JetBlue return, evac
Join Date: Aug 2002
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Oxygen masks deploy automatically when airplane is above 10,000 feet more or less
It's very unlikely that they had an engine fire/overheat/smoke and a cabin decompression at the same time. This has never happened so far I know. It's physically not very likely, because if air is being blown overboard, smoke is less likely to happen.
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Please take a look in this accident report at the possible cuase for fatalities. Note it was a an engine fire on ground!
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The cause of the accident was an uncontained failure of the left engine, initiated by a failure of the No 9 combustor can which had been the subject of a repair. A section of the combustor can, which was ejected forcibly from the engine, struck and fractured an underwing fuel tank access panel. The fire which resulted developed catastrophically, primarily because of adverse orientation of the parked aircraft relative to the wind, even though the wind was light. Major contributory factors were the vulnerability of the wing tank access panels to impact, a lack of any effective provision for fighting major fires inside the aircraft cabin, the vulnerability of the aircraft hull to external fire and the extremely toxic nature of the emissions from the burning interior materials. The major cause of the fatalities was rapid incapacitation due to the inhalation of the dense toxic/irritant smoke atmosphere within the cabin, aggravated by evacuation delays caused by a forward right door malfunction and restricted access to the exits.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The cause of the accident was an uncontained failure of the left engine, initiated by a failure of the No 9 combustor can which had been the subject of a repair. A section of the combustor can, which was ejected forcibly from the engine, struck and fractured an underwing fuel tank access panel. The fire which resulted developed catastrophically, primarily because of adverse orientation of the parked aircraft relative to the wind, even though the wind was light. Major contributory factors were the vulnerability of the wing tank access panels to impact, a lack of any effective provision for fighting major fires inside the aircraft cabin, the vulnerability of the aircraft hull to external fire and the extremely toxic nature of the emissions from the burning interior materials. The major cause of the fatalities was rapid incapacitation due to the inhalation of the dense toxic/irritant smoke atmosphere within the cabin, aggravated by evacuation delays caused by a forward right door malfunction and restricted access to the exits.
Join Date: May 2000
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A couple of points...
The triple chime that repeats about every 30 seconds is likely the Lav Smoke Detector Alert and not the cockpit-to-cabin call. Note that it sounds on a regular cycle, including during the flare.
There was a possible turbine burst - based on the reports that schrapnel hit the fuselage and cowling parts were found on the ground. I did hear internally that a fuel line burst or was cut, causing the fire to take longer than expected to extinguish. In my opinion, this alone could have primed the Captain to tell the flight attendants to prep for possible evacuation. Add in the smoke in the cabin and I can understand the Evac mindset during the 13 minute flight. A lot was happening in a short time.
Once on the ground, the PAs don't seem to match what was being told to ATC. This is a head-scratcher. There is clearly a PA telling the flight attendants to take their stations, then the Easy Victor call. (That's our EVAC command and we all know it's archaic and confusing.) Once started, it's extremely difficult to stop an evacuation. Based on the selfie-video, I don't see any evidence that the passengers were panicking or opened an exit before the Easy Victor call.
All in all, kudos for the crew for getting on the ground quickly. The NTSB and FAA will have a field day with the video evidence of how effective the company procedures are.
Personally, I am quite unhappy with seeing the passenger response and lack of true command of the cabin. Seeing the lack of reaction from the passengers as they were more concerned with turning on their cellphones and taking videos tells me that we need to adjust our culture and make sure there is no ambiguity when the Evac decision is made.
The triple chime that repeats about every 30 seconds is likely the Lav Smoke Detector Alert and not the cockpit-to-cabin call. Note that it sounds on a regular cycle, including during the flare.
There was a possible turbine burst - based on the reports that schrapnel hit the fuselage and cowling parts were found on the ground. I did hear internally that a fuel line burst or was cut, causing the fire to take longer than expected to extinguish. In my opinion, this alone could have primed the Captain to tell the flight attendants to prep for possible evacuation. Add in the smoke in the cabin and I can understand the Evac mindset during the 13 minute flight. A lot was happening in a short time.
Once on the ground, the PAs don't seem to match what was being told to ATC. This is a head-scratcher. There is clearly a PA telling the flight attendants to take their stations, then the Easy Victor call. (That's our EVAC command and we all know it's archaic and confusing.) Once started, it's extremely difficult to stop an evacuation. Based on the selfie-video, I don't see any evidence that the passengers were panicking or opened an exit before the Easy Victor call.
All in all, kudos for the crew for getting on the ground quickly. The NTSB and FAA will have a field day with the video evidence of how effective the company procedures are.
Personally, I am quite unhappy with seeing the passenger response and lack of true command of the cabin. Seeing the lack of reaction from the passengers as they were more concerned with turning on their cellphones and taking videos tells me that we need to adjust our culture and make sure there is no ambiguity when the Evac decision is made.
Join Date: Jan 2000
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Cabin crew could've been put on station after the stop completed.
Crew talking to ATC then advised that evacuation started.
Safest thing to do then is to avoid confusion and command the evacuation including the other items on its checklist.
Crew talking to ATC then advised that evacuation started.
Safest thing to do then is to avoid confusion and command the evacuation including the other items on its checklist.
Join Date: Feb 2005
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Deploying the mask, pilots must probable avoided pass affected by smoke. It was a very good decison.
Please take a look in this accident report at the possible cuase for fatalities. Note it was a an engine fire on ground!
Your understanding of how passenger oxygen systems work is wrong. The masks work similar to nasal tube systems. They simply add a small amount of oxygen to ambient air. They provide no protection in a smoke event and for that reason both Boeing and Airbus caution pilots not to deploy the system in the event of smoke in the cabin. The oxygen canisters also burn very hot and can generate a light smoke adding to confusion.
In this case the pilots did not deploy the masks. The flight attendants deployed them manually in the cabin. This suggests that Jet Blue's flight attendant training is lacking.
In this case the pilots did not deploy the masks. The flight attendants deployed them manually in the cabin. This suggests that Jet Blue's flight attendant training is lacking.
I don´t know the oxygen confirguration for the Jet Blue´s Airbus A320 but for the standard aircraft there is no Flight Attendant Oxygen manual release for the Oxygen passenger mask from their stations.
For dropping "manually" the cabin crew should use the "manual release tool" for each passenger row.
So for dropping all the mask at the same time there is only a switch at the cockpit or the automatic mode due to the loss of pressurization at 14,000 ft cabin preassure.
For dropping "manually" the cabin crew should use the "manual release tool" for each passenger row.
So for dropping all the mask at the same time there is only a switch at the cockpit or the automatic mode due to the loss of pressurization at 14,000 ft cabin preassure.
Join Date: Feb 2004
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I have no comments on whether the evacuation was necessary or not, but "a few bruises" and "flesh burns" are not the worst injuries you can sustain using slides. I've heard of spinal injuries (after faulty slide deployment) and broken limbs (in one case possibly caused by a person carrying something at the time).
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Absolutely, the slides must be used with much discretion. The CC is expecting direction from the cockpit so keeping them up to date on your situation and intentions is critical.
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and the cap was the bloke who opened an exit by himself.
For a lot of airlines these days there is no briefing at all, and the pictographic instructions just tell you, not to open the exit in case you can spot a fire outside.
So matter of fact that bloke may just have done what he was poorly instructed to do...
Must problably blowed out as a result of explosion.
But the report will clearly indicate the root course of the engine trouble, so no need for speculation.
Join Date: Dec 2006
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1. CRM seems to stop at the flight deck. Why is there no brief to the pax on what is going to happen and what they are meant to do immediately after landing - even if it is stay where you are until we tell you to do something. Why use 'secret' codes for evacuation - perhaps if pax were better briefed their response might be better. Even Sully's Hudson adventure was nearly screwed up by a pax opening a rear exit door unrequested flooding the rear cabin.
2. "instructions just tell you, not to open the exit in case you can spot a fire outside" There has been a recent tendency for cabin crew to tell pax to close the blinds before leaving the aircraft and for pax in window seats to close the blinds anyway to 'play' with various electronics. In an emergency these will be left down and after a crash that stresses the airframe the blinds may well be jammed shut - so it will not be possible to "spot a fire outside". Cabin crew turn off the lights before take off - they should also open all the binds before engine start until after takeoff and reopen any closed blinds before landing.
Not sure about the US, but in Oz we were instructed during the brief to tell them to only do so (window/self help exit) if they hear the command 'evacuate evacuate' and there is NOT an FA in the vicinity of the exits...
I always used to tell them what I wanted them to do if the exit was blocked/after exiting eg 'do not open the exit and do not let anyone else open unless it is safe' 'once you exit help the others away from the aircraft and upwind'
Ok maybe it was a bit more than required but it made me feel more comfortable and a number of them always commented 'I always wondered what you were supposed to do afterwards'
I always used to tell them what I wanted them to do if the exit was blocked/after exiting eg 'do not open the exit and do not let anyone else open unless it is safe' 'once you exit help the others away from the aircraft and upwind'
Ok maybe it was a bit more than required but it made me feel more comfortable and a number of them always commented 'I always wondered what you were supposed to do afterwards'
I am not sure Easy Victor is a secret code. At my airline it is a warning to the flight attendants that a evacuation may be needed. It is however not a evacuation order. If evacuation is needed the flight crew is supposed to make a clear PA to the flight attendants and passengers to evacuate the aircraft and include any needed instructions as to exits to use. I suspect the same is true at JB and easy victor is not a evac command.
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You are incorrect in your assumption. At JetBlue, there are three PAs to choose from after the brake is set after an RTO or Emergency Landing:
Remain Seated = do not evacuate.
Cabin Crew at Stations = evacuation possible, wait for command.
Easy Victor - Evacuate.
If it is decided that an evacuation is not warranted after the "cabin crew at stations" PA, then it will be followed by "remain seated."
At no point is there an actual "evacuate" PA given, just the coded PAs.
Remain Seated = do not evacuate.
Cabin Crew at Stations = evacuation possible, wait for command.
Easy Victor - Evacuate.
If it is decided that an evacuation is not warranted after the "cabin crew at stations" PA, then it will be followed by "remain seated."
At no point is there an actual "evacuate" PA given, just the coded PAs.