrates - repeat - demonstrates, how to seamlessly switch from an automatics type instrument approach to a manual approach with just three clicks of the AP, AT, turn off the FD and complete the approach manually. This should be normal competency. But it rarely happens because instructor demonstrations are a thing of the past. And more probably because the instructor himself lacks the skill or currency to do the demonstration. Yet the very basics of instructing include first demonstrate.
always thought that the old CAA Base Check/IR was a bit like the Seven Labours of Hercules but the new regime, in my opinion, was far too lax and seemed to me to be a recipe for concealing weaknesses that could have been put right with proper instruction and further training.
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Eckhard..I suspect you are referring to the "alt hold button"?..equivalent of "push to level" on the Airbus...by pushing in the VS/FPA selector
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Crikey,
I'm astounded at the number of people trying to mitigate what a total cluster this was. Yes, I know that its fashionable in aviation not to point fingers and apportion blame. I also know that we need not throw stones, willy-nilly, for 'it could happen to you' when circumstances conspire to paint you into a corner.
However, this was not being painted into a corner. This was a two-engined go-around. A beautifully simple operation in a Boeing. It is akin to being unable to do other very basic manoeuvres, such as landings, steep turns, etc.
Absolute lunacy that leeway is given over creating such a mess over something so simple. I appreciate that external factors may be impinging his critical thinking abilities, but the captain must have been legally unfit for duty sometime before such effects impinged upon his abilities to perform a go-around, and cause an emergency situation, whilst damaging an aircraft.
I'm astounded at the number of people trying to mitigate what a total cluster this was. Yes, I know that its fashionable in aviation not to point fingers and apportion blame. I also know that we need not throw stones, willy-nilly, for 'it could happen to you' when circumstances conspire to paint you into a corner.
However, this was not being painted into a corner. This was a two-engined go-around. A beautifully simple operation in a Boeing. It is akin to being unable to do other very basic manoeuvres, such as landings, steep turns, etc.
Absolute lunacy that leeway is given over creating such a mess over something so simple. I appreciate that external factors may be impinging his critical thinking abilities, but the captain must have been legally unfit for duty sometime before such effects impinged upon his abilities to perform a go-around, and cause an emergency situation, whilst damaging an aircraft.
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Absolute lunacy that leeway is given over creating such a mess over something so simple.
Add limited fuel to put the pressure on, and you will find it hard to take a step back to catch your breath.
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That's true enough, we all know it, but there isn't much you can do with that information - except, topically, recognising that what you're after is THR/TOGA/TOGA, and not *blank/LOC/GS. Or else, things will go tits up, quickly.
The fuel concern came about due to the ineptitude of the crew. One could have argued that pointing your nose at an alternate and getting there ASAP was handling the fuel situation well, until you then cringe as you read further, whereby it is stated that NCL is long enough for a flapless approach.
How do you not know this about your home field?
I'm not disagreeing with what you say, Mana; but I'm afraid that it's hard to mitigate why this guy was near a commercial airliner when his mind is in such a state that he was unable to execute a MAP, nor correct his errors in a timely manner.
The fuel concern came about due to the ineptitude of the crew. One could have argued that pointing your nose at an alternate and getting there ASAP was handling the fuel situation well, until you then cringe as you read further, whereby it is stated that NCL is long enough for a flapless approach.
How do you not know this about your home field?
I'm not disagreeing with what you say, Mana; but I'm afraid that it's hard to mitigate why this guy was near a commercial airliner when his mind is in such a state that he was unable to execute a MAP, nor correct his errors in a timely manner.
but I'm afraid that it's hard to mitigate why this guy was near a commercial airliner when his mind is in such a state that he was unable to execute a MAP, nor correct his errors in a timely manner.
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Boeing's aren't that tough if you get automation confusion. You can hand fly it very easily and very quickly. If you desire to get back onto automation it is also easily accomplished no matter how screwed up the level of automation(FMA displays) is -
click, click = A/P OFF, A/T's OFF.
FD's - both OFF
FD's - both ON
You're in basic automation level. If you can't figure THIS situation out you have no business being in the cockpit -
Select roll and pitch mode as desired. Since you've been screwed up maybe
HDG - select
and
V/S - 1000' would be simplest.
A/T's - Speed
Obviously verifying the FMA's to see that the automation is actually delivering the desired thrust/roll/pitch mode.
click, click = A/P OFF, A/T's OFF.
FD's - both OFF
FD's - both ON
You're in basic automation level. If you can't figure THIS situation out you have no business being in the cockpit -
Select roll and pitch mode as desired. Since you've been screwed up maybe
HDG - select
and
V/S - 1000' would be simplest.
A/T's - Speed
Obviously verifying the FMA's to see that the automation is actually delivering the desired thrust/roll/pitch mode.